Ryon v. State

Orth, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. WONG SUN v. UNITED STATES On 14 January 1963 the Supreme Court of the United States decided Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 , 83 S. Ct. 407 . The Court pronounced the principles to be applied where the issue is whether statements and other evidence obtained after an illegal arrest or search should be excluded. “[F]ederal agents elicited an oral statement from defendant Toy after forcing entry at 6 a.m. into his laundry at the back of which he had his living quarters. The agents had followed Toy down the hall to the bedroom and there had placed him under arrest.* 1 * * * Toy’s statement, which bore upon his participation in the sale of narcotics, led the agents to question another person, Johnny Yee, who actually possessed narcotics.

Yee stated that heroin had been brought to him earlier by Toy and another Chinese known to him only as ‘Sea Dog’. Under questioning, Toy said that ‘Sea Dog’ was Wong Sun. Toy led agents to a multifamily dwelling where, he said, Wong Sun lived. Gaining admittance to the building through a bell and buzzer, the agents climbed the ⁶⁴ stairs and entered the apartment.

One went into the back room and brought Wong Sun out in handcuffs. After arraignment, Wong Sun was released on his own recognizance. Several days later, he returned voluntarily to give an unsigned confession. [The Supreme Court] ruled that Toy’s declarations and the contraband taken from Yee were the fruits of the agents’ illegal action and should not have been admitted as evidence against Toy. [371 U. S.] at 484-488, 83 S. Ct. at 416 . It held that the statement did not result from ‘an intervening independent act of a free will,’ and that it was not ‘sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion’ Id., at 486 , 83 S. Ct. at 416 .

With respect to Wong Sun’s confession, however, the Court held that in the light of his lawful arraignment and release on his own recognizance, and of his return voluntarily several days later to make the statement, the connection between his unlawful arrest and the statement had ‘become so attenuated as to dissipate the taint. Nardone v. United States, 308 U. S. 338, 341 , 60 S. Ct. 266 , 84 L. Ed. 307 .’ Id., at 491, 83 S. Ct. at 419 .” 2 The key to the holding in Wong Sun is in this statement by the Court, 371 U. S. at 487-488 , 83 S. Ct. at 417 : “ ‘We need not hold that all evidence is ‘fruit of the poisonous tree’ simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions of the police. Rather, the more apt question in such a case is ‘whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.’ Maguire, Evidence of Guilt, 221 (1959).’ ” The Court in Brown v. Illinois, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2259-2260 (1975), explained the Wong Sun holding: “The exclusionary rule thus was applied in Wong ⁶⁵ Sun primarily to protect Fourth Amendment rights. Protection of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was not the Court’s paramount concern there.

To the extent that the question whether Toy’s statement was voluntary was considered, it was only to judge whether it ‘was sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint of the unlawful invasion.’ 371 U.S. at 486 , 83 S. Ct. at 416 (emphasis added).” The Court in Wong Sun made clear that “verbal evidence which derives so immediately from an unlawful entry and an unauthorized arrest as the officers’ action in the present case is no less the ‘fruit’ of official illegality than the more common tangible fruits of the unwarranted intrusion. . . . Nor do the policies underlying the exclusionary rule invite any logical distinction between physical and verbal evidence. Either in terms of deterring lawless conduct by federal officers, ... or of closing the doors of the federal courts to any use of evidence unconstitutionally obtained, . . . the danger in relaxing the exclusionary rules in the case of verbal evidence would seem too great to warrant introducing such a distinction.” 371 U. S. at 485-486 . MIRANDA v. ARIZONA Wong Sun left the basic law relating to admissibility of confessions unchanged.

The question upon challenge of a confession was simply whether the statement offered was “voluntary”. In state cases the Supreme Court applied the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, examining the circumstances of interrogation to determine whether the processes were so unfair or unreasonable as to render a subsequent confession involuntary. See, e.g., Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503 (1963); Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U. S. 560 (1958); White v. Texas, 310 U. S. 530 (1940); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936). Where the State’s actions offended the standards of fundamental fairness under the Due Process Clause, the State was then deprived of the right to use the resulting confessions in ⁶⁶ court.

This traditional test of voluntariness was the rule of Maryland. “The basic standard governing the admissibility of extra-judicial statement is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the statement was voluntary.” Robinson v. State, 3 Md. App. 666, 671 (1968), citing Taylor v. State, 238 Md. 424 (1965) and McFadden v. State, 1 Md. App. 511 (1967). 3 It was not until the decision of the Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 , decided 13 June 1966, that the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, a privilege made applicable to the States in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U. S. 1 (1964), was seen as the principal protection for a person facing police interrogation. The Court in Miranda , for the first time, expressly declared that the Self-Incrimination Clause was applicable to state custodial interrogations, and that an accused’s statements might be excluded at trial despite their voluntary character under traditional principles. Michigan v. Tucker, 94 S. Ct. 2357, 2363 (1974). Miranda established a set of specific protective guidelines, commonly known as the Miranda rules or warnings.

