Scott v. Marden

Sloan, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This case comes up on an appeal from an order of the Circuit Court of Baltimore City, overruling a demurrer to ² the amended bill of the appellee, the demurrer having been sustained to the original bill. The allegations of the bill are substantially as follows: First: That William H. Scott, at the time of his death, January 5th, 1926, owned an interest in a corporation known as the Great Seott Furniture Company, in Baltimore, worth approximately $150,000, and other real and personal property; and had on his life one insurance policy in the Travelers’ Insurance Company of Hartford,' Connecticut, of $5,000, and three policies of $5,000 each in the Equitable Life Assurance Society of New York, the net benefits or proceeds of which amounted to $16,669.19, which four policies have been made the subject of interpleader proceedings by the respective life insurance companies; and that he held one other life insurance policy, the details of which were not known to the appellee. Second: That at the time of his death the said William H. Scott was about eighty-five years of age, and since the death of his wife in 1916 he had been living alone in a boarding house in Baltimore;; that besides the infirmities of age he was subject to attacks of disease; that he was rarely visited by his sons or his family, and that he required considerable assistance and attention, nursing and care; that some time after his wife’s death he employed the appellee to look after him from time to time, especially when he was ill, which she did to the best of her ability, but the demands upon her time became exigent, and that he frequently expressed himself to the appellee and to other persons as being not only grateful for her attentions, but that he was financially indebted to her for services and that he wished to reward her substantially for her services; the appellee was unmarried, having been divorced from her husband, and was largely dependent upon her own efforts for a living, and felt that she was entitled to whatever fair allowance Mr. Scott would make for her.

Third: That on or about November 18th, 1918, Mr. Scott sent to the appellee to come to his boarding house on ³ Linden Avenue, at which time he told her he wanted to give her two policies of insurance, some furniture, and some money that he had in bank, and that he started to write a paper as a memorandum thereof, but after writing the date he asked the appellee to finish it at his own dictation, and that he asked Mrs. Virginia G-inn, the boarding house proprietress, to witness the paper, which she did; that he signed the paper and handed it to the appellee, which said paper is as follows: “Atlantic City, E". J., “Eovember 25, 1918. “I bequeath to Margaret Marden all money in bank in my name, also personal belongings, furniture in storage, etc., in my name, also policies Travelers $5,000, Equitable $5,000, policies in safe deposit. “fm. IL Scott, “Virginia Ginn. “Eov., 1918.” He told her that the policies of insurance were in his safe deposit box, and she could get them at any time, and handed her the key to the box, but she never attempted to use it; he subsequently delivered to her such of the furniture as ho intended to be covered by the memorandum, and also attempted to put the money in bank in their joint names, but on the advice of officers of the bank decided to defer it and make some other arrangements in lieu thereof. Eourth: That Mr. Scott, after signing the memorandum, continued his demands upon the appellee for nursing and attention; that he manifested a decided personal liking for the appellee, which grew into a fixed desire on his part to marry her; that she gave him no encouragement, always endeavoring in a friendly way to dissuade him of the idea; that the appellee had other ideas in her mind and had engaged herself to marry a worthy gentleman of substantial means; that Mr. Scott exhibited great agitation over this engagement, and finally persuaded the appellee to break off her engagement, and that she agreed not to marry during the ⁴ lifetime of Mr. Scott, her agreement to remain single being based on the faith of the transaction alleged in the fifth paragraph of the bill.

Eifth: On October 7th, 1920, Mr. Scott went to the home of Major James W. Denny, a member of the Baltimore bar and an ex-member of Congress, a man of high standing at the Baltimore bar, and there executed an instrument of writing, entitled a codicil, which is as follows: “Codicil. “In the name of God, amen. “I, William H. Scott, of the City of Baltimore, being in health and of sound and disposing mind, memory and understanding, do make and publish this as and for a codicil to my last will and testament by me heretofore made, dated December 4th, 1918. “I am desirous to make suitable provision for the comfort of my esteemed and faithful friend, Margaret Marden, at present residing at 2313 N. Charles Street in the City of Baltimore, and I hereby give, devise and bequeath to said Margaret Marden the sum of twenty thousand dollars ($20,000.00) to be paid to her out of my estate absolutely, provided she shall survive me and shall not have married during my lifetime. My life insurance and my interest in certain bonds shall first be applied to pay to her the said sum of twenty-thousand dollars, which I think can be done without interference with the business affairs mentioned in my will. “I hereby confirm my said will, except as modified or changed by this codicil thereto, by this gift to Margaret Marden if she survive me and shall not have married during my lifetime.” Which was signed by Mr. Scott and witnessed by Major Denny and Mrs. Marie S. Bladin. Sixth: That after executing the codicil of October 7th, 1920, which the bill alleges is in substance and effect a binding and irrevocable contract between herself and Mr. Scott, and an obligation upon him and his estate, Mr. Scott again ⁵ sought the advice of Major Denny, and upon the 15th of October, 1920, executed a bond, signed and under seal, in the handwriting of Major Denny and witnessed by him, which is as follows: “Baltimore, Oct. 15, 1920. “In consideration of five dollars and other good and valuable considerations paid me, I hereby agree and promise to pay to Mrs. Margaret Marden of Baltimore the sum of twenty-five dollars weekly from this date during my natural life. Provided she shall not marry again, and if she shall marry, this obligation to cease. “Witness my hand and seal this 15th October, 1920. “William H. Scott, (Seal.) “Witness, “James W. Denny.” That on or about October 16th, 1920, in response to a letter from.

