Seaman v. Seaman

Oektttt, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Anna M. Whelan, late of Washington County, at the time of her death was seised and possessed of both real and personal property. She died intestate and letters of administration, on her estate were in due course granted to James W. Seaman. The notice to creditors provided for in section 109, article 93, Code Pub.

Gen. Laws of Maryland, was duly given, all debts and claims against the estate properly proven, paid and satisfied, a balance, remaining in the hands of the administrator after the satisfaction of all such debts, claims and costs, divided among the distributees, and a final administration account showing these facts was on September 16th, 1921, filed and approved. On February 26th, 1921, Clyde PI. Wilson and Edward Oswald, Jr., trustees appointed to sell the real estate of the decedent, Anna M. Whelan, sold to Edgar S. and Corrinne S. Darner a part of such real property for $6,000, which sale was reported to and, on March 30th, 1921, ratified by the Circuit Court for Washington County.

The purchase money, instead of being distributed to those entitled, was by order of the court held by the trustees until its further order. No further order was passed, however, and on October 29th, 1921, a petition was filed in the case by James W. Seaman, an heir at law of Anna M. Whelan, setting out the passage of a final administration account in the estate of Anna M. Whelan and the other facts to which we have referred, and ³ praying the passage of an’order directing the distribution of the purchase money in the hands of the trustees. The purchasers answered this petition, and admitted the facts stated in it, but denied that the petitioners were entitled to a distribution of the purchase money because, they contended, creditors of Anna M. Whelan, notwithstanding the notice- to creditors and the final and complete administration of her estate in the Orphans’ Court of Washington Obunty, could still prosecute their, claims against: the real estate, on the theory that the provisions of 109A, article 93 of the Code Pub. Gen.

Laws of Maryland, were applicable to the facts of this case, and that the notice to creditors in the Whelan estate, while conforming to the requirements of section 109, article 93 of the Code Pub. Gen. Laws of Maryland, was not in accordance with the requirements of 109A of the same article. The question having been submitted on petition and answer, the lower court accepted the theory of the purchasers and dismissed the petition, and from that order this appeal was taken.

The reasons impelling the court to that conclusion appear in a very interesting and elaborate analysis of the provisions of sections 109 and 109A, art. 93, Code Pub. Gen. Laws of Maryland contained in the opinion of the lower court. After a careful examination of the statutes and the authorities cited in that opinion we are, however, unable to agree with the conclusion reached, since, in our opinion, section 109A, article 93 Ibid., is not applicable to the facts of this case.

It is conceded that the notice to creditors, provided for in section 109, Ibid., was given, and that all claims filed in the orphans’ court against the estate of Anna M. Whelan have been settled. Thider such circumstances no claims- against that estate, not filed in the orphans’ court prior to the final settlement of the estate in that court, can be presented against the real estate in the hands of a purchaser in g’ood faith for value without notice. ⁴ This case, in its essential particulars, cannot be dis-’ tinguished from the case of Van Bibber v. Reese, 71 Md. 608 , and unless the effect of that case has been nullified by subsequent legislation, it furnishes a complete answer to the appellant’s contention. -In that case, as in this, the decedent left both real and personal property; the notice to creditors required by section 109, article 93, Code Pub. Gen. Laws of Maryland was given, and a final account stated, which showed that, after paying all claims proved against the estate, there remained in the hands of the executor there, as there remained in the hands of the administrator here, a balance for distribution.

In speaking of the liability of the land of a decedent for the payment of his debts, the Oourt in that case said: “We have said that the land of a decedent is, under the express language of the Oode, only contingently or conditionally liable to be sold for the payment of his debts. His personal estate is the primary fund to which resort must be had. If that be sufficient, ,a court of equity has no jurisdiction to decree a sale of his real estate for the payment of his debts. It is, consequently, only when it appears to the court that the personal assets are not sufficient, that its jurisdiction can be exercised,” and, in speaking of the effect of a final administration account on that liability, it was further said: “If the final account, thus settled pursuant to all the provisions, safeguards and requirements of our testamentary system, shows upon its face that the personal estate is sufficient to pay all debts and the costs of administration, the sole condition upon which a court of equity may decree the sale of the decedent’s real estate, for the payment