Seldon v. State

MURPHY, Chief Judge: In the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, Ronald L. Seldon, appellant, was convicted of possession with the intent to distribute more than 448 grams of cocaine and related violations of the Maryland Controlled Dangerous Substances Act. Appellant concedes that the evidence was sufficient to establish that he committed those offenses on July 13, 2000, but argues that the circuit court erred in denying his Motion to Suppress that evidence. Appellant now presents two questions for our review: I. DID THE LOWER COURT ERR WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE THAT OCCURRED ON OCTOBER 29,1999?

II

DID THE LOWER COURT ERR WHEN IT DENIED APPELLANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE SEARCH OF HIS VEHICLE THAT OCCURRED ON JULY 13, 2000? For the reasons that follow, we shall answer “yes” to each question, and we shall therefore reverse the judgments of the circuit court. Factual Background I. The October 29, 1999 Search On October 26, 1999, appellant drove his vehicle to Pohanka Mazda, an automobile dealership in Salisbury, Maryland. 1 On October 29, 1999, an employee of the dealership contacted the Wicomico County Police Department to report that something “suspicious” had been discovered in a vehicle that had been ²¹⁰ brought in for service. Detective Carson Wentland of the Wicomico County Police Department received the call.

Before proceeding to the dealership, he contacted the Maryland State Police and requested assistance. Maryland State Police Sergeant Michael Lewis was dispatched to the dealership. When Sergeant Lewis and Detective Wentland arrived, they were directed to appellant’s vehicle by Bruce Willey, the mechanic who had made the repairs, and John Fiscus, a supervisor. At the time the officers arrived, appellant’s vehicle had been repaired and was ready to be picked up.

Sergeant Lewis directed Mr. Willey to drive the vehicle into the service bay area. Once the vehicle was in the service bay, Mr. Willey pointed to the section of the vehicle where he had discovered the suspicious item. Sergeant Lewis then entered the vehicle, pushed back the front seat, lifted the carpet, and observed a secret compartment. 2 He lifted the lid of the compartment and looked inside, but found nothing. Upon further examination of the vehicle, Sergeant Lewis discovered a second secret compartment which was located in the gas tank.

This compartment, which was electrically and hydraulically powered, could not be opened by hand. Sergeant Lewis attempted to open the compartment by using his “alligator grips,” but his attempt was unsuccessful. He then used a screwdriver to pry open the compartment “slightly,” and was able to determine that there was no contraband in the compartment. Sergeant Lewis reported his findings to the Wi-comico County Narcotics Task Force, and was told by a member of that organization that appellant was a suspected drug dealer in the area.

Because no contraband was found in appellant’s vehicle, the officers took no further action on this occasion.

II

The July 13, 2000 Search On July 13, 2000, Sergeant Lewis spotted appellant’s vehicle traveling eastbound on Route 50 near Annapolis, Maryland, ²¹¹ and stopped the vehicle because it was traveling at the speed of 71 m.p.h in a posted 55 m.p.h. zone. Appellant was the sole occupant of the vehicle. Sergeant Lewis approached the passenger side of the vehicle and, through an open window, asked for appellant’s license and registration. According to his suppression hearing testimony, at this point Sergeant Lewis noticed: (1) a strong odor of air freshener coming from the interior of the vehicle; (2) law enforcement decals affixed on the vehicle’s windshield; (3) the “definitive odor of cocaine;” and (4) a large “wad” of money that came protruding out of appellant’s pocket as appellant reached for his driver’s license. 3 Sergeant Lewis also testified that appellant seemed to be “extremely nervous,” that appellant’s “carotid pulse was pounding,” and that all of these observations were consistent with illegal drug activity.

When Sergeant Lewis examined appellant’s license and registration, he realized that appellant was under investigation by the Wicomico County Narcotics Task Force, and recognized appellant’s vehicle as the vehicle searched nine months before at Pohanka Mazda. Sergeant Lewis returned to his vehicle and placed a call to determine the status of appellant’s license. After being informed that the license was valid, Sergeant Lewis called Sergeant Michael Kenhart of the Wi-comico County Narcotics Task Force. During this conversation, Sergeant Lewis stated that he had stopped appellant for a traffic violation and that he “had enough to do him,” but wanted to know whether the arrest of appellant might adversely affect any Task Force investigation.

Sergeant Ken-hart responded that appellant was still under investigation, and he would call back with an answer. A few minutes later, Sergeant Kenhart called back, and told Sergeant Lewis that the Task Force had no objection to appellant’s arrest. At this point, Sergeant Lewis called for backup and requested a canine unit, 4 and activated a video and audio recording system ²¹² that provided the suppression hearing court with the ability to review the stop from that point forward. Sergeant Lewis again approached appellant’s vehicle, and asked appellant to step out.

