Schnepfe v. Schnepfe

Boyd, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. On the 9th day of June, 1904, Caroline Mahle, who was ihen a widow, entered into a marriage settlement with John Henry Schnepfe, which began with the recital that “Whereas, a marriage is intended to be solemnized between the said Caroline Mahle and John Henry Schnepfe, and in view of which they desire to provide that certain real and personal property shall, after the said intended marriage has taken place, be possessed, enjoyed and disposed of as though they were unmarried * * * .” In paragraph 1 it was agreed that “In consideration of the said intended marriage and certain other good and valuable considerations” said Caroline Mahle shall continue to possess ³³² fete real and personal property 'which she then owned, with power to dispose of it, absolutely or conditionally, by deed or will, notwithstanding her coverture, and a similar provision was made as to property acquired by her during coverture, and Mr. Schnepfe agreed to unite with her in the execution of such deeds and conveyances as might be required. Paragraph 2 provided that: “In consideration of the said Caroline Mahle uniting in marriage with the said John Henry Schnepfe, the said John Henry Schnepfe doth agree to pay in lieu of any dower interest which she, the said Caroline Mahle, would acquire in his, the said John Henry Schnepfe’s estate, the sum of $12,000.00; the said $12,000.00 to be paid to the said Caroline Mahle upon the death of the said John Henry Schnepfe out of whatever estate the said John Henry Schnepfe may die seized of, said payment to be made prior to the distribution of said estate;” and provision was made that in the event of the death of Caroline Mahle during said Schnepfe’s lifetime he was to pay the $12,000.00 to her children by Jacob Mahle, and he further agreed to relinquish all right, title and interest which he would acquire by way of curtesy in the estate of Caroline Mahle. Paragraph 3 is as follows: “3.

That in consideration of said marriage, and the further consideration of the payment of $12,000.00 aforesaid by the said John Henry Schnepfe to the said Caroline Mahle, the said Caroline Mahle doth relinquish all right, title and interest, which she, the said Caroline Mahle, shall acquire by way of dower in the estate of the said John Henry Schnepfe, and she, the said Caroline Mahle, doth further agree to unite with the said John Henry Schnepfe in the execution of all such needful deeds or conveyances or instruments in law as may be required by the said John Henry ³³³ Selmepfe to transfer or convey any or all of the property of which the said John Henry Schnepfe may he now possessed or shall hereafter acquire.” The appellee filed the hill in this ease against the executor of the said John Henry Schnepfe in which she alleges: (1) that on or about the 13th of November, 1913, said Schnepfe died seized and possessed of a very considerable estate, made up of real and personal property and securities, and cash of great value and amount; (2) that she and said Schnepfe were married on the 11th of July, 1904, in Baltimore, wherein she and he resided until the time of his death, although for a great many years since their marriage they lived separate and apart; (3) that shortly before their marriage they made the ante-nuptial contract referred to above, a copy of which is filed; (4) she refers specially to the provision of the agreement that he was to pay the $12,000.00; (5) alleges that at the time of making the agreement and at the time of the marriage he had subject to call upwards of $42,000.00 deposited in bank and stocks, &e., which are sot out in the bill; (6) that he left what purported to be a will, a copy of which is filed;. (J) that said will was admitted to probate and Henry B. Schnepfe qualified as executor; (8) that many questions must arise in the administration of the estate which required the construction of the will; (9) states various questions which she alleges must arise; (10) that her rights can only be protected by the administration of the estate under the direction and control of the lower Court; (11) that she has not been able to discover and ascertain wbat property and estate said Schnepfe left. “Nor has she been able to ascertain and discover where and bow invested, if at all, the sum of twelve thousand dollars, hereinbefore recited and mentioned in tlxe ante-nuptial (contract) or agreement herein exhibited, is or may be, if indeed such fund or the proceeds thereof actually exists, and may he directly identified or ear-marked;” (12) that her husband was at the time of his death in his J5th year, and she was in her J6th ³³⁴ year; (13) tliat so far nothing has been accomplished in the Orphans’ Court by the executor, except he has qualified as such, so- far as the records show. The prayers of the bill are: (1) That the estate be administered under the direction and control of the lower Court; (2) that the will bé construed; (3) that the executor answer the bill under oath, and disclose and set forth in detail all the property and estate of the said John Henry Sehnepfe, real, personal and mixed, money in bank, the securities, stocks, bonds and choses in action in his name, and subject to his order; that the real and leasehold property of which he died seized and possessed be described, and if the stun of $12,000.00 was set apart by the deceased in his deposit box at the Drovers & Mechanics National Bank, or elsewhere, or stocks, bonds or securities, representing such amount are in, his possession, identified or ear-marked as the property of the plaintiff; or if they have not come into his possession but defendant has knowledge and information thereof, that he may disclose the same fully and at large in his answer; (4) “That the said ante-nuptial contract or agreement herein-before set out between your oratrix and the said John Henry Sehnepfe deceased, her husband, may be established and enforced herein, and that the said defendant, Henry B. Sehnepfe, executor as aforesaid, may be decreed to- pay over unto your oratrix said sum of twelve thousand dollars, or turn over to her such securities, stocks or bonds of the full value thereof, if such be in the custody and possession of the said defendant, together with such income accrued and accruing thereon and thereupon, if any, in the hands of said.defendant, and due unto your oratrix, and to account with her therefor,” and (5) for general relief. An answer was filed at length and among other allegations in it is one.that the plaintiff had abandoned the said John Henry Sehnepfe for more than three years, which abandonment bars her from enforcing the ante-nuptial agreement, and another is that the bill does not state such a case as en ³³⁵ titles her to relief in equity—the jurisdiction of a Court of Equity being denied.

