Scheihing v. Baltimore & OHIO R. R.

Sloan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. George Elmer Scheihing, about eighteen years before his death at State Sanitarium, Maryland, on February ¹⁷¹ 28, 1939, was an employee of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company. On October 16, 1930, he applied for membership in the Relief Department of the Railroad, an insurance branch of the railroad, for a policy of $2,000, for death for natural causes only, and named his wife, Pamela W. Scheihing, the appellant, as beneficiary, “or to whom I may hereafter from time to time designate in writing by way of substitution, with the written consent of the superintendent.” It does not appear in the record when, but for a long time before his death, George E. Scheihing and his wife, Pamela, had been separated, she living since the separation at Norfolk, Virginia. On July 9, 1938, he obtained a decree of absolute divorce from his wife Pamela, and on the 11th day of July, 1938, he was married to the appellee, Maude E. Scheihing.

On the 28th day of February, 1939, George E. Scheihing died of tuberculosis at the Maryland State Sanitarium. The 8th day of August, 1938, George E. Scheihing applied to the Superintendent of the Relief Department of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad for a change of beneficiary of his insurance policy from Pamela Scheihing to his wife, Maude E. Scheihing, and on the same day the application was approved by W. M. Kennedy, the superintendent. After the death of George E. Scheihing, on March 7, 1940, Pamela Scheihing filed a bill against the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, alleging that George Scheihing, unknown to her, until the day of his funeral, by fraud and perjured testimony had procured a divorce from her, and that simultaneously with the filing of that bill, she had filed one to set aside and vacate the decree of divorce; that it was not until after the death of George E. Scheihing that she learned of the change of beneficiary in the policy of insurance, and that if the decree of divorce be set aside, she would, under the by-laws of the Association be restored as beneficiary. The bill then prayed the passage of an order restraining the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company from paying any monies or other benefits which may accrue ¹⁷² until the final disposition of her petition to set asj.de the decree of divorce. . .

The Railroad Company, answered this bill, and later Maude E. Scheihing asked leave to. be. made a party defendant, and prayed an order, on the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company to show- cause why it .should. not pay the proceeds of the insurance, policy to. her. This, petition was also answered by the Railroad Company. Both of its answers disclaimed any interest in the controversy and after the answer, of Pamela Scheihing to the petition of Maude E. Scheihing, the Railroad Company paid the sum of two thousand dollars in court, and thereafter the case proceeded with Pamela Scheihing as .plaintiff and Maude E. Scheihing as defendant, and it is from a-decree directing the clerk of the .Circuit Court No, 2, to pay the fund to Maude E; Scheihing, the plaintiff appeals. It. appears that before the' hearing- in this case, after two days had been ■ consumed in‘ the other case to set aside the decree of divorce, the plaintiff dismissed it. • The plaintiff’s brief and oral argument was practically all taken up with the contention that at the hearing, at the conclusion of which ' the decree was passed, “the appellant was not afforded, an opportunity properly to present her case,” and that “she was, therefore, denied her right to due process of law.” The plaintiff contends that the only matters to be taken up at the hearing were questions of law.

Such procedure is permissible under the Code, 1939, Art. 16, Sec.' 22.6, by which the “court may make an order * *• * and may direct such question of law to be raised for the opinion of the court," either by special case or in such other manner as the court may. deem expedient; and all such proceedings as the decisions of such questions of law may render unnecessary may therefore be stayed.” Such a proceeding is not a demurrer but is intended to be rid of irrelevant questions which have no part in a controversy, so as to leave the decision to the point of the case. In this respeet it much resembles the recent rules of court applicable to cases at law. The court may, of its own ¹⁷³ motion or • order, direct such questions to be decided. Buckler v. Safe Deposit & Trust Company, 115 Md. 222, 225 , 80 A. 899 ; Hall v. Hughes, 119 Md. 487, 494 , 87 A. 387 ; Robinson v. Hospelhorn, 169 Md. 117, 122 , 179 A. 515 , 184 A. 903 , 103 A. L. R. 740; Ruhl v. Wagner, 146 Md. 595, 601 , 127 A. 495 .

The record does not show just what the plaintiff now contends, and that is that the hearing was had for the sole purpose of arguing questions of law. The case had been set down for hearing twice before, with the plaintiff not ready on either occasion. The third time, which is the one now in this court on appeal, the defendant submitted all of her