Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Marburg

Boyd, C. J., delivered the opinion of'the Court. The Safe Deposit and Trust Company of Baltimore, as trustee under the will of Martha E. Williams, reported to the lower Court a sale to the appellee of an undivided half interest “in and to the fee simple and irredeemable ground rent of $600 per annum issuing out of a lot of ground” on Charles street in Baltimore. The sale was dependent upon the vendors of the whole rent being able to- convey a good and merchantable title. Exceptions were filed by the purchaser on the ground that the rent of $600.00 was á sub-rent and leasehold property, and hence the vendors could not give the purchaser a fee simple title to it, as contracted for. ' An order was passed sustaining the exceptions and setting aside the sale, and from that order-this appeal was taken.

On March 5, 1806, Robert Sinclair leased to Francis Hollingsworth a lot of ground located at the southwest corner of Charles and Mulberry streets, fronting 75 feet On Charles street, and created thereon an irredeemable ground rent of one rent per annum. On the 11th day of the same month Francis Hollingsworth endeavored to apportion the ground rent-of one cent by conveying the upper half of the lot subject to a ground rent of one-half cent, and conveying the lower 'half to Charles Worthington subject to the .same rent. Subsequently Robert Sinclair, who owned the fee simple interest in the lot south of the lower half, leased to Charles Worthington ⁴¹² a small triangular strip of ground, creating an annual irredeemable rent of one cent on it. That strip of land and the lower half of the original lot constitute the property on which the rent which the appellee agreed to purchase is reserved.

Through mesne conveyances the lot in question became vested in the heirs at law and representatives qf Nathaniel F. Williams, among whom was Martha E. Williams, who had an undivided half interest therein. On March 10, 1866, she and the other heirs at law and representatives of Nathaniel F. Williams leased it, creating thereon a ground rent of $600.00, payable semi-annually. It is admitted that the persons entitled to demand payment of the rents of one cent each in the respective leases from Robert Sinclair to Francis Hollingsworth and to Charles Worthington, and to make re-entry for non-payment of the same, were under no legal disability to make such demand and re-entry, and that said rents had not been paid or demanded for a period of more than twenty years before the proposed sale. The question therefore is whether under and by virtue of the Act of 1884, Oh. 502, now section 26 of x\rt. 53 of the Code, the lessor’s' (Sinclair’s)) reversion is barred and the original leasehold title converted into a fee simple.

That Act is as follows: “Whenever there has been no demand or payment for more than twenty consecutive years of any specific rent reserved out of a particular lot, or any part of a particular lot, under any form of lease, such rent shall be conclusively' presumed to have been extinguished, and the landlord shall not thereafter set up any claim thereto, or to the reversion in the lot out of which it issued, or have the right to institute any suit, action or proceeding whatsoever to recover said rent or said lot,” and then goes on to give a landlord who is under a legal disability, when the period of twenty years shall expire, two years after the removal of such disability within which to assert his rights. There would seem to be no doubt that the Legislature intended by the Act of 1884, not only that the rent shall be conclusively presumed to have been extinguished, when there ⁴¹³ has been no demand or payment for more than twenty consecutive years, but that the reversionary interest of the owner of the fee should be barred and terminated. It expressly said that the landlord shall not thereafter set up any claim to any reversion in the lot out of which the rent issued, or have the light to institute any suit, action or proceeding whatsoever to recover said lot. It manifestly was not intended to simply bar the rent already due, as sec. 1 of Art. 57 of the Code was also amended by the Act of 1884, so as to require all actions to recover rent in arrears to be commenced within three years from the time the cause of action accrued, but this section of the Act now under consideration has a much wider scope than that, and is in effect supplemental to sections 1 and 2 of the Statute of 21 James I, Ch.' 16, which sections are in force in this State.

