Schneider v. Pullen

Marbury, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Appellant, individually, and trading as City Barber Schools, filed his bill of complaint in the Circuit Court of Baltimore City against the State Superintendent of Schools and the Maryland State Board of Education, asking for a declaration that Section 14(a) of Article 77, as amended by Chapter 489 of the Acts of 1947, is void and unconstitutional, and that proposed rules and regulations issued by the State Superintendent of Schools ⁶⁷ under this statute are invalid. He also asked for an injunction to restrain the defendants from enforcing any provisions of the act, and for further relief. Respondents demurred, the demurrer was sustained to complainant’s amended bill, and the bill was dismissed with costs.

From that decree the case was appealed here. Appellant has been since 1913 the proprietor of a barber school, teaching the barber trade and conducting a barber shop for the use of the students of his school. He sues on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated, and he contends that Section 14(a) of Article 77 is in violation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights and the Constitution of the United States, because it is an improper delegation of a legislative function and deprives him of his property rights without due process of law. Section 14(a) was first adopted by Chapter 1043 of the Acts of 1945, and by the title of that act it is intended to provide “for the certification and regulation of private trade schools which operate a program of trade and/or technical education * * * or which will give pre-employment or supplementary training in certain occupational fields * * Chapter 489 of the Acts of 1947, which enacts Section 14(a) in its present form, states in its title that its'purpose is to provide “with certain restrictions that every school or educational institution charging tuition or fees for attendance must secure a certificate of approval from the State Superintendent of Schools”.

In the body of the statute, it is provided that: “* * * every private school or educational institution, however designated, which charges tuition or fees for attendance, and which offers a program of college, professional, preparatory, high school, junior high school, elementary, kindergarten, or nursery school work, or any combination thereof, or which offers a program of trade or technical education, or both, or which gives pre-employment or supplementary training, or both, in the fields of trade or industry, and any and ⁶⁸ every private school or educational institution charging tuition or fees for attendance, except those operated by bona fide church organizations, must secure a certificate of approval issued by the State Superintendent of Schools, before it may begin or continue to operate or function in this State.” There is a proviso that this shall not have any application to a school or college now operating under a charter granted by the Legislature. The act further provides that the State Superintendent of Schools shall issue a certificate of approval “to any applicant operating or proposing to operate such a private school or educational institution whose conditions of entrance, scholarship, educational qualifications, standards and facilities are adequate and appropriate for the purposes, program, training and courses to be taught or given therein.” This certificate may be revoked by the State Board of Education. Any applicant who has been denied a certificate is given a hearing before the State Board of Education, and, if the decision of that body is adverse, he can appeal to the circuit court of the county, or the Superior Court of Baltimore City. There is a further right of appeal to this court on the question of denial or revocation of a certificate.

The act also provides that there shall be no other remedy in any other courts by way of mandamus, injunction, certiorari, or otherwise. The Legislature cannot, of course, interfere with the judicial process by depriving litigants from raising questions involving their fundamental rights in any appropriate judicial manner, nor can it deprive the courts of the right to decide such questions in an appropriate proceeding. We have consistently held that where a special form of remedy is provided, the litigant must adopt that form and must not by-pass the administrative body or official, by pursuing other remedies. We have, however, been careful to point out that where constitutional questions are involved, the litigant has the right to raise them in a court of equity, and such court has the right to consider them.

That is true whether the ⁶⁹ question is raised in an ordinary suit for injunction, or in a bill for a declaratory decree. Kahl v. Cons. Gas Co., 191 Md. 249, 258 , 60 A. 2d 754 . Commissioners of Cambridge v. Eastern Shore Public Service Co., 192 Md. 333 , 64 A. 2d 151 .

Francis v. MacGill, 196 Md. 77 , 75 A. 2d 91 . Kracke v. Weinberg, 197 Md. 339 , 79 A. 2d 387 . Appellant has a special interest in bringing this