Schuman v. Schuman

Smith, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The parties to this proceeding were married in 1959. It was the second marriage for each. No children were born as a result of the marriage.

The children of the parties by their prior marriages are grown and married. The age of Mr. Schuman does not appear in the record, but he testified that he was a retired civil service employee, having been so employed for 44 years, Mrs. Schuman was 57 years old at the time of the trial. Her recent employment has been “baby sitting”. She stated she had had no other employment for a number of years, although she had worked previously.

The husband left the home on May 22, 1967, having left the bedroom of the parties approximately four months previously. It is apparent that serious friction had existed for quite some months prior to January of 1967. There was little verbal communication between the parties in the weeks immediately prior to the ultimate departure of Mr. Schuman from the home because, as Schuman put it, of the “screaming tirades” of his wife. Mrs. Schuman filed suit for divorce a mensa et thoro' on June 9, 1967.

From the final decree awarding her such a divorce, alimony in the amount of $180.00 per month and counsel fees of $600.00, she appeals to this Court alleging that the award for alimony and the award of counsel fees are both inadequate. We agree, although not to the extent desired by her. The net worth of the husband is approximately $79,000.00. He showed total monthly income from his civil service pension, a pension from Vitro Corporation, and social security of $591.00. ¹⁵ The addition of $190.00 net income from rental properties plus •dividend and interest income produced a total net monthly income for the husband of $876.00.

He estimated his total expenses at $549.00 monthly exclusive of any payment to Mrs. Schuman. Mrs. Schuman estimated her total monthly expenses at $509.00. It is clear that the trial court awarded her alimony pendente lite in the amount of $324.00. We find ourselves puzzled as to just what else may have been included in the order.

The statement of the case in appellant’s brief indicates that this award was conditioned upon the defendant’s “making the monthly house mortgage and other payments” amounting to $185.00. The order of court dated July 10 which appellant has printed in the record extract recites that appellee is making these payments but the actual order requires no such payment. This order calls for the $324.00 monthly award to account from June 29. The alimony pendente lite order appearing in the record is not dated July 10, but June 29.

There is no July 10 docket entry nor is there any July 10 order of any kind in the record. The June 29 order after directing payment of $324.00 per month beginning July 1 states: “Husband will make house payments of $127.00 plus realty taxes — award is based on this premise.” An alimony pendente lite order directing the husband to pay mortgage payments and real estate taxes on property owned by the parties as tenants by the entireties is unauthorized and void under our decisions. See Roberts v. Roberts, 160 Md. 513, 522 , 154 A. 95 (1931) ; Dougherty v. Dougherty, 187 Md. 21, 32 , 48 A. 2d 451 (1946) ; Hull v. Hull, 201 Md. 225, 232 , 93 A. 2d 536 (1953) and Tumminello v. Tumminello, 205 Md. 609, 611 , 109 A. 2d 776 (1954). We were advised at oral argument of this cause that the home of the parties has now been sold.

It is an unfortunate fact of life that two people cannot live apart as inexpensively as they can live together. The innocent wife is entitled to alimony. The husband is entitled to live also. It is also true that parties estimating their expenses for the ¹⁶ purpose of determining what is proper alimony do not always proceed with the same precision with which an accountant would compute a profit and loss statement.

At oral argument appellant cited Wygodsky v. Wygodsky, 134 Md. 344 , 106 A. 698 (1919) as authority for the proposition that once alimony pendente lite has been set, it may not be decreased by the trial court without a showing of changed conditions. That case did not so hold. It was an appeal of an alimony pendente lite order. Our predecessors there said: “The decree allowing the alimony in this case provides that it shall continue until 'the further order of the Court,’ thereby reserving the right and power to the Court, to change or modify the decree as the conditions or other circumstances may require, either by