It had been held in Campbell v. Shipley, 41 Md. 81 , that: “When the relation of landlord and tenant has been created, the possession of the tenant is consistent with the title of the landlord and the mere non-demand and non-payment of rent are not sufficient to bar the landlord’s title, whatever effect they may have, if long continued, upon his right to recover the rent.” The early case of Gwynn v. Jones, 2 G. & J. 184 , was quoted at length, wherein it had been said, amongst other things, that: “If no rent was paid and the tenancy not expressly admitted, there is nothing to show that the possession was held in hostility to the rights of the landlord and those claiming under him. In the absence of this proof nothing is to be presumed in favor of an adverse possession, and more particularly so where it commenced rightfully and with the consent of the owner.” Other cases to the same effect might be cited, among which is that of Myers v. Silljacks, 58 Md. 319 , which was decided shortly after the Legislature adjourned in 1882, and possibly hastened the passage of the Act now under consideration. However that may be, it is well known from cases in this Court and otherwise that the complex system of ground rents in this State often rendered titles unmarketable, although in some instances the rents had ⁴¹⁴ not been collected for many years, and some of them were for such a nominal sum and were owned by so many persons, that it was difficult, to obtain the reversions for anything like a reasonable amount as compared with the rent reserved. But, as under the laws of this State a leasehold interest is personal property, and there are oftentimes many subdivisions of the land originally leased, with sub-leases existing, titles were not only made uncertain, but values were materially affected.

There were therefore urgent reasons for relief by legislation, and'we can have no doubt that that enacted by what is now sec. 26 of Art. 53 was not only intended to, but did have the effect of extinguishing the reversionary intereso when there was no demand or payment of rent for more than twenty years, unless there be some constitutional objection to it which renders it inoperative. It is true that at one time the constitutionality of such statutes was questioned, but there is no longer any doubt about the right of the Legislature to pass laws which may result in vesting good titles in those holding lands by adverse possession — provided, of course, the former owners have a reasonable time after the passage of such laws within which to assert their rights. Under conditions existing in this country such laws were essential for quieting titles. As we adopted the English statutes which were in force on July 4, 1776, and which by experience had been found applicable to our conditions, and as that of 21 James I, Ch. 16, was held to be in force here, it was not necessary for the Legislature of Maryland to pass such a- statute, but it has from time to time passed laws which have changed that statute and which prescribe the kind of evidence required to establish adverse possession.

For example, prior to the Act of 1852, Ch. 177, actual enclosure for twenty years was essential to prove possession of land by a tort feasor, but that Act declared that actual enclosure should no longer be necessary. In Thistle v. Frostburg Coal Co., 10 Md. 129 , our predecessors said that it was not “within the scope of the legislative power to give to a law the effect of taking from one man his property and giving ⁴¹⁵ it to another, by any new rule of tenure, retroactive in its character,” and it was held that the Act of 1852 could not-be given a retroactive operation, but the Court said: “It is equally clear that it was within the power of the Legislature to alter and remodel the rules of evidence and remedies, to which parties claiming title and possession of land might resort, and therefore a law would be constitutional which merely declared that evidence which would be sufficient to support a claim to title in equity might be made availing for the same purpose at law.” So the Act of 1894, Ch. 661 (now sect. 7 of Art. 57) changed the statutes of James I by enacting that the period within which any suit or action may be brought under any statute of limitations in force in this State should not be extended because the plaintiff was a feme covert, imprisoned or beyond the seas, or out of the jurisdiction of the State at the time of the accrual of the right, title or cause of action. That Act did not provide for its taking effect at a future time, and we held in Baumeister v. Silver, 98 Md. 418 , that when a non-resident had a vested right to sue to recover land held adversely for more than twenty years, the Legislature could not take away the right without allowing a reasonable time within which to bring his action, and hence the Act of 1894 should be so construed as to allow a non-resident ten years after its passage within which to bring suit — a non-resident having, -under the construction placed by our predecessors on the Statute of James, ten years within which to institute an action after coming into the State, although the property might have been held adversely by the defendant for twenty or more years. Since June 1st, 1904, non-residents have under that Act been in the same position as to the right to sue for the recovery of lands as residents, and have no advantage over the latter by reason of their non-residence.

In this case more than twenty years had elapsed since the passage of the Act of 1884, during which time the owners of the reversion could have asserted their rights, but not having done so there can be no more reason why they shall not be