Sea Watch Stores Ltd. Liability Co. v. Council of Unit Owners of Sea Watch Condominium

CATHELL, Judge. Sea Watch Stores Limited Liability Company (Sea Watch Stores) and the Club at Sea Watch, Ltd. (the Club at Sea Watch LTD appears to be a managing entity for the Sea Watch Stores) appeal from a judgment rendered against them granting injunctive relief in favor of The Council of Unit Owners of Sea Watch Condominium (Council of Unit Owners) by the Circuit Court for Worcester County (Eschenburg, J., presiding). Appellants present five questions: 1. Should the Council have been permitted to avail itself of the judicial system before it complied with the dispute settlement mechanism mandated by the Maryland Condominium Act? 2.

Did the lower court err in ruling that the Council may impose rules for a condominium by means of restrictive covenants without compliance with the Declaration, the by ¹⁰ laws of the condominium, and the Maryland Condominium Act? 3. Did the lower court err in failing to hold the Council to a standard of reasonableness in its enforcement of restrictions regulating the use by a small minority of owners of the general common elements, where such restrictions were not provided for in the Declaration, Bylaws, and in particular err in finding that the Council’s actions were reasonable in: (A) refusing to approve the opening of a doorway between two units, where the Appellants provided an engineer’s certificate of safety? (B) refusing to approve signs advertising the services? (C) insisting that Appellants’ game room needed a special exception for an arcade, where the city zoning administrator testified that no such license was required or available?

And (D) otherwise attempting to impose unreasonable restrictions on the operation of Appellants’ stores? 4. Did the lower court err in holding that the name of a condominium complex constitutes a service mark which the Appellants misappropriated by using it in their corporate names and businesses? 5. Did the lower court err in awarding attorneys’ fees to the Council? We shall answer question one in the affirmative, and questions two, three, four, and five in the negative.

We shall affirm Judge Eschenburg’s well reasoned decision. Preliminary Discussion In order to comprehend fully the present dispute, certain precepts of the law of real property generally and of condominiums specifically must be examined. We shall first address the nature of a condominium. 1 It is a subdivision of ¹¹ land as land is defined to include all of its constituent elements, including the airspace above the physical land. A condominium is no less a subdivision in real property terms than a subdivision of physical ground that extends, not vertically, but horizontally.

To conceptualize that a condominium is a subdivision, one needs to visualize that if the vertical building comprised of individual condominium units were to be laid horizontally on the ground, the condominium would then be a subdivision of that ground. 2 All a condominium is, is a vertical, rather than a horizontal, subdivision of one of the incidents of real property, the airspace. One must always remember that the condominium statutes did not create new real property. They simply created another way to own airspace 3 and to regulate the use of that incident of real property that had always been a part of real property. 4 Judge Eschenburg anticipated the focus of our ¹² discussion on the susceptibility of condominium units to encumbrances that can be imposed generally on any real property when he stated in his thoughtful opinion: [Appellee] was the record owner of the eight store units and entered into a Deed, Agreement, and Declaration[ 5 ] of Covenants, Restrictions, Charges, and Liens, which contains the Restrictions. The Court finds that these Restrictions amount to restrictive covenants running with the land.

In order to be valid and enforceable, restrictive covenants may not be unreasonable, nor may they be against public policy. Eisenstadt v. Barron, 252 Md. 358 , 250 A.2d 85 (1969). ¹³ Eisenstadt did not concern a condominium. It concerned restrictions on a lot within a subdivision. Accordingly, Judge Eschenburg was resolving the issues in this case according to the general law applicable to the placement of restrictions on the use of real property.

He was completely correct in doing so. We hold, as Judge Eschenburg essentially found, that both the general law as to the use of real property and the law regulating condominiums apply when one is dealing with the uses to which horizontal slices of a vertical column of real property, ie., a condominium unit, may be subjected. Unless the statute provides to the contrary, when a condominium unit is encumbered by restrictions contained in the governing documents and by restrictions contained in that unit’s chain of title, all reasonable restrictions, ie., the most restrictive provision, will generally apply. In the case sub judice, a prior owner in the chain of title to the real property at issue “as a part of that general plan” of development of the eight commercial units caused to be recorded a declaration that contained restrictions by conveying the property to a subsequent owner in the chain of title by a deed containing that declaration of restrictions.

