Scott v. State

BATTAGLIA, J. This case comes to us from a judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the Circuit Court for Baltimore City’s denial of Martin Scott’s motion to correct an illegal sentence. We must consider whether the Court of Special Appeals erred when it used the doctrine of law of the case to give preclusive effect to a Circuit Court order denying Scott’s motion to correct an illegal sentence. Moreover, we must decide whether Scott’s sentence was illegal under Maryland Rule 4-345 because his commitment records were corrected without a hearing and in such a way as to allegedly increase his sentence. 1 We conclude that the Court of Special Appeals ¹⁷³ erred when it applied the doctrine of the law of the case to a motion to correct an illegal sentence. We affirm, however, the ¹⁷⁴ Court of Special Appeals’ judgment on the ground that Scott’s sentence was not illegal under Maryland Rule 4-345.

I. Background A. Facts On October 1, 1981, Scott was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of the following offenses: • Case No. 18035413: Count 1: First-degree murder. Count 2: The use of a handgun in the commission of a felony. • Case No. 18035416: Count 1: Robbery with a deadly weapon. Count 8: The use of a handgun in the commission of a felony. • Case No. 18107511: Count 1: Assault with intent to murder. Count 2: The use of a handgun in the commission of a felony.

The offenses arose out of the same incident that occurred on November 25, 1980; the State, however, had charged Scott with the crimes in separate indictments. On November 5, 1981, the jury determined death to be the appropriate sentence for the first-degree murder charge, and the trial judge, Judge Peter Ward, imposed the following sentences: • Case No. 18035413: Count 1: Death. Count 2: 15 years for the use of a handgun in the commission of a felony “consecutive to 1st count — Murder in the First Degree.” • Case No. 18035416: Count 1: 20 years “consecutive to the sentence in 18033413” for robbery with a deadly weapon. Count 8: ¹⁷⁵ 15 years “consecutive to the 1st count” for the use of a handgun in the commission of a felony. • Case No. 18107511: Count 1: 30 years “consecutive to sentence in 18035416” for assault with intent to murder.

Count 2: 15 years “consecutive to the 1st count” for the use of a handgun in the commission of a felony. Scott’s total sentence, thus, was death plus ninety-five years. On July 28,1983, while incarcerated pursuant to the murder conviction in Case No. 18035413, Scott pled guilty to first-degree murder in a case involving a different incident, Case No. 18035701, for which Judge Edgar Silver, on the same day, imposed a sentence of life imprisonment, specifically stating, “Balance of Natural Life. Sentence to run consecutive to sentence now serving.” On September 19, 1983, this Court vacated the death sentence for the first-degree murder charge in Case No. 18035413, remanding the case to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for a new sentencing proceeding.

Scott v. State, 297 Md. 235 , 465 A.2d 1126 (1983). A new jury, with Judge John Byrnes presiding, again imposed the death sentence. On August 5, 1987, this Court again vacated the death sentence in Case No. 18035413, remanding the case for another new sentencing proceeding. Scott v. State, 310 Md. 277 , 529 A.2d 340 (1987).

This time, on remand, the State and Scott agreed to a sentence of life imprisonment for the first-degree murder charge. As a result, on February 10, 1988, Judge Byrnes resentenced Scott to “balance of life,” with this sentence to run consecutive to the sentence imposed by Judge Silver in Case No. 18035701. On October 10, 1989, Scott filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Judge Byrnes noted that Scott’s motion lacked “complete clarity,” but it appeared that Scott intended to argue that both of his life sentences were illegal.

In support of his motion, without specifying which sentence he was referring to, Scott first argued that “balance of Natural Life ... lends to ambiguity in the interpretation of the actual ¹⁷⁶ sentence” because it could be construed as a life sentence without the possibility of parole. He then argued that his commitment records failed to comply with Rule 4 — 351(a)(5), 2 as the term “consecutive” was “deficient” in that it did not indicate a starting date. Judge Byrnes held a hearing on the motion on May 2, 1990. At that hearing, Scott acknowledged that his complaint essentially concerned the absence of a clear starting date for both life sentences.

