Samarzevosky v. Baltimore City Passenger Railway Co.

Briscoe, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This suit was brought on the 19th of November, 1897, by Appolonia Samarzevosky, a married woman, by her husband and next friend, Felix Samarzevosky, against the Baltimore City Passenger Railway Company to recover for alleged personal injuries sustained by her. The declaration was demurred to upon the ground that a suit for personal injuries to a married woman must be brought by the wife and husband jointly, and this in ⁴⁸⁰ volves a construction of the Act of 1892, ch. 267, relating to married women. The Act of 1898, chapter 457, which repeals and reenacts Article 45 of the Code, title “Husband and Wife,” and which authorizes suits by married women for torts committed against them as fully as if they were unmarried, does not take effect until the first day of January, 1899, and cannot affect the decision of this case.

It is settled by numerous decisions of this Court and the question seems therefore beyond dispute, that prior to the Act of 1892, the husband and wife were required to join in an action for personal injuries to the wife. In Wolf v. Bauereis, 72 Md. 488 , decided in June, 1890, it was distinctly held in construing the Act of 1882, which is now section 7 of Article 45 of the Code, that a feme covert was not entitled in an action for an assault and battery to maintain an action in her own name alone, by virtue of the provisions of the statute relied on. And in Baltimore City Passenger Railway Company v. Kemp and wife, 61 Md. 77 , it was said: “ It is perfectly well settled, that in an action brought for personal injuries suffered by the wife, the husband and wife must join and the declaration must conclude to their damage.” And to the same effect are the cases of Clark v. Wootten et al., 63 Md. 114 , and Treusch v. Kamke, etc., 63 Md. 278 . But it is contended that the Act of 1892, ch. 267, changed the rule of law as heretofore established and gave her the right to sue independently of her husband for injuries to her person as well as to her property.

Now, it appears by the Act of 1892, that section 1 of Article 45, of the Code, was repealed and re-enacted so as to read: “ The property real and personal belonging to