Samie v. State

MEREDITH, J. On November 30, 2004, Abdul Samie became involved in an altercation with a family that was seeking to rent an apartment from him. How and why the skirmish began and escalated are questions that were vigorously disputed by the parties and witnesses. Samie, the appellant, was charged with multiple counts of assault and attempted murder, but was convicted of a single count of attempted second degree assault. One of the participants in the altercation was the teenage son of the family we shall refer to as the “Doe” family, Tyriq Doe.

Tyriq’s involvement in the fight had led to juvenile delinquency proceedings against him. At Samie’s criminal trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Samie’s counsel asked the trial court to order the State to produce for inspection and potential use as impeachment material an agreed statement of facts that had been prepared and used in Tyriq’s juvenile proceedings. The trial court refused to provide Samie’s counsel any access to the statement. Although the trial court was correct that Maryland law strives to protect the confidentiality of the records of juvenile proceedings, the court erred in failing to consider whether there was good cause to order access for Samie, a defendant in a criminal proceeding arising out of the same circumstances that led to the juvenile proceedings.

Because the statute imposing the confidentiality requirement — Maryland Code (1973, 2006 Repl.Vol.), Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“CJP”), § 3-8A-27(b)(l) — specifically contemplates that a court may order disclosure “upon good cause shown,” and because the trial court did not make any finding regarding the ⁶² existence of good cause for disclosure to Samie, we shall vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. Factual Background On the occasion of the encounter between Samie and the Doe family, Samie was at the apartment complex he owns and manages, attending to some landlord-tenant matters. The Doe family observed a “for rent” sign, and approached Samie to inquire about renting an apartment. When Samie told the Does that he had no apartment for rent, the father, “Mr. Doe,” pointed to the sign.

Samie said that the sign was old. According to one tenant who witnessed the encounter, Mr. Doe became belligerent and said to Samie, “you mean you don’t want to rent it to a black man.” Samie denied that was so, and a physical altercation followed. According to one of Sarnie’s tenants who testified as a witness for the defense, Mr. Doe pounced upon Samie “from behind and begin [sic] hammering down on him with his fist primarily, hitting him, striking him on the head.” Samie yelled for onlookers to call the police. Samie similarly testified that Mr. Doe had attacked him after being told there were no apartments available.

According to Samie, as he tried to move away from Mr. Doe, Tyriq, a tall and husky youth, joined in the attack. Some witnesses recalled that, at some point, Tyriq was wielding a knife. Samie managed to get into his Dodge van and start the engine. As Samie began driving the van, he struck Mr. Doe, then backed up and struck Ms. Doe and her six-year-old child, and then crashed the van into a tree.

Samie contended that he had lost his glasses in the scuffle and could not see where he was going. Samie claimed that he did not intend to strike anyone with the vehicle, but simply wanted to get away from his assailants. Mr. Doe was taken to Shock Trauma. He suffered two broken legs and a neck fracture, and was in the hospital for 16 days.

Both Mr. Doe and Ms. Doe instituted civil suits against Samie. ⁶³ Samie was taken to The Johns Hopkins Hospital. He was treated for a knife wound to his head and four wounds to his chest, as well as numerous bruises. On the third day of Samie’s criminal trial, defense counsel proposed to call Tyriq as a witness for the defense, and asked the court to order the State to produce the statement of facts that had apparently been agreed to at Tyriq’s juvenile proceedings. Defense counsel stated: Your Honor, that [is] what I learned this morning, that this witness, Mr. [Tyriq Doe], in fact, during the juvenile proceedings agree[d] to a specific statement of facts that was produced by the State at that time, during the juvenile proceedings.

That has not been disclosed to me [in] discovery, and I believe the State’s position is that I’m not entitled to it, in light of the fact that this was a juvenile proceeding[ ]. In light of the fact that this witness is here to testify, I have specific questions, I want to ask him____I would ask the Court to have the State release to me [ ] the statement of facts used within the juvenile proceedings. The prosecutor opposed the disclosure, arguing that, “under the rules, matters dealing with juvenile adjudications are to be kept confidential.” Tyriq’s personal counsel also lodged an objection to disclosure of the statement. The trial court asked the prosecutor whether the statement presented any different facts than the State had elicited during Samie’s trial.

The prosecutor responded that it did not, but noted that she had not read the statement previously and was in the process of reading it during their discussion. The trial court admonished the prosecutor to turn over the agreed statement of facts if it differed from what the State contended happened in the present case. After a brief delay, the prosecutor reported that there was nothing different in the statement. The trial court stated that it would review the statement in camera.

But when the court reconvened for the afternoon session, the trial court announced that, based upon the court’s understanding of Maryland Rule 11-121, there could be no ⁶⁴ access to the record from Tyriq’s juvenile proceeding. The transcript reflects the following: THE COURT: Okay. I did research on that, and I’m not entitled to it, you are not entitled to it, none of us are entitled to it. So I’m going to return the statement of facts to [the prosecutor].

Referring to Maryland Rule 11-121, nothing associated with the juvenile Court can be released for any reason[, u]nless it is expressly provided by law, [i.e., unless] there is express permission under the law that would allow [release. W]hich means ... you have got trouble with it, and you understand the trouble with it. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Would you say ... we are limited on what we can ask on impeachment[?] THE COURT: Well, I don’t disagree with you, but I think that is the law, so I would follow the law. (Emphasis added.) Tyriq then testified that his family met Samie for the first time on the date they went to ask about renting an apartment. According to Tyriq, no one hit anyone until Samie drove his van into the Does as they were walking away.