Scott argued that, even though he had received the death sentence and had been incarcerated since November 27, 1980, his commitment records did not stipulate when his sentence began. On May 17, Judge Byrnes had modified commitment records prepared for all of Scott’s cases. The modified commitment records included information such as the original sentencing judge, the fact that the sentences had been corrected, and the fact that the corrections had been witnessed by the Clerk of the Court. The note “Total Time Served On All Cases: 2 consecutive life sentences plus ninety-five years” was also included on the final commitment record for the 1983 murder conviction for which a life sentence had been imposed.

On June 6, 1990, Judge Byrnes issued a memorandum and order denying Scott’s motion to correct the illegal sentence. In his order, Judge Byrnes dismissed Scott’s first contention that the sentence imposed in 1983 by Judge Silver in Case No. 18035701 was ambiguous because the State might interpret “natural life” to mean no possibility of parole, reasoning that the “historical record fact is that the State did not invoke ¹⁷⁷ Section 412(b)(2)” 3 “imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole____” As such, Judge Byrnes concluded, there was no basis for Scott’s contention that the correctional authorities would be confused and imprison him without possibility for parole. Judge Byrnes stated, however, that “to clarify the matter fully, an amended commitment will be issued to delete the phrase ‘natural life.’ ” With respect to Scott’s second contention, Judge Byrnes concluded that Rule 4-351(a)(5) was not violated because it was clear that the sentences were to run consecutive to each other. Judge Byrnes noted, however, that, because of Judge Silver’s subsequent life sentence in 1983 and because of the fact that Scott’s death sentence was vacated twice and ultimately reduced to a life sentence in 1988, Scott’s commitment records should be corrected to clarify his sentence.

Judge Byrne explained: [S]ince this Court’s sentence of February 10,1988 [the life sentence that replaced the vacated death sentence] reads: “Balance of Life ... consecutive to ... No. 18035701 (Silver, J. 7/28/83), and that latter sentence was ordered by Judge Silver to run consecutive to the sentence then being served (J. Peter Ward’s November 6, 1981 sentence in No. 18035413 of 15 years, and in No. 18035416 of 20 years and 15 years, and in No. 18107511 of 30 years and 15 years all consecutive to one another) the result at that time (7/28/83) would have been 95 years consecutive to the death sentence first imposed on November 6, 1981 ¹⁷⁸ and later reimposed on February H, 1985. When these two death sentences in No. 18035413, Count 1 were vacated and ultimately replaced, with defendant’s concurrence on February 10, 1988, by a life sentence, and the result is that those 95 years are consecutive to that life sentence, and the life sentence imposed in No. 18035701 by Judge Silver on July 28,1983 will run consecutive to it, i.e., the life sentence in No. 18035413. Consequently, the Commitment record in No. 18035413, Count 1 should be corrected to delete the phrase ... ‘consecutive to # 18035701.’ ” Judge Byrnes also concluded that Scott’s sentences began when he was incarcerated on November 27,1980. 4 On January 24, 1997, Scott filed his first petition for post conviction relief, which was dismissed without prejudice.

On January 30, 1998, Scott filed a second petition for post conviction relief, arguing, among other things, that Judge Byrnes erred by “revising” Scott’s sentence. Scott contended that, under Robinson v. Lee, 317 Md. 371 , 564 A.2d 395 (1989), the Court of Appeals had held that the language “[consecutive to] sentence now being served” was deficient. On April 19, 1999, Judge Carol Smith denied Scott’s petition. In her ruling, Judge Smith distinguished Scott’s case from Robinson .

