Savoy v. State

BISHOP, Judge. After a bench trial in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, appellant, Woodrow Raymond Savoy, was convicted of two counts of manslaughter under Md.Ann.Code art. 27, § 388 (1985 Cum.Supp.) and sentenced to two consecutive five year terms. Appellant asks whether the court erred in imposing two consecutive sentences upon conviction of two counts of manslaughter where the deaths arose out of a single incident of grossly negligent driving. At trial appellant agreed to proceed on a not guilty statement of facts as to the two counts of manslaughter.

Appellant offered no evidence in defense of the charges, and was found guilty on both counts. At sentencing, appellant argued in mitigation that any sentences imposed should ⁵⁹² not run consecutively since all charges resulted from one incident. The court was unpersuaded and sentenced appellant to the statutory maximum of five years on each count, time to run consecutively. ANALYSIS Appellant contends that the trial court’s imposition of consecutive five year sentences constitutes an illegal sentence.

Although no objection to the sentences was raised below, we nevertheless address the merit of appellant’s contention since the issue of an illegal sentence should ordinarily be reviewed on direct appeal even if no objection was made in the trial court. See Walczak v. State, 302 Md. 422, 427 , 488 A.2d 949 (1985); Loud v. State, 63 Md.App. 702 , 708 n. 3, 493 A.2d 1092 , cert. denied, 304 Md. 299 , 498 A.2d 1185 (1985); Cook v. State, 62 Md.App. 634, 643 , 490 A.2d 1311 (1985). In appellant’s view, despite the occurrence of two deaths, only one sentence is permissible under art. 27, § 388 because only one incident of grossly negligent driving took place. In support of this view, appellant argues that it is unclear whether the legislative intent of art. 27, § 388 is punishment for each death caused or punishment for each act of grossly negligent driving resulting in death, regardless of the number of victims.

Because of this alleged uncertainty, he asserts that the rule of lenity mandates Maryland courts to interpret art. 27, § 388 consistent with his reading of the statute. We hold that appellant’s argument is without merit and that the legislative intent of art. 27, § 388 is clearly to create a separately punishable offense for each death resulting from an offender’s grossly negligent driving. Section 388 provides: Every person causing the death of another as the result of the driving, operation or control of an automobile, motor vehicle, motorboat, locomotive, engine, car, streetcar, train or other vehicle in a grossly negligent manner, ⁵⁹³ shall be guilty of a misdemeanor to be known as “manslaughter by automobile, motor vehicle, motorboat, locomotive, engine, car, streetcar, train or other vehicle,” and the person so convicted shall be sentenced to jail or the house of correction for not more than 5 years, or be fined not more than $1,000.00 or be both fined and imprisoned. In any indictment or warrant for manslaughter by automobile, motor vehicle, motorboat, locomotive, engine, car, streetcar, train or other vehicle, it shall not be necessary to set forth the manner and means of death.

It shall be sufficient to use a formula substantially to the following effect: “That A-B on the ... day of ..., nineteen hundred and .. at the County (City) aforesaid, unlawfully, in a grossly negligent manner did kill or slay C-D.” In interpreting this section, the cardinal rule of statutory construction is to determine the legislative intent. Reid v. State, 302 Md. 811, 816 , 490 A.2d 1289 (1985); Willis v. State,