Satterfield v. State

John Orlando Satterfield v. State of Maryland, Misc. No. 10, September Term, 2022. Opinion by Hotten, J. MD. CODE ANN., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ARTICLE § 8-201 – POST- CONVICTION DNA TESTING – EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE Criminal Procedure Article § 8-201(d)(1) of the Maryland Code provides that a person convicted of a crime of violence is entitled to post-conviction DNA testing, upon a showing that “a reasonable probability exists that the DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or sentencing[]” and “the requested DNA test employs a method of testing generally accepted within the relevant scientific community.” Petitioner failed to demonstrate that there was a reasonable probability that the results of any DNA testing would be exculpatory or mitigating.

As such, the circuit court properly denied Petitioner’s petition for post- conviction DNA testing. MARYLAND RULES 4-701 ET SEQ. – POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING – PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS UNDER MD. CODE ANN., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ARTICLE § 8-201 “Maryland Rules 4-701 et seq. govern post-conviction DNA testing procedures.” Edwards v. State, 453 Md. 174 , 189 n.12, 160 A.3d 642 , 651 n.12 (2017); Md. Rule 4-701 (“The Rules in this Chapter apply to proceedings filed under [Md.] Code [Ann.], Criminal Procedure Article, § 8-201.”). The Supreme Court of Maryland held that the circuit court: (1) was not required to hold a hearing prior to denying Petitioner’s petition for post- conviction DNA testing under Maryland Rule 4-709(b)(1)(B); (2) was not required to consider Petitioner’s reply to the State’s answer nor was Petitioner entitled to submit a reply under Maryland Rule 4-707(a); (3) failed to comply with Maryland Rule 4-709(e); however, remand would be futile, Jackson v. State, 448 Md. 387, 411 , 139 A.3d 976, 990 (2016).

Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court’s denial of Petitioner’s petition for post-conviction DNA testing. Circuit Court for Baltimore County IN THE SUPREME COURT Case No.: 03-K-06-004604 Argued: February 3, 2023 OF MARYLAND* Misc. No. 10 September Term, 2022 __________________________________ JOHN ORLANDO SATTERFIELD v. STATE OF MARYLAND __________________________________ Fader, C.J., Watts, Hotten, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, JJ. __________________________________ Opinion by Hotten, J. __________________________________ Filed: April 24, 2023 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2023-09-05 16:23-04:00 Gregory Hilton, Clerk *During the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022.

The Post-Conviction DNA Testing Statute, Md. Code Ann., Criminal Procedure (“Crim. Proc.”) § 8-201, allows persons convicted of a crime of violence to file a petition: “(1) for DNA testing of scientific identification evidence that the State possesses that is related to the judgment of conviction[]” or “(2) for a search by a law enforcement agency of a law enforcement data base or log for the purpose of identifying the source of physical evidence used for DNA testing.” A circuit court is required to order DNA testing of such evidence if two conditions are met. See id. § 8-201(d). First, the petitioner must demonstrate that “a reasonable probability exists that the DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or sentencing[.]” Id. § 8-201(d)(1)(i).

Second, “the requested DNA test [must] employ[] a method of testing generally accepted within the relevant scientific community.” Id. § 8-201(d)(1)(ii). If the circuit court denies the petition, the petitioner can directly appeal to this Court. Id. § 8-201(k)(6). In this case, Petitioner, John Orlando Satterfield, was convicted of fourteen criminal offenses, including first-degree murder, and sentenced to life imprisonment plus 150 years.

Pursuant to Crim. Proc. § 8-201(b)(1), Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction DNA Testing (the “Petition”). The Circuit Court for Baltimore County denied the Petition without a hearing or an explanation. On appeal, Petitioner seeks our review of the circuit court’s denial of his Petition, as well as the circuit court’s decision not to conduct a hearing or allow the opportunity to reply to the State’s answer to his Petition.

For the reasons outlined below, we shall affirm the circuit court’s denial. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND Background The testimony at trial established the following. On September 8, 2006, at approximately 9:30 p.m., Randy Hudson, also known as “Scooby,” drove to Dundalk located in Baltimore County to pick up his daughter from the home of her grandparents, Anna and Eric Fountain. Mr. Hudson parked behind the house.