Specifically, she noted the following: Petitioner seems to suggest that his various original commitment records used the term “sentence now being served” as the link to each other consecutive sentence in his various cases. This is incorrect. Only in the original commitment record issued in case number 18035701, dated July 7, 1983, is that language used. All of the other ¹⁷⁹ six original commitment records, as well as the four sentence modifications dated May 17, 1990, refer to case numbers and counts to provide clarity for both the Petitioner and the prison authority.

Furthermore, any anomaly in Petitioner’s sentencing records was the result of Petitioner’s resentencing after his twice successful appeals of the imposition of death sentences. In this regard, Petitioner’s case is dissimilar to Robinson , wherein the sentences were being imposed for convictions of new and different crimes. Judge Smith then explained that Scott incorrectly had stated the holding in Robinson : In that case, the Court of Appeals merely stated that the trial judge has an obligation “to articulate the period of confinement with clarity so as to facilitate the prison authority’s task.” Robinson v. Lee at 379, 564 A.2d 395 . “Fundamental fairness dictates that the defendant understand clearly what debt he must pay to society for his transgressions.” Id. at 380 , 564 A.2d 395 . In dicta, the Court encouraged trial judges to “spell out with reasonable specificity the punishment to be imposed commensurate with the defendant’s background, conduct, and personality traits.” Id.

The Court did not hold that the use of the phrase “consecutive to sentence now serving” was, in and of itself, deficient. Finally, Judge Smith concluded that Judge Byrnes did not err when he rewrote Scott’s commitment records on May 17,1990, without benefit of a hearing because the modifications did not “change the substance of Petitioner’s sentences” and a hearing on the motion to correct an illegal sentence was indeed held prior to when the corrections were made. She concluded that it was “abundantly clear that ... Petitioner is to serve two life sentences plus ninety-five years, all to be served consecutively, commencing on November 27, 1980.” On September 4, 2001, Scott filed another motion to correct an illegal sentence and for a reduction of sentence, repeating his previous claims and including, as a new claim, that his ¹⁸⁰ sentence was rendered illegal because of Governor Glendening’s new parole guidelines.

On November 19, Judge Albert Matricciani denied Scott’s motion. He first noted that “petitioner’s allegations regarding the ambiguity and illegality of his sentences have already been addressed by Judge Carol Smith in her memorandum dated April 16, 1999 [and that] Judge Smith found ‘no fatal ambiguity or illegality in Petitioner’s sentences.’ ” Judge Matricciani then stated that Judge Smith had concluded that Scott’s claim that the Court erred by rewriting his commitment records on May 17,1990, without a hearing as required by Maryland Rule 4-345(c) to be without merit. Judge Matricciani also concluded that, under State v. Kanaras, 357 Md. 170 , 742 A.2d 508 (1999), Scott’s sentence was not rendered illegal by Governor Glendening’s parole policies. On June 16, 2003, Scott appealed.

Scott v. State, 150 Md.App. 468 , 822 A.2d 472 (2003). He presented two questions for the Court of Special Appeals’ review: 1. Did the motion court abuse its discretion in failing to make its own determination on the merits regarding whether appellant’s sentence was illegal? 2. Did the motion court err in accepting the post-conviction court’s determination regarding whether Md. Rule 4-345(d) was violated? 5 Id. at 470 , 822 A.2d at 473 .

With respect to Scott’s contention that Judge Matricciani abused his discretion in failing to make his own determination on the merits about the legality of his sentence, the Court of Special Appeals held that, while Rule 4-345(a) created a “limited exception to the general rule of finality,” a “court is [not] required to consider anew repeated motions by a litigant setting forth the same facts and contentions.” Id. at 473-74 , 822 A.2d at 475 . The intermediate appellate court supported ¹⁸¹ its conclusion by determining that the doctrine of law of the case is applicable to a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Id. at 474 , 822 A.2d at 475 . It also determined that Judge Matricciani did not abuse his discretion when he adopted Judge Smith’s rationale for denying Scott’s motion.

