Rowe v. Baltimore Colts

Gilbert, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This is the case of the tackled tackle. It involves David Rowe, a defensive tackle for Baltimore Football, Inc., trading as the Baltimore Colts (Colts) who filed a claim with the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. Rowe asserted that he sustained a loss of the use of his right arm as a result of an accidental injury during a scrimmage 1 two days after an exhibition game with the Philadelphia Eagles.

The Commission found that Rowe had, indeed, suffered a compensable injury resulting in 40% loss of the use of his right arm with 30% being attributable to the injury incurred in the scrimmage. The Colts attempted to block Rowe’s recovery by appealing to the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. 2 Prior to trial, Rowe and the Colts each filed a motion for summary ⁵²⁸ judgment. The motions were denied by Judge Cullen H. Hormes. The case was tried by a jury, presided over by Judge Walter Haile.

The jury decided that Rowe did not incur an accidental injury within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Md. Ann. Code art. 101. Apparently believing he is the victim of an erroneous jury instruction, Rowe has appealed to this Court. He asks that we reverse the judgment of the circuit court that was entered on the jury’s verdict. —THE FACTS— The Colts played an exhibition game against the Philadelphia Eagles on Friday, August 17, 1979.

In the course of that game, Rowe "either tripped [or slipped] on the turf and came down on . .. [his] elbow. And ... [he] sustained an injury to . . . [his] elbow.” He was treated by the team trainer. Because the Colts had the next day off from practice, Rowe flew home. When he returned on the morning of the 19th 3 his elbow was swollen.

Rowe was sent to the team’s physician, where the elbow was aspirated. Rowe then returned to the practice field and joined the scrimmage. During that scrimmage, Rowe says he received the injury that led to this litigation. Rowe described the event in these words: "Well, in this practice, I was playing left defensive tackle that I had played for the whole time I was with the Colts, and also with the other pro teams.

And I took a play straight on, front. And whenever, as a football player, you’re told to take everything up in front of you, you accept blocks from the offense. You react to the blocks in front of you, and you move to where the ball is. And in this ⁵²⁹ play, I hit up into the guard, and the play was coming real — well, coming very close to me.

Ed Simonini who is our middle linebacker who’s a very tenacious person, and, well, we call him a big hitter. He came running forward. And in the process of trying to hit the ball player, he drove into the back of my arm. And I’ll be honest with you, I never experienced any pain like that in my life.

I played 20 years of football, and that was the most excruciating pain I ever had. And I immediately walked on over, and I told the trainer. And I’ve always prided myself on being a very physical person. I’m six eight, 280 pounds, and I never even — I rarely missed practice.

And it really, it really was quite an injury. ... Very rarely does a defensive lineman, contrary to what was said earlier, very rarely does a defensive lineman get hit in the back because the reaction time for the secondary linebacker is such that if the ball carrier — the ball carrier is already into the defensive line before the linebackers or the secondary can get to them. So very — I would say I wouldn’t think one out of a million hits would you take in the back. In fact, in twenty years of football, that’s the only time I can think back where I got speared from the back side.

I can’t think of another incident. That was what was so different about it, such a unique thing. It was just different.” (Emphasis supplied.) Rowe claims that the injury terminated his career as a professional football player. The Colts’ position was and is that the injury happened in the game with the Eagles and not during the practice.

The then Colt "Strength Coach,” Joseph Vitt, testified that there was no record of any injury to Rowe in the course of the practice on August 19, or 20, 1979. ⁵³⁰ The Issues In this Court, Rowe raises a number of contentions wherein he perceives that reversible error has been committed by either a hearing court or the trial court. Our review of the Rowe brief discloses five areas 4 he asks us to examine, namely: I. The hearing court erred in failing to grant Rowe’s summary judgment motion and, thereby, affirm the Workmen’s Compensation Commission.

II

The trial court erred in not directing a verdict in favor of Rowe.

III

Rowe was entitled to a judgment N.O.V. or a new trial.

