Schindel v. Schindel

Bart or, J., delivered the opinion of this court. The bill in this case is filed by the appellant against her husband, the appellee, claiming — 1st, an account of the rents, produce and profits of the real and personal estate belonging ³¹² to the wife at the time of the marriage, and which are in the hands and possession of the appellee. 2nd, that the husband may-be restrained by injunction from collecting the rents, profits and produce of her real estate, and from managing, controlling, renting, or leasing, or in any way intermeddling with her said real estate. 3rd, that the complainant may have the full enjoyment of her real and personal estate, to her own sole and separate use. And lastly, for general relief. The record shows that the appellant and appellee were lawfully married on the 8th day of May 1855, and that about the 1st day of November following, the appellant left the residence of her husband, returned to that of her mother, and has ever since been living in a state of separation from him, against his consent.

At the time of the marriage, she was seized and possessed of real and personal estate, which passed into his possession and control, and the claim for specific relief is based upon the construction placed by the appellant upon the several acts of Assembly of 1841, ch. 161, 1842, ch. 293, and 1853, ch. 245, and the 38th section of art. 3rd of the constitution. It has been contended, in support of the bill, that the effect of the several acts of Assembly, and the constitutional provision to which we have referred, is to vest in a married woman a separate and independent estate in all her property, real and personal, exempt from the control of her husband, and entirely free from his marital rights. This court has said, in the decision pronounced at the present term, in the case of Saml. E. Schindel vs. A. J. Schindel.

(ante 108,) that such is not the true construction of these several acts of Assembly. In our opinion, there is nothing either in the constitutional provision, or in any of our statutes, which authorizes us to go to the extent of decreeing the specific relief asked for in this case, or to award the injunction prayed for in the bill. What has been said in the opinion of this court pronounced in the case we have referred to, dispenses with the-necessity of enlarging upon this branch of the case. It is sufficient for us to say, that the constitutional provision which declares ££that the General Assembly shall pass laws necessary to protect the property of the wife from the debts of ³¹³ the husband, during her life, and for securing the same to her issue after her death,” does not operate to change the rights of property acquired by marriage, so as to deprive the husband of all his marital rights secured to him by the common law.

The act of 1853, which was passed in compliance with the constitutional requirement, simply carries out one branch of the duty imposed fay the constitution on the Legislature; that is to say, it protects the property of the wife from the debts of the husband, but does not, in any other respect, alter or impair the marital rights of the husband therein. This view is consistent with the judgments of this court in the cases of Turton vs. Turton, 6 Md. Rep., 375 ; Rawlings vs. Adams, 7 Md. Rep., 26 ; Logan vs. McGill, 8 Md. Rep., 461 ; Peacock vs.