A copy of an inventory containing stocks and personal property and cash amounting to $15,-9 G3.45 was filed with the answer. The lower Court passed a decree requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of $12,000 and the costs of the proceeding, but denied all other relief prayed for. Erom that decree this appeal was taken. Although the attorneys for the appellant have displayed commendable zeal and industry in the preparation of their brief, it will not be necessary to separately pass on all the points raised by them or refer to all of the authorities cited.

It may be well to say in the beginning that we cannot assent to the position taken by the counsel for the appellant that the fact that the claim of the plaintiff was not passed by the Orphans’ Court or proven as provided for in Article 93 precludes her from maintaining this bill. It is true that Section 83 of Article 93 says that no administrator shall discharge any claim against his decedent (otherwise than at his own risk), unless it he first passed by the Orphans’ Court, or be proven according to the rules prescribed in that article, and Section 97 provides that “No administrator shall be allowed in his account for any claim discharged by him unless he produce the claim passed by the Orphans’ Court or proven as herein directed,” but those sections are not intended to exclude from distribution a claim established by a Court of justice. Section 99 provides that no administrator shall be obliged to discharge a claim of which vouchers and proof shall be exhibited as aforesaid, but may reject and at law dispute the same, in case he has reason to believe that the deceased never owed the debt or had discharged the same or a part thereof, or had a claim in bar, and Section 100 provides that in no case shall the order of the Orphans’ Court or Register of Wills that an account or claim will pass when paid be deemed of validity to establish such claim or account. Tf a creditor knows that his claim will be contested, ³³⁶ or if he.cannot procure the proof that is necessary in order to comply with the provisions of Article 93, there can be no reason why he should not sue, in law or equity, as the nature of the claim may require or authorize.