Sergeant Lewis then asked appellant for permission to search the vehicle. Appellant refused that request. Sergeant Lewis continued to converse with and question appellant until the backup unit arrived. Once the backup unit arrived, Sergeant Lewis patted down appellant to search for any weapons. 5 Sergeant Lewis then proceeded to search the vehicle.

Almost immediately, he located the two steel compartments that he had previously searched at the dealership. 6 The compartment located underneath the front passenger seat was empty. A search of the second compartment turned up what appeared to be one package of cocaine and two packages of marijuana, each of which was covered by a fabric softener secured by saran wrap and clear packaging tape. 7 Appellant was arrested and charged accordingly.

III

The Circuit Court’s Ruling After a hearing on appellant’s Motion to Suppress, the circuit court filed a Memorandum and Order that included the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: Two separate searches occurred as previously outlined. The Court will therefore separately examine the constitutionality of each search. July 13, 2000 In assessing the constitutionality of the search of Defendant’s vehicle, the Court must first determine whether Sergeant Lewis’ stop of the vehicle was reasonable. The ²¹³ Maryland Court of Special Appeals reiterated the Supreme Court guidelines that “the level of suspicion required for a stop is considerably less than the proof needed for probable cause.” Lawson v. State, 120 Md.App. 610, 618 , 707 A.2d 947 (1998)(citing Quince v. State, 319 Md. 430, 433 , 572 A.2d 1086 (1990)); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989).

The initial stop of Defendant’s vehicle for speeding was legitimate and reasonable. Sergeant Lewis testified that while traveling behind Defendant’s vehicle, he paced Defendant speeding at approximately 71 m.p.h. in a 55 m.p.h. zone. Consequently, Sergeant Lewis was justified in stopping Defendant for a traffic infraction, which has been acknowledged by Defendant. The Fourth Amendment protects against unlawful searches and seizures including seizures that involve only a brief detention.

United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 , 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). A traffic stop is a detention that implicates the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682 , 105 S.Ct. 1568 , 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). The Supreme Court has made it clear that a detention should only last as long as it [sic] necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.

Ferris v. State of Maryland, 355 Md. 356, 369 , 735 A.2d 491 (1999)(quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 , 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983)). As previously discussed, the stop, of Defendant implemented the Fourth Amendment but was a valid seizure based on probable cause-the Defendant was speeding. There are numerous cases that discuss when it is appropriate for an officer to detain a driver for further investigation, once the purpose of the traffic stop has been fulfilled. In two instances the detainment is constitutionally permissible under the Fourth Amendment: (1) the driver consents to the continuing intrusion; (2) the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a crime is being or is about to be committed.

Ferris, 355 Md. at 372 , 735 A.2d 491 (citing United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 540 (10th Cir.1994)). To determine whether a seizure has oc ²¹⁴ curred under the Fourth Amendment, the test is whether in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. Ferris, 355 Md. at 376 , 735 A.2d 491 . Before addressing the issue of consent and reasonable suspicion, the Court must determine whether the stop of Defendant constituted one or two stops.

The Court is assisted by the video tape which provides a minute by minute recordation of the stop. Sergeant Lewis stopped Defendant at. approximately 1:50 p.m. and activated the recording system immediately thereafter. At 1:53 p.m. Sergeant Lewis received confirmation that Defendant’s license was valid.

At 2:00 pm. Sergeant Lewis received, information regarding the registration of the vehicle. Sergeant Lewis testified that in this time period he began to prepare a warning citation for the speeding offense. Sergeant Lewis returned to Defendant’s vehicle at 2:03 pm.

It is inferred that if this had been a routine traffic stop without incident, Sergeant Lewis would have returned Defendant’s driver’s license and vehicle registration, issued the warning and Defendant would have been on his way. The stream of events did not occur. Defendant was not given his license, registration or a citation. Sergeant Lewis had already determined before he approached Defendant’s vehicle for the second time that he was going to search the vehicle.

It is evident that Sergeant Lewis removing Defendant from his vehicle was not justified by the first stop for speeding. The Sergeant’s initial purpose in stopping Defendant was to enforce the laws of the roadway and to investigate the manner of driving with the intent to issue a citation or warning. Once the purpose of the stop was fulfilled, the continued detention of the car and occupant amounted to a second detention. Id. at 372 , 735 A.2d 491 ; See Royer, 460 U.S. at 500 , 103 S.Ct. 1319 .

