Scott v. Jenkins

KARWACKI, Judge. This appeal concerns the pleading requirements for a claim of punitive damages. We are asked whether a complaint seeking monetary damages for a tort must make a specific claim for punitive damages and whether that complaint must set forth facts that, if proven true, would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages. The answer to both questions is yes.

Consequently, for the reasons explained below, we shall reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. I. During the investigation of an assault and battery unrelated to the case sub judice, Prince George’s County Police Officer, Corporal Robert Scott, Petitioner, assisted in the detention of a juvenile suspect. Scott was informed by Terry N. Jenkins, Respondent, that someone other than the detainee was responsible for the crime. For reasons disputed by the parties, Jenkins and Scott engaged in a scuffle, resulting in Jenkins’ arrest for battering Corporal Scott.

Jenkins testified at the trial below that the State nolle prossed his battery charge. Shortly thereafter, Jenkins filed a Complaint and a demand for a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. Jenkins subsequently filed an Amended Complaint charging Scott, and others, 1 individually and in their official ²⁶ capacities, with counts of assault, battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, slander, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Jenkins’ Amended Complaint demanded judgments for each count: “1.

For damages in the amount of $500,000.00. 2. For costs plus interest. 3. For such other and further relief as the court may deem just and proper.” Jenkins’ Amended Complaint neither made a specific claim for punitive damages, nor did it allege that Scott acted with actual malice. Following the close of all evidence at trial, Jenkins requested the submission of a punitive damages instruction to the jury.

Scott objected, pointing out that Jenkins failed to plead punitive damages in his original and Amended Complaints and that no mention of punitive damages was made during trial until the discussion of jury instructions with the trial judge. The court overruled Scott’s objection, noting that Jenkins’ claim of $500,000 damages, given the nature of the case, should have forewarned Scott that punitive damages were being sought. Scott also objected to the form of the punitive damages instruction. The jury returned a verdict in Jenkins’ favor on the false arrest and battery counts, awarding him $150.00 compensatory damages, and $1,000.00 punitive damages.

The verdict sheet did not indicate upon which of the two counts submitted to the jury the punitive award was predicated. 2 ²⁷ Scott appealed the judgment based on that verdict to the Court of Special Appeals, claiming that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on punitive damages when Jenkins failed to specifically claim or plead such damages in his Amended Complaint. Noting that Jenkins’ complaint averred that Scott had “placed his finger in Jenkins’s nostril, that Scott was verbally abusive to Jenkins, that Scott beat Jenkins, and that Jenkins acted with due care at all times and did nothing to provoke such abusive behavior[,]” Scott v. Jenkins, 107 Md.App. 440, 443 , 668 A.2d 958, 960 (1995), the intermediate appellate court concluded that “Scott was notified adequately of Jenkins’ intent to seek punitive damages at trial.” Scott, 107 Md.App. at 445 , 668 A.2d at 960 . We granted Scott’s petition for certiorari to consider the adequacy of Jenkins’ “claim” for punitive damages.

II

Of the necessities for the prosecution of a successful lawsuit, none is more important than the pleading. It is the first, and sometime the last, opportunity a plaintiff has to make his or her case. Although Maryland abandoned the formalities of common law pleading long ago, it is still a fair comment to say that pleading plays four distinct roles in our system of jurisprudence. It (1) provides notice to the parties ²⁸ as to the nature of the claim or defense; (2) states the facts upon which the claim or defense allegedly exists; (3) defines the boundaries of litigation; and (4) provides for the speedy resolution of frivolous claims and defenses.

John A. Lynch, Jr. & Richard W. Bourne, Modern Maryland Civil Procedure § 6.1 (1993). Of these four, notice is paramount. American Express Co. v. State, 132 Md. 72, 74 , 103 A. 96, 96 (1918); Pearce v. Watkins, 68 Md. 534, 538 , 13 A. 376, 377 (1888); see also Early v. Early, 338 Md. 639, 658 , 659 A.2d 1334, 1343 (1995)(“The Court has no authority, discretionary or otherwise, to rule upon a question not raised by the pleadings, and of which the parties therefore had neither notice nor an opportunity to be heard.”). To that end, Maryland Rule 2-303(b) requires that each claim in a pleading “be simple, concise, and direct.

