Secretary, Department of Public Safety & Correctional Services v. Allen

Murphy, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The issue in this case is whether an indigent inmate’s constitutional right of access to the courts is violated by a prison regulation which limits his postage-free mailings to seven per week. (1) Charles A. Allen, an indigent prisoner at the Maryland Penitentiary, filed a complaint with the Inmate Grievance Commission pursuant to Maryland Code (1957, 1978 Repl. Yol.) Art. 41, § 204F(d), alleging that officials of the institution failed to provide free postage for all his mail, thereby violating his constitutional rights of free speech, freedom of religion, and access to the courts. 1 Specifically, Allen challenged the Division of Correction’s Regulation 250-1 (DCR 250-1) which sets forth policies and procedures pertaining to inmate mail.

Section IV-A of the regulation permits an inmate to “write sealed letters to a court, Judge, ¹³⁵ clerk of court, attorney-at-law, elected or appointed government official, such as members of Congress or the Maryland General Assembly, Governor, Attorney General, Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services or the Inmate Grievance Commission.” The regulation specifies that this mail, unlike other outgoing correspondence, is not subject to inspection by prison officials. Section IV-A requires proper postage to be affixed to outgoing envelopes, “except in the case of an indigent inmate’s legal mail.” Under Section IV-F, an indigent inmate “will be provided with sufficient first-class postage for seven (7) letters per week.” DCR 250-1 does not restrict the number of letters an inmate may mail at his own expense, nor does it define the term “legal mail.” Moreover, it is unclear whether DCR 250-1, § IV-F, as interpreted and administered, provides an indigent inmate with sufficient first-class postage for seven “letters” per week without regard to their individual weight and postage requirements, or whether it limits him to seven fifteen cent stamps per week. (2) At an evidentiary hearing before the Inmate Grievance Commission, Allen testified that a number of his letters had been returned during a two-week period from November 28, 1977 to December 13, 1977 for lack of postage. Although the record shows that letters to several attorneys, to a member of the General Assembly, to the Commissioner of Corrections, and to a federal judge were among those returned to Allen, the content of this correspondence is not disclosed.

The Inmate Grievance Commission found Allen’s complaint “to be meritorious in part.” Concluding that an indigent inmate’s “legal mail,” which it defined as mail to the courts, attorneys and officials enumerated in § IV-A, should not be subject to the limitation of seven letters per week, the Commission held that “the imposition of said limitation on legal mail would effectively limit an indigent inmate’s right of access to the courts.” The Commission further concluded that an indigent inmate’s mail addressed to any party other than those set forth in § IV-A would be subject to “the seven letters per week restriction.” ¹³⁶ The Secretary of the Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services subsequently reversed the Commission’s order. He reasoned “that the allowance of seven stamps per week or 28 or more per month is quite adequate and generous” to insure an indigent inmate’s access to the courts, and that legal mail was included within the restriction on free postage. Pursuant to Code, Art. 41, § 204F, Allen appealed to the Baltimore City Court. That court held DCR 250-1 to be “fair and reasonable, and considerably more generous than such privileges in effect in other states.” It noted, however, that an exception to the seven letter per week rule “should be made where the inmate is required to file a responsive answer or pleading within a certain designated time, in any pending case.” In modifying the Secretary’s order, the court said: “Outgoing mail of an inmate, addressed to any party designated in DCR 250-1-IV-A shall be excluded from the seven letters per week postage limit set forth in DCR 250-1-IV-F only when the inmate must file a responsive answer, pleading, motion, or appeal in a pending legal action in any court, within a designated period of time under the provisions of any court Order or rules of any court.

Proper postage must be affixed to such mail by the Division of Correction if the inmate is indigent. All other outgoing mail of an inmate, addressed to any party designated in DCR 250-1-IV-A, should be included in the mail privileges allowed such inmate under the provisions of DCR 250-1-IV-F.” Dissatisfied with this ruling, the Secretary sought review in the Court of Special Appeals, contending that DCR 250-1, as interpreted and administered by the Division of Correction, does not deny an indigent inmate any constitutional or statutory right of access to the courts, and that the lower court exceeded its statutorily defined scope of judicial review by modifying a regulation which it had found to be reasonable. 2 The Secretary maintained that the court’s ¹³⁷ decision, in effect, required prison officials to open and read an indigent inmate’s outgoing mail to determine whether it contained a court pleading eligible for postage-free mailing, and that this imposed an unreasonable burden on the Division of Correction. Allen maintained that the lower court’s order simply provides “a safety mechanism to ensure that [he] and his fellow inmates will not be denied access to the courts by missing a critical filing deadline because they cannot afford a postage stamp.” We granted certiorari prior to argument in the Court of Special Appeals to consider the important constitutional issue raised in the case. (3) Where, as here, an inmate alleges that a prison regulation impinges upon his exercise of constitutionally guaranteed rights, several established principles are involved in evaluating the prisoner’s claim.

