Saia v. Sain

ROSALYN B. BELL, Judge. Appellant, Charles B. Saia, appeals from a judgment rendered by the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. Appellee, Gloria E. Sain, sought a declaratory judgment that the residuary clause of Sadie Cataldi’s will was void. Ms. Sain requested an injunction against the personal representative prohibiting any distribution of estate assets.

At the conclusion of Ms. Sain’s case, the court found that the ³²⁴ residuary clause was patently ambiguous and therefore unenforceable. On appeal, appellant raises four issues. The first issue asks: “Is a bequest to ‘survivors’ of a class or group of designated beneficiaries in the residuary clause of a Will restricted to surviving members of the class or group as a matter of law, and is such a bequest ambiguous?” Since we agree with appellant that such a bequest is not ambiguous and is restricted to surviving members of the group, we need not and do not reach the other issues. FACTS Sadie Cataldi died in October, 1983.

By her will dated October 25, 1980, she made a specific bequest of $1,000 to the Franciscan Monastery. The balance of the estate was to pass by way of the residuary clause in her will, as follows: “All the rest, residue, and remainder of my estate, I give, devise, and bequeath in equal shares to the survivors of the following: Charlie B. Saia (my nephew), Grace Saia Carr (my niece), Margaret Saia (my niece), Annette Belford (my niece), Richard E. Caperna (my grand-nephew), Charles Citrano, Jr. (my nephew), Wendi Louise Carr (my great-niece), and Rosaline Grauso (my niece).” The appellant is one of the eight individuals named by Sadie Cataldi in the residuary clause. Appellee is an heir at law but not one of the legatees, nor is she a descendant of any of the legatees. RESIDUARY CLAUSE The basic issue in the case sub judice is whether the word “survivors” is subject to a precise and definite meaning or whether it is so ambiguous as to render the residuary clause unenforceable.

We hold that the word “survivors,” when used to limit a group, is not ambiguous but is subject to a precise definition. ³²⁵ The Court of Appeals of Maryland has not hesitated to interpret the word “survivors” as found in a testamentary clause. In Ross v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 168 Md. 65 , 176 A. 483 (1934), the testator set up an elaborate scheme of disposition, leaving a significant share of his estate to his six children. The will then provided: “But if any of my sons shall die before he or they shall have received the whole of the property I hereby give to him or them; or if any of my daughters shall die without issue living at the time or times of her death or their deaths, then shall the trustee hold the property belonging to him, her or them thus dead, in trust for the use of the survivors, in the same manner, and for the same estates and purposes, as those above mentioned.” (Emphasis added.) The issue before the Court was whether the word “survivors,” as found in that provision, was limited to the testator’s six children or did it include his grandchildren. In holding that the provision only applied to his children, the Court said: “These children are the six specifically named members of a group to take the share of any child in the group that had fallen in on the happening of the particular contingency created by the will____ A survivor is one who continues to live after the death of those who comprise his group ... it seems to us to be clear law as well as good sense that, in a case like this, where there is an ultimate limitation upon a contingency to a group of persons plainly described, and there is a person answering the description in esse when the contingency happens, that person alone can take.” (Emphasis added.) Ross, 168 Md. at 72-73 , 176 A. 483 .

Numerous other states have been asked to interpret testamentary clauses using the word “survivors.” In Croft v. McKie, 235 S.C. 231 , 111 S.E.2d 210 (1959), the testator left each of his seven children a tract of land for his or her “sole and separate use.” The will provided: ³²⁶ “If any of the children should die childless, ‘her or their share shall revert to my estate for division among the survivors.’ ” Croft, 111 S.E.2d at 211 . In interpreting the word “survivors” in that provision, the Court said: “Unless there is something in the context of the instrument or attendant circumstances showing a different intention, the authorities are generally to the effect that the word ‘survivor’ should be given its literal interpretation as meaning one who outlives another, one of two or more persons who live after the other or others have died.” Croft, 111 S.E.2d at 213 . Similarly, in Holt v. Miller, 33 N.E.2d 19 (Ohio App.1937), the Court considered a provision of a will which devised a remainder life estate to the testatrix’s two children, Clinton Howard Miller and Lindy Pearlette Miller, share and share alike, and to the “survivor of them.” The Court stated: “This language could not, in its common acceptation, have included the children of Lindy Pearlette Holt. When the two