Mr. Denny, she went to his office and that then and there Mr. Scott, together with Mr. Denny, proposed the two papers, to wit, the codicil and the bond as a contract to carry out the intentions which Mr. Scott had frequently expressed by word of mouth to the appellee, to wit: that if she would refrain from marrying during his lifetime, he would agree to give her $20,000 as her own, and that your oratrix agreed that she would not marry during Mr. Scott’s lifetime, and the papers were handed to her to keep as a memorandum of the contract, and it was understood that the second paper provided for a weekly payment of twenty-five dollars as part of and supplementary to the paper of October 7th, Mr. Scott explaining to the appellee that he thought the arrangement in the contract of October 7th was not sufficient, and that the second paper was intended to provide an arrangement which was substantially equivalent to immediate possession of the capital. Seventh: That shortly after the death of Mr. Scott the appellee was about to file the codicil for probate when she learned that he had executed a later will as of November ⁶ 3rd, 1920, which undertook to make a different disposition of his estate, whereupon she obtained legal advice with a view to enforcing the codicil against the estate of Mr. Scott as a contract. Eighth: That although an inventory has not been filed by the executors within three months after administration, the appellee avers that the said William H. Scott left a personal estate of upwards of $150,000 or $200,000, against which she charges that each of the three documents herein set forth constitute an existing claim and obligation against the estate of the deceased, and that the assets of the said estate are impressed with a trust pro tanto in her favor— (1) By the paper of November 18th, 1918, which operates as an assignment of the $5,000 policy of the Travelers’ Insurance Company, being policy No. 115518, and of the policy in the Equitable Life Assurance Society of New York, No. 1790653, amounting, with the accrued profits, to $5,-351.11; these being the policies which William H. Scott had in his safe deposit box on November 18th, 1918; the other two policies in the Equitable Life Assurance Society had been pledged for loans and were in the possession of the society as collateral security; that the furniture mentioned in the paper had been delivered to the appellee, 'and that “as to the money in bank, the intentions of the parties had been waived by mutual consent and substituted by the subsequent settlements upon your oratrix by William H. Scott”; (2) by the paper entitled “codicil,” which specifies the proceeds of Mr. Scott’s life insurance policies and certain bonds as primary funds for the payment of $20,000 'and that this constitutes an equitable lien on the balance of the insurance fund after the payment of the two policies of $5,000 each above mentioned; (3) that under the sealed bond of October 15th, 1920, William H. Scott paid to- the appellee twenty-five dollars per week to the first day of January, 1923, when he discontinued said payments, “by reason,” as your oratrix alleges, “of the fact that the family of Mr. Scott were jealous of his fondness for her and were apprehensive lest he should marry her, and about the time Mr. Scott stopped paying the weekly provision ⁷ for her they forbade her coming to’ his boarding house to provide for his comforts, etc.” and engaged a nurse for him. The amount claimed to be due and owing on the bond as of January 5 th, 1926, is $3,900.

Ninth: The appellee claims that there is due to her on the two $5,000 policies $10,351.17, $20,000 under the codicil of October 7th, 1920, and $3,900 under the contract of October 15th, 1920, or a total of $34,251.17, with interest from January 5th, 1926. Tenth: .The bill then charges that subsequent to the death of the said William H. Scott she had been informed that on July 12th, 1921, he had made a declaration of trust of his stock in the Great Scott Furniture Corporation, amounting to 992 shares, in favor of his sons, William G. Scott, J. Carroll Scott, and Samuel W. Scott, and seeks to fasten a trust upon the same to the extent of the balance due her under her three obligations. Eleventh: That aside from the property covered by the trust agreement the estate of William H. Scott is insufficient to satisfy the appellee’s claims, “and the declaration of trust is on its face, and in its very essence, an attempt to hinder, delay and defraud” the appellee “and other creditors, and constituted ipso facto an act of bankruptcy.” The appellee then prays, substantially: (1) For an accounting with the executors of William U. Scott; (2) that the amount found to- be due the appellee may be adjudged an equitable lien against his real and personal property; (3) that the declaration of trust of July 12th, 1921, may be declared null and void to' the extent of her claim against the same; (4) that the trustees, who' are 'also the beneficiaries under the trust agreement, may be required to disclose their dealings and accounts in the management of the trust and of the corporation; (5) that the executors may be required to bring into court all books, papers, etc., pertaining to' the estate of William H. Scott; (6) that the appellants here, who are also the defendants below, may be required to answer certain interrogatories filed with the bill of complaint tor dis ⁸ covery of all assets of the estate of William H. Scott; and (7) for general relief. To- the bill as amended- the appellants demur, the grounds of demurrer being, in effect: (1) That it is multifarious as to p-artie-s and subject-matter; (2) that it fails to- disclose any grounds for relief; (3) that it fails to-, disclose any agreement enforceable in equity between the plaintiff and the decedent; (4) that the paper writings of November 25th, 1918, and October 7th, 1920, are testamentary and ambulatory in form and