Maryland case law › Schillinger v. Kratt

Schillinger v. Kratt

25 Md. 49 (1866) · Maryland Court of Appeals
Maryland Court of AppealsDisposition: ReversedGoldsborough, J.✓ Good law
SummaryThis was an action on a promissory note. The plaintiff (appellee) declared on the note and proved its execution and non-payment. The defendant (appellant) pleaded a set-off, claiming that certain articles he had furnished to the plaintiff's wife should be credited against the note. At trial, the court granted instructions that were founded entirely on the admission of the execution and non-payment of the note and did not refer to the evidence offered under the plea of set-off. The effect was to withdraw the set-off evidence from the jury's consideration. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (Goldsborough, J.) held that this was error. The Court explained that the evidence under the plea of set-off should have been submitted to the jury under instructions sufficiently comprehensive to cover the case actually made by the proof. The Court noted that the presumption of law growing out of the rela
Questions presented
  • Whether the trial court erred in granting instructions that were founded altogether upon the admission of the execution and non-payment of the note declared on, and did not refer in any way to the evidence offered under the plea of set off, thereby withdrawing that evidence from the consideration of the jury.
  • Whether the trial court erred in rejecting the appellant's prayer as too general.
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Goldsborough, J., delivered the opinion of this Court: ~We think the instructions contained in the bill of exceptions were improperly granted. They are founded altogether upon the admission of the execution and non-payment of the note declared on, and do not refer in any way to the evidence offered under the plea of set off, and the effect of granting them was to withdraw this evidence from the consideration of the jury. This, in our opinion, was error. The evidence in question should have been submitted to the jury under instructions sufficiently comprehensive to cover the case actually made by the proof.

The presumption of law growing out of the relationship of the parties was, that the articles furnished by the appellant were a gift to the wife of the appellee, and the Court, if it had been called on to do so, might have so instructed the jury. But it was not authorized to find the facts shown by this evidence, although its legal conclusions upon them might have been substantially correct had they been found by the jury according to the evidence. Some of the testimony tended to support the plea of set off, but other portions of it, if believed by the jury, may have been sufficient in their 55 judgment, supported by tbe presumption of law, to establish a state of case which would defeat that defence. The prayer offered by the appellant was too general to meet this view of the evidence, and for that reason was properly rejected.

(Decided June 1st, 1866.) Judgment reversed, a/nd procedendo awarded.