Semelsberger v. Hatem

McWilliams, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Conformable to the provisions of Maryland Rule 826 g, the parties prepared and signed and the chancellor, Pugh, C. J., approved the statement which (as edited) follows: The Claimants Hugh H. Semelsberger and Patricia Semelsberger, and Thomas J. Hatem, Receiver of The National Guild Insurance Company agree to the following Statement of Case ⁴⁵ pursuant to Rule 826 g of the Maryland Rules of Procedure: 1. Thomas J. Hatem, Insurance Commissioner of the State of Maryland, is Receiver of The National Guild Insurance Company which was placed in Receivership on December 5, 1966. Hugh H. Semelsberger, Jr. and Patricia Semelsberger, his wife, filed claims in the Receivership for damages relating to personal injuries suffered by Semelsberger in an accident on May 29, 1965 in Washington, D. C. In that accident Semelsberger was struck by a motor vehicle owned by National Guild’s insured Germaine J. Matrozzo.

Semelsberger was a police officer at the time of the accident, and was diverting traffic from the scene of a collision which involved two other motor vehicles. Claimants filed timely claims with the Receiver, and the Receiver had duly filed exceptions and recommendations to the Court concerning the claims. 2. Semelsberger and his wife subsequently filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in 1967 for damages naming as Defendants Germaine J. Matrozzo, her husband James J. Matrozzo, and the operators and owners of the other two vehicles involved in the accident which commanded Semelsberger’s attention at the time he was struck by Matrozzo. The Receiver declined to defend the Matrozzos in the U. S. District Court proceedings by leave of this Honorable Court; and they were represented therein by their own counsel. 3.

The case came to trial in the District of Columbia, and after four days it was terminated as follows on November 6, 1970: By Release executed November 6, 1970 Semelsberger released the other four Defendants, in consideration of the total sum of $15,000.00, ⁴⁶ paid in the following manner: $11,000 was paid in cash by Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO), the insurance carrier of the Defendants Cosgroves; the sum of $1,000.00 was paid in cash by the Defendants Vines and the Buffalo Cab Association; Semelsberger accepted a Promissory Note from the Matrozzos in the amount of $2,500.00, payable in consecutive monthly installments of $75.00 each. 4. The Matrozzos also executed an Agreement with Government Employees Insurance Company where the Matrozzos agreed to repay GEICO in the event they defaulted on their Note and GEICO was compelled to pay the balance due thereon to Semelsberger, pursuant to its agreement with him. Matrozzo testified in Court that he did in fact make nine payments on the Note to Semelsberger, in the total amount of $675.00. 5. No specific Release was executed and given by the Semelsbergers to the Matrozzos upon dismissal of the District Court case, but the Semelsbergers filed two Orders, one dismissing the action as to the Matrozzos without prejudice, and the other dismissing the action as to the remaining Defendants with prejudice.

The District Court action thereafter could not be revived by the Semelsbergers against any Defendant, because of the Statute of Limitations. 6. A hearing was held before the Honorable James H. Pugh on October 18, 1971 relating to the Semelsbergers’ claims. At the hearing the parties agreed: a) That the insured’s husband, James J. Matrozzo, was negligent in the operation of her motor vehicle, and that his negligence was a proximate cause of Semelsberger’s personal injuries. b) That the National Guild automobile lia ⁴⁷ bility insurance policy issued to Germaine J. Matrozzo would have provided coverage up to the sum of $15,000.00 for personal injuries for each person. The premiums due on the insurance policy had been paid. c) That the damages suffered by Semelsberger were valued in excess of $15,000.00 and therefore any award made to him and to his wife relating to her derivative claim would equal the policy limit of $15,000.00. d) The parties stipulated the following Exhibits which were introduced at the trial: i) Joint Exhibit No. 1 — Certified Copy of Docket Entries from the U. S. District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No. 349-67, Hugh H. Semelsberger, Jr. and Wife v. Germaine J. Matrozzo, et al. ii) Joint Exhibit No. 2 — Promissory Note dated November 6, 1970 from James John Matrozzo and Germaine J. Matrozzo, his wife, to Hugh H. Semelsberger, Jr. in the amount of $2,500.00. iii) Joint Exhibit No. 3 — Agreement between James John Matrozzo and Wife and Government Employees Insurance Company. iv) Joint Exhibit No. 4 — Release executed by Hugh H. Semelsberger, Jr. dated November 6, 1970, releasing Daniel Cos-grove, Thomas J. Cosgrove, Joe Frank Vines, Jr. and the Buffalo Cab Association. v) Receiver’s Exhibit No. 1 — Original application for insurance executed by Mrs. Matrozzo on October 2, 1964. vi) Claimants’ Exhibit No. 1 — Copy of Standard Auto Insurance Policy issued by The National Guild Insurance Company. 7.