As Judge Eschenburg found, this is one way in which restrictions may be imposed on the use of real property. 6 That deed (recorded among the Land Records of Worcester County at Liber 564, folio 416 et seq. in 1976) for the most part contains the restrictions and conditions appellants were alleged to have violated. The deed conveyed, and restricts, the use of store units 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, apparently comprising commercial units in the Sea Watch Condominium in Ocean City, a primarily residential complex. The store units were conveyed to 11500 Ocean Highway Limited Partnership, also described ¹⁴ in the deed as “Declarant.” 7 The deed notes that the “De-clarant” intended to “take title to the Store Units” and thereafter to sell them “under a general plan of development.” 8 This deed provides that both the named “Declarant” (the grantee), and the owner, the.Council of Unit Owners of Sea Watch Condominium (the grantor), wished to create “certain rights and obligations regarding the maintenance and operation of the Store Units.” 9 It states that both parties chose to accomplish their desires by subjecting “the Store Units to certain covenants, charges, restrictions, and liens as hereinafter set forth” to be “collectively referred to as the ‘Restrictions.’ ” The deed also notes that the restrictions were for the benefit of the “Store Units, all other Condominium Units within Sea Watch Condominium and the Council.” The Council of Unit Owners was expressly delegated enforcement responsibility. The actual granting clause states: “The Council does hereby grant, convey and assign unto the Declarant the Store Units, subject, however, to, and burdened, benefited and bound by, the Restrictions.” (Emphasis added.) The haben-dum clause provides that the “Declarant” (the grantee), its successors and assigns, would have and hold the store units, forever, in fee simple “subject, however, to the” restrictions. ¹⁵ The habendum clause, moreover, stated explicitly, in reference to the restrictions, that the restrictions were hereby covenanted and agreed shall be binding upon the Declarant [the grantee], its successors and assigns, and the Store Units and each of them, to the end that the Restrictions shall run with, bind, benefit and burden the Store Units and each of them for and during the period of time specified hereafter.

Thereafter, the grantor and grantee specified the duration of the restrictions: All Restrictions ... shall be deemed covenants running with the land or charges and liens upon the land, or both, and any and every conveyance of any Store Unit shall be absolutely subject to the Restrictions whether or not it shall be so expressed in the deed____ The Restrictions ... shall continue in full force and effect ... until the 31st day of December in the year 2015, and thereafter shall be automatically extended ... for successive periods of ten years. We shall, as did Judge Eschenburg, construe the restrictions at issue in this case as we would review any restrictive covenant imposed on real property. We acknowledge that the condominium documents may contain provisions that conflict with these deed restrictions. There may also be zoning restrictions in conflict.

The conflicts between reasonable restrictions are, so long as a conflict does not create an impossible situation in regard to use, resolved, as they generally always have been, by applying the reasonable provision that most restricts the use. The Facts The complaint in the instant case establishes the creation of the condominium through the execution and recording of the pertinent documents and discusses the powers of the board of directors and provisions of the condominium bylaws. It then discusses the conveyance of the eight store units at issue in the case at bar by the deed, which we have mentioned, from the Council of Unit Owners, as the owner of the stores, to ¹⁶ 11500 Ocean Highway Limited Partnership. The complaint notes that the conveyance to 11500 Ocean Highway Limited Partnership was subject to certain restrictions intended to run with the land as a part of a general plan of development of the eight stores. 10 The various relevant restrictions are set out in the complaint, and a copy of the deed in which they were established is attached to the complaint and incorporated therein by reference.

Appellee, the plaintiff below, then listed in the complaint the provisions it alleges were violated and that it sought to enforce, referring to both the restrictions contained in the direct chain of title (the deed) to the store units and in one instance to the covenants and restrictions contained in the Condominium Declaration and Bylaws. The complaint alleges the following violations: A. Permitting, causing, and encouraging deliveries to the store units through the front entrances. B. Permitting, causing, and encouraging customer access to the store units through the rear entrances. C. Permitting, causing, and encouraging the store units to remain open after 11:00 p.m. by inter alia removing the doors.

D. Causing objects to be placed in the common elements (including chairs, and rubbish and debris), and disparaging the title of [appellee] to the common elements located in the area immediately adjacent to the store units. E. Causing noxious odors or offensive activity and annoying unit owners and interfering with their peaceful use and possession by cooking and allowing objectionable odors to emanate from a store unit. F. Conducting unlawful activity by operating a public arcade in the so called “kids center” and “hangout” in ¹⁷ violation of the Town of Ocean City zoning laws, and by performing unlawful renovations in violation of the Town of Ocean City zoning laws. G. Placing signs upon the store units in violation of sign requirements and without Board of Direetorsf] approval.

H. Challenging [appellee’s] right to administer, manage, and regulate the condominium and the use of its common elements by failing and refusing to abide by the requirements applicable to the operation of store units and by threatening to appropriate the general common elements to [appellants’] sole use for its customers (e.g., use for storage, customer access, store promotion, and recreation areas set aside for customers).[ 11 ] The complaint substantially tracked the restrictions contained in the deed that created special restrictions, above and beyond the restrictions contained in the Condominium Declaration and Bylaws, as to the eight store units. In reference to paragraphs A and B aforesaid, the deed provides: 1. Deliveries (a) All deliveries of any kind to Store Units (including deliveries of inventory and supplies) shall be made through the rear entrances to those Units. No deliveries shall be made through the front entrances to Store Units.

For purposes of this Deed and Declaration the “front entrances” of Store Units 1, 2, 3 and 4 shall be the entrance at the north side of each of those Units, and the “rear entrance” to those Units shall be the entrance at the south side thereof. The “front entrance” of Store Units 5, 6, 7 and 8 shall be the entrance at the south side of each of those Units, and the “rear entrance” to those Units shall be the entrance at the north side thereof. ¹⁸ (b) All deliveries to Store Units shall be subject to general direction and control by the Board of Directors of the Council or its duly authorized employees or representatives, provided such direction and control is exercised in a reasonable manner. Delivery vehicles shall be permitted to use the common elements of Sea Watch Condominium only to the extent that such use does not, in the reasonable judgment of the Board of Directors of the Council, interfere with the normal use of those common elements by the occupants of residential Condominium Units or with the normal traffic through them by sanitation, utility or other vehicles providing services to the Condominium. 2. Customers (a) Customer access to Store Units shall be afforded only through the front entrances to whose Units, and rear entrances to Store Units shall not be used to provide customer access.