As Mr. Hudson unlocked the back door to enter the home, he was “approached from behind by someone who grabbed him [around] the throat.” Mr. Hudson testified that the man had “big arms[,]” but was unable to describe him because the man had “a shirt pulled over his face.” The man pushed Mr. Hudson into a nearby alley where two other men appeared. Mr. Hudson testified that the men “were wearing Yankees baseball caps[]” and were armed. The men demanded money from Mr. Hudson. According to Mr. Hudson, the men “beat him, [] took $3,000” from him, and asked for “the rest” of his money.

Ms. Fountain testified that she and her granddaughter were sleeping in the living room when a noise inside the house awakened her. According to Petitioner’s description of Ms. Fountain’s trial testimony, two men “burst into her home, neither of whom [were] Petitioner.” The men yelled at Ms. Fountain, “pointed a gun at her, told her not to look at them, and took her cell phone.” The two men ran up and down her steps a few times until they went back outside. They subsequently returned, “dragg[ing] [Mr. Hudson] into the house, and up the stairs.” Ms. Fountain heard gunshots. The two men ran back downstairs and left the home.

Ms. Fountain went upstairs and discovered her husband on the floor 2 bleeding, and Mr. Hudson lying on the bed. Ms. Fountain called 911 from Mr. Hudson’s cell phone. Upon arrival, Officer Thomas Wehrle noticed the front door “was slightly ajar.” He peered inside to see Ms. Fountain “kneeling down on the floor . . . holding a small child, . . . hysterical and crying.” Ms. Fountain directed Officer Wehrle to “hurry up,” advising that Mr. Hudson and Mr. Fountain were upstairs. Officer Wehrle found Mr. Hudson lying on the bed, bleeding and “gasping for air.” He also found Mr. Fountain on the floor “completely unresponsive” and not “breathing, . . . as if he’d been deceased.” Dr. Carol Allan, an Assistant Medical Examiner for the State, performed the autopsy on Mr. Fountain.

Dr. Allan testified that Mr. Fountain “sustained two gunshot wounds to his torso, one near his right shoulder and another to his upper abdomen.” Dr. Allan determined that the cause of death was gunshot wounds and that “the manner of death [was] homicide.” Chalene Smith, an informant for the Baltimore City Police Department, contacted the Baltimore City police with information related to the crime. Thereafter, the Baltimore City authorities contacted the Baltimore County authorities, sharing Ms. Smith’s information. Detective Craig Schrott, a member of the Homicide Unit of the Baltimore County Police Department, interviewed Ms. Smith in September 2006. Detective Schrott testified that, during the course of the investigation, authorities first identified Darnell Smith as a suspect.

Authorities “[t]hen [] were able to identify [Petitioner] and Christian Lee[]” as suspects. 3 Detective Gary Childs, also a member of the Homicide Unit, interviewed another witness to the crime, Tori Kucz. Ms. Kucz testified that, on the evening in question, she and Petitioner were running errands. Ms. Kucz and Petitioner “drove around” until they picked up Mr. Smith, Mr. Lee, and Ms. Smith. Ms. Kucz overheard in conversation that Petitioner “didn’t like [Mr. Hudson][.]” Ms. Kucz testified that she “knew that we were goin’ to do somethin’ that shouldn’t be happenin’[.] I knew that we were goin’ to do somethin’ that wasn’t right.” She testified that they drove to a “liquor store[,]” smoked marijuana, and drove to the Dundalk area near Ms. Fountain’s home.

According to Ms. Kucz, Petitioner told her to park the car in the alley on Ms. Fountain’s street. The group subsequently “walked to a park,” where they sat and drank. A few hours later, Petitioner, Mr. Smith, and Mr. Lee told Ms. Kucz and Ms. Smith “to stay there[]” and “that they were gonna be back[.]” Ms. Kucz testified that the men left, “came back shortly thereafter[,]” and “left again.” Ms. Kucz testified that she later had to relieve herself, prompting her and Ms. Smith to walk up the street and “around to the back alley, where [her] car was parked.” Ms. Smith “stopped and went to the bathroom first, then further down the alley by [her] car [Ms. Kucz] stopped and” relieved herself. Ms. Kucz testified that, as she was “goin’ to the bathroom in the alley,” Mr. Lee and Mr. Smith “come runnin’ down the alley,” screaming to “start the car[.]” According to Ms. Kucz, Mr. Lee and Mr. Smith “were yelling[]” and “anxious or . . . afraid or something.” Ms. Kucz started the car, “made a left out of the alley,” and a few moments later, picked up Petitioner on the “side of the street[.]” Ms. Kucz testified that, “[w]hen [Petitioner] got in the car, he was fussin’ at me because I didn’t answer my 4 cell phone[]” and that he yelled at Mr. Smith and Mr. Lee that “nobody was supposed to get shot.

