Sacchet v. Blan

RAKER, Judge. This case presents a single question of statutory interpretation of a provision within Article 27 of the Maryland Code: Is “manslaughter by automobile” under § 388 a “crime of violence” as defined by § 643B(a) for purposes of determining an inmate’s good conduct credits pursuant to § 700(d)? We shall hold that manslaughter by automobile is not such a crime. I. The relevant facts and procedural history of this case, gleaned primarily from the parties’ stipulation in the habeas corpus proceeding which gave rise to Petitioner’s appeal, are as follows: Respondent was convicted of manslaughter by automobile pursuant to Maryland Code (1957,1996 Repl.Vol., 1998 Suppl.) Article 27, § 388. 1 In September, 1995, the Circuit Court for Frederick County sentenced Respondent to a term of incarceration of ten years, seven years suspended.

Prior to March, 1997, the Division of Correction (D.O.C.) had considered § 388 offenses to be excluded from the list of offenses enumerated as a “crime of violence” in § 643B(a) and cross-referenced under § 700(d)(2), dealing with “Good Conduct Deductions” for prison inmates. In accordance with this interpretation, upon Respondent’s entry into prison in September, 1995, the D.O.C. awarded him ten “good conduct credits” per month as ⁸⁹ prescribed by § 700(d)(3). This calculation established April 3,1997 as Respondent’s “mandatory supervision” release date, pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1997 Repl.VoL, 1998 Supp.) Article 41, §§ 4-501(13) and 4-612, provided he comply with the requirements of the good conduct award. There is no dispute that Respondent maintained himself accordingly; he did nothing during the course of his incarceration to warrant removal or deduction of his good conduct credits.

In March, 1997 the D.O.C. reconsidered its interpretation of § 643B(a), and from that time forward has classified § 388 offenses as included, within the definition of “crime of violence,” thus calculating the good conduct credits for § 388 offenders at the rate of only five days per month of incarceration, pursuant to § 700(d)(2). Consequently, the D.O.C. recalculated Respondent’s good conduct award and established his mandatory supervision release date as September, 1997. Respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus, challenging the D.O.C.’s re-interpretation of § 643B(a) as it applied to the crime of manslaughter by automobile under § 388, and as it affected the calculation of his good conduct credits under § 700(d). The Circuit Court for Washington County determined after a hearing that manslaughter by automobile is not included as a crime of violence under the list of § 643B(a) offenses and, consequently, that good conduct credits were to be awarded Respondent at the rate of ten days per month in accordance with § 700(d)(3).

The circuit court further ordered, on April 18, 1997, that Respondent “be released under mandatory supervision forthwith.” The State filed a timely appeal to the Court of Special Appeals which affirmed the circuit court in a reported opinion. See Sacchet v. Blan, 120 Md.App. 154 , 706 A.2d 620 (1998). The State thereafter filed a timely petition for writ of certiorari which we granted in order to address the important issue presented.

II

Manslaughter by automobile is a statutory offense in Maryland. The statute currently reads, in pertinent part, as follows: ⁹⁰ § 388. Manslaughter by automobile, vessel, etc____ Every person causing the death of another as the result of the driving, operation or control of an automobile, motor vehicle, locomotive, engine, car, streetcar, train, vessel, or other vehicle in a grossly negligent manner, shall be guilty of a felony to be known as “manslaughter by automobile, motor vehicle, locomotive, engine, car, streetcar, train, vessel, or other vehicle,” and the person so convicted shall be sentenced to jail or the house of correction for not more than 10 years, or be fined not more than $5,000 or be both fined and imprisoned. When the General Assembly originally enacted this legislation in 1941, 2 a violation of the statute constituted a misdemeanor offense and carried a maximum term of imprisonment of three years.

Several amendments followed. In 1982, the Legislature increased the maximum term of imprisonment to five years, see Laws of Maryland, 1982, Ch. 92, and then again, in 1989, to ten years, see Laws of Maryland, 1989, Ch. 515. In 1997, violation of § 388 was reclassified as a felony. ■ See Laws of Maryland, 1997, Chs. 372, 373. Importantly, none of these changes had occurred prior to 1975, the year of § 643B’s enactment. 3 Manslaughter by automobile had thus comprised a criminal offense under Maryland’s statutory law for thirty-four years when the General Assembly designated certain offenses as “crimes of violence” under § 643B(a).

That statute provides, in its current form and in pertinent part, as follows: § 643B. Mandatory sentences for crimes of violence. ⁹¹ (a) Crime of violence defined ... —As used in this section, the term “crime of violence” means abduction; arson in the first degree; kidnapping; manslaughter, except involuntary manslaughter; mayhem and maiming, as previously proscribed under §§ 384, 385, and 386 of this article; murder; rape; robbery; robbery with a deadly weapon; carjacking or armed carjacking; sexual offense in the first degree; sexual offense in the second degree; use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or other crime of violence; an attempt to commit any of the aforesaid offenses; assault in the first degree; and assault with intent to murder, assault with intent to rape, assault with intent to rob, assault with intent to commit a sexual offense in the first degree, and assault with intent to commit a sexual offense in the second degree, as these crimes were previously proscribed under former § 12 of this article. [Emphasis added.] The calculation rate for the number of good conduct credits an inmate is to receive during the period of incarceration for a particular crime depends upon whether the crime is included within § 643B(a)’s definition of “crime of violence.” The bifurcated classification system, established by the General Assembly in 1992, provides as follows: § 700. Diminution of term of confinement of prisoner. (d) Good conduct deduction.—(1) An inmate shall be allowed a deduction in advance from the inmate’s term of confinement, subject to the inmate’s future good conduct.