IV

The trial judge erred in refusing to instruct the jury "that accidental injury includes an unusual event or occurrence.” V. Professional football players are entitled to full coverage under the Workmen’s Compensation Law. We shall answer each issue in the same order as Rowe has raised them, adding such additional facts as may be necessary for clarification. I. The Motion for Summary Judgment The Court of Appeals said in Metropolitan Mortgage Fund, Inc. v. Basiliko, 288 Md. 25, 29 , 415 A.2d 582 (1980), aff'g 44 Md. App. 158 , 407 A.2d 773 (1979) that: "[A]n appellate court should be loath indeed to overturn, ... [because perhaps the hearing court should have granted a summary judgment] a final ⁵³¹ judgment on the merits entered in favor of the party resisting the summary judgment motion. This is aptly demonstrated by the present case where, after a full evidentiary hearing, the court determined that respondents’ signatures to the guarantee agreements were not genuine.

To turn the tables in this manner would be nothing short of substituting a known unjust result for a known just one.. .. . .. [W]e now hold that a denial (as distinguished from a grant) of a summary judgment motion, as well as foregoing the ruling on such a motion either temporarily until later in the proceedings or for resolution by trial of the general issue, involves not only pure legal questions but also an exercise of discretion as to whether the decision should be postponed until it can be supported by a complete factual record; and we further hold that on appeal, absent clear abuse .. . the manner in which the discretion is exercised will not be disturbed.” As we see it, Rowe’s complaint about Judge Hormes’ failure to grant a summary judgment in Rowe’s favor has been answered by the clear holding of Metropolitan. Here, as there, "[to] turn the tables in this manner would be nothing short of substituting” a known just result for an unknown one. Judge Hormes expressly rejected Rowe’s motion because he was not convinced that the Commission correctly applied the law to the facts. We think that the judge did not abuse his discretion in deciding that the ultimate decision of for whom judgment was to be entered should await a complete factual presentation under proper jury instructions.

II

The Motions for Directed Verdicts Rowe asserts that the trial judge erred in refusing to grant a motion for a directed verdict made at the close of the Colts’ case and later upon the close of all the evidence. ⁵³² A directed verdict is never appropriate when there is any legally sufficient and relevant evidence, however slight, from which a rational mind can infer a fact, which if found to exist would preclude entry of judgment for the movant. Impala Platinum, Ltd. v. Impala Sales (U.S.A.), Inc., 283 Md. 296, 328-29 , 389 A.2d 887 (1978); Fowler v. Smith, 240 Md. 240, 246 , 213 A.2d 549 (1965); Brock v. Sorrell, 15 Md. App. 1, 6-7 , 288 A.2d 640 (1972). In considering whether to grant a directed verdict, the trial judge is required to view all admitted evidence and inferences rationally deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made. United Bank & Trust Co. of Maryland v. Schaeffer, 280 Md. 10, 12 , 370 A.2d 1138 (1977); Fowler v. Smith, 240 Md. at 247 ; City of Salisbury v. McCoy, 47 Md. App. 488, 491-92 , 424 A.2d 164 (1981); Beckner v. Chalkley, 19 Md. App. 239, 249 , 310 A.2d 569 (1973); Miller v. Michalek, 13 Md. App. 16, 17 , 281 A.2d 117, 118 (1971).

"Maryland,” as the Court of Appeals has had the opportunity to observe in Fowler v. Smith, 240 Md. at 246 , "has gone almost as far as any [other] jurisdiction that we know of in holding that meager evidence is sufficient to carry the case to the jury.” See also Brock v. Sorrell, 15 Md. App. at 6 . Unless the facts and circumstances permit the drawing of but one inference in regard to the issues, a directed verdict should not be granted. Snoots v. Demorest, 254 Md. 572 , 255 A.2d 12 (1969); Beckner v. Chalkley, 19 Md. App. at 249 . There was evidence in the instant case that a defensive lineman must "play [the game] with reckless abandon;” that "if you’re playing the game right you play with pain;” "you can expect impact injuries in football;” it is not a phenomenon for a defensive lineman to be struck from behind by the defensive linebacker and by the safety, who "are coming up from behind to make a tackle.” Such evidence generated a jury issue in the light of Rowe’s testimony that "very rarely does a defensive lineman get hit in the back.” We conclude that Judge Haile did not err in denying Rowe’s motions for a directed