Nobody was supposed -- this wasn’t supposed to happen.” Ms. Kucz explained that: [Mr. Lee] . . . was saying he don’t know what happened. The man came at him and he just pulled the trigger, that he didn’t mean to do it. He kept sayin’ that he shot the man, he think he dead. I think I [killed] him, yo.

You know that color white? He was that color white they get before they die. . . . [T]his was not supposed to happen, that nobody was supposed to get hurt or die. The police later searched Mr. Smith’s home and uncovered “a gun, ammunition, and a sweatshirt.” It was determined that the gun and ammunition recovered were used to shoot and kill Mr. Fountain. Authorities also recovered a cigarette butt from the alley that was “laying on the ground near the fence opening” behind the Fountains’ house.

A Forensic Technician with the Baltimore County Police Department testified that the cigarette butt was recovered with “other trash and debris in the alley[]” and “was neither wet, dirty[,] or damaged.” The DNA on the cigarette butt was later determined to be that of a female, thereby excluding Petitioner as a source of DNA. Detective Michael Forsyth also testified that, on the evening in question, a cell tower “[l]ess than a mile[]” from Ms. Fountain’s home intercepted a call from a cell phone associated with Petitioner. Petitioner’s DNA was also collected from a hat recovered in the backyard of the Fountains’ home. Petitioner was subsequently arrested on September 29, 2006.

Legal Proceedings On February 7, 2008, Petitioner was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County of fourteen counts, including first-degree murder, armed robbery, and first-degree assault. On March 19, the circuit court sentenced Petitioner to life plus 150 years. That 5 same day, Petitioner noted an appeal to the Appellate Court of Maryland.1 On April 15, 2010, the Appellate Court affirmed the convictions. On January 7, 2015, Petitioner filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief pursuant to the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act.

See Crim. Proc. §§ 7-101–109. The circuit court conducted a post-conviction hearing on September 24. On October 27, by way of written memorandum and order, the circuit court denied the petition.

The circuit court explained that: Along with the testimony of the firearms expert, and Ms. Kucz’s testimony, the [S]tate also relied on DNA evidence and cell phone records to tie the three co-defendants to the crime. Ultimately this evidence led to the conviction of Petitioner resulting in the Post-Conviction Petition that this court is now addressing. Petitioner filed leave to appeal, which was denied by the Appellate Court on July 28, 2016. On August 24, 2022, Petitioner filed the Petition.

Pursuant to Crim. Proc. § 8- 201(d)(1)(i), Petitioner asserted that there was a reasonable probability that DNA testing of the cigarette butt from the alley “has the scientific potential to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence.” The State filed an answer and motion to dismiss on August 30. On September 5, the circuit court denied the Petition without a hearing or explanation. On October 3, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.

The circuit court denied the motion on October 27, finding that the Petition “was properly denied.” 1 During the November 8, 2022 general election, the voters of Maryland ratified a constitutional amendment changing the name of the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland to the Appellate Court of Maryland. The name change took effect on December 14, 2022. 6 On October 10, 2022, Petitioner filed a notice of appeal. By order dated October 27, the Appellate Court transferred Petitioner’s appeal to this Court. Petitioner filed a Motion to Supplement the Record on January 24, 2023, whereby he sought to include the transcripts of the police interviews with Ms. Smith and Ms. Kucz.

We denied the motion on January 30.2 DISCUSSION Standard of Review This Court “reviews without deference the legal standard that a [circuit] court uses in ruling on a petition[]” for post-conviction DNA testing. Fuster v. State, 437 Md. 653, 671 , 89 A.3d 1114, 1124 (2014) (citation omitted); Edwards v. State, 453 Md. 174, 185 , 160 A.3d 642, 649 (2017) (“Because we are asked to interpret the language in the post- conviction DNA testing statute, . . . our review is plenary.” (footnote and citations omitted)). “We review a circuit court’s determination of whether a reasonable probability exists that the DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence for clear error.” Givens v. State, 459 Md. 694, 705 , 188 A.3d 903, 909 (2018) (citation omitted). “Under this standard, if there is any competent evidence to support the factual findings below, those findings cannot be held to be clearly erroneous.” Id., 188 A.3d at 909 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 2 During oral arguments, defense counsel stated that she had the discs containing the transcripts in her possession at the time the Petition was filed. 7 Parties’ Contentions Petitioner raises two issues on appeal. First, Petitioner reiterates that a “reasonable probability” exists that testing the cigarette butt had the potential to “produce exculpatory evidence[]” relevant to his claim. Petitioner believes that the DNA testing could “implicate and/or provide impeachment evidence” against Ms. Smith and Ms. Kucz before the jury.