As to paragraph C of the complaint, the deed containing the restrictions provides: 4. Hours of Operation. Store Units may not be open for business or for deliveries prior to 7:00 a.m. or after 11:00 p.m. without the prior written approval of the Board of Directors of the Council. As to paragraphs D and E of the complaint, the deed provides: 7.

Use of Store Units (a) No rubbish or debris of any kind shall be placed or permitted to accumulate upon or adjacent to any Store Unit, so as to render such Unit or any portion thereof unsanitary, unsightly, offensive, or detrimental to any of the other Units of Sea Watch Condominium, or to the occupants thereof, and the Owner of each Store Unit shall, at its expense, maintain its Unit in a clean, orderly and sanitary condition, free of insects, rodents, vermin and other pests. No objec ¹⁹ tionable odors shall be permitted to arise from any Store Unit or portion thereof. As to paragraph F, the deed states: (b) All Store Units shall be operated in compliance with all current and future building, zoning, occupancy and other applicable laws. As to paragraph G, the deed restrictions provide: 8.

Signs. The Owner of each Store Unit may erect and maintain on the exterior thereof an appropriate sign (as determined by the Board of Directors of the Council, in its discretion) indicating the nature of such Unit’s use and identifying the establishment located therein. Except as permitted by the preceding sentence, no signs may be erected or placed on or within any Store Unit closer than five feet from the front or rear boundary thereof without the prior written approval of the Board of Directors of the Council. As to paragraph H, several provisions of the deed restrictions recite: r (b) Guests, invitees, licensees, tenants and customers of Store Units may use the general common elements of Sea Watch Condominium only for purposes of ingress and egress to and from those Units.

Without limiting the generality of the preceding sentence, no such guests, invitees, licensees, tenants, or customers, as such, shall be permitted to loiter in the common areas of Sea Watch Condominium, nor shall they be permitted to use the common element bathrooms, or the common element game rooms, swimming pools, tennis courts, or other recreational facilities of the Condominium. (c) Neither the Owners of Store Units nor their tenants, guests, invitees, licensees or customers shall place or cause to be placed or stored within the common elements of Sea Watch Condominium any furniture, packages, or objects of any kind without the prior written approval of the Board of Directors of the Council. ²⁰ We shall first further address the applicability of the deed’s restrictions to the subject property. Although appellants apparently do not understand' that a condominium regime is real property and, thus, subject to the laws that generally apply to deed-imposed restrictions in the chain of title, Judge Eschenburg was fully conversant with the applicable legal standards. He initially opined: “As a threshold matter, the Court finds that the [deed] Restrictions are valid and enforceable____ [T]hese Restrictions amount to restrictive covenants running with the land.” He then noted the applicable law: [Restrictive covenants may not be unreasonable, nor may they be against public policy.... [Restrictive covenants must “touch and concern” the land,[ 12 ] the original parties must have intended that the restrictive covenant run with the land, there must be privity of estate, and the restrictive covenant must be in writing. [Citation omitted.] He then appropriately made specific findings as to the deed restrictions: In this case, the restrictive covenants do touch and concern the land.

The performance of the covenant, the application of the Restrictions, necessarily rendered the [appel-lee’s] interest in the land less valuable at the time of the covenant because the Restrictions serve to limit the uses to which the land could be put. Second, the language of the Restrictions clearly states that the parties intended the covenants to run with the land. Restrictions, Background, Para, (d) (The 1976 Deed purported “to cause the covenants, restrictions, charges and liens hereinafter set forth to run with, burden and benefit the [store units], and each of them”). Third, the parties to the 1976 Deed were in privity and, finally, the agreement was memorialized in writing. ²¹ [Appellants] point out no public policy that is offended by the Restrictions.

The Restrictions are not illegal. The Restrictions are clearly intended and designed to limit the use of the store units to ensure that the use of the residential units and the common areas is not unduly disturbed. [Citation omitted.] The trial judge then noted that appellants were attacking the applicability of the deed restrictions by claiming that the restrictions violated “the principles of self governance” of the condominium and that the restrictions amounted to an ultra vires taking by appellee of the general common elements. We shall digress for a moment to discuss a case that, if applicable, would be helpful to appellants in respect to their argument below and on appeal, that the Council of Unit Owners’ actions were ultra vires. In Ridgely Condominium Ass’n v. Smyrnioudis, 105 Md.App. 404 , 660 A.2d 942 (1995), the condominium association’s Board of Directors adopted a resolution that prohibited clients of the commercial units from utilizing the condominium’s lobby.