No technical forms of pleadings are required. A pleading shall contain only such statements of fact as may be necessary to show the pleader’s entitlement to relief or ground of defense.... ” III. In the context of a negligence action, we have previously held that a sufficient pleading must “allege, with certainty and definiteness, facts and circumstances sufficient to set forth (a) a duty owed by the defendant to the plaintiff, (b) a breach of that duty and (c) injury proximately resulting from that breach.” Read Drug and Chemical Co. v. Colwill Constr. Co., 250 Md. 406, 412 , 243 A.2d 548, 553 (1968)(emphasis in original).

Our holding in Read Drug flowed from the natural import of the language of former Md. Rule 301 b, now Rule 2-303(b), that a “pleading shall contain only such statements of fact as may be necessary to show the pleader’s entitlement to reliefi.]” Md. Rule 2-303(b). In that regard, any claim for relief based upon an alleged tort, intentional or non-intentional, must allege facts, if proven true, sufficient to support each and every element of the asserted claim. In a civil battery action, for example, a ²⁹ well-pleaded complaint must allege facts sufficient to show that the defendant engaged in an “unpermitted application of trauma ... upon any part of the” plaintiff, proximately causing his or her injuries. Saba v. Darling, 72 Md.App. 487, 491 , 531 A.2d 696, 698 (1987)(quoting Richard J. Gilbert and Paul T. Gilbert, Maryland Tort Law Handbook § 3.1 (1986)) aff'd, 320 Md. 45 , 575 A.2d 1240 (1990).

Likewise, in a claim for false arrest, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant deprived him or her of his or her liberty without consent and without legal justification. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Paul, 256 Md. 643, 654 , 261 A.2d 731, 738 (1970); Mahan v. Adam, 144 Md. 355, 365 , 124 A. 901, 905 (1924). As we shall explain, however, facts sufficient to support an intentional or non-intentional tort claim do not necessarily entitle a plaintiff to a punitive damages award.

IV

We have lately, and at great length, discussed the necessary prerequisites to a punitive damages award. Lest there be any remaining doubt, in order to recover punitive damages in any tort action in the State of Maryland, facts sufficient to show actual malice must be pleaded and proven by clear and convincing evidence, and a specific demand for the recovery of punitive damages must be made before an award of such damages may be had. Prior to 1972, this Court held fast to a standard requiring “actual malice” before recovery of punitive damages in negligence actions. See Davis v. Gordon, 183 Md. 129, 133-34 , 36 A.2d 699, 700-01 (1944).

With the decision in Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co., 267 Md. 149 , 297 A.2d 721 (1972), our predecessors departed from this rule, holding that in automobile negligence cases, implied malice, 3 while falling short “of ³⁰ wilful or intentional injury, contemplates conduct which is of an extraordinary or outrageous character” and will support a punitive damages award. Smith, 267 Md. at 168 , 297 A.2d at 732 . That standard was applied as recently as Nast v. Lockett, 312 Md. 343 , 539 A.2d 1113 (1988). Shortly after the Smith decision, an explosion of punitive damages litigation ensued, fueled in part by two opinions which, in effect, severed punitive damage awards from their historical rationales of punishment and deterrence.

Schaefer v. Miller, 322 Md. 297, 322 , 587 A.2d 491, 503-04 (1991)(Eldridge, J., concurring). Relying primarily upon Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Gardiner Dairy Co., 107 Md. 556 , 69 A. 405 (1908), the Court in H & R Block, Inc. v. Testerman, 275 Md. 36 , 338 A.2d 48 (1975), while acknowledging that H & R Block exhibited a reckless disregard for the rights of others by employing inexperienced and unqualified employees, nevertheless concluded that punitive damages were recoverable in a tort action arising out of a contractual relationship only upon a showing of “actual malice.” Although the Court conceded that punitive damages were potentially recoverable in tort actions arising out of contractual relationships when the contract was broken for the “sole purpose of wrongfully injuring the plaintiff,” punitive damages based on any other motive would obliterate the distinction between tortious conduct and simple breach of contract. 275 Md. at 44 , 338 A.2d at 53 (emphasis in original). One year later, in Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524 , 366 A.2d 7 (1976), the Court stepped away from Tester-man and held that when tortious conduct preceded a contractual relationship, implied, rather than actual, malice could support a punitive damages award. 4 “Conduct of an extraor ³¹ dinary nature characterized by a wanton or reckless disregard for the rights of others” became sufficient to support such an award. 278 Md. at 532 , 366 A.2d at 12 . In a concurring opinion in Schaefer, supra, a medical malpractice action which upheld the reversal of a punitive damages award, 322 Md. 297 , 587 A.2d 491 (1991), Judges Eldridge, Cole, and Chasanow called upon this Court to abandon the distinction between torts arising out of a contractual relationship versus those that do not, otherwise known as the Testerman-Wedeman Rule, and to return to the actual malice standard announced in Davis, supra.

