Senez v. Collins

HOLLANDER, J. This appeal arises from a dispute as to the ownership of a 291-square-foot sliver of land situated along the boundary of two adjoining waterfront properties in the Middle River area of Baltimore County. The disputed area also includes a portion of a concrete boat ramp that straddles the common boundary. Linda Ann Senez, appellant, is the owner of 341 Worton Road (the “Senez Property”); Ann and Steve Collins, appellees, own 339 Worton Road (the “Collins Property”). Both properties front on Norman Creek, a tributary of the Chesapeake Bay, and each contains a single family home.

In September 2004, appellees filed a quiet title action in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, and also alleged claims, inter alia, of trespass and nuisance. Appellant filed a counterclaim based on adverse possession. Following a bench trial in 2006, the court ruled in favor of appellees as to most of their claims, including adverse possession. ³⁰⁸ On appeal, appellant presents one issue: “Whether the circuit court erroneously denied the appellant’s adverse possession claim despite the evidence of twenty-three years of hostile possession and the absence of any clear and unequivocal acts by the appellees to challenge her exclusive, hostile possession.” For the reasons that follow, we answer in the affirmative and shall therefore vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Appellant purchased the Senez Property on November 22, 2000, and began to live there immediately.

Her predecessors in title, Arthur L. and Joan E. Myers (“the Myers”), had previously acquired the property on April 6, 1981, and lived there continuously for approximately nineteen years and seven months. Appellees purchased the Collins Property on August 14, 2000, from the estate of George Cook, who had owned the property with his wife, Madeline Cook (“the Cooks”). 1 The Cooks had acquired the property on August 7, 1973. In October 2000, appellees tore down the existing house on the property and commenced construction of a new home. As a result, they did not begin living on the property until late July 2001.

Thus, although appellees purchased the Collins Property before appellant acquired the Senez Property, appellant was already living on her property before appellees moved into theirs. At the time the parties purchased their respective properties, the properties were separated by a concrete retaining wall (the “Wall”), which did not precisely track the property line. The Wall, approximately 115 feet long, extended almost the entire length of the boundary between the properties, beginning some 75 feet from Worton Road and terminating at the point where the Wall met a concrete sea wall, or bulkhead, ³⁰⁹ which separated the Collins Property from Norman Creek. A survey of the Senez Property, which was conducted for appellant by Bryan R. Dietz, and which was later admitted at trial as a joint exhibit (the “Dietz Survey”), showed that approximately 35 feet before meeting the sea wall, the Wall diverged from the boundary line.

Between that point and the sea wall, according to the Dietz Survey, the Wall sat entirely on the Collins side of the property line. As a result, a narrow strip of the Collins Property was located on the Senez side of the Wall. That narrow strip between the Wall and the boundary line is the area of land in dispute. The disputed area contains part of a concrete boat ramp that extends past the sea wall, providing access from the Senez Property to Norman Creek.

The boat ramp is entirely on the Senez side of the Wall. But, because the Wall does not follow the boundary, a portion of the boat ramp falls on the Collins side of the property line. In the disputed area, the elevation of the ground on the Senez side of the Wall is a few feet higher than the elevation on the Collins side. As noted, the Wall was a retaining wall; it maintained the properties at their differing elevations.

On September 29, 2004, appellees filed suit against appellant, seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief, on the grounds of trespass, continuing trespass, private nuisance, quiet title, and invasion of privacy. 2 In relevant part, appellees contended that they owned “one half of a boat ramp which straddles the parties' properties,” and that appellant had “[installed a wood fence between the properties, which fence not only encroaches on the Collins Property but at the south end of the Collins Property, also blocks access by [appellees] ³¹⁰ to that part of the Collins Property which includes the shared boat ramp.” In her Answer, appellant contended that she “presently owns the entirety of the boat ramp by adverse possession.” She also denied “the allegation that any portion of the fence encroaches upon the Collins Property insofar as she presently owns the property in question by adverse possession.” Then, on November 8, 2004, appellant filed a “Counterclaim for Title by Adverse Possession and Bill to Quiet Title.” 3 She alleged that “the Senez Property is ... marked at its boundary with the Collins Property by a one-foot wide block wall and a wooden privacy fence,” and that she “and her predecessors in title for more than the prescriptive period of twenty (20) years have maintained the lawn, erected and/or maintained fencing and/or the aforedescribed block wall and/or have otherwise exercised actual peaceable possession” of the disputed area. Further, appellant contended that her predecessors’ possession, as well as her own, had been “actual, open, notorious, exclusive and hostile, and that said possession has been continuous and uninterrupted,” thus satisfying the requirements for adverse possession. The matter was heard by the circuit court, sitting without a jury, in December 2006. 4 All of the parties testified at trial. 5 ³¹¹ At trial, the court received into evidence as a joint exhibit the de bene esse deposition testimony of Arthur Myers, the prior owner of the property acquired by appellant. In his deposition, Mr. Myers stated that he purchased the property with his wife in 1980, but did not secure a boundary survey at that time.

