Schmidt v. State

Warren Schmidt v. State of Maryland, No. 2795, September Term, 2018. Argued: October 4, 2019. Opinion by Gould, J. SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT – PROBATION AND RELATED DISPOSITIONS – GROUNDS AND CONSIDERATIONS IN GENERAL Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc.

(“CP”) § 6-220 (2001, 2018 Repl. Vol.), which states that a court may, under certain circumstances, stay the entering of judgment and place a defendant on probation after a guilty verdict, applies to a judgment on a guilty finding or guilty plea that would have otherwise become final upon sentencing. Therefore, CP § 6- 220 does not apply to a judgment that has already been made final through a finding of not criminally responsible (“NCR”). SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT – RECONSIDERATION AND MODIFICATION OF SENTENCE – DISPOSITION – OTHER DISPOSITIONS Md. Rule 4-345(e)(1), granting a court the power to revise a sentence, does not apply to a finding of NCR.

A finding of NCR is not a “sentence” as the term is contemplated by the Rule. Circuit Court for Montgomery County Case No. 121965 REPORTED IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. 2795 September Term, 2018 ______________________________________ WARREN SCHMIDT v. STATE OF MARYLAND ______________________________________ Reed, Beachley, Gould, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Gould, J. ______________________________________ Filed: April 7, 2020 Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. Suzanne Johnson 2020-04-07 13:42-04:00 Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk Appellant Warren Schmidt appeals from the denial by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County of his motion under Md. Rule 4-345(e) to convert a not criminally responsible (“NCR”) finding to a probation before judgment (“PBJ”). We hold that the trial court correctly denied Mr. Schmidt’s motion.

As we explain below, the PBJ statute—Md. Code Ann., Crim. Proc. (“CP”) § 6-220 (2001, 2018 Repl. Vol.)—applies to a guilty finding or guilty plea that would have otherwise become final upon sentencing, not a judgment made final by a finding of NCR.

When Mr. Schmidt decided to plead guilty, he came to a fork in the road: he could either plead NCR or he could proceed to sentencing and seek a PBJ under CP § 6-220. Both options had their own risks and potential benefits. Mr. Schmidt chose the former rather than expose himself to the risks of the latter. With the State’s agreement, the court found him NCR and imposed a five-year conditional release under which he was released to the community subject to the supervision and care of the Department of Mental Health and Hygiene (the “Department”).1 After successfully completing his conditional release, Mr. Schmidt tried to return to that fork in the road and take the other path by requesting a PBJ in order to ultimately have his record expunged.

Finding that the PBJ statute does not apply to defendants found NCR, the circuit court denied Mr. Schmidt’s request. For the reasons explained below, we conclude that the circuit court’s ruling was correct, and in addition we hold that Rule 4-345, which only allows the modification of a “sentence,” does not apply to a finding of NCR. 1 The Department is now known as the “Department of Health.” Accordingly, we affirm. BACKGROUND FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS In October 2012, Mr. Schmidt arrived at Suburban Hospital in Bethesda with an injured wrist. At that time, he was in the midst of a not-yet diagnosed schizophrenic episode.

After a nurse completed drawing his blood, Mr. Schmidt stood up suddenly and began to strangle her. She was eventually rescued, but not before sustaining significant injuries. Based on a pretrial psychiatric evaluation finding that Mr. Schmidt was no longer a danger to himself or to society, Mr. Schmidt and the State agreed that he would plead guilty to first-degree assault and assert (and the State would not contest) a plea of NCR, and the State would agree to supervised conditional release. Pursuant to that agreement, Mr. Schmidt pleaded guilty to first-degree assault and a sentencing hearing was scheduled for a later date.

At the November 7, 2013 sentencing hearing, the court found Mr. Schmidt NCR and imposed a five-year conditional release under the supervision of the Department. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court told Mr. Schmidt that he had 90 days to file a motion for modification. On February 7, 2014, Mr. Schmidt filed a motion for modification under Maryland Rule 4-345. Instead of seeking a prompt hearing, Mr. Schmidt requested that the motion be held in abeyance pending a request for a hearing, so that in the future he could seek to modify his disposition.

The court accepted the motion for filing and agreed to hold the motion in abeyance. 2 More than four years later, on July 18, 2018, Mr. Schmidt requested a hearing on his motion for modification, which the court granted. At the September 20, 2018 hearing, the court questioned whether a PBJ was legally available in Mr. Schmidt’s case because of the NCR finding and requested that the parties provide supplemental briefing on that issue. Mr. Schmidt argued in his supplemental brief that CP § 6-2202 allows a court to “stay the entering of [a judgment]” in cases such as this where the defendant had been found guilty. Specifically, he noted that a “judgment,” not a “conviction,” is what triggers CP § 6-220, and that under Langworthy v. State, 284 Md. 588 (1979), an NCR finding constitutes a final judgment.

Mr. Schmidt also referred to recent changes in expungement law that, he contended, bolstered his position. Under this new legislation, several categories of crimes—including relatively less serious crimes where the defendant had been found to be NCR—could be expunged without a prior PBJ ruling. Mr. Schmidt argued that these changes did not exclude the possibility of expunging other NCR findings through the mechanism of a PBJ. Mr. Schmidt further argued that “the fact that a small category of crimes can be expunged if the defendant has a finding of NCR indicates that for other more serious crimes for which 2 CP § 6-220(b)(1) states: When a defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere or is found guilty of a crime, a court may stay the entering of judgment, defer further proceedings, and place the defendant on probation subject to reasonable conditions if: (i) the court finds that the best interests of the defendant and the public welfare would be served; and (ii) the defendant gives written consent after determination of guilt or acceptance of a nolo contendere plea. 3 there was an NCR finding, a Defendant would have to be granted [a PBJ] before petitioning for expungement.” The State countered that there is no statute or case that would allow for a PBJ after the defendant had been previously found NCR.