The association later adopted, by less than a unanimous vote, a bylaw amendment that tracked the language of the resolution. We said, in a footnote, that under the condominium documents, the denial of all use of common elements to a unit owner by the governing body constituted an “ultra vires taking of a portion of their percentage interest in the common areas in derogation of the ... declaration as well as certain provisions of the ... Act.” Id. at 409 n. 2, 660 A.2d 942 . We did not, however, base our decision on that argument because it had not been raised.

The Court of Appeals, in its review of Ridgely, 343 Md. 357, 365 , 681 A.2d 494 (1996), noted that we had declined to base our decision on that theory. See Id. at 365 , 681 A.2d 494 . It then noted that at oral argument before it, the issue had been presented and noted the contention that the bylaw provision adopted had violated both the condominium declaration and statute by “ ‘taking’ a property right. Such changes ... they maintained, may only be accomplished by ... the unanimous consent of the unit owners.” Id. at 366 , 681 A.2d 494 .

The Court of Appeals then decided to address the issue that we ²² had declined to resolve. The Court noted that the bylaw restriction adopted by amendment forbade the commercial unit owners from accessing their units through general common element areas. After a discussion of numerous foreign cases stating that in order to prohibit all use of a general common element by a particular unit owner bylaw amendments had to be passed unanimously, because a conversion of the general common elements to exclusive use of one owner constituted a taking of other owners’ property without authority, id. at 367 , 681 A.2d 494 (citing Kaplan v. Boudreaux, 410 Mass. 435 , 573 N.E.2d 495 (1991); Makeever v. Lyle, 125 Ariz. 384 , 609 P.2d 1084, 1089 (App.1980)), the Court of Appeals concluded: . Here, the rule at issue affected an “interest” in property.

The bylaw amendment revoked the commercial unit owners’ right to have their clients use the lobby. That right resembles an easement, which is an interest in property.... Since the right resembles an easement, we hold that the bylaw amendment affected an interest in the appellees’ property.[ 13 ] Ridgely, 343 Md. at 369-70 , 681 A.2d 494 (emphasis added). After mentioning the “exclusive use” foreign cases it had previously discussed, which held that the granting of exclusive use of any general common element to one owner or a group of unit owners constituted a forbidden change in the ownership of those excluded, the Court noted that in respect to Ridgely Condominium: [T]he bylaw amendment disparately affected a portion of the unit owners by revoking a property interest they ac ²³ quired when they purchased their units, without affecting the rights of the other unit owners. ...

Further, under § ll-106(a), “[e]ach unit in a condominium has all of the incidents of real property.” ... [T]he Association has attempted to reduce the “easement”... and that “easement” is one of the incidents of the ownership of a ... unit. Id. at 370-71, 681 A.2d 494 . The Court concluded: By by-law amendment, the Association has attempted to deny that mutuality of use of a general comment element [W]e hold that it was beyond the power of the Association by by-law amendment to purport to deprive the owners ... of their rights under the declaration and under the Maryland Condominium Act to the enjoyment of the lobby---- Id. We cite to the Ridgely cases to emphasize that less than all unit owners may not arbitrarily and unilaterally amend bylaws that take away any of the incidents or rights in real property that existed when the condominium was created and to contrast that rule of law with the private deed restrictions separately created in the case at bar.

When one by deed gives up or grants away an incident of real property that is part of his or her condominium unit, or purchases a condominium unit that a predecessor in title has encumbered with restrictions or has conveyed away such rights, it is not the condominium association, in the exercise of its governance, that alters the rights. The rights are modified by the agreement of the owner/grantor (in this case coincidentally the Council of Unit Owners — the actual owners of the individual units) and the buyer/grantee. In this case, appellants’ predecessors, by agreement, limited the incidents of ownership. This was simply a real property transaction in which condominium units were the objects of the sale.

When appellants’ predecessors in vertical privity agreed to, and executed, the deed containing the declaration of restrictions, it was not a condominium-style transaction involving governance, even ²⁴ though the seller that joined in the creation of the restrictions was the Council of Unit Owners. In this instance, the Council of Unit Owners was not exercising its rights to govern the use of common elements or even the units. It was exercising its rights as the owner, not of common elements, but of individual units. For example, had the Council of Unit Owners not incorporated the restrictions in its deed to Sea Watch Store’s predecessors in title, but that first predecessor in title had then created them in subsequent conveyances, it would be clear that the restrictions had not been created as a part of the governance of the condominium.

We reiterate the condominium did not amend its bylaws to create the restrictions. This is, therefore, almost entirely a real property issue, not a condominium governance issue. We cannot leave our discussion of the Court of Appeals’s Ridgely without discussing a case that we decided between our Ridgely and the Court of Appeals’s Ridgely . In Alpert v. Le’Lisa Condominium, 107 Md.App. 239 , 667 A.2d 947 (1995), we affirmed a trial court that had upheld a nonunanimous decision of the condominium owners that passed a rule and amended the bylaws by assigning exclusive parking privileges to certain parking spaces.

The original condominium documents classified the parking area merely as a general common element and, therefore, equally available to all owners. The Alperts bought a unit believing it had assigned to it a specific parking place because they had observed a parking place with the number of the unit they were purchasing affixed to it. After they finalized the purchase, the condominium governing body informed the Alperts that they had reassigned the covered parking place bearing their condominium unit’s number to another unit that had been owned for a longer period of time. After a dispute developed, thirty-one of the thirty-two unit owners (The Alperts being the dissenting owner) amended the bylaws to give to the condominium the right to deny to the Alperts all use at all times of the specific parking space at issue by giving itself the power to assign specific spaces to specific units and to exclude all other unit owners from utilizing the assigned space.