Tyriq testified that he never hit Samie, but contended that he had found a knife in the gutter, and had stabbed Samie, but only after Samie had driven the van into the family members. Disclosure of Confidential Juvenile Records On appeal, Samie asserts that the trial court erred in not permitting defense counsel to review the statement of facts Tyriq agreed to in connection with a juvenile proceeding arising out of the same occurrence that led to Sarnie’s prosecution. The State counters that, pursuant to Rule 11-121 and CJP § 3-8A-27(b)(l), Samie was not entitled to review the record, and “an in camera review of the document in question is all that is required.” In the subtitle of the Maryland Code dealing with juvenile causes, CJP § 3-8A-27(b)(l) provides: ⁶⁵ (b)(1) A court record pertaining to a child is confidential and its contents may not be divulged, by subpoena or otherwise, except by order of the court upon good cause shown or as provided in § 7-303 of the Education Article. (Emphasis added.) CJP § 3-8A-27(c) similarly provides that, even when the records have been “sealed,” the records may be opened “by order of the court upon good cause shown.” CJP § 3-8A-23(c) further provides: “Evidence given in a proceeding under this subtitle is not admissible against the child in any other proceeding in another court, except in a criminal proceeding where the child is charged with perjury and the evidence is relevant to that charge and is otherwise admissible.” Maryland Rule 11-121 implements the statute, stating, in pertinent part: a.

Sealing of Records. Files and records of the court in juvenile proceedings, including the docket entries and indices, are confidential and shall not be open to inspection except by order of the court or as otherwise expressly provided by law. On termination of the court’s juvenile jurisdiction, the files and records shall be sealed.... a. Unsealing of Records.

Sealed files and records of the court in juvenile proceedings may be unsealed and inspected only by order of the court. (Emphasis added.) The statute provides in CJP § 3-8A-27(b)(l) that a juvenile record is confidential and that portions of it may not be disclosed “except by order of the court for good cause shown.” The plain language of the statute anticipates that there will be circumstances in which there is good cause to disclose portions of the record. Rule 11-121 does not specifically mention “good cause,” but clearly contemplates that the court may order disclosure under some circumstances, presumably when there is a good cause that outweighs the juvenile’s interest in confidentiality. Cf.

Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320 , 94 ⁶⁶ S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974) (a state’s interest in avoiding disclosure of a juvenile offender’s record “must fall before the right of [a defendant in a criminal proceeding] to seek out the truth in the process of defending himself’); Zaal v. State, 326 Md. 54, 77 , 602 A.2d 1247 (1992) (noting that Maryland cases “reflect a ... tendency to allow a defendant access to information when privacy interests are not overriding”). ■ In the context of good cause for a postponement, this Court has stated: “The determination as to what constitutes good cause..... is a discretionary one.” Marks v. State, 84 Md.App. 269, 277 , 578 A.2d 828 (1990), cert. denied, 321 Md. 502 , 583 A.2d 275 (1991). In, the present case, the trial court did not purport, to exercise any discretion to determine whether there was any good cause for defense counsel to review the statement, but rather concluded that the court had no discretion to permit any review of the record by defense counsel. When a trial court is expected to exercise judicial discretion in deciding a matter, its failure to exercise any discretion is error. As the Court of Appeals put it in Gunning v. State, 347 Md. 332, 351 , 701 A.2d 374 (1997): It is well .settled that a trial judge who encounters a matter that falls within the realm of judicial discretion must exercise his or her discretion in ruling on the matter.

That exercise of discretion must be clear from the record. The court’s failure to fulfill this. function can amount to error, that ordinarily requires reversal. (Citations, and internal quotation -marks omitted.) In the present case, the record reflects that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion because it concluded it had none. This was error.

We recognize that, as the State reminds us, “trial judges are not obliged to spell out in words every thought and step of logic,” Beales v. State, 329 Md. 263, 273 , 619 A.2d 105 (1993), and, “[a]bsent an indication to the- contrary, trial courts are presumed to know the law and apply it correctly.” Jones v. State, 138 Md.App. 12, 21 , 769 A.2d 1015 , cert. denied, 364 Md. 535 , 774 A.2d 409 (2001). Here, however, there was “an ⁶⁷ indication to the contrary”: the trial court’s express comments explaining its reasoning for denying access indicate that it did not believe it had any discretion to grant access under any circumstances. The State asserts that the trial court properly ruled that the defendant was not entitled to the statement because the trial judge “undertook an in camera review of the document in question before making her ruling,” and “[a]fter her review of the document, she ruled that the defendant was not entitled to it.” There are two flaws in this argument. First, although the trial judge originally stated that it was her intention to undertake an in camera review of the document, her subsequent comments — “I’m not entitled to it, ... none of us are entitled to it” — indicate that the court interpreted Rule 11-121 as precluding even the court’s review.

Second, even if the court did conduct some review in camera, the court’s comments indicate that the review did not apply the correct legal standard and analyze whether there was good cause for disclosure. The State also argues that the record in this case is unclear with respect to the significance of the undisclosed document. Although that question could have been addressed by the trial court during its in camera review, it was not, through no fault or lack of diligence on the part of Samie. The general test for whether a confidential document should be disclosed was set forth by the Court of Appeals in Cole v. State, 378 Md. 42, 63 , 835 A.2d 600 (2003) (quoting Zaal, supra, 326 Md. at 72 , 602 A.2d 1247 ): “ ‘Disclosure is permitted when the need for it outweighs the privacy interest of [the party who has a privacy interest in the record].’ ” The