Id. at 477 , 822 A.2d at 477 . With respect to Scott’s contention that a hearing was required when his commitment records were corrected in 1990, the Court of Special Appeals explained that Rule 4-345 requires a hearing when a sentence is modified. Id. at 479 , 822 A.2d at 478 . When commitment records are modified, however, the intermediate appellate court concluded that a hearing is not required.

Id. Because Judge Byrnes did not modify Scott’s sentence but rather clarified his commitment records, the Court of Special Appeals thus concluded that there was no error. Id. Scott then filed in this Court a petition for writ of certiorari, which we granted.

Scott v. State, 376 Md. 543 , 831 A.2d 3 (2003).

II

Discussion Scott first contends that the Court of Special Appeals erred when it applied the doctrine of law of the case to a motion to correct an illegal sentence. Scott argues that, because Rule 4-345(a) allows a defendant to raise the illegality of a sentence at any time, it is inappropriate to use the doctrine of law of the case to give preclusive effect to earlier orders in a case denying relief. In the same vein, Scott also argues that Judge Matricciani abused his discretion when he adopted Judge Smith’s ruling denying Scott’s motion to correct an illegal sentence. Finally, Scott argues that, when Judge Byrnes corrected his commitment records, he violated Rule 4-345 by doing so without a hearing.

Scott, moreover, maintains that his sentence became illegal due to Judge Byrnes’ actions because Judge Byrnes effectively increased his sentence by eighty years when he corrected Scott’s commitment records. This is so, Scott argues, because he was serving his fifteen-year handgun sentence (Case No. 18035413) and not the death ¹⁸² sentence, when Judge Silver imposed the additional life sentence in 1983 (Case No. 18035701). Scott reasons that the life sentence imposed by Judge Silver should run consecutive to the fifteen-year handgun sentence and concurrent with his subsequent sentences because Judge Silver stated that Scott’s life sentence was “to run consecutive to sentence now serving.” The State argues that the Court of Special Appeals correctly concluded that the doctrine of the law of the case may be applied in connection with a motion to correct an illegal sentence. The State also contends that Judge Matricciani did not abuse his discretion when he adopted Judge Smith’s ruling denying Scott’s motion to correct an illegal sentence.

Finally, the State argues that Judge Byrnes did not impose an illegal sentence when he corrected Scott’s commitment records because a hearing was not required and Scott’s sentence was not increased by eighty years. The State maintains that a hearing was not required because, when Judge Byrnes corrected Scott’s commitment records, he did not modify Scott’s sentence. The State also argues that Scott’s sentence was not increased by eighty years when the corrections were made because Scott was serving the sentence for murder in Case No. 18035413, not the handgun sentence, when Judge Silver imposed the additional life sentence. A. Law of the Case We agree with Scott that the Court of Special Appeals erred in applying the doctrine of law of the case. 6 We do not agree ¹⁸³ with Scott, however, that the intermediate appellate court erred because Rule 4-345(a) renders the doctrine of law of the case inapplicable to motions to correct an illegal sentence. 7 Rather, the Court of Special Appeals erred in its conclusion that Judge Matricciani was bound by Judge Smith’s denial of Scott’s motion to correct an illegal sentence because the two judges were “colleague[s] of coordinate jurisdiction.” Stewart v. State, 319 Md. 81, 91 , 570 A.2d 1229, 1234 (1990).

It is for this reason that the doctrine of the law of the case does not apply. In Maryland, as we explained in Goldstein & Baron Chartered v. Chesley, 375 Md. 244 , 825 A.2d 985 (2003), generally, the “law of the case doctrine is one of appellate procedure.” Id. at 253 , 825 A.2d at 990 (internal quotations omitted). Under the doctrine, once an appellate court rules upon a question presented on appeal, litigants and lower courts become bound by the ruling, which is considered to be the law of the case. 8 Turner v. Housing Authority of Balti ¹⁸⁴ more City, 364 Md. 24, 32 , 770 A.2d 671, 676 (2001). Not only are lower courts bound by the law of the case, but “[djecisions rendered by a prior appellate panel will generally govern the second appeal” at the same appellate level as well, unless the previous decision is incorrect because it is out of keeping with controlling principles announced by a higher court and following the decision would result in manifest injustice.