At the hearing on October 18, Mrs. Ma ⁴⁸ trozzo testified in part, concerning the application for auto insurance, as follows: a) Direct examination by Mr. Sweeney: “Q. And at the time, did your husband James drive that vehicle to any degree? A. Only back and forth to work. That is all. Q. Did he work every day?

A. Yes, every day except Sundays. Q. How many miles did he drive to work, do you recall approximately? A. Well, when we lived in Rockville, to Wheaton, from there. Q. Did he have a driver’s license?

A. As far as I know, he didn’t. Q. You never saw it? A. I never saw it, no. Q. Mrs. Matrozzo, let me direct your attention; also, another question on that application.

This is paragraph 8 and it says, ‘List all persons who drive the described automobiles’, and you list your name do you not, your name Matrozzo, and on the right it says percentage, and you find there the figure 100%. Now, at the time, based on the testimony you just gave, Mrs. Matrozzo, at the time you signed that document, you did not, in fact, drive a car 100%, did you? A. That is right.” b) Direct examination by Mr. Sweeney: “Q. Why did you sign that note, Mrs. Matrozzo? A. I thought when we signed this that we were; I thought when we signed this, this was the end of all our, the settlement with Semelsberger.

Q. You thought it was the end of the case with Mr. Semelsberger? A. Yes. Q. Mrs. Matrozzo, on the application ⁴⁹ which we have identified earlier, question 7A reads, ‘Has any driver had automobile insurance declined or cancelled’, and it is checked off yes. A. Yes.

Q. Now, to what does that refer; which insurance was declined or cancelled? A. We had insurance with State Farm when I first got my driver’s license, and only had three, about three months, and I thought the reason they cancelled it, I didn’t get no explanation about why. Q. Was your husband himself named as an insured on that policy? A. Yes.

He was. Q. And was that the reason you did not put his name in when you applied for National Guild insurance, because of the prior cancellation? A. I believe so. Q. Thank you, Mrs. Matrozzo.” c) Cross-examination by Mr. Helfand: “Q. At the time you filled out this application, which is Defendant’s Exhibit No. 5, isn’t it true that at that time, the time you filled it out, you intended to be the only driver?

A. That is right.” d) Re-direct examination by Mr. Sweeney: “Q. Mrs. Matrozzo, do you remember testifying a few moments ago that when you took out this insurance your husband was driving the car to and from work? A. Yes. Q. And you intended that he continue to drive to and from work, did you not? A. Not all the time.

Q. But occasionally? A. Occasionally. Q. And that was your intention when you took out the insurance ? A. Occasionally, yes.

Q. The fact of the matter is he did just that, didn’t he? A. Off and on. Q. Wasn’t he driving it every day? ⁵⁰ Wasn’t he driving it 75 or 80% of the time at the time of the accident? A. Yes.

Q. Mrs. Matrozzo, just one last question or two about the question that counsel just asked you on cross examination, about notice from the insurance company about rescission, or cancellation; actually you were notified shortly after the accident, after you gave your statement, that the policy was going to be rescinded, or cancelled or voided, were you not? A. They sent me a statement in the mail, like I said, just said, it was going to be cancelled, and that is all. Q. They had previously taken your statement, had they not, and asked you about the application and your husband’s vision and absence of a