Scott v. State

ADKINS, Judge. Thomas Scott appeals his conviction for first degree rape for two reasons. First, he contends that a statement given by him to the police was coerced and in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Second, he asserts that the evidence in the record is insufficient to establish the aggravation required to elevate a second degree rape to a first degree rape.

The instant case had its genesis in a sexual assault that took place on the night of June 10, 1983. For purposes of this decision, it is unnecessary to rehash the details of this assault. Suffice it to say that the appellant, age 15, had sexual intercourse with the five-year old victim. As a result, the victim suffered vaginal trauma, described as an “[ujnremarkable” 2-3 cm. tear in the perineal area “which was bleeding mildly,” and a loss of her virginity.

The Confession Shortly after the incident, the victim identified the appellant as the man who had done something “nasty” to her. The appellant was taken into custody and, after a lengthy booking session, he was placed in a small room. According to his testimony at the suppression hearing, two officers entered the room and threatened him with a blackjack. Later, the appellant’s father proclaimed that he would hit him with a chair if he did not stop smiling.

It is these threats, coupled with the appellant’s youthful age and lack ⁶⁰³ of experience with law enforcement procedures, that the appellant contends rendered his confession involuntary. To be admitted into evidence, a confession must be both voluntary and it must be given after the accused has properly waived his rights under Miranda and its progeny. Schmidt v. State, 60 Md.App. 86, 96 , 481 A.2d 241 (1984). If either of these conditions has not been met, the confession cannot be used to obtain a conviction.

There are two hurdles that a confession must clear before it can be deemed voluntary. One is based on common law principles and the other examines whether the accused was accorded due process of law. The reason behind the rules is that confessions involuntarily given are inherently unreliable. R. Gilbert, C. Moylan, Maryland Criminal Law: Practice and Procedure § 39.1 (1984).

In other words “a false confession [is] a cheap price to pay for being released from the thumbscrew or to be cut down from the yardarms.” Id. Under the State’s non-constitutional common law, a confession must be given voluntarily or it cannot be admitted into evidence. Finke v. State, 56 Md.App. 450, 482 , 468 A.2d 353 (1983). The focus of this inquiry is whether the accused was bullied or induced into incriminating himself.

Hillard v. State, 286 Md. 145, 151-53 , 406 A.2d 415 (1979). “A threat of corporeal violence is the clearest case of an inducement that excludes the confession.” Jackson v. State, 209 Md. 390, 395 , 121 A.2d 242 (1956) (quoting 3 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 833 (Chadbourn rev. 1970)). Scott asserts on appeal, as he did in the trial court, that he was threatened by the police. Unlike Jackson , where the police officers involved did not deny the allegations of brutality, the officers in this case took the stand at the suppression hearing and denied any knowledge of the incident. As a result, the trial judge was faced with conflicting testimony.

Apparently, he chose to believe the police officers. Since it is the province of the trial court to ⁶⁰⁴ resolve conflicting testimony, we must accept the trial court’s finding of fact that the alleged threat never took place. See Hurley v. State, 60 Md.App. 539, 554 , 483 A.2d 1298 (1984). Next, the appellant contends that his father’s threat to hit him with a chair rendered his confession involuntary.

Preliminarily, we note that the father was not a State agent. The mere fact that no agency relationship existed, however, would not necessarily preclude a finding that the confession was involuntary. In Watts v. State, 99 Md. 30 , 57 A. 542 (1904) for example, a reporter’s exhortation to a defendant to confess rendered the defendant’s confession involuntary. In a recent analysis of the case, the Court of Appeals noted that the plea to confess was made “with the sheriff present.” Hillard, 286 Md. at 152 , 406 A.2d 415 .

The instant case lacks the essential element that rendered all the confessions analyzed by the Hillard court involuntary: a plea to confess. Assuming the truth of the appellant’s rendition of what was said, it does not amount to a statement to the accused “that making an inculpatory statement will be to his advantage.” Hillard, 286 Md. at 153, 406 A.2d 415 . Thus, the father’s command was not a demand to confess, but rather a mere request to change a facial expression. Without a threat or offer of assistance, there is nothing in the record to show that the appellant’s confession was given in violation of the common law voluntariness standard.

Thus, we reject this contention. The appellant also asserts that his confession was inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of the strictures outlined in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 457-58 , 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1618-19 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Specifically, he asserts that his right to free legal counsel was not properly explained to him. The police officers who testified at the suppression hearing controverted this allegation.

Additionally, the waiver form that was initialed and signed by the appellant stated that “[i]f you want a lawyer and ⁶⁰⁵ cannot afford one, you will not be asked any questions, and the court will be requested to appoint one for you.” Based on this evidentiary record, there is an abundance of evidence to support the trial court's decision to reject the defendant’s rendition of the facts. At the very least, we cannot say that its decision was clearly erroneous. Md.Rule 1086. Based on this conclusion, we hold that the defendant’s waiver of his Miranda rights was properly obtained.

Cf. In Re Shannon A., 60 Md.App. 399, 407-08 , 483 A.2d 363 (1984). Thus, we reject the appellant’s Miranda argument. As we recently noted in Finke v. State, 56 Md.App. at 487 , 468 A.2d 353 , we cannot end our decision here.

Rather, we are compelled by the United States Constitution to undertake an independent review of the record to verify that, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant’s confession was freely and voluntarily given. Given the absence of coercion and the fact that the appellant was informed of his rights, we find no basis for concluding that his statement was involuntarily given. See In Re Shannon A., 60 Md.App. 399, 408-09 , 483 A.2d 363 (1984)