According to the State, the discussion of “final judgment” in Langworthy was in the context of determining the appealability of a guilty finding when the defendant is found NCR, and has no bearing on the concept of “judgment” for purposes of CP § 6-220. Further, the State contended that CP § 6-220 only applies when the defendant is placed on probation and that an NCR finding does not contemplate or permit probation. Finally, the State noted that the General Assembly’s recent allowance for the expungement of NCR findings for certain crimes reflected an intent to deny expungement for other crimes. In reply, Mr. Schmidt argued that the State failed to meaningfully distinguish Langworthy or cite to any authority precluding a PBJ for a defendant found NCR.

He also contended that CP § 6-220 does not require a period of probation because, in practice, many cases are disposed of under that section without probation. Finally, he argued that it would be fundamentally unfair to deprive him of a legal mechanism to have his judgment expunged. On November 13, 2018, the court held another hearing where both Mr. Schmidt and the State advanced the arguments set forth in their supplemental filings. The court agreed with the State and explained its finding that Mr. Schmidt was not eligible for a PBJ: . . .

So, in looking at the statutes, looking at the probation before judgment statute and looking at the expungement statutes and looking at the Langworthy case, the legislature has the authority to define those instances 4 in which the probation before judgment is permitted. And they’ve indicated that when a defendant pleads guilty or nolo contendere or is found guilty of a crime, meaning after a trial, the Court may stay the entering of the judgment and defer further proceedings and place the defendant on probation subject to reasonable conditions. So, in this case the defendant admitted his involvement in the case. However, because of an evaluation he was found not criminally responsible.

So, there was no sentence actually imposed rather, he was sent for treatment. And so, at this point, I don’t believe that the probation before judgment is a mechanism, that can be used in a case where a person has been found NCR in a case. Because I believe that in a criminal case, the judgment is, the final judgment in a criminal case is the sentence imposed. It’s the fine, it’s the sentence, it’s the probation.

That is the judgment in a criminal case. And in this case, because of the not criminally responsible finding, there was no final judgment as its understood in the criminal sense. And it’s not a guilty finding for any purpose. And the purpose of the probation before judgment is to remove the guilty finding.

And in this case the eventual finding is not criminally responsible. The final judgment is not a guilty finding, the final judgment is an NCR finding. *** The legislature has not included that in the probation before judgment statute, and so I don’t think that it’s the kind of final judgment from which a probation before judgment was envisioned by the legislature. The[y] certainly have the ability to include that just as they have in the expungement statute. But they have not done so in the probation before judgment.

So, I don’t believe that there’s been a satisfactory demonstration here that the defendant is permitted to make this request under 6-220. So, at this point, I’ll deny the motion to grant the probation before judgment at this time because I don’t think the statute contemplates that in an NCR finding. This timely appeal followed. DISCUSSION The parties’ arguments on appeal are largely the same as those presented to the circuit court.

Mr. Schmidt argues that the circuit court made legal errors (which are reviewed without deference) in holding that an NCR finding was not a guilty verdict or a “judgment” and that CP § 6-220 did not apply in this instance. Mr. Schmidt contends that, contrary to the court’s holding, a finding of guilt must precede an NCR finding, and that 5 an NCR finding is a “judgment” under Langworthy. According to Mr. Schmidt, therefore, the prerequisites of CP § 6-220 are satisfied when a defendant is found to be NCR. The State counters that the court correctly denied Mr. Schmidt’s motion to modify his sentence because Rule 4-345—the procedural vehicle used by Mr. Schmidt to seek a PBJ—does not apply to NCR findings.3 Here, we must determine whether the court was legally correct when it ruled that it lacked the ability to modify its finding of NCR to impose a PBJ.

We hold that the trial court was legally correct because: 1) a finding of NCR is not the type of judgment contemplated by CP § 6-220; and 2) Rule 4-345 does not apply to NCR findings. STANDARD OF REVIEW Generally, we are unable to review a decision on a motion to modify a sentence under Rule 4-345(e) that is “addressed to the court’s discretion.” Carter v. State, 193 Md. App. 193, 207 (2010) (citation omitted); see also Hoile v. State, 404 Md. 591, 617 (2008). However, we may review such a decision where, as here, the circuit court ruled as a matter of law that it did not have the ability to consider the motion on its merits. See Fuller v. State, 169 Md. App. 303 , 309 n.5 (2006) (quotation omitted), aff’d, 397 Md. 372 (2007).

We review the circuit court’s legal findings without deference. See, e.g., Vielot v. State, 225 Md. App. 492, 500 (2015). 3 The State also argues on appeal that even assuming Rule 4-345 could be applied to vacate the NCR finding and replace it with a PBJ, Mr. Schmidt’s motion and the circuit court’s ultimate ruling were both untimely under Rule 4-345(e)(1). The State did not, however, raise these issues in the circuit court, and we need not address them to resolve this appeal. 6 THE PBJ STATUTE: WHAT DOES IT STAY? To provide the defendant an opportunity to avoid the stigma of a conviction, see In