In post -Miranda trials, where the State seeks to introduce a statement taken from an accused during custodial interrogation, it must, as part of its proof of voluntariness, affirmatively show that all the Miranda warnings required to be given were in fact given, and that the accused, in giving ⁶⁷ the statement, understood his rights and knowingly and intelligently waived them. MICHIGAN v. TUCKER The Supreme Court decided Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U. S. 433 on 10 June 1974. We know now, in the light of Tucker , that failure to give all the Miranda warnings does not necessarily abridge the privilege against self-incrimination. Tucker tells us, at 444, that the Court in Miranda “recognized that these procedural safeguards were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination was protected. . . .

The suggested safeguards were not intended to ‘create a constitutional straitjacket,’ [ 384 U. S., at 467 ], but rather to provide practical reinforcement for the right against compulsory self-incrimination.” Thus, evidence obtained without full compliance with the Miranda dictates is not, for that reason, always to be excluded. So, in Tucker , the failure to advise an accused during a custodial interrogation, held prior to the Miranda decision, of his right to appointed counsel, did not in the circumstances existent, infringe against the right against compulsory self-incrimination but only violated the prophylactic rules developed to protect that right. Therefore, the use of the testimony of a witness discovered by the police as a result of the accused’s statements did not violate any requirements under the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, relating to the adversary system. Prior to Tucker , in Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971), the Court held that a statement of the defendant himself, taken without informing him of his right of access to appointed counsel, could be used to impeach defendant’s direct testimony at trial.

Id., at 224 . 4 ⁶⁸ From Wong Sun through Tucker , the rule appeared to be that verbal evidence is not always to be excluded because it derived from an illegal detention (and thus resulted from an unreasonable search and seizure) or because it was obtained without full observance of the Miranda prophylactic safeguards.* *** 5 It is when the fruits of police misconduct actually infringe upon a defendant’s Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights that they must be suppressed. There were, to be sure, areas which required explication. In Morales v. New York, 396 U. S. 102, 105-106 (1969), the Court said: “In any event, in the absence of a record that squarely and necessarily presents the issue and fully illuminates the factual context in which the question arises, we choose not to grapple with the question of the legality of custodial questioning on less than probable cause for a full-fledged arrest.” 6 BROWN v. ILLINOIS Brown v. Illinois, 95 S. Ct. 2254 , decided 26 June 1975, was a case lying at the crossroads of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. The accused was arrested without probable cause and without a warrant.

He was given, in full, the Miranda warnings. Thereafter, while in custody, he made two inculpatory statements. It was because of the Court’s concern about the implication of its holding in Wong ⁶⁹ Sun to the facts in Brown’s case, that it granted certiorari. The opinion of the Court 7 defined the issue thus, at 2256: “The issue is whether evidence of those statements was properly admitted, or should have been excluded, in petitioner’s subsequent trial for murder in state court.

Expressed another way, the issue is whether the statements were to be excluded as the fruit of the illegal arrest, or were admissible because the giving of the Miranda warnings sufficiently attenuated the taint of the arrest.” 8 The Illinois courts refrained from resolving the question, which the Supreme Court noted was as apt in the case before it as it was in Wong Sun , whether Brown’s statements were obtained by exploitation of the illegality of his arrest. Observing that Wong Sun preceded Miranda , the Court said that the Illinois courts “assumed that the Miranda warnings, by themselves, assured that the statements (verbal acts as contrasted with physical evidence) were of sufficient free will as to purge the primary taint of the unlawful arrest.” 95 S. Ct. at 2260 . The Court held that the statements were inadmissible. It emphasized that its holding was a limited one. “We decide only that the Illinois courts were in error in assuming that the Miranda warnings, by themselves, under Wong Sun always purge the taint of an illegal arrest.” Id., at 2262-2263.

But what it said in reaching the holding is of the utmost significance. The Court made clear that “exclusion of a confession made without Miranda warnings might be regarded as necessary to effectuate the Fifth Amendment, but it would not be sufficient fully to protect the Fourth. Miranda warnings, and the exclusion of a confession made without them, do not alone sufficiently deter a Fourth Amendment violation.” Id., ⁷⁰ at 2260-2261. Even if the statements were found to be voluntary under the Fifth Amendment, the Fourth Amendment issue may remain. “In order for the causal chain, between the illegal arrest and the statements made subsequent thereto to be broken, Wong Sun requires not merely that the statement meet the Fifth Amendment standard of voluntariness but that it be ‘sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.’ * * * Wong Sun thus mandates consideration of a statement’s admissibility in light of the distinct policies and interests of the Fourth Amendment.” Id., at 2261.

