Samuels v. State

Bloom, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellant, George Lee Samuels, was indicted by the grand jury for Prince George’s County in one case (No. 81-596) for housebreaking and related offenses allegedly occurring on January 21, 1981, and in a second case (No. 81-597) for housebreaking and related offenses as well as for transporting a handgun, all of which allegedly occurred on January 23,1981. Over appellant’s objection, the fifth, sixth, seventh and eighth counts of the second indictment (handgun offenses) were consolidated with all counts of the first indictment for trial before a jury. Appellant was convicted of housebreaking (count 1 of the first indictment) and transporting a handgun and carrying a handgun (counts 5 and 6 of the second indictment).

The two handgun violations were merged. Appellant was sentenced to concurrent terms of one year imprisonment for housebreaking and one year imprisonment for transporting a handgun. In this appeal, he asserts: 1. The trial court erred in permitting a joint trial of charges contained in two charging documents. ⁴⁸⁸ 2.

The evidence was insufficient to sustain appellant’s conviction for housebreaking. 3. The trial court erred in admitting irrelevant and prejudicial evidence. Because we agree with appellant’s first two contentions and will reverse therefore, it will not be necessary to'address the third one. FACTS Sometime between 10:00 a.m. and 2:30 p.m. on January 21, 1981, the house of William Pointer on School Way in Prince George’s County was broken and entered.

Several items of personal property were taken from the house, including an adding machine and a citizen’s band radio. At approximately 11:00 a.m. on January 23, 1981, Detective M. M. Shapiro of the Prince George’s County Police Department stopped an automobile for traffic violations. His attention had initially been drawn to the vehicle when it proceeded onto a "dead-end street of a known breaking and entering suspect.” The traffic violations occurred when the vehicle came back out of that street. The operator of the vehicle was one Michael Johnson, whose aunt was the owner of the automobile.

Three other people were in the car, including appellant who was in the left rear seat behind the operator. Detective Shapiro, with Johnson’s consent, searched the trunk of the car and found various items of personal property, including an adding machine and a citizen’s band radio which were subsequently identified by Pointer, as items taken from his house on January 21, 1981. While Detective Shapiro was searching the trunk of Johnson’s car, his companion, Detective A. L. Creveling, asked the passengers for identification. When the passengers got out of the car, Creveling observed the butt of a gun sticking out from underneath the driver’s seat into the rear of the vehicle.

He removed that weapon, searched further ⁴⁸⁹ and found a second gun under the right front seat. According to Detective Creveling, the first gun was located in such position that it would have been between appellant’s feet while he was seated in the automobile. Michael Johnson appeared as a State’s witness at appellant’s trial. He testified that on Wednesday, January 21, 1981, he was driving his aunt’s car, accompanied by Craig Horn and Mark Jackson (the same persons who were with Johnson and appellant on January 23).

About 9:30 or 10:00 a.m., they picked up appellant at Ballou High School in the District of Columbia and drove into Prince George’s County, stopping in front of a house on School Way. Appellant and Jackson, according to Johnson, went into the house through the front door. Johnson then parked his car in the driveway, and the three passengers started loading the trunk with items taken from the house, including an adding machine and citizen’s band radio. Johnson then testified that on January 23, 1981, he was again with Horn and Jackson in his aunt’s car.

They again picked up appellant at Ballou High School and drove into Maryland where they were stopped by the police. Appellant denied complicity in the housebreaking and called as witnesses two of his high school teachers who testified that, according to their records, appellant was in school on January 21, 1981, from 9:10 a.m. until 10:00 a.m. and from 10:55 a.m. to 11:40 a.m. His other teachers did not keep attendance records and were thus unable to state whether appellant attended their classes on January 21. Appellant also denied knowing that the guns were in the car.

He testified that the first time he saw any guns was when the police officer reached under the driver’s seat, withdrew the gun and held it up for him to see. JOINDER The joinder of offenses in charging documents in general is governed by Md. Rule 712a. The joinder of two or more charging documents for trial is governed by Md. Rule 745. ⁴⁹⁰ Rule 712 provides: a. Offenses.

Two or more offenses, whether felonies or misdemeanors or any combination thereof, may be charged in the same charging document in a separate count for each offense, if the offenses charged are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. Rule 745 provides: a. Joint Trial — Charging Documents. The court may order two or more charging documents to be tried together if the offenses and the defendants could have been joined in a single charging document. b.

Motion for Joinder of Offenses. If a defendant has been charged in two or more charging documents, either party may move for a joint trial of the charges. In ruling on the motion, the court shall inquire into reasons for the motion and the ability of either party to proceed at a joint trial. c. Prejudicial Joinder.

If it appears that any party will be prejudiced by the joinder for trial of counts, charging documents or defendants, the court may, upon its own motion or the motion of any party, order separate trials of counts, charging documents or defendants, or grant any other relief justice requires. The only connection between the January 21, 1981, housebreaking and the January 23, 1981, possession and transportation of handguns is that the police officers discovered evidence of both offenses at the same time and in the same automobile — the stolen goods in the trunk and the guns under the front seats. That connection is an insufficient ⁴⁹¹ basis for a joint trial of the two charging documents. The charges could not have been joined together under the authority of Md. Rule 712a because they were not of the same or similar character, or based on the same act or transaction, or based on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan.

Neither could a joint trial of the two charging documents be ordered under authority of Md. Rule 745a. Separate offenses should not be joined for trial unless the evidence of each individual offense would be admissible at a separate trial for the other offense. State v. Jones, 284 Md. 232 , 395 A.2d 1182 (1979); McKnight v. State, 280 Md. 604 , 375 A.2d 551 (1977). Evidence of possession and transportation of a handgun on January 23 would be inadmissible in a separate trial for housebreaking on January 21; evidence of housebreaking on January 21 would be inadmissible in a separate trial for handgun offenses occurring on January 23.

In a prosecution for a particular crime, evidence which in any manner shows or tends to show that the accused has committed another crime wholly independent of that for which he is on trial is irrelevant and inadmissible. Harrison v. State, 276 Md. 122 , 345 A.2d 830 (1975). This case comes within none of the recognized exceptions to that rule enunciated in Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664 , 350 A.2d 680 (1976). SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE Appellant asserts that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for housebreaking because that conviction rests upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.

Other than the testimony of Michael Johnson, who admitted his own complicity in the breaking and entering of the Pointer house while implicating appellant in that crime, the only evidence tending to connect appellant with the offense was his presence in Johnson’s automobile and the presence of goods stolen from the Pointer house in the trunk of that automobile two days after the housebreaking. ⁴⁹² Maryland continues to adhere to the rule that a conviction may not rest upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. Turner v. State, 294 Md. 640 , 452 A.2d 416 (1982); Brown v. State, 281 Md. 241 , 378 A.2d 1104 (1977). The policy underlying the rule was stated in Watson v. State, 208 Md. 210, 217 , 117 A.2d 549 (1955): The reason for the ruling requiring the testimony of an accomplice to be corroborated is that it is the testimony of a person admittedly contaminated with guilt, who admits his participation in the crime for which he particularly blames the defendant, and it should be regarded with great suspicion and caution, because otherwise the life or liberty of an innocent person might