Consequently, at 2:03 pm. the initial stop concluded and a second and separate stop began. The Court must, therefore, determine whether Defendant consented to the questioning outside the vehicle or if Sergeant Lewis had a reasonable and articulable suspicion to ²¹⁵ support the second detainment of Defendant. A consensual encounter is defined as the voluntary cooperation of a private citizen in response to non-coereive questioning by a law enforcement official. Ferris, 355 Md. at 373 , 735 A.2d 491 (citing United States v. Werking, 915 F.2d 1404, 1408 (10th Cir.1990)).

In this type of encounter, a private citizen is not seized under the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, because he is free to leave at any time. Id. Questioning an individual is allowed as long as the officer does not convey a message that compliance with the request is required. Ferris, 355 Md. at 375 , 735 A.2d 491 (quoting Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434-35 , 111 S.Ct. 2382 , 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991)).

The test is objective, not subjective, therefore the Court must decide whether a reasonable person would have believed that he was free to end the conversation or encounter. Ferris, 355 Md. at 375 , 735 A.2d 491 . The Court looks at a variety of factors including: the time and place of the encounter, the number of officers present and whether they were uniformed, whether the police removed the person to a different location or isolated him or her from others, whether the person was suspected of a crime, whether the police retained the person’s documents, and whether the police exhibited threatening behavior or physical contact that would suggest to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to leave. Id. at 377 , 735 A.2d 491 .

Sergeant Lewis walked to the driver’s side of Defendant’s vehicle and stated to Defendant, “Come on back here. I wanna talk to you for a minute-come back here.” The parties proceeded to a location away from the side of the road and between the two vehicles. As evidenced by the video tape, Sergeant Lewis stood two to three feet from Defendant. At that time, Sergeant Lewis was still in the possession of Defendant’s driver’s license and registration, had not yet issued any type of citation, and suspected Defendant of committing a crime-possession of CDS.

Defendant did not voluntarily exit the car, did not consent to the questioning and he was not free to leave at any time. A reasonable person in the position of Defendant ²¹⁶ would not have felt free to leave, consequently a seizure occurred. The Court, therefore, must determine whether the detainment of Defendant was based on reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal conduct to determine whether it was a constitutional seizure. The United States Constitution requires that “the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Id. at 384 , 735 A.2d 491 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 , 88 S.Ct. 1868 , 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)).

The standard is objective as to whether a reasonably prudent person in the officer’s position would have been warranted in believing that Defendant was involved in criminal activity that was afoot. Ferris, 355 Md. at 384 , 735 A.2d 491 (citing Derricott v. State, 327 Md. 582, 588 , 611 A.2d 592 (1992)). Any determination of reasonable suspicion must be based on the totality of the circumstances-the whole picture. Ferris, 355 Md. at 385 , 735 A.2d 491 (citing Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 8 , 109 S.Ct. 1581 , quoting United, States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 , 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)).

The suspicion is less that the level of probable cause. Ferns, 355 Md. at 385 , 735 A.2d 491 (citing Graham v. State, 325 Md. 398, 408 , 601 A.2d 131 (1992)). “[I]t is not enough that law enforcement official can articulate reasons why they stopped someone if those reasons are not probative of behavior in which few innocent people would engage-the factors together must serve to eliminate a substantial portion of innocent travelers before the requirement of reasonable suspicion will be satisfied.” Karnes v. Skrutski, 62 F.3d 485, 493 (3rd Cir.1995). When Sergeant Lewis approached Defendant’s vehicle and asked for his license and registration, he made numerous observations. He observed a strong odor of air fresheners emitting from the vehicle; Defendant was extremely nervous in that his carotid pulse was pounding and he did not make eye contact; Defendant produced a large ‘wad’ of cash from his pocket as he retrieved his license and registration; ²¹⁷ the car was very clean; the windshield was affixed with stickers indicating support for the police.

All of these observations caused Sergeant Lewis to be suspicious that Defendant might be in the possession of CDS. He also believed that he smelled the “definitive odor of cocaine.” In addition, he recalled Defendant’s name as a suspected drug dealer and remembered the observations he made in October 1999 of the concealed compartments in the vehicle. Considering Sergeant Lewis’ observations in the aggregate, the Court finds that he had reasonable, articulable suspicion to continue to detain Defendant for further investigation. Consequently, the Court finds that the second detainment was not an unconstitutional seizure.