Hawes v. Liberty Homes, 100 Md.App. 222, 231 , 640 A.2d 743, 747 (1994); see also Goldstein, 375 Md. at 260 , 825 A.2d at 994 (adopting the reasoning in Hawes); Houghton v. County Comm’rs of Kent. Co., 305 Md. 407, 414 , 504 A.2d 1145, 1149 (1986)(explaining that the law of the case doctrine does not apply to the Court of Appeals because it is required to review judgments of subordinate courts)(citing Loveday v. State, 296 Md. 226, 229-34 , 462 A.2d 58, 61 (1983)). Here, however, there have been no appellate rulings in Scott’s case with respect to whether Scott’s sentence was illegal; rather, one circuit court judge followed the reasoning of another circuit court judge in the same case. Therefore, the law of the case doctrine is inapplicable.

With respect to the decisions of circuit courts, we have held that, “as a general principle, one judge of a trial court ruling on a matter is not bound by the prior ruling in the same case by another judge of the court.” Gertz v. Anne Arundel County, 339 Md. 261, 273 , 661 A.2d 1157, 1163 (1995)(quoting State v. Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 449 , 470 A.2d 1269, 1283 (1984)); see also Stewart, 319 Md. at 91 , 570 A.2d at 1234 (stating that “no trial judge is required to abdicate his own individual judgment merely because a colleague of coordinate jurisdiction has made a ruling”). Of course, the second judge may adopt the prior judge’s reasoning as his or her own, as long as that judge does not “abdicate his own individual judgment.” Stewart, 319 Md. at 91 , 570 A.2d at 1234 . When Judge Matricciani denied Scott’s second motion to correct an illegal sentence, he cited Judge Smith, his peer on the Circuit Court, and quoted ¹⁸⁵ her earlier denial of Scott’s first motion, thereby reflecting his agreement with her reasoning. Having so agreed, Judge Matrieciani, as Judge Smith’s colleague of coordinate jurisdiction, thus, was free to adopt Judge Smith’s reasoning, but he was not bound by the doctrine of the law of the case to do so.

See Gertz, 839 Md. at 273, 661 A.2d at 1163 . The Court of Special Appeals erred by determining otherwise. As earlier mentioned, Scott also argues that Judge Matricciani abused his discretion by failing to make his own determination when he adopted or agreed with Judge Smith’s reasoning. We need not explore this contention further, however, because as explained in Part B below, the determination by both judges that Scott’s sentence was not illegal is correct as a matter of law.

B. Issue of Error The Court of Special Appeals correctly held that Judge Matrieciani did not err when he concluded that Scott’s corrected commitment records did not result in an illegal sentence under Rule 4-345. We agree that, by correcting Scott’s commitment records, Judge Byrnes did not modify Scott’s sentence and render it illegal. We also agree that Judge Byrnes did not violate Rule 4-345(c) when he corrected Scott’s commitment records. 9 Scott contends that his sentence was modified because Judge Byrnes’ corrections effectively increased his sentence by eighty years. This occurs, according to Scott, because, when Judge Silver imposed a life sentence in 1983 (Case No. 18035701), he was serving his fifteen-year handgun sentence (Case No. 18035413).

Because Judge Silver stated that Scott’s life sentence was “to run consecutive to sentence now serving,” Scott, relying on Robinson v. Lee, 317 Md. 371 , 564 A.2d 395 (1989), reasons that the life sentence imposed by ¹⁸⁶ Judge Silver should run consecutive to the fifteen-year handgun sentence and concurrent with his subsequent sentences. Because Scott relies so heavily on Robinson , however,