The old space was covered. The ²⁵ new space assigned to the Alperts was not. On appeal to us, the Alperts raised the specific argument that the Court of Appeals resolved in its Ridgely: [The Alperts] argue that Le’Lisa does not have the authority to designate specific parking spaces for the exclusive use of individual unit owners without amending the declaration by unanimous consent of the unit owners---- The Alperts further argue that to do so would encroach on each tenant’s right to access and possession of the common elements, thereby prejudicing the rights of other tenants without each tenant’s consent. Id. at 246 , 667 A.2d 947 (footnote omitted).

Alpert and the Court of Appeals’s Ridgely are plainly inconsistent. The Court of Appeals has clearly stated, although it did not mention Alpert in that respect, that what was done in Alpert cannot be done. We were thus wrong in Alpert . Apparently, no appeal was taken in that case, and apparently Alpert was not in that respect brought to the Court of Appeals’s attention in Ridgely because it was reviewing our Ridgely , which predated Alpert .

It would be inappropriate to ignore one of our holdings that espoused a rule that we know has effectively been rejected by the high court. Accordingly, because we were incorrect in Alpert , we hereby expressly overrule its holding. We return now to Judge Eschenburg’s treatment of appellants’ ultra vires argument. He rejected it, noting: “Nothing in Maryland’s Condominium Act limits the application of restrictive covenants running with the land to condominium units, whether residential or commercial.

Md. Real Prop. Code Ann., Section 11-101, et seq.” In so finding, the trial judge displayed a basic and fundamental understanding of the general law of real property and the way in which it may, on occasion, interact and affect a condominium regime. We note the clearly compatible language of the statute that supports the trial court’s finding. At the time of the conveyance of the eight stores to the 11500 Ocean Highway Limited Partnership, section 11-106 of the Real Property Article, ²⁶ effective July 1, 1975, less than two months prior to the recording of the initial condominium documents (Declaration, Plat, and Bylaws), provided: “Each unit in a condominium has all of the incidents of real property.” 14 Md.Code (1974, 1981 Supp.), § 11-106 of the Real Property Article.

Section 11-109, “Council of unit owners,” stated that a condominium council had the power: (5) To transact its business ... (6) To ... sell, mortgage, lease ... convey, transfer ... and otherwise dispose of any part of its property and assets; ... (8) To acquire by purchase or in any other manner ... and otherwise [to] deal with any property, real or personal, or any interest therein, wherever located. [Emphasis added.] Md.Code (1974, 1981 Supp.), § ll-109(d) of the Real Property Article. Accordingly, the Council of Unit Owners had the right to be an owner of property and was statutorily authorized to acquire the stores or any other property, sell the stores, and “deal” with them as a property owner in any way in which property may be managed or conveyed by any owner.

As to the store units here involved, the Council of Unit Owners was clearly exercising its right as an owner and a grantor, i.e., one of the declarants creating the restrictions imposed by the deed. The trial judge went on to find that the restrictions were in fact reasonable. The trial judge then looked at each alleged violation of the restrictions and the reasonableness of each particular restriction as applied. We shall shortly journey where Judge Eschenburg traveled.

First, we review some of Maryland’s more recent cases dealing with restrictions on real property that are created in a chain of title. We stated in Bright v. Lake Linganore Ass’n, 104 Md.App. 394, 414 , 656 A.2d 377 (1995): ²⁷ “... [I]n the construction of deeds ... the intention of the parties shall prevail unless it violates or infringes some established principle of law. To ascertain this meaning and intent of the parties resort must be had to the whole deed that every word of it may take effect and none be rejected.... ” Logsdon v. Brailer Mining Co., 143 Md. 463, 474-75 , 123 A. 113 (1923) (emphasis added, citations omitted). See also ...

McKenrick v. Savings Bank, 174 Md. 118, 128 , 197 A. 580 (1938) (Even when covenants do not expressly provide words of inheritance or running with the land language, “if ... it was the intention ... that the restrictions were part of a uniform general scheme or plan ... which should affect the land granted and ... retained alike, they may be enforced in equity....”); Legum v. Carlin, 168 Md. 191, 194 , 177 A. 287 (1935) (“Where the intention is clearly ... manifested by the language used ... it will be gathered from the words used.... ”). In the present case, the deed creating the restrictions notes that the grantee was to hold the property “unto” itself and “[i]ts successors and assigns, forever, in fee simple,” subject to the restrictions. The restrictions were to be “binding upon the [grantee], its successors and assigns” and to “run with, bind, benefit and burden the Store Units.” We stated in Bright : “Another and more fundamental rule, we think, is involved-that unless some positive rule of law is contravened, every part of a deed is to be given effect, if possible, and the intention of the parties must prevail.” 104 Md.App. at 416 , 656 A.2d 377 (quoting Adams v. Parater, 206 Md. 224 , 111 A.2d 590 (1955)). In the present case, the intentions of the Council of Unit Owners, as the owner of the store units, and 11500 Ocean Highway Limited Partnership were crystal clear.