The final issue for the Court to decide is if the search of Defendant’s vehicle was based upon probable cause. Maryland Code, Article 27, § 594B(c) provides: A police officer may arrest a person without a warrant if the officer has probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed or attempted and that such person has committed or attempted to commit a felony whether or not in the officer’s presence or view. Probable cause requires less evidence “than would justify conviction but more evidence than that which arouse a mere suspicion.” Wilkes v. State, 364 Md. 554, 584 , 774 A.2d 420 (2001). “Because many situations which confront officers in the course executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusion of probability.” Id. at 585, 774 A.2d 420 .

Sergeant Lewis questioned Defendant outside the vehicle. Defendant did not consent to the search. Defendant denied that he was transporting any illegal substance including cocaine. Sergeant Lewis patted down Defendant to check for weapons; no weapons or other contraband were found.

Among his observations, Sergeant Lewis believed that he smelled the “definitive odor of cocaine.” ²¹⁸ Odors gained from the unaided human senses may furnish evidence of probable cause. Ford v. State of Maryland, 37 Md.App. 373, 378 , 377 A.2d 577 (1977)(citing Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 , 68 S.Ct. 367 , 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948)). Knowledge gained from the sense of smell alone may be of such character as to give rise to probable cause for a belief that a crime is being committed in the presence of an officer. Ford, 37 Md.App. at 379 , 377 A.2d 577 .

In Ford , the officer testified that he smelled an odor of marijuana emanating from within the vehicle. Id. Consequently the Court found that the officer had probable cause to believe that the vehicle contained marijuana and probable cause for the Defendant’s arrest existed. Id. at 380 , 377 A.2d 577 .

Therefore, the search of the vehicle was valid as a search incident to an arrest, Ford, 37 Md.App. at 380 , 377 A.2d 577 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 , 89 S.Ct. 2034 , 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969)), or under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment. Ford, 37 Md.App. at 380 , 377 A.2d 577 ; See Carroll y. United States, 267 U.S. 132 , 45 S.Ct. 280 , 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). The facts before this Court also contemplate the same principle-whether smell plus the aggravating factors constituted probable cause.

Sergeant Lewis did not observe any illegal substance in plain view in the vehicle or on the body of Defendant pursuant to the frisk. The basis of his articu-lable suspicion was comprised of his observations including what he perceived to be the “definitive odor of cocaine.” The cocaine confiscated from Defendant’s vehicle weighed 497 grams without the packaging and was cut with caffeine. It was wrapped with fabric softeners, saran wrap and clear packaging tape. It was concealed in an electronically and hydraulically controlled steel compartment below the floorboards of the vehicle, which also contained 854 grams of marijuana similarly packaged.

Sergeant Lewis testified that he smelled air fresheners mixed with the “definitive odor of cocaine.” When asked to describe what cocaine smells like he responded, “cocaine smells like cocaine.” ²¹⁹ Based on the testimony, it is apparent that some of the witnesses associate a particular smell with the odor of eocaine-'cocaine smells like cocaine’. It is, however, scientifically impossible that the confiscated drug could be detected because the cocaine seized and the caffeine with which it was cut had no detectible odor. Although Sergeant Lewis stated that he smelled the definitive odor of cocaine, the Court finds that it was impossible for him to have done so. The Court, however, finds that Sergeant Lewis believed that he smelled cocaine from the odors with which he associated it.

The cocaine was wrapped in layers of masking agents. Notwithstanding Sergeant Lewis’ belief that he smelled cocaine, based on the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that all of the observations and prior knowledge of the police officer of Defendant and the vehicle created a reasonable and articulable suspicion to investigate further, and amounted to probable cause to search the vehicle. Defendant’s constitutional right to be protected from illegal searches and seizures was not violated. The Court finds that the search of the vehicle and the seizure of the cocaine and marijuana was lawful.

October 26,1999 .... The question becomes whether the bailee, the dealership could consent to a search by Sergeant Lewis and Detective Wentland. Once Defendant delivered the vehicle to the dealership for service, the vehicle was in the control and possession of the dealership. Mr. Willey testified that he worked on the vehicle and noticed a suspicious item that was not considered a feature of the Mazda MPV or any Mazda vehicle.

Mr. Willey reported the suspicious item to his supervisor who reported the finding to the authorities. ²²⁰ Sergeant Lewis and Detective Wentland arrived at the dealership and Mr. Willey described to them what he had observed. The vehicle was driven to the service bay by Mr. Willey and the officers were directed to the area of the vehicle where the suspicious item had been located. Thus the bailee, the dealership, consented to the search. Sergeant Lewis and Detective Wentland moved the seat and lifted the carpeting to view what was ultimately determined to be the concealed compartments.

