Saylor v. Plaine

Robinson, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Jonathan Plaine died in the year 1835, having by will disposed of his property as follows: “ I give and bequeath unto my wife, Lydia Plaine, all my property, both real and personal, that now belongeth or in anywise appertaineth unto me, or that may or shall at any time hereafter belong' unto me, to be wholly hers during her widowhood, out of which property she is to pay all of my legal debts, and at the termination of her widowhood, I give and bequeath unto Martin Diehl, Jacob Saylor, Thomas Ogle and Abraham Wolfe, of Martin, all the property, both real and personal, that my wife shall possess at the termination of her widowhood, to dispose of according to his or their verbal directions, should her widowhood terminate in death; but should her widowhood terminate in marriage, I give and bequeath unto the said Diehl, Saylor, Ogle and "Wolfe, only three-fourths of the property, both real and personal, that shall be pos ¹⁶³ sessed by the said Lydia Plaine at the termination of her widowhood by marriage, and the said three-fourths to be disposed of according to the verbal directions of the said Diehl, Saylor, Ogle and Wolfe, or either of them; and the remaining one-fourth I will and bequeath unto the said Plaine to be wholly hers to make use of as she may see or think proper.” Lydia Plaine, the widow, lived until 1866, and after death there was found among her papers, carefully put away, an instrument of writing, signed by the testator, Jonathan Plaine, without date, containing directions to the said Diehl, Saylor, Ogle and Wolfe, as to the manner in which he desired them to dispose of the property upon the termination of the widowhood of his wife, either by marriage or death. On the back of this instrument was found the following endorsement: “ This paper with the contents is not to go to Court, but to be kept at home in the hands of the executors, or Diehl, Saylor, Ogle or Wolfe.” The first question to be decided is, whether Diehl, Saylor and others take a beneficial interest in the property under the will, or was it devised to them in trust ? We deem it unnecessary to review the many cases in which this question has arisen upon the construction of wills.

It is sufficient to say that no positive rule can be laid down which shall determine in all cases what terms or expressions will carry a beneficial interest, or what will create a trust; Courts, refusing to be governed by arbitrary rules or mere technical phraseology, will look to the whole will in order to ascertain the intention of the testator. The words “ Trust ” or Trustees have, it is true, a defined and technical meaning, and are more generally as well as more properly used, but it is well settled that there is no magic in particular words, and any language ¹⁶⁴ which satisfactorily indicates an intention to stamp upon the devise the character of a trust will be sufficient. If the intention be not plainly expressed, or if the language used be ambiguous, there are certain well-established rules which Courts will invoke to aid them in the construction of the instrument. The heir is always favored in law, and is not to be excluded on mere conjecture.

On the contrary, there must be satisfactory evidence of an intention to give a beneficial interest to the devisee, and not merely negative evidence, that no benefit was intended to the heir. “ For,” says Lewin on Trusts, 181, “the trust results to him not so much on the ground of intention, but because the devisor has declared no intention.” In regard to the will before us, although it is inartificially drawn, and its provisions somewhat curious, yet looking to its whole context, we think there can be but little doubt as to its proper construction. In the first place, the testator devises to his wife during her widowhood, all the property, real and personal, with remainder over to Diehl, Saylor, Ogle and Wolfe, “ to dispose of according to his or their verbal directions.” In the event of her marriage, he gives to her one-fourth of the property, “ to be wholly hers to make use of as she may see or think proper,” and the remaining three-fourths to the said Diehl and others, “ to be disposed of according to the verbal directions of the said donees or either of them.” Now we cannot fail to observe the striking difference in the language used in the devise to the wife, and in the limitation over to Diehl and others. In the former he directs that the property shall be wholly hers, to make use of as she may see or think proper. The intention to give the wife a beneficial interest is plainly expressed, and the language used is clear and unambiguous.

The property is to be “ ivholly hers” during the widowhood, and in the event of marriage, one-fourth is to be “ wholly hers, to ¹⁶⁵ make use of as she may see or think proper.” But in the limitation over to Diehl, Saylor, Ogle and Wolfe, these significant words are entirely omitted. lie does not say that the property shall be wholly theirs upon the termination of the intermediate estate, but devises it to them “to be disposed of according to their verbal directions, or the directions of either of them.” If it were the purpose to limit the estate over to them in fee, why authorize them to dispose of it according to their verbal directions ? Can we presume that the testator did not know that a devise of the fee necessarily carried with it the power of disposing of the property in any manner which the devisees might see proper ? Again, is it reasonable to presume that he intended to give to each a beneficial interest, and at the same time to authorize either one of them to dispose of