Appellants’ attempt to obscure the clear intent of the restrictions by attempting to create a conflict between the condominium statute, the condominium documents, and the deed is ineffective. The law is clear. The trial court in the case sub judice discussed the privity of the parties in 1976. Beyond that, however, is a require- ²⁸ merit that there be a more important privity of estate that exists in the case sub judice.

In Bright , we commented on our cases that adopted the modern view of privity of estate and discussed extensively our prior case of Gallagher v. Bell, 69 Md.App. 199 , 516 A.2d 1028 (1986), cert. denied, 308 Md. 382 , 519 A.2d 1283 (1987). See 104 Md.App. at 417-20 , 656 A.2d 377 . We said in Bright : We then discussed the “modern view” of privity that abolished the requirements of both horizontal and mutual privity, retaining only the requirement of vertical privity, i.e., the person receiving the benefit or bearing the burden of the covenant is a successor in title to the original cove-nantor or covenantee. [Gallagher, 69 Md.App.] at 216-17, 516 A.2d 1028 . We saw nothing precluding the adoption of the “modern view” and, though not in express language, applied that view by stating that “vertical privity” focused on devolutional relationships, where we perceived “the focus should be.” Id. at 217 , 516 A.2d 1028 .

While our cases have discussed vertical privity, perhaps one of the simplest explanations of the difference between “vertical” and “horizontal” privity is found in the North Carolina covenant case of Runyon v. Paley, 331 N.C. 293 , 416 S.E.2d 177, 184-85 (1992): [M]ost states require two types of privity: (1) privity of estate between the covenantor and covenantee at the time the covenant was created (“horizontal privity”), and (2) privity of estate between the covenanting parties and their successors in interest (“vertical privity”).... ... The mere fact that defendants and plaintiff ... did not acquire the property directly from the original covenanting parties is of no moment. Regardless of the number of conveyances that transpired, defendants and plaintiff ... have succeeded to the estates then held by the covenantor and covenantee, and thus they are in vertical privity____ ²⁹ Where ... the restriction is contained in the chain of title, we have not hesitated to enforce the restriction against a subsequent purchaser when the court may reasonably infer that the covenant was created for the benefit of the party seeking enforcement. 104 Md.App. at 419-20 , 656 A.2d 377 . We held in Bright : [Vjertieal privity of estate exists.

Thus, the charge at issue follows the land (the lots); it runs with and binds the land. This is further evidenced by the general plan of development, discussed in greater detail, infra, and by the language of the Key Deeds, and other deeds, declaring the covenants to run with the land. Id. at 420 , 656 A.2d 377 . No plausible argument can be made that the deed restrictions in this case do not run with the land and burden the owner of the units at issue — appellant Sea Watch Stores.

In light of the great weight of evidence and of the law, appellants’ attempts to resist the enforcement of the deed restrictions, looked at in the best light possible, are frivolous. The restrictions contained in the deed are clearly applicable. In our Markey v. Wolf, 92 Md.App. 137 , 607 A.2d 82 (1992), a case in which property owners in a subdivision were attempting to force on a party their interpretation of a restriction regarding the required cost of houses that were built in that subdivision, we noted: As we have said, the imposition of restrictive covenants is almost universally recognized. A more difficult problem is the interpretation of such covenants.

From the very early days of subdivision development, the cases have been concerned primarily with the adoption and applicability of rules of construction. Generally, covenants have been construed narrowly and strictly though in more recent years a “reasonableness rule” (termed a modern rule in some foreign jurisdictions) has been engrafted upon the general rule. ³⁰ We explain the metamorphosis as it occurred in Maryland and other jurisdictions.[ 15 ] Id. at 149-50 , 607 A.2d 82 . Quoting from Himmel v. Hendler, 161 Md. 181, 187-88 , 155 A. 316 (1931), we further opined: In interpreting words used to create restrictions, the court should endeavor to ascertain the real purpose and intention of the parties and to discover the purpose from the surrounding, circumstances at the time of the creation of the restriction, as well as from the words used. In endeavoring to arrive at the intention, the words used should be taken in their ordinary and popular sense, unless it plainly appears from the context that the parties intended to use them in a different sense, or that they have acquired a peculiar or special meaning in respect to the particular subject-matter.

Markey, 92 Md.App. at 153 , 607 A.2d 82 . We noted in Markey that the Court of Appeals in Turner v. Brocato, 206 Md. 336 , 111 A.2d 855 (1955), had emphasized the need to give effect to the intentions of the parties. In Belleview Constr. Co. v. Rugby Hall Community Ass’n, 321 Md. 152, 158 , 582 A.2d 493 (1990), the Court stated: “The rule of strict construction should not be employed ... to defeat a restrictive covenant that is clear on its face, or is clear when considered in light of the surrounding circumstances.” See also Markey, 92 Md.App. at 156 , 607 A.2d 82 .