Indeed Section 116 says: “Ho administrator shall be bound to take notice of any claim against his decedent unless the same shall be exhibited to such administrator legally authenticated; or unless such claim shall have been passed by the Orphans’ Court and entered by the Register upon his docket, or unless a suit shall he pending against such administrator for such claim.” Other sections might be referred to but we do not deem it necessary. What was said in Steuart v. Oarr, 6 Grill, 430, on page 444, in reference to the statute then under consideration may be applied to this case. It was there said: “The only answer that need be given to this new ground of defense is that this section of the Act of Assembly never was designed to apply, and by the judicial tribunals of the State never has been held as applying to cases where the notice to the executor or administrator has been given through the medium of a lis pendens or been in due time followed by it. numerous cases must arise and have arisen where the authentication of claims in the particular mode prescribed by the Acts of Assembly was impracticable, and for the recovery of which, resort to a Court of justice was the only alternative left to the creditor for the recovery of his claim.” The position taken in this ease by the executor shows that it would have been useless for the appellee to have proven his claim in the Orphans’ Court, even if it be conceded that it could have been validly determined by that Court. It will not be necessary to consider all of the prayers of the bill, for if the decree was justified under any "of them, that is sufficient, regardless of whether other relief could be granted.

Without now referring to other prayers in the bill, the third and fourth, laying aside any question about the ³³⁷ one for general relief, were sufficient to give tlie Court jurisdiction to pass the decree appealed from. An ante-nuptial agreement was not sufficient to bar dower at common law, and hence they have been frequently before Courts of equity. In the note to Kroell vs. Kroell, 219 Ill. 105 , as reported in 4 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 801, it is said: “Ante-nuptial contracts, by which it is attempted to regulate and control the interest which each of the parties to the marriage1 shall take in the property of the other, during coverture or after death, such as dower and the like, are favored by the Courts and will be enforced in equity according to the intention of the parties, whenever the contingency provided for by the contract arises.” In the note to Rieger v. Schaible, 81 Neb. 33 , as reported in 16 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 700, the more recent cases are cited.

It will be seen by an examination of them that a Probate Court or Orphans’ Court, or by whatever name the Court having jurisdiction of probate matters inay be known, has determined many of the questions which arose under ante-nuptial contracts, but they are either when such Courts have been given sufficient powers by statute, or the question1 was such as those Courts could properly determine, and many of them expressly recognize the jurisdiction of Courts of equity. The case of Naill v. Maurer, 25 Md. 532 , which is one of the leading cases on the subject, is cited in the note in 4 A. & E. Ann. Cas., and in the principal case in 16 A. & E. Ann. Cas. The bill was filed in that case by the appellee for an allowance of dower in the real estate of her husband. The defense was that her right to dower was barred by an ante-nuptial contract, and the Court so finding reversed the decree and dismissed the bill.

In speaking of the contract’ the Court said: “The main object in view was the consummation of the marriage, and it was to that end that the contract was executed. It seemed almost impossible to view the contract as founded on any other consideration, although the reciprocal character of the stipulations might be held to constitute one sufficient to make the contract binding and effective.” The Court then held that section 289 (now 306) of ³³⁸ Art. 93, in reference to an estate settled on a married woman by the husband by jointure, or other settlement before marriage, did not deprive the wife of her power to bar her dower by any other form of ante-nuptial contract. The Court said: “Her power to bind herself by such a contract, in equity, must be admitted, and we do not doubt that this contract constitutes an equitable bar to' the claim sought to be enforced by this bill,” and cited cases which distinguish an equitable from a legal bar of dower—showing an ample reason why such cases should be entertained by Courts of equity. The case of Schnepfe v. Schnepfe, 108 Md. 139 , was an appeal by the husband from a decree rendered against him in favor of the appellee, by which he was required to pay into Court sufficient cash to buy stock of the City of Baltimore to the amount of $20,000.00, in order to secure the $12,000.00 named in this contract.

Under the decree the clerk was to act as trustee and was to' pay over the income therefrom to-the defendant during his life and at his death to turn the stock over to his executors, who were directed to sell it, and out of the proceeds to pay $12,000.00 to his widow, or if she was dead, to her children. That decree was reversed, and after giving other reasons for the reversal the Court said: “The appellee’s counsel contend, however, that the decree is in effect the specific enforcement of the ante-nuptial contract, and therefore clearly within the powers of a Coiirt of equity. Büt we think if allowed to stand the decree would in effect make a different contract from that entered into by the