Petitioner argues that Ms. Smith and Ms. Kucz possessed the “motivation to lie and implicate others to avoid prosecution[.]” According to Petitioner, this would lead “the jury to question their credibility as witnesses, thus making the evidence exculpatory.” Petitioner contends that he would not have been convicted, but for Ms. Kucz’s testimony. Second, Petitioner argues that the circuit court erred in dismissing the Petition without conducting a hearing or providing the opportunity to reply to the State’s answer to his Petition. Relying on Blake v. State, 418 Md. 445 , 15 A.3d 787 (2011) (“Blake II”), Petitioner maintains that he should “be given an opportunity to respond and challenge the State’s representation[]” as a matter of “[f]undamental fairness[.]” He, therefore, believes remand is appropriate. In response, the State asserts that DNA testing of the cigarette butt would not have resulted in the discovery of exculpatory evidence.

Rather, it “may have, at best, amounted to impeachment evidence against the credibility of” Ms. Smith and Ms. Kucz—“not exculpatory evidence or mitigating evidence as required for relief under [Crim. Proc.] § 8- 201.” According to the State, “even if the DNA from the cigarette butt had been tested and determined to match that of either [Ms.] Smith or [Ms.] Kucz, that evidence, as a matter of law, would be neither exculpatory nor mitigating.” Furthermore, even if the DNA testing 8 revealed Ms. Kucz or Ms. Smith as “aiders and [abettors] . . . or . . . could have been used to impeach their credibility,” such a showing would be “immaterial to the standard of relief under [Crim. Proc.] § 8-201.” Such evidence, the State maintains, would not “clear [Petitioner] of guilt or tend to establish his innocence.” Finally, on the procedural issue, the State contends that both Crim. Proc. § 8-201 and Maryland Rule 4-707 authorize the circuit court, upon consideration of the State’s answer, to deny the Petition without a hearing and his response to the State’s answer.

Analysis A. Crim. Proc. § 8-201: The Post-Conviction DNA Testing Statute “[I]n 2001, the General Assembly enacted [Crim. Proc.] § 8-201, which authorizes post-conviction DNA testing.” Givens, 459 Md. at 706 , 188 A.3d at 910 . “The General Assembly intended [Crim. Proc. § 8-201] to serve as ‘a mechanism for a person who has been convicted of certain serious crimes to obtain exculpatory or mitigating evidence through the DNA testing of items related to that conviction.’” Id., 188 A.3d at 910 (quoting Simms v. State, 445 Md. at 163, 167, 126 A.3d at 28 2015)); Edwards, 453 Md. at 188 , 160 A.3d at 651 (“The statute was enacted . . . to provide an avenue for the exoneration of the actually innocent.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Crim. Proc. § 8-201(b)(1) provides that “a person who is convicted of a crime of violence[3] . . . may file a petition: [] for DNA testing of scientific identification evidence 3 “Crime[s] of violence” are defined by Md. Code Ann., Criminal Law § 14-101 . Petitioner was convicted of fourteen counts, including first-degree murder, armed robbery, and first-degree assault. Petitioner’s offenses, by definition, qualify as violent crimes under Crim.

Proc. § 8-201. See id. § 14-101. 9 that the State possesses that is related to the judgment of conviction[.]” “Scientific identification evidence” is defined as evidence that: (i) is related to an investigation or prosecution that resulted in a judgment of conviction; (ii) is in the actual or constructive possession of a law enforcement agency or agent of a law enforcement agency; and (iii) contains biological evidence from which DNA may be recovered that may produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of a convicted person of wrongful conviction or sentencing if subject to DNA testing. Id. § 8-201(a)(5).4 Under Crim. Proc. § 8-201(d), a court must “order DNA testing if the petitioner demonstrates that two conditions are met.” Givens, 459 Md. at 707 , 188 A.3d at 910 (citation omitted).

