Sacchet v. Blan

GERARD F. DEVLIN, Judge, Specially Assigned. Appellee, Robert Blan, was convicted in September 1995 of manslaughter by automobile under Md.Code (1957, 1996 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 388, and sentenced to ten years with seven years suspended. Appellee Blan filed for a writ of habeas corpus in the Circuit Court for Washington County, alleging illegal confinement on the basis of an insufficient award of good conduct credits by the Division of Correction.

In the instant case, the Division of Correction considered manslaughter by automobile to be a crime of violence under Article 27, section 643B, and, as a result, awarded good conduct credit at the rate of five days per month. Blan argued that manslaughter by automobile was not included on the list of “crimes of violence” in section 643B and, as a result, he was entitled to an award of ten days per month. Following a hearing on April 18, 1997, the Circuit Court for Washington County (McDowell, J.) held that automobile manslaughter under section 388 was not included on the list of crimes of violence as listed in section 643B and ordered that the Department credit Blan with the additional good conduct credits. ANALYSIS The sole issue to be determined in this case is whether Article 27, section 643B, which defines “crime of violence” to include “manslaughter except involuntary manslaughter” includes the offense of “manslaughter by automobile, motor vehicle, locomotive, engine car, streetcar, train, vessel, or ¹⁵⁶ other vehicle,” which is a separate offense under Article 27, section 388.

The appellant argues that there are only two common law forms of manslaughter, voluntary and involuntary, and that by excluding involuntary manslaughter as a crime of violence it therefore included all other types of manslaughter. We disagree. The offense of manslaughter by automobile, covered by Article 27, section 388, is a separate statutory misdemeanor. Connor v. State, 225 Md. 543, 558 , 171 A.2d 699 , cert. denied, 368 U.S. 906 , 82 S.Ct. 186 , 7 L.Ed.2d 100 (1961).

In construing the language of a statute, it is necessary to give effect to the legislative intent. Kaczorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 512-13 , 525 A.2d 628 (1987). In ascertaining the legislative intent, normally one need only look to the plain language of the statute. Blondell v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, 341 Md. 680, 690-91 , 672 A.2d 639 (1996).

In interpreting legislative intent, it is clear that Maryland usually follows what was the English Rule until Pepper v. Hart, House of Lords, A.C.