Scott v. State

Orth, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellant was convicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, before Judge John N. Maguire, presiding without a jury, of the offenses of carnal knowledge and assault and battery charged under indictment No. 31410 and incest charged under indictment No. 31411. He was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of 2 years on the conviction of carnal knowl ⁷¹¹ edge, for a term of 1 year on the conviction of assault and battery, concurrent with the first sentence and for a term of 5 years on the conviction of incest, consecutive with the first sentence. Under the title “Incest”, Art. 27, § 335 of the Maryland Code (1967 Repl.

Vol.) proscribes a person knowingly having carnal knowledge of another person, being within the degrees of consanguinity within which marriages are prohibited by law in Maryland. Md. Code (1964 Repl. Vol.) Art. 62, § 2 provides, among other prohibitions, that a man shall not marry his daughter. Code, Art. 27, § 464 proscribes the carnal knowledge by any person, except male persons under the age of 18 years, of any female not his wife, between the ages of 14 and 16 years.

Carnal knowledge and sexual intercourse are synonymous (Clark and Marshall, Law of Crimes, 6th Ed. § 11.01, p. 675), the ancient term for the act itself being “carnal knowledge” (4 Bl. Comm. 210). So at common law, rape was the act of a man having unlawful carnal knowledge of a female over the age of 10 years by force without the consent and against the will of the victim. Hazel v. State, 221 Md. 464 .

Sexual intercourse, and thus carnal knowledge, judicially defined, “means actual contact of the sexual organs of a man and woman and an actual penetration into the body of the latter.” Robert v. State, 220 Md. 159 , quoting State v. Diamond 264 P. 697 (Nev.). Therefore, penetration is an essential element of the crime of rape at common law. Craig v. State, 214 Md. 546 . An unlawful sexual intercourse with a girl under the age of consent, commonly known as “statutory rape”, is often characterized as “carnal knowledge and abuse” (Perkins on Criminal Law [1957], ch. 2, § 5, p. 113), as in Code, Art. 27, § 462.

The Court of Appeals has assumed that penetration is also an essential element of statutory rape. Edmondson v. State, 230 Md. 66 ; Smith v. State, 224 Md. 509 ; Robert v. State, supra. As the term “carnal knowledge” is used in Code, Art. 27, § 335 (incest) and § 464 (carnal knowledge of a female between the ages of 14 and 16 years) as it is in § 462, we assume that penetration is also an essential element of those crimes. But emission is not an essential element.

It is not embraced within the definition of sexual intercourse (carnal knowledge) above ⁷¹² and is not required to be proved to establish rape by the provisions of Art. 27, § 461, prescribing the penalty for that crime. Thus the facts necessary to be proved to convict the appellant of the offense of incest were that he : 1) knowingly engaged in sexual intercourse, as defined, 2) with a person, being within the degrees of consanguinity within which marriages are prohibited in Maryland. The facts necessary to be proved to convict the appellant of the offense of carnal knowledge as charged were that he: 1) was 18 years of age or over; 2) engaged in sexual intercourse, as defined, with a female, who: a) was not his wife; and b) was between the ages of 14 and 16 years. “For this Court to reverse a judgment entered in a case tried by the lower court without a jury, it must be shown that there was no legally sufficient evidence, or proper inferences therefrom, from which the court could find the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Crum and Dunbar v. State, 1 Md. App. 132, 135 , quoting McCray v. State, 236 Md. 9, 15 . In the instant case we think there was such evidence.

It was uncontradicted that the prosecutrix was the daughter of the appellant and that she had attained her fourteenth birthday on January 15, 1966. It is a rational inference from the age of the prosecutrix that the appellant was over the age of 18 years. The real contention with respect to the evidence is that the act of sexual intercourse was not proved in that the testimony of the prosecutrix was not worthy of belief, and, even if believed, that penetration was not proved. The prosecutrix testified that she left her house about 10:30 P. M. on October 23, 1966 with her father and two brothers, the older of whom, Tommy, was 13 years old.

They drove in the appellant’s automobile to a tavern. The younger brother was asleep and the appellant told Tommy to go to sleep. The appellant and the prosecutrix went into the tavern where the ⁷¹³ appellant drank a beer and the prosecutrix drank a soda. The appellant told his daughter that the brakes on the car were not working and gave her a dime to call her aunt.

Then, “we walked down into the glade and he took me into the woods a few feet and took my clothes down, and my slacks, my girdle and my underwear down to my knees and put his - - - he laid on top of me, and I tried to get loose, and he slapped me. And, I didn’t get loose until he kicked me---I mean, I kicked him.” He put his penis “all the way into me * * * I was trying to get loose and even got up and he smacked me, threw me on the ground again, and I kicked him to get loose and he grabbed hold of my arm and told me to get back into the car; and go with my brothers and go to my aunt’s, but I didn’t go up, we went to the house and he was down there. And, he beat Tommy for telling my mother and he beat Tommy, and she went and called the police.” On cross-examination she said that she was in the woods with the appellant for two hours and a half and that he was on top of her for that length of time. In response to a question “Now did he have his organ in you for that length of time?” she answered, “Yes.” On redirect examination, however, she indicated she did not “have the proper conception of the amount of time” she was with her father.

She further said that she did not bleed, had no marks on her face or on her throat and neck and that there were no bruises or marks on her anywhere as a result of the incident. 1 On cross-examination the prosecutrix denied that she had admitted, at the preliminary hearing, to having intercourse with other men and boys before. A police officer testified that he was not sure whether she said, at the preliminary hearing, that two boys once had attempted to have intercourse with her or that they did ⁷¹⁴ have intercourse with her. When cross-examined on this subject at the trial, the brother, Tommy, said that at the preliminary hearing she said she had had “bad relations” with boys or men other than the father, but he did not know the meaning of sexual intercourse and defined “bad relations” at