The Court went on to explain why the exclusionary rule would be substantially diluted if the Miranda warnings, by themselves, were held to attenuate the taint of an unconstitutional arrest, regardless of how wanton and purposeful the Fourth Amendment violation. It then rejected the per se rule the Illinois courts appeared to have accepted, but also declined to adopt any alternative per se or “but for” rule, id., at 2261: “The question whether a confession is the product of a free will under Wong Sun must be answered on the facts of each case. No single fact is dispositive. The workings of the human mind are too complex, and the possibilities of misconduct too diverse, to permit protection of the Fourth Amendment to turn on such a talismanic test.” It discussed, id., at 2261-2262, what is to be considered in determining the question of admissibility of a statement obtained after an illegal detention, see infra, pointing out that the burden of admissibility rests, of course, on the prosecution. 9 ⁷¹ SUMMARY The teachings of Wong Sun and Miranda , as explicated in Tucker and Brown, are clear. 1) The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applies equally to statements and tangible evidence obtained following an illegal arrest or an otherwise illegal search and seizure. 2) Such statements are not rendered inadmissible simply because of the illegal arrest or unreasonable search and seizure. 3) Such statements are not rendered admissible simply because the Miranda warnings were fully given. 4) Admissibility of such statements, vel non, must be answered on the facts of each case, upon consideration of: (a) the voluntariness of the statement, which is a threshold requirement; (b) compliance with the Miranda safeguards, which is important in determining whether the statements were obtained by exploitation of the illegal conduct; (c) other relevant factors, such as (i) the temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession; (ii) the presence of intervening circumstances; and ⁷² (iii) “particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” MINNIE SUE RYON vs STATE OF MARYLAND — THE CASE SUB JUDICE Statement of the Case On 8 December 1971 the Grand Jury for Prince George’s County returned a seventeen count indictment against Minnie Sue Ryon, Howard Davis Brown, Jr., and Thomas Edward Tennant.

The 1st count presented that they feloniously, wilfully and of deliberately premeditated malice aforethought did murder Samuel Garner Ryon (Minnie Sue Ryon’s husband) on 6 November 1971. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th counts alleged respectively that they conspired together to murder Mr. Ryon, to rob him with a deadly weapon, and to commit burglary of his dwelling. The remaining counts charged Brown and Tennant with various crimes against the person and property of Mr. Ryon. On 27 January 1972 the case was removed to the Circuit Court for Harford County for trial.

Mrs. Ryon was separately tried. She went to trial before a jury under the 1st count for the murder of her husband, the conspiracy charges being severed. On 13 October 1972, she was convicted of murder in the first degree, and on 20 December 1972 she was committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction for the rest of her natural life. 10 This Court affirmed the judgment on direct appeal. Ryon v. State, No. 376, September Term, 1973, filed 11 June 1974, unreported, cert. den., 272 Md. 747 (1974).

On 30 June 1975 certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court of the United States. Ryon v. Maryland, 95 S. Ct. 2674 . The judgment of the Court of Special Appeals ⁷³ was vacated and the cause remanded to that Court “for further consideration in light of Brown v. Illinois.” Eleven contentions were raised in the original appeal to us. We found none merited grounds for reversal.

We look again at the second contention as it relates to the mandate of the Supreme Court, in disposing of it we said: “The appellant’s second complaint is that her confession should not have been admitted into evidence. I 11 ! She does not. bottom this claim upon Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 . It is clear that there was full compliance with the safeguards prescribed by that case.

At the hearing on the motion to suppress the confession, the State met its burden of establishing that the statement was freely and voluntarily made. * * * The appellant bases her contention, however, on two other premises. She complains initially that the statement followed an arrest for which no adequate probable cause was shown t 12 l It is firmly established in Maryland that a confession which is otherwise shown to have been voluntary is not rendered inadmissible by the fact that the accused was in custody under an illegal arrest at the time of making the confession. * * * It is furthermore clear that the rule enunciated in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 , does not control prosecutions in the courts of this state. * * * The lawfulness of the arrest is, therefore, a complete irrelevancy.” (citations omitted) 13 ⁷⁴ The Facts Surrounding the Confession We give a compendium of the evidence adduced at the hearing on the motion to suppress the confession. On 12 ⁷⁵ November 1971, Detective William R. Johnson of the Prince George’s County Police Department appeared before a Maryland District Court Commissioner and subscribed and swore to an application for a warrant to arrest Mrs. Ryon, Brown and Tennant. The application set out as a “concise statement of facts showing probable cause that defendants committed a criminal offense” that they “Conspired and did murder Samuel G. Ryon on or about November 6, 1971.