In its reasoning, the concurrence pointed out that the Testerman-Wedeman Rule was (1) unsupported by Maryland authority, Schaefer, 322 Md. at 316-18 , 587 A.2d at 501-02 ; (2) inconsistently applied by the Court, 322 Md. at 318-21 , 587 A.2d at 502-03 ; and (3) unrelated to the purposes of punitive damages. 322 Md. at 321-22 , 587 A.2d at 503-04 . Within the year, this Court adopted the rationale of the Schaefer concurrence. In Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420 , 601 A.2d 633 (1992), we rejected both the Testerman-Wedeman Rule, and the implied malice standard announced in Smith v. Gray Concrete and Pipe Co., supra. We held that “in a non-intentional tort action, the trier of fact may not award punitive damages unless the plaintiff has established that the defendant’s conduct was characterized by evil motive, intent to injure, ill will, or fraud, i.e., ‘actual malice.’ ” Zenobia, 325 Md. at 460 , 601 A.2d at 652 (citing Davis v. Gordon, 183 Md. at 133 , 36 A.2d at 701 ).

The reasons for the return to the pre-Smith rule were far less opaque than the inconsistent cases that the departure from it had spawned. Noting that the “the purpose of punitive damages related entirely to the nature of the defendant’s conduct,” we concluded that “the availability of punitive damages ought to depend upon the heinous nature of the defen ³² dant’s conduct,” and not upon whether the tortious conduct occurred within the context of a contractual relationship. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 454 , 601 A.2d at 650 (citing Schaefer v. Miller, 322 Md. at 321-22 , 587 A.2d at 503 ) (citations omitted). Moreover, the prophetic warning in Smith v. Gray Concrete, supra, that the “implied malice” or as there used, “gross negligence,” standard “may be so flexible that it can become virtually unlimited in its application,” 267 Md. at 166 , 297 A.2d at 731 , proved true. “Despite [that] Court’s [attempts to limit] the implied malice standard to torts involving the operation of motor vehicles, the standard [was] freely applied to other non-intentional torts.” Zenobia, 325 Md. at 457 , 601 A.2d at 651 (citations omitted).

Perhaps the most compelling reason for casting aside the implied malice standard was its elusive nature. Although the purported basis for assessing punitive damages is to punish and deter particularly reprehensible conduct motivated by a conscious and evil motive, the various formulations of “implied malice” reached conduct that was perhaps reprehensible, but otherwise free of the ill-will appropriately targeted by a punitive damages award. 5 325 Md. at 458-59 , 601 A.2d at 651-52 . Not only did this inconsistency expose individuals and companies alike to an ever changing legal landscape which more often concealed, rather than revealed, the conduct subject to a punitive damages award, it also “undermine[d] the deterrent effect of [such] awards.” Id., 325 Md. at 459 , 601 A.2d at 652 (citing 2 L. Schlueter and K. Redden, Punitive Damages, Appendix B, at 418-19 (2d ed.l989))(suggesting that under the “implied malice” standard, potential defendants may either refrain from socially beneficial behavior out of fear, or engage in conduct harmful to society). See also Owens- ³³ Corning v. Garrett, 343 Md. 500, 538 , 682 A.2d 1143, 1161 (1996); ACandS, Inc. v. Godwin, 340 Md. 334 at 361-62 , 667 A.2d 116, 129 (1995).

In addition to requiring that punitive damages claimants