(2) For an inmate whose term of confinement includes a consecutive or concurrent sentence for either a crime of violence as defined in Article 27, § 643B of the Code or a crime of manufacturing, distributing, dispensing, or possessing a controlled dangerous substance as provided under Article 27, § 286 of the Code, this deduction shall be calculated at the rate of 5 days for each calendar month, and on a prorated basis for any portion of a calendar month, ⁹² from the first day of commitment to the custody of the Commissioner through the last day of the inmate’s maximum term of confinement. (3) For all other inmates, this deduction shall be calculated at the rate of 10 days for each calendar month, and on a prorated basis for any portion of a calendar month, from the first day of commitment to the custody of the Commissioner through the last day of the inmate’s maximum term of confinement.[ 4 ] The issue we are called upon to resolve in this case is whether “manslaughter by automobile” in § 388 is included within the “crime of violence” of “manslaughter” in § 643B(a). Our answer in turn will determine the rate of good conduct credits under § 700 that should apply to an inmate convicted of an offense in violation of § 388.

III

As this Court has often declared, the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true legislative intent that lies behind the statutory enactment itself. See, e.g., Catonsville Nursing v. Loveman, 349 Md. 560, 570 , 709 A.2d 749, 753 (1998); Jones v. State, 311 Md. 398, 405 , 535 A.2d 471, 474 (1988). The primary indication of legislative intent is found in the plain language of the statute, with the words given their ordinary and natural meanings. See Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 672 , 659 A.2d 1347, 1350 (1995); Parrison v. State, 335 Md. 554, 559 , 644 A.2d 537, 539 (1994).

Both parties before this Court, and indeed before the circuit court and Court of Special Appeals, have argued that the plain language of the key statutory provision in question, § 643B(a), favors the opposite interpretation, and outcome, each respectively seeks. ⁹³ The State asserts that the clear legislative intent embedded in the phrase “manslaughter, except involuntary manslaughter” was to include all forms of manslaughter, including § 388’s manslaughter by automobile, within the enumeration of crimes of violence, except for common law involuntary manslaughter. Had the General Assembly intended to include only common law voluntary manslaughter it would have employed that term alone rather than use the formulation it did. Moreover, if the Legislature had desired to except manslaughter by automobile from the enumerated offenses, it easily could have done so but purposefully chose not to. Respondent retorts that “manslaughter, except involuntary manslaughter” plainly indicates, instead, that only the two common law varieties of manslaughter were being contemplated by the drafters of § 643B(a): the phrase simply provides that voluntary manslaughter is included within the list of crimes of violence, involuntary manslaughter excluded.

Furthermore, had the General Assembly wanted to include manslaughter by automobile as a crime of violence, it easily could have done so but purposefully elected not to. The plain meaning of § 643B(a) thus appears plainly different to the two parties at bar. Respondent similarly propounds that the General Assembly’s failure to modify the manslaughter phrase in § 643B(a) is proof that manslaughter by automobile is not a crime of violence thereunder. This is so, he argues, because the Legislature has several times revised other phrases within the same subsection in order to add to or clarify the list of crimes of violence.

Especially instructive is the 1981 amendment to § 643B(a) which appended to the common law crime of “robbery” the statutory offense of “robbery with a deadly weapon,” under § 488. See Laws of Maryland, 1981, Ch. 353. Moreover, the Legislature’s inaction with respect to the manslaughter language is particularly revealing, if § 388 offenses were originally meant to be included in 1975, in light of the fact that until the D.O.C.’s re-interpretation of § 643B(a) in 1997, the “prosecutors and the courts ... [and] the Division of Correction” had essentially “thwarted” the intent of the Gen ⁹⁴ eral Assembly for twenty-two years without any legislative correction. The Court of Special Appeals found this purported decision by the Legislature not to amend the manslaughter language in § 643B(a) dispositive: [Sections 388 and 643B] have been revisited several times by a legislature that meets at least annually, and at no time has the legislature included manslaughter by automobile as a crime of violence.' They could have done so easily but they did not.

The only interpretation is that the omission was deliberate. Sacchet v. Blan, 120 Md.App. 154, 157 , 706 A.2d 620, 621 (1998). The State might have responded before this Court that the reason for this supposedly purposeful inaction by the General Assembly was the legislators’ contentment, with the “fact” that manslaughter by automobile was already included within the enumerated offenses, which contention of fact the State continues to press. The State’s counter argument is different, however.

The State insists that “no conclusion can be drawn from [the] historical application” of § 643B because it is only since the Legislature’s 1992 bifurcation of the distribution of good conduct credits between crimes of violence and other crimes that the inclusion vel non of § 388 as a crime of violence has become relevant. 5 ⁹⁵ We conclude that the answer to the question before us lies neither in any supposed plain meaning of the phrase “manslaughter, except involuntary manslaughter” as enacted by the 1975 General Assembly nor in any purported inaction with respect to the same language by the successive Legislatures. Resolution of this case does not require us to rely upon what