Satchell v. State

Bishop, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellants were convicted by a jury in the Criminal Court of Baltimore of daytime housebreaking and, on April 19, 1982, were each sentenced to ten years imprisonment. Appellant Satchell raises three questions in his appeal: 1. Was he denied his right to be tried within 180 days in accordance with Maryland Rule 746? 2.

Was he denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial? 3. Did the trial court err in the manner in which it reinstructed the jury in response to a jury question raised after the jury began to deliberate? Appellant LeSane also raises three questions: 1. Should certain evidence have been excluded because of an alleged unconstitutional seizure? 2.

Did the trial court’s supplemental instructions to the jury constitute prejudicial error? 3. Should appellant have been granted a mistrial because of the improper admission of evidence of other crimes. Facts At about 10:00 P.M., on Thursday, March 26, 1981, Eva Abramson and her daughter, Shandy Abramson, were in their house with an elderly person when the doorbell rang. Peeking through the curtain, Eva Abramson saw Satchell, whom she did not know, ringing the bell.

She did not answer the door and, after ringing the bell "for about five minutes,” Satchell left. Eva Abramson slipped out of the house and followed Satchell in her car to a nearby supermarket parking lot, where she saw him join three other men in a yellow van. Eva Abramson then drove to her son’s house and reported the incident to the police. ³³⁵ Meanwhile, two other men came to the Abramson house from the vicinity of the parking lot. They too rang the front doorbell, and then went to the back of the house and rang the back doorbell.

Shandy Abramson did not answer either door and called the police. The men returned to the parking lot area. Shortly after 10:00 P.M., on Thursday, March 26, 1981, acting on the calls from the Abramsons, plus information that they had received from the police radio that the persons observed by the Abramsons had been involved in a burglary of the Barrash residence on Menlo Drive, the police stopped the yellow van, which was being driven by appellant LeSane. When LeSane produced a driver’s license belonging to a third party, he was ordered from the van.

As he alighted a pistol (which later turned out to be a starter’s gun) was seen on the dashboard. Thereupon, the three passengers, Satchell, David Edwards and Leonard Davis were ordered out of the van. As they alighted, Satchell pulled a cover over a pile of items in the back of the van. The police pulled the cover back and found items from the Barrash residence.

Satchell I. Maryland Rule 746 The Maryland Rule 746 issue in this case requires that we consider not only that rule, but also its relationship with Maryland Rule 745 (c), Prejudicial Joinder. We set out herein the pertinent parts of these rules: Maryland Rule 746: a. General Provision. Within 30 days after the earlier of the appearance of counsel or the first appearance of the defendant before the court pursuant to Rule 723, a trial date shall be set which shall be not later than 180 days after the appearance or waiver of counsel or after the appearance of defendant before the court pursuant to Rule 723. ³³⁶ b.

Change of Trial Date. Upon motion of a party made in writing or in open court and for good cause shown, the county administrative judge or a judge designated by him may grant a change of trial date. Maryland Rule 745 (c) Prejudicial Joinder If it appears that any party will be prejudiced by the joinder for trial of counts, charging documents or defendants, the court may, upon its own motion or the motion of any party, order separate trials of counts, charging documents or defendants, or grant any other relief justice requires. The chronology of Appellant Satchell’s case follows: March 26, 1981 — arrest March 27, 1981 — bail April 30, 1981 — indictment May 21, 1981 — Arraigned; appearance of public defender Carey for Satchell.

LeSane failed to appear; bench warrant issued [no entry of appearance by Carey for LeSane but records indicate documents filed by Carey for LeSane], June 12, 1981 — Motion to sever: Satchell June 22, 1981 — LeSane apprehended August 6, 1981 — Appearance new attorney for Satchell August 17, 1981 — hearing: Satchell, Davis, Edwards, LeSane Original trial date postponed at request of LeSane to obtain private counsel. Edwards and Davis agreed to waive 180 days rule. Satchell refused to waive 180 days rule [severence denied] (88th day). August 18, 1981 — Satchell files speedy trial motion. ³³⁷ October 15,1981 — Appearance of new attorney for LeSane [despite this LeSane was represented at trial by Carey], November 23, 1981 — Two State witnesses unavailable.

Davis failed to appear — Bench warrant issued for Davis. Trial date for Edwards, LeSane and Satchell postponed to December 1, 1981 (186th day). December 1, 1981 — Trial date: Edwards, LeSane and Satchell. Case put on move list.

December 18, 1981 — [Edwards enters guilty plea]. December 21, 1981 — Hearing Edwards and Satchell: Motion to Dismiss. December 22, 1981 — Dismissal motion denied. Trial commences.

December 23, 1981 — Trial concludes: guilty verdicts. April 19, 1982 — Sentencing. April 27, 1982 — Appeal. Appellant argues: "The docket entries reflect that appellant was arraigned on May 21, 1981; the first appearance of his counsel was entered on that date.

Trial commenced December 21, 1981, some 212 days later. The case was originally scheduled for trial on August 17, 1981. The State at that point wished to try appellant, LeSane, and two others together. On that date all four defendants appeared in court.

LeSane requested a postponement to obtain private counsel. Two of his co-defendants (a Mr. Edwards and a Mr. Davis) agreed to the postponement. Appellant objected.” ³³⁸ Appellant’s right to be tried within 180 days of arraignment was violated because a co-defendant needed a continuance to obtain counsel. Appellant himself did not need a continuance, objected to it, and demanded a speedy trial.

The State could have tried Appellant separately within the 180-day period, but decided that it was in its best interest to try him jointly with others who were not prepared for trial.” Appellant cites numerous authorities, none of which support his argument that the above chronology violated Maryland Rule 746. In Epps v. State, 276 Md. 96 (1975) the Court held that a case should not be postponed where the defendant is ready to go to trial simply because the State wishes to try him jointly with others. Epps was a constitutional speedy trial case, to which very different standards apply. State v. Lattisaw, 48 Md. App. 20, 27 (1981).

There is no statufrny provision for good cause in a constitutional speedy trial setting. In Epps , Judge O’Donnell applied the four criteria set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) and properly concluded that Epps had been denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial. A most important factor in reaching that conclusion was the actual prejudice suffered by Epps in the unavailability of a key witness at the time of the trial on August 22, 1973, who had been available on December 28, 1972, the original trial date and the date on which Epps insisted that he be tried. In the case before us the only issue is whether the administrative judge erred when he found that there was good cause to postpone the appellant’s case along with the cases of the other defendants.

In Epps , at 117, the Court although finding them factually distinguishable from Epps , cites several federal cases which support the ruling of the trial court in this case that the desire of the State for a joint trial and the acquiescence of three of the four defendants to the postponement may amount to good cause within the constitutional speedy trial setting. See United ³³⁹ States v. Annerino, 495 F. 2d 1159, 1162-64 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Phillips, 482 F. 2d 191, 195-96 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1114 (1973); United States v. DiTienne, 468 F. 2d 151, 156-58 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 911 (1973); United States v. Carosiello, 439 F. 2d 942, 944-45 (3d Cir. 1971); Hedgepeth v. United States, 364 F. 2d 684, 687-89 (D.C. Cir. 1966). We pointed out in Lattisaw, supra, at 27 , that delays are not always attributable to prosecutorial laxity and that the problem of picking a suitable trial date ’’increases in complexity when there are multiple defendants.” As