First, a court must find “a reasonable probability exists that the DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or sentencing[.]” Crim. Proc. § 8-201(d)(1)(i) (emphasis added). Second, a court must also find that “the requested DNA test employs a method of testing generally accepted within the relevant scientific community.” Id. § 8- 201(d)(1)(ii). If it is determined that “‘a genuine factual issue as to whether the evidence exists, ordinarily the court should hold a hearing.’” Brown v. State, 470 Md. 503, 546 , 236 A.3d 488, 512 (2020) (quoting Arey v. State, 400 Md. 491, 507 , 929 A.2d 501, 510 (2007)). “If 4 The cigarette butt at issue “meet[s] the statutory definition of ‘scientific identification evidence.’ . . . [This] item[] [is] related to the investigation of [Petitioner] to the extent that the police collected th[is] item[] from the scene of crime for processing.” Edwards, 453 Md. at 190 n.13, 160 A.3d at 652 n.13 (citations omitted). 10 the results of the post[-]conviction DNA testing are unfavorable to the petitioner, the court shall dismiss the petition.” Crim.

Proc. § 8-201(i)(1). A petitioner “has a direct right of appeal to this Court in cases involving post[-]conviction petitions for DNA testing[.]” Fuster, 437 Md. at 663 n.2, 89 A.3d at 1120 n.2 (citing Crim. Proc. § 8-201(k)(6)). B. The Exculpatory or Mitigating Evidence Against this backdrop, we first address the issue of whether a “reasonable probability exists” that the requested testing of the cigarette butt “has the scientific potential to produce exculpatory evidence relevant to” Petitioner’s claim.

Edwards, 453 Md. at 190 , 160 A.3d at 652 . We hold that, as a matter of law, the facts alleged do not afford Petitioner relief. As an initial matter, Petitioner is correct that he need not show that the DNA testing has a reasonable probability to exonerate him under Crim. Proc. § 8-201(d)(1)(i).

We have held that, under Crim. Proc. § 8-201(d)(1)(i), “a ‘reasonable probability’ requires more than mere possibility, rather, it is a fair likelihood that something is true.” Givens, 459 Md. at 707 , 188 A.3d at 910 (emphasis added) (citing Beaman v. State, 453 Md. 407, 420 , 162 A.3d 864, 872 (2017)). As we explained in Givens: The petitioner’s burden to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the evidence would be exculpatory does not require “establish[ing] that the result would have been different if the DNA results sought were known at the time of trial.” The results need not exonerate the petitioner or prove that someone else committed the crime. Rather, “exculpatory” in [Crim.

Proc.] § 8-201 means only “evidence that would tend to clear the accused of guilt, or tend to establish his or her innocence.” To satisfy his burden, [the petitioner] must demonstrate that the testing he seeks has the scientific potential to produce evidence that would tend to show that he did not commit the crime, or that he is innocent. 11 Id. at 707–08, 188 A.3d at 910–11 (internal citations omitted). As such, Petitioner must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that the testing of the cigarette butt “has the scientific potential” to produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence “that would tend to show that he did not commit the crime[.]” Id., 188 A.3d at 910–11 (internal citations omitted); Edwards, 453 Md. at 196 , 160 A.3d at 655 (“We thus hold that ‘exculpatory’ under [Crim. Proc.] § 8-201(d)(1) means evidence that would tend to clear the accused of guilt, or tend to establish his or her innocence.”). Furthermore, “[i]n assessing whether there is a reasonable probability that DNA testing may produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence,” a court may consider the following non-exhaustive factors: (1) “the nature of the item (e.g., whether it is an instrumentality of the crime),” (2) “the physical proximity between where the item was located and where the crime occurred,” and (3) “the temporal proximity between when the perpetrator touched the item and when the crime occurred.” Edwards, 453 Md. at 199 , 160 A.3d at 657 . “Other relevant factors include the temporal proximity between the crime and the discovery of the item, the condition of the item, and the evidence the jury heard regarding that item.” Givens, 459 Md. at 714 , 188 A.3d at 914 (citation omitted). “To assess whether a reasonable probability exists that test results could produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence, a court must examine the facts of the crime, as well as the petitioner’s assertions.” Id., 188 A.3d at 914 (citations omitted).

Applying Edwards and Givens to the instant case, we conclude that Petitioner has failed to establish that DNA testing of the cigarette butt is warranted. While the cigarette butt was within “physical proximity” to the crime, it was not an “instrumentality of the 12 crime” nor touched by any of the three men who unlawfully entered the Fountains’ home. See Edwards, 453 Md. at 199–200, 160 A.3d at 657 (finding reasonable probability where the item requested for DNA testing was within “physical proximity” of the crime and handled by the perpetrator immediately before the crime occurred). Assuming, arguendo, the DNA testing of the cigarette butt matched with either Ms. Kucz’s or Ms. Smith’s DNA, Petitioner contends that this match “would have drawn the jury to question their credibility as witnesses, thus making the evidence exculpatory.” We disagree.