The first compartment was opened and nothing was found. The second compartment could not be opened because it was hydraulically and electronically controlled. Sergeant Lewis attempted to open the compartment using wires but was unsuccessful; he peeked in the compartment using a screwdriver.... The actions by Sergeant Lewis and Detective Wentland did not exceed the scope of the search.

The suspicious item identified by the dealership was located beneath the floorboards near the gas tank. The officers did not search any other area of the vehicle-i.e. the trunk or glove box-except where they were directed to search by the dealership employees. The Court finds that the search of Defendant’s vehicle at the dealership was not an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment. The bailee’s consent made it a reasonable search.

For these reasons, the Court will deny the Motion to Suppress relating to the incident that occurred on July 13, 2000, and deny the Supplemental Motion to Suppress relating to the incident that occurred on October 26, 1999. Appellant was thereafter convicted and this appeal followed. Discussion While we are persuaded that the circuit court did not make any clearly erroneous finding of fact, we are also persuaded that the circuit court erred in denying appellant’s motion for suppression. 8 The Fourth Amendment guarantees ²²¹ “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const, amend.

IV

It is well settled that, under the Fourth Amendment, 9 a search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is “per se unreasonable ... subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). It is also well settled that if data set forth as a basis for the existence of probable cause ... was come upon or derived as a result of an illegal search and seizure [that the party moving for suppression of evidence has “standing” to seek that relief], such primary illegality—in the absence of evidence of attenuation or a ²²² source independent of such “taint—precludes the use of such derivative evidence from being a valid basis for establishing the existence of probable cause, under the doctrine of the “fruit of the poisonous tree.” Everhart v. State, 274 Md. 459, 480 , 337 A.2d 100 (1975). The “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine is applicable to the judgments of conviction at issue in the case at bar. I. One of the specifically established exceptions to the warrant requirement is a search that is conducted pursuant to a valid consent.

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 , 93 S.Ct. 2041 , 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). A less common variation of the standard consent case is that of third-party consent. In United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 , 94 S.Ct. 2041 , 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1973), the United States Supreme Court held that a third party who “possesses common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected” may validly consent to a search of the premises or those effects. Id. at 171 , 94 S.Ct. 988 .

The Matlock Court noted: Common authority is, of course, not to be implied from the mere property interest a third party has in the property. The authority which justifies the third-party consent ... rests on mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection, in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched. Id. “The resolution of the issue of consent always turns on the facts of each case.” State v. Miller, 144 Md.App. 643, 651 , 799 A.2d 462 (2002). Professor LaFave’s treatise on the Fourth Amendment explains that “of obvious importance” in determining whether a bailor assumes the risk that a bailee would consent to a search is “the extent to which the bailor ²²³ made efforts to secure, even as against the bailee, the privacy of his effects.” 3 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §§ 8.6(a)(3d ed.1996).

LaFave went on to state: Where possession of the car was given on the understanding that the bailee would subject it to general use, driving it about for his own purposes, then the bailee may give effective consent to a search of those portions of the car which he could be expected to make use of. If, for example, the owner hands over both the ignition key and trunk key, then the bailee may consent to a search of the trunk, for, as noted in United States v. Eldridge, “access to the trunk is a normal incident to the use of an automobile.” But if the bailment of the car is for a special and limited purpose, then that purpose must be taken into account in assessing the extent of risk assumed by the bailor. Id. (Emphasis added)(footnotes omitted).

Neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court has addressed the issue of whether a mechanic has the authority to consent to a search of a vehicle that the mechanic has been authorized to repair. 10 This issue, however, has been addressed by other appellate courts, including the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In United States v. Eldridge, 302 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.1962), the defendant loaned his automobile to a friend, who was driving the automobile when it was stopped because the police had been notified by a caller that there might be stolen guns in the automobile. The police asked if they could search the vehicle, and the friend gave them permission to do so, and voluntarily opened the trunk which revealed the presence of two stolen Coast Guard radios. 11 Prior to trial, the defendant unsuccessfully argued that the ²²⁴ evidence should be suppressed because “the protection of the Fourth Amendment was a personal right that could not be waived for him by ... a gratuitous bailee of the car.” His motion was denied. The appellate court affirmed, explaining: On the merits of the constitutional issue we agree with the result reached by the District Court.

Not every search made without a warrant is illegal. The Fourth Amendment prohibits only ‘unreasonable’ searches and seizures. Such decision as have been cited to us or discovered by research have only a peripheral bearing on the question to be decided in this case. Lower federal courts have deemed searches reasonable if consented to by the person in lawful possession of the articles seized, or the premises on which they are found, as where the defendant’s partner consented to a search, where an office manager in sole control of the office and the corporate records consented to the search and seizure,