Having been instructed by the Court of Appeals and guided by our own decisions, we now address the trial court’s specific findings as to the allegations and contentions of appellee. We are mindful that in reviewing a trial court’s findings of fact, we are somewhat constrained. Unless its findings of fact are clearly erroneous, we must affirm. Maryland Rule 8-131(c) provides that in an action tried without a jury an appellate court “will not set aside the judgment of the trial court on the evidence unless clearly erroneous, and will give due regard to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” The ³¹ Court of Appeals in the civil forfeiture case of $3,417.46 U.S. Money v. Kinnamon, 326 Md. 141, 149 , 604 A.2d 64 (1992), reiterated the longstanding appellate rule that decisions of a trial judge will not be overturned on the evidence unless clearly erroneous: In Ryan v. Thurston, 276 Md. 390, 391-92 , 347 A.2d 834 (1975), we analogized the scope of review of a circuit court under Maryland Rule 1386 to that possessed by this Court and the Court of Special Appeals under former Maryland Rules 886 and 1086 (the provisions of both now being contained in Maryland Rule 8-131(e)).

See Housing Comm’n v. Lacey, 322 Md. 56, 59 , 585 A.2d 219 (1991). These rules have been consistently interpreted in our cases to require that appellate courts accept and be bound by findings of fact of the lower court unless they are clearly erroneous. And as we said in Ryan v. Thurston, supra, 276 Md. at 392 , 347 A.2d 834 , “[t]he appellate court must consider evidence produced at the trial in a light most favorable to the prevailing party and if substantial evidence was presented to support the trial court’s determination, it is not clearly erroneous and cannot be disturbed.” Moreover, as we reiterated in Housing Comm’n v. Lacey, supra, 322 Md. at 59-60 , 585 A.2d 219 , the trial court is not only the judge of a witness’s credibility but also of the weight to be attached to the evidence. It is thus plain that the appellate court should not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on its findings of fact but will only determine whether those findings are clearly erroneous in light of the total evidence.

See Kowell Ford, Inc. v. Doolan, 283 Md. 579, 584 , 391 A.2d 840 (1978). In Weisman v. Connors, 76 Md.App. 488, 500 , 547 A.2d 636 (1988), cert. denied, 314 Md. 497 , 551 A.2d 868 (1989), Judge Wilner, for this Court, stated: In a non-jury case, the appellate court does not evaluate conflicting evidence but assumes the truth of all evidence, and inferences fairly deducible from it, tending to support the findings of the trial court, and, on that basis, simply inquires whether there is any evidence legally sufficient to ³² support those findings. See Pahanish v. Western Trails, Inc., 69 Md.App. 342 , 517 A.2d 1122 (1986); Carling Brewing Co. v. Belzner, 15 Md.App. 406 , 291 A.2d 175 (1972). The appropriate standard in our review of a trial court’s grant or denial of a petition for an injunction is whether the trial court’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether the trial court has abused its discretion in regard to the action it took based upon its fact-finding.

Maryland Trust Co. v. Tulip Realty Co., 220 Md. 399 , 153 A.2d 275 (1959), was a case that also involved restrictions imposed by deed on the use of real property, in that case a shopping center. The trial court, much as Judge Eschenburg here, ordered compliance with the restrictions. The Court of Appeals noted: That part of the chancellor’s decree which required the erection of a wire fence ... was proper. The chancellor, who had an opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses, concluded that the words and actions of some of the defendants were in direct and irreconcilable conflict, and found as a fact that Sedgemoor constructed ... with the intention of ... [violating a restriction].

In doing so, we cannot find that the chancellor was clearly wrong. Id. at 410-11 , 153 A.2d 275 (emphasis added). After explaining why it could not hold that the chancellor was clearly wrong, the Court directed its attention at the injunctive remedy: The Chancellor ... required the ... corporations ... to erect the fence, which is the chief bone of contention in this controversy. What he did in the exercise of his discretion was clearly not erroneous____ ...

Moreover, we find no abuse of the discretion the chancellor exercised when he ordered the erection of a fence to prevent a threatened breach of the parking area covenants. Id. at 412-14, 153 A.2d 275 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). ³³ The Trial Court’s Findings Judge Eschenburg addressed each of the restrictions separately. We shall review his findings in the same manner. In addressing A, 16 regarding deliveries to the store units through the front entrances, Judge Eschenburg stated: [Appellee] complains of commercial deliveries made to [appellants’] store units through the front entrances. [Ap-pellee] introduced testimony of soft drink deliveries and of [appellants’] own employees moving merchandise through the lobby.

The Court finds that these violations occurred. The Court further finds that the Restriction promotes the flow of traffic in the lobby area and, because other entrances are dedicated to delivery uses, does not unduly limit the [appellants’] ability to use their property for commercial purposes. The evidence clearly supports the trial judge’s findings as to the improper use of front entrances and the reasonableness of the restriction in that it “promotes the flow of traffic.” In respect to B, customer access through the rear door, the court found that appellants left the rear doors of the units open during business hours and encouraged customers to use the rear doors. There is evidence supporting that finding.

The trial court found that the restriction was reasonable in that it promoted the “security” of the condominium and did not unduly limit access to the store units. We agree. The trial judge then found, in respect to appellants’ operation of the stores after 11:00 p.m. (paragraph C of appellee’s complaint), that appellants violated the provision by allowing some of the stores to remain open twenty-four hours a day and removing the doors altogether after appellee began securing the doors.