As the State recalls, the defense questioned “[t]he credibility of both women . . . at trial. Ms. Kucz was vigorously cross-examined by the defense.” While Ms. Smith did not testify at trial, “defense counsel emphasized [their] alleged ‘motivation to lie’[5] about the events in question.” As the State observes, both the jury and the court were “well aware” of Petitioner’s involvement in the crimes and that, on the night in question, both Ms. Kucz and Ms. Smith smoked and walked through the alley. Ms. Kucz’s testimony placed her and Ms. Smith at the scene of the crime. Ms. Kucz also testified that she and Ms. Smith smoked on the night in question.

The DNA on the cigarette butt was determined to be that of a woman; therefore, the jury and the court knew that Petitioner was excluded as a DNA source. Contrary to Petitioner’s contentions, finding Ms. Kucz’s or Ms. Smith’s 5 Petitioner is the father of Ms. Kucz’s children. While Ms. Kucz “love[s]” Petitioner, Ms. Kucz testified that she “was involved in somethin’ that I shouldn’t have been involved in. . . . [T]his man died . . . and I was close to that. . . . I’m hopin’ this will [] put me at peace[.]” Additionally, Ms. Kucz testified knowing that she “could still be charged in this case.” 13 DNA on the cigarette butt would not undermine their credibility because such a DNA result would position them exactly where Ms. Kucz’s testimony already placed them.

Even if the DNA evidence on the cigarette butt had been a match with either Ms. Kucz’s or Ms. Smith’s DNA, it would not have tended to “disprove or negate” Petitioner’s guilt. Id. at 200 , 160 A.3d at 657 ; Givens, 459 Md. at 716 , 188 A.3d at 915 (noting that “[t]he absence of DNA does not tend to clear [Petitioner] of guilt or establish that he was innocent.” (emphasis added)). Finding either of their DNA on the cigarette butt “is not exculpatory or inculpatory.” Givens, 459 Md. at 715 , 188 A.3d at 915 . Ms. Fountain and Mr. Hudson both testified that three men were at the scene of the crime and entered the Fountains’ home, including Petitioner.

It follows that the DNA testing of the cigarette butt from a female would not exculpate Petitioner from being present at the scene. Again, a Forensic Technician with the Baltimore County Police Department testified that the cigarette butt was recovered with “other trash and debris in the alley[]” and “was neither wet, dirty[,] or damaged.” The cigarette butt was “laying on the ground near the fence opening behind the vehicle parked in the backyard[]” of the Fountains’ house. The technician verified that there were a “group of homes[]” within the vicinity of the alley. It is possible that the cigarette butt belonged to someone else entirely.

See id. at 716 , 188 A.3d at 915 . As we stated in Givens, “[f]inding a third party’s DNA would not suggest that someone else committed the crime[.]” Id., 188 A.3d at 915 . “At best, this result could indicate that there was another individual . . . in [the alley] at some unknown time, and [] that individual also came into contact with [the cigarette butt] at some other unknown time.” Wallace v. State, 452 Md. 558, 578 , 158 A.3d 521, 532 (2017). 14 There are several “logical explanations” for why DNA testing of the cigarette butt would not produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence. Givens, 459 Md. at 717 , 188 A.3d at 916 . “‘[T]here is enough other incriminating evidence and an explanation for the DNA result[]’” to establish Petitioner’s guilt. Id., 188 A.3d at 916 (quoting Dist.

Atty’s Off. for the Third Jud. Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 62 , 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2316 (2009)). It follows that Petitioner “has failed to show that there is a reasonable probability that the results of any testing . . . would be exculpatory or mitigating[]” under Crim. Proc. § 8-201(d)(1)(i).

Id., 188 A.3d at 916 . Rather, “[i]t simply maintains the status quo.” Id. at 716, 188 A.3d at 915 . We, therefore, conclude that Petitioner is not entitled to testing under Crim. Proc. § 8-201(d)(1)(i).

C. Crim. Proc. § 8-201’s Procedural Requirements We next address whether the circuit court erred in dismissing the Petition without: (1) providing