Royster v. State

Orth, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. STATEMENT OF THE CASE On 28 June 1975 Samuel Lee Royster was issued a traffic citation. It charged that he “did unlawfully violate Article 66V2, § 11-902” by “driving while intoxicated.” Prior to trial in the District Court he demanded a jury trial, and the case was transferred to the Criminal Court of Baltimore. He was arraigned on 17 August 1975 and prayed a trial by jury.

Trial was set for 22 September. On that date the trial was postponed by “mutual agreement” and scheduled for 4 November. 1 The transcript of the proceedings shows what transpired when the case came on for trial: “MR. SALKIN [James Salkin, Esq. Assistant State’s Attorney]: At this time, Your Honor, the State will call the case of Samuel Royster as to driving while impaired, warrant number 47504115.

THE CLERK: Samuel Royster under warrant 47504115 the State of Maryland charges you with driving while impaired. ¹⁶¹ MR. SHERMAN [Robert Sherman, Esq., Defense Counsel]: The plea would be not guilty. The appearance of Robert Sherman entered. THE COURT: He is not entitled to a jury trial.

MR. SHERMAN: I understand that because the State is only calling B although there is an A charge in this case.” 2 The trial proceeded without a jury. The verdict of the court was guilty. 3 The sentence was 60 days in the Baltimore City Jail. Royster appealed.

ISSUE FOR DECISION Royster does not challenge the propriety of the State’s prosecuting him under § 11-902 (b). Section 16-104 of Art. 66V2 provides: “It shall be sufficient to charge any person with a violation of § 11-901 (reckless and negligent driving) and § 11-902 (driving while intoxicated, impaired or under the influence of drugs) and the court is empowered to make a finding under any subsection of either § 11-901 or § 11-902.” The citation charged him with violating § 11-902 without designating a subsection, although it expressed the charge as “driving while intoxicated.” See Insley v. State, 31 Md. App. 46 (1976). He claims that he was unconstitutionally denied a jury trial. He presents the contention by asking: “Is it a violation of due process of law to, in effect, deny a defendant a requested trial by jury by using the simple device of calling for trial a lesser included offense than that charged when said lesser offense carries a penalty not severe enough to warrant trial by jury?” ¹⁶² THE LAW Courts Art. § 4-301 vests exclusive original jurisdiction in the District Court over certain designated crimes including those in which a person at least 16 years old is charged with violation of the motor vehicle laws. 4 Section 4-302 sets out certain exceptions to this jurisdiction, including those in subsection (d) thereof, which provides: “Jury trial. — (1) The District Court is deprived of jurisdiction if a defendant is entitled to and demands a jury trial at any time prior to trial in the District Court.

(2) A defendant may demand a jury trial in a criminal case if the penalty for the offense with which he is charged permits imprisonment for a period in excess of three months; the state may not demand a jury trial.” Section 4-302 (e) provides, with certain exceptions not here applicable, that “... the District Court does not have jurisdiction of an offense or offenses otherwise within the District Court’s jurisdiction if a person is charged with an offense or offenses arising from the same circumstances but not within the District Court’s jurisdiction. In this case, the circuit court for the. county has exclusive original jurisdiction over all the offenses.” 5 Driving while intoxicated, proscribed by Art. 6672, § 11-902 (a) is punishable upon conviction by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by fine of not more than $1,000 or both. Art. 6672, § 17-101 (b) (i)'. Driving while ability is impaired by the consumption of alcohol, proscribed by Art. 6672, § 11-902 (b), is punishable upon conviction by imprisonment for not more than two months or a fine of not ¹⁶³ more than $500, or both.

Art. 66V2, § 17-101 (b) (ii). Because of the penalty authorized upon conviction