Rudo v. A. H. Bull Steamship Co.

URNER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The plaintiff, an American seaman, employed on the Arlyn, a steamship of American registry, was injured on a dock from which the ship was being supplied with coal. A pipe extending across the dock was struck and broken by a net load of the coal in bags, as it was being drawn by a fall connected with equipment on the vessel.’ ²⁸² The duty assigned to the plaintiff at the time of the accident was to unload bags of coal from a truck, and place them in the net attached to the fall. The injury to the plaintiff resulted from the burning effect of chemicals discharged from the broken pipe.) It is alleged in the declaration that the accident was caused by negligence of the defendant owners, through their officers, agents and servants, in the manner in which the hoisting operation was conducted.

The suit is specifically brought under section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act 1920 (U. S. Code, title 46, sec. 688 [46 U. S. Code Ann. sec. 688]), which provides: “Any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment may, at his election, maintain an action for damages at law, with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States modifying or extending the common law right or remedy in cases of personal injury to railway employees shall apply; and in case of the death of any seamai. as a result of any such personal injury the personal representative of such seaman may maintain an action for damages at law with the right of trial by jury, and in such action all statutes of the United States conferring or regulating the right of action for death in the case of railway employees shall be applicable. Jurisdiction in such action shall be under the court of the district in which the defendant employer resides or in which his principal office is located.” Prior to the enactment of that provision, a seaman’s redress, under the general,maritime law, for an injury received in the course of his employment, was limited usually to the recovery of wages and the expense of maintenance .and cure, unless the injury resulted from unseaworthiness or defective equipment of the ship. The Osceola, 189 U. S. 158 , 23 S. Ct. 483 , 47 L. Ed. 760 ; Chelentís v. Luckenbach S. S. Co., 247 U. S. 372 , 38 S. Ct. 501 62 L. Ed. 1171 ; Warner v. Goltra, 293 U. S. 155 , 55 S. Ct. 46 , 79 L. Ed. 8 . The quoted statute applies by reference the principles of the Federal Employer’s ²⁸³ Liability Act (45 U. S. Code Ann. secs. 51-59), affecting interstate railway employees, to the right of action accorded to seamen for personal injuries.

Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U. S. 375 , 44 S. Ct. 391, 394 , 68 L. Ed. 748 . In accordance with the rule of liability defined in that legislation, a seaman may recover from his employer for an injury suffered in the course of his duty as the result of negligence on the part of other members of the crew. The question raised by demurru to the declaration is whether such a right of recovery exists when, as in this instance, the accident occurred on a dock, which is an extension of the land. State Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Corporation, 259 U. S. 263 , 42 S. Ct. 473, 474 , 66 L. Ed. 933 ; Cleveland Term. & Valley R. Co. v. Cleveland S. S. Co., 208 U. S. 316 , 28 S. Ct. 414 , 52 L. Ed. 508 ; Atlantic Coast Shipping Co. v. Royster, 148 Md. 443, 446 , 129 A. 668 .

The lower court answered that question in the negative by sustaining the demurrer. As the ground of the ruling could not be obviated by amendment, a judgment was entered for the defendants, and from it the plaintiff has appealed. The theory, here advanced, that an injury to a seaman, while performing on land a service for his ship, is within the purview of section 33 of the Merchant Marine Act 1920, is contrary to the decisions rendered in the following cases: Todahl v. Sudden & Christenson (C. C. A.) 5 Fed. (2nd) 462; Esteves v. Lykes Bros. S. S. Co. (The Almeria Dykes) (C. C. A.) 74 Fed. (2nd) 364, 365; Hughes v. Alaska S. S. Co. (D. C.) 287 Fed. 427 ; Soper v. Hammond Lumber Co. (D. C.) 4 Fed. (2nd) 872; Thorpe v. State’s S. S. Co. (D. C.) 1930 A. M, C. 376; Lindh v. Booth Fisheries Co. (D. C.), 2 Fed. Supp. 19; Trillo v. Pacific S. S. Co. 1930 A. M. C. 923.

No opposing adjudication upon such an issue was cited. While we have not been referred to any decision of the Supreme Court of the United States upon the distinct question of law considered in those cases and presented on this appeal, there have been expressions by that court which appear to support the view that the Merchant Marine Act 1920 does ²⁸⁴ hot apply to land accidents. In Panama R. Co. v. Johnson, supra, the court said: “Rightly understood, the statute neither withdraws injuries to seamen from the reach and operation of the maritime law, nor enables the seamen to do so. On the contrary, it brings into that law new rules drawn from another system and extends to injured seamen a right to invoke, at their election, either the relief accorded by the old rules or that provided by the new rules.

The election is between alternatives accorded by the maritime law as modified, and not between that law and some non-maritime system. The source from which the new rules are drawn contributes nothing to their force in the field to which they are translated. In that field their strength and operation come altogether from their inclusion in the maritime law.” In State Industrial Commission v. Nordenholt Corporation, supra, it was said in the opinion: “When an employee working on board a vessel in navigable waters, sustains personal injuries there, and seeks damages from the employer, the applicable legal principles are very different from those which would control if he had been injured on land while unloading the vessel. In the former situation the liability of employer must be determined under the maritime law; in the latter, no general maritime rule prescribes the liability, and the local law has always been applied.; The liability of the