Ruckle v. State

⁵⁸² Henderson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant was indicted in 1957, jointly with one Davis and one Midgett, on a charge of kidnapping. He was also separately indicted for armed robbery. The three defendants were all tried together.

They were all convicted and Ruckle was sentenced to 15 years for kidnapping and 20 years for robbery, to run consecutively. He appealed, but later dismissed his appeal. Midgett appealed and secured a reversal on the ground that the trial court had improperly answered a question propounded by the jury out of the presence of the accused. Midgett v. State, 216 Md. 26 .

On March 9, 1959, Judge Allen granted a motion to dismiss the kidnapping indictment against Midgett. Both he and Ruckle were subsequently re-indicted, although it does not appear the old indictment or judgment against Ruckle was set aside at that time. After a retrial, Midgett was unsuccessful in a second appeal. Midgett v. State, 223 Md. 282 , cert. den. 365 U. S. 853 .

Meanwhile, Ruckle filed a petition for post conviction relief in which he was granted a new trial, on May 13, 1959, although he strenuously contended that he was entitled to a release and did not want a new trial. Leave to appeal was denied by this Court. Ruckle v. Warden, 220 Md. 683. On March 23, 1962, Ruckle was re-arraigned on the 1959 charge of kidnapping and the 1957 charge of robbery.

He was specifically asked if he wanted a new trial, and replied emphatically that he did not and would never agree to one. The verdicts in the 1957 cases were then re-entered and he was sentenced to the same terms of imprisonment as were originally imposed. He appeals here. The first contention is that because Ruckle filed a motion to quash the kidnapping indictment of 1959, he was entitled to a ruling thereon.

If he had been willing to accept a new trial, it may well be that he would have been entitled to insist that the trial court rule upon the validity of the new indictment. But since he declined to stand trial again on that or any other indictment, and the trial court simply re-entered the verdicts upon the 1957 indictments, he cannot be heard to complain of the insufficiency of the 1959 re-indictment for kidnapping. That ⁵⁸³ indictment is not before us on the present appeal, and we are not concerned with its sufficiency. The appellant