It has been established through two confidential sources who talked with defendant Howard Brown and the confidential sources stated that Howard Brown indicated to them that he along with defendant Thomas Edward Tennant murdered Samuel G. Ryon and were paid to do so by defendant Minnie Sue Ryon.” The formal charge was violation of Code, art. 27, §§ 407, 410 and 38. The Commissioner issued the warrant the same date. It was addressed to “Any law enforcement officer authorized to serve criminal process.” It set out that the sworn application of Johnson alleged that Mrs. Ryon, Brown and Tennant “Did unlawfully and feloniously with premeditation and malice aforethought, murder Samuel Gardner [sic] Ryon.” It formally charged violation of Code, art. 27, §§ 407, 410 and 38. It commanded the law enforcement officer to arrest the persons charged and to bring them before the Commissioner or some other judicial officer as required by law.

It warned: “Hereof fail not or have you then and there the warrant.” The warrant was endorsed over the signature of a Judicial Officer as returned on 13 November 1971. It showed that bond was not authorized and set a trial date of 15 November 1971. On the back of the warrant, addressed “TO THE PERSON ⁷⁶ ARRESTED”, there were set out certain rights of an arrestee: “You do not have to say anything to anyone about any charge which has been placed against you, and anything you do say may be used against you in court. You have the right to consult with a lawyer before the police start questioning you and to have a lawyer present while the police are questioning you.

If the police are questioning you and a lawyer is not present, you may have the questioning stopped so that you may talk to a lawyer. You also have the right to consult with your family or friends. If you are being questioned or held and you want to talk to your family or friends or to a lawyer, you will be allowed to use a telephone, if necessary. If you want a lawyer but cannot afford to pay for one, you may have the right to have one assigned to represent you free of charge, if the crimes with which you are charged are serious enough.

A judge or a District Court commissioner or the Public Defender’s Office can tell you whether you are eligible for a court-assigned lawyer. If you decide to give a statement, you still have the right to stop at any time so you may talk to a lawyer.” Each of Mrs. Ryon, Brown and Tennant signed the warrant as having read or having had read “to me the contents of the aforegoing document” and acknowledging receipt of a copy thereof. Detective Johnson certified over his signature that at 0245 hours on 13 November 1971 he had executed “the above warrant by arresting the defendant or personally delivering to him and leaving with him a copy of the warrant.” 14 The back of the warrant also contained the “Statement and Certification of Initial Appearance before ⁷⁷ Judicial Officer.” The Judicial Officer certified that the initial appearance of the arrestees before him was on 13 November 1971 at 1:50 a.m., that he determined that the defendants were provided with a copy of the charging document and informed them of each offense charged, of the rights set out in the warrant, of the right to consult counsel and to contact family and friends, and that no statement need be made, but if one is made, it may be used against the maker in a court of law. See Maryland District Rule 706.

The homicide was investigated by Johnson and his superior officer, Lieutenant Detective James Fitzpatrick. It was stipulated: “1. That the Defendant, Minnie Sue Ryon, was arrested at approximately 8:45 P.M. on November 12,1971. 2. That she was taken to the Seat Pleasant Police Pleadquarters promptly and arrived there 15-20 minutes later. 3.

That Mrs. Ryon was questioned by several officers and was taken before the Magistrate of her initial appearance at about 4 A.M. on November 13, 1971. 4. That from the time Mrs. Ryon arrived at Seat Pleasant until she was taken before the Magistrate the next morning, there were present there on duty two (2) judicial officers between the hours of 4:00 P.M. and 12:00 Midnight and one (1) judicial officer between the hours of 12:00 Midnight and 8:00 A.M. 5. The judicial officers who were there were authorized to perform all acts within the scope of their office, including hearing the initial appearance for an arrested defendant as required by Maryland Rules. 6. That at the time the Defendant was brought to police headquarters she had to walk past the office of the judicial officer to reach the detention room where she was questioned. ⁷⁸ 7.

That about 4:00 P.M. November 12, 1971, a warrant was issued by a judicial officer for the arrest of Mrs. Ryon.” The testimony of Johnson and Fitzpatrick tended to show that they arrested Mrs. Ryon about 9:15 p.m. on 12 November 1971. They were aware that a warrant for her arrest had been issued and that it was required that she be brought before a judicial officer without unnecessary delay. 15 The warrant was not served on her when they first took her into custody. She was told that they were taking her to view some suspects. Johnson explained that one of the reasons she was told this was so she would be off-guard and another reason was that the officers did not want to embarrass her unduly.

It was also felt that it would be easier to question her at the police station rather than to tell her what it was about at the time they arrested her. At Seat Pleasant she was told she was charged with murder. She was given the full Miranda warnings about 9:35 p.m. She gave both an oral and written statement.

The taking of the written statement began about 10:00 p.m. and was concluded about 3:45 a.m. the next day.