At the outset, we recognize that a convicted prisoner cannot avail himself of the full panoply of rights and privileges which attend ordinary citizenship. Nonetheless, he is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections by reason of his conviction and incarceration. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 , 99 S. Ct. 1861, 1877 , 60 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1979); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119, 129 , 97 S. Ct. 2532 , 53 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1977); Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 , 97 S. Ct. 1491 , 52 L. Ed. 2d 72 (1977); Thomas v. State, 285 Md. 458 , 404 A.2d 257 (1979). Rather, he retains a variety of constitutional rights “that the courts must be alert to protect.” Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 225 , 96 S. Ct. 2532 , 49 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1976).

It has, for example, been held that sentenced prisoners enjoy freedom of speech and religion under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, see Pell v. ¹³⁸ Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 , 94 S. Ct. 2800 , 41 L. Ed. 2d 495 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 , 92 S. Ct. 1079 , 31 L. Ed. 2d 263 (1972); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 , 84 S. Ct. 1733 , 12 L. Ed. 2d 1030 (1964); that they are protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invidious discrimination based on race, see Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 , 88 S. Ct. 994 , 19 L. Ed. 2d 1212 (1968); and that they may claim the protection of the due process clause to prevent additional deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law, see Meachum v. Fano, supra; Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 , 94 S. Ct. 2963 , 41 L. Ed. 2d 935 (1974). That prison inmates retain certain constitutional rights does not mean that the exercise of these rights are not subject to regulation. The fact and the nature of institutional confinement, as well as the legitimate goals and policies of the penal institution, limit these retained constitutional rights. See Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 99 S. Ct. at 1877 ; Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Labor Union, supra at 125; Pell v. Procunier, supra at 822.

Accordingly, there must be “mutual accommodation between institutional needs and objectives and the provisions of the Constitution that are of general application.” Wolff v. McDonnell, supra, 418 U.S. at 556 . It is now well established that “prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts.” Bounds v. Smith, supra, 430 U.S. at 821 . See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600 , 94 S. Ct. 2437 , 41 L. Ed. 2d 341 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 , 94 S. Ct. 1800 , 40 L. Ed. 2d 224 (1974). This right, a corollary of the constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection, 3 has evolved from two sets of Supreme Court cases, both of which have invalidated unreasonable impediments to court access, and imposed affirmative obligations upon the state to facilitate inmate access to the courts.

In one line of cases, the Court has considered the rights of indigent inmates who seek appellate review of their ¹³⁹ convictions. See, e.g., Ross v. Moffitt, supra; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 , 83 S. Ct. 814 , 9 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1963) (states must provide counsel for an indigent on his first appeal of right from a criminal conviction); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 , 81 S. Ct. 895 , 6 L. Ed. 2d 39 (1961) (indigent prisoners must be allowed to file habeas actions without payment of docket fees); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 , 79 S. Ct. 1164 , 3 L. Ed. 2d 1209 (1959) (indigent prisoners have right to file appeals without payment of docket fees); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 , 76 S. Ct. 585 , 100 L. Ed. 891 (1956) (states that provide criminal appeal procedures must furnish indigents with free transcripts when necessary to effectuate the appeal). In the second set of cases, the Court has addressed the rights of inmates who mount collateral attacks on their convictions and seek redress for violations of their constitutional rights. See, e.g., Bounds v. Smith, supra, 430 U.S. at 828 (prison authorities must assist inmates in preparation and filing of legal papers by providing adequate law libraries or assistance from persons with legal training); Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 , 92 S. Ct. 250 , 30 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1971), aff’g Gilmore v. Lynch, 319 F. Supp. 105 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (requiring California prison officials either to expand prison law libraries or to adopt another alternative to satisfy prisoners’ legal needs); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 , 89 S. Ct. 747 , 21 L. Ed. 2d 718 (1969) (state may not bar inmate writ-writing without providing a reasonable alternative); Ex Parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 , 61 S. Ct. 640 , 85 L. Ed. 1034 (1941) (invalidating a prison regulation which required prior approval of habeas petitions by prison officials).

In both instances, the Court has emphasized that the pertinent inquiry is whether adequate, effective and meaningful access to the courts has been provided. Meaningful access is, however, to be distinguished from unrestricted or unlimited access. The states have been required to “shoulder affirmative obligations” in order that all prisoners might have a “reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.” Bounds v. Smith, supra, 430 U.S. at 824-25 .