There is evidence to support his findings. He further found the restriction to be reasonable in that it was designed to, and in the trial court’s opinion did, promote ³⁴ tranquility and foster the primarily residential aspect of the complex. We concur. The court, in respect to D, regarding the placement of objects in the common elements, found that there was evidence that appellants placed tables and chairs in the common element areas in violation of the restriction “apparently under a claim of ownership of these areas.” Thereafter, when appellants finally removed the table and chairs, the trial court found that appellants allowed “rubbish and debris” to remain on the common elements.

There is evidence to support those findings. Judge Eschenburg found that the restriction was reasonable. We again agree. In respect to E, the allegation that appellants caused offensive odors, the court found that the restriction “on the emission of noxious odors ... [was] ... reasonable ... because the result could be inconsistent with the residential use of the remainder of the condominium.” We likewise agree.

The trial court, however, did not find that the violations of this restriction had been sufficiently significant to constitute an “excessive emission.” The court did not order an injunction in reference to this issue. There has been no cross-appeal taken in respect to it. Accordingly, we need not address it further. In respect to F, the assertion that appellants were operating a public arcade, in violation of the zoning laws of Ocean City, the court opined: [Appellee] complains of the [appellants’] operation of a public arcade, containing more than four arcade machines and open to the general public, in -violation of the Town of Ocean City’s Zoning Code.

The Court is persuaded by testimony introduced at the hearing that such violations occurred regularly. [Appellants] knew that they were operating a public arcade -without the proper licenses and continued to operate it in the face of complaints. [Appellants] are therefore enjoined from operating more than four arcade machines in any store unit without an arcade license, or otherwise violating zoning ordinances. ³⁵ The deed restrictions require that all stores “be operated in compliance with all ... building [and] zoning ... laws.” The town’s zoning administrator testified that when he informed appellants that the arcade needed to be limited to four machines, rather than the fifteen machines sometimes situated in one store, he was informed by appellants that they were operating a “game room” on the condominium’s behalf, ie., a condominium game room. The evidence was clear that the condominium operated its own game room at a different location. Moreover, the zoning administrator testified that if those stores containing the machines were open to the general public, they were not “in a legal status.” There was evidence that the stores were open to the general public. Appellants even took the doors off the stores to allow the general public to have access to the stores twenty-four hours a day.

We hold that Judge Eschenburg was neither clearly erroneous in his findings of fact nor did he abuse his discretion in enjoining the operation of the arcade. The complaint, in allegation G, asserted that appellants had “[p]lac[ed] signs upon the store units in violation of sign requirements and without Board of Directors^] approval.” The deed restrictions state that a store owner may erect a sign so long as the appropriateness of it is “determined by the Board of Directors of the Council.” The deed restrictions also state that, unless permitted by the board, “no signs may be erected or placed on or within any Store Unit closer than five feet from the front or rear boundary thereof without the prior written approval of the Board of Directors of the Council.” We emphasize again that this is a restriction found in the deed. A similar provision is also in the condominium bylaws. For our present purposes, we consider only the deed restrictions.

The trial judge found that the sign restrictions were reasonable “in the interest of maintaining the visual harmony of the condominium.” We agree. The trial judge further found that there was evidence before him from which an inference could be made that “unapproved signs” were “plac[ed] ... on the common elements ... [and] within five feet of the front windows.” There was evidence that at least ³⁶ some of these signs were electronic message boards and neon signs. He further considered evidence that “directional arrow and portable signs” had been placed in the common elements. The trial judge found that the use and placement of the signs violated the restrictions.

He was not clearly erroneous. In enjoining such forbidden activities, he did not abuse his discretion. In averment H, the complaint asserted that appellants, by the actions complained of, were challenging appellee’s right to manage and regulate the condominium, appropriating the general elements for its sole use — including using the common elements for storage, customer access, and store promotion — and attempting to use (sell the use of) the condominium’s recreational amenities. The deed restrictions specifically state: Guests, invitees, licensees, tenants and customers of Store Units may use the general common elements of Sea Watch Condominium only for purposes of ingress and egress to and from those Units.

Without limiting the generality of the preceding sentence, no such guests, invitees, licensees, tenants, or customers, as such, shall be permitted to loiter in the common areas ... nor shall they be permitted to use the common element bathrooms, or the common element game rooms, swimming pools, tennis courts, or other recreational facilities of the Condominium. [Emphasis added.] In the face of this clear, unambiguous, and precise restriction, appellants, in their post-hearing memorandum, argued that [placing tables and chairs ... adjacent to the tennis courts and play ground would ... enhance that area ... as well as [appellants’] temporary innocuous use of other common areas. [Appellee’s] absolute prohibition of the reasonable use of the common elements goes too far and is unreasonable. ... [T]he Use and Access Rules ... are unreason ³⁷ able.... [ 17 ] Appellee, replying to appellants’ post-hearing memorandum, noted [Appellants] ... continue to make the mistaken assumption that the Store Restrictions [the deed restrictions] are mere rules imposed by