Mr. Myers recalled that the Wall (or a predecessor to it) was already in place when he purchased the property now owned by appellant. He did not know who originally constructed the Wall, however. Mr. Myers did not realize that the Wall did not track the property line, and he assumed that the Wall was situated on his neighbors’ side of the boundary. According to Mr. Myers, in the late 1980’s a portion of the original Wall fell down; the Cooks had the Wall rebuilt in the same footprint, at their own expense, with a better foundation and “weep holes” to allow drainage.

Throughout the time the Myers owned what is now the Senez Property, both when the original Wall existed and after the construction of the replacement Wall, the Myers maintained the property up to the Wall, doing yard maintenance and the like. According to Mr. Myers, the Cooks never objected to his maintenance of the property up to the Wall. Mr. Myers recounted that he constructed the boat ramp while he lived at the property. 6 Although Mr. Myers did not obtain a boundary survey at that time, he claimed that he never received any complaints that the boat ramp encroached on the Cooks’ property. Mr. Myers never expanded the ramp, and had no need to perform significant maintenance on it.

In addition, Mr. Myers constructed a wooden sea wall, or bulkhead, across the eastern side of his property, fronting on ³¹² Norman Creek. At the same time, he constructed a wooden bulkhead on the Cooks’ side of the boat ramp, extending to the concrete sea wall along the east side of what is now the Collins Property. He explained that, due to erosion from the creek, “we were losing property.” 7 Mr. Myers testified: The only discussion I had with George [Cook] was when I was gonna build the bulkhead the water had started eroding around his bulkhead and I say, “Well, I’ll tie it into your bulkhead so the water can’t get down there.” You see, it was undermining his bulkhead, so that’s why, if you see that there’s some curve in this when I brought it back to meet his bulkhead. Mr. Myers allowed many neighbors to use the boat ramp, “with permission.” In particular, he recalled that he allowed various neighbors to use the ramp during a period in which “the local [public] ramp closed, and until it was opened again, I allowed them to come down and put their boats in.” According to Mr. Myers, this use was infrequent, and “anyone [who] would launch their vessel from [his] ramp did so after first securing [Mr. Myers’s] permission.” Mr. Myers was emphatic that the ramp “was not open to the public [such] that they could wander down [the] property.” With regard to the Cooks, however, Mr. Myers asserted that there was no formal “understanding.” In his words, “I’m a neighbor and I offered it.” Mr. Myers also assisted the Cooks with launching boats from the ramp.

When asked whether he recalled seeing anyone from the Cook family ever cross the Wall and use the boat ramp, Mr. Myers said: “I wouldn’t have thought anything of it if they did.” Mr. Myers indicated that, “to his recollection,” after appellees purchased the Collins Property “they never used” the ramp. Shortly before Mr. Myers sold his property to appellant in 2000, he obtained a survey of the property, to ensure that a fence he intended to construct on the southern boundary of his ³¹³ property (i.e., the opposite side from the Collins Property) correctly followed the property line. The surveyor informed Mr. Myers that, on the northern side of his property, there was “about a foot difference” between the Wall and the actual property line, such that the Wall was “a foot back from the property line onto 33 9,” i.e., the Collins Property. Mr. Myers said that his primary interest was the correct placement of the fence on the southern side of the property, rather than the northern property line, but he placed the survey in the materials shown to prospective buyers of his property.

He commented that “anybody who was buying it could look at that survey and figure it for themselves what they wanted to do with it.” Ann Collins testified that she and her husband purchased the Collins Property in August 2000. The Myers were their next-door neighbors until appellant purchased the Senez Property and moved in around Thanksgiving of 2000. Appellees did not move in immediately, however, because they were replacing the existing house on their property with a new one. Nevertheless, Ms. Collins said that she visited the property often, particularly to do gardening.

She claimed that, before the existing house was demolished in October 2000, she was there “almost every day. And then, on the weekends Steve and I would go down and spend two nights there. We got a blow-up mattress.” Ms. Collins maintained that she frequently used the boat ramp. The following colloquy is relevant: [APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: How many times did you use the boat ramp between, well, between let’s say, the time you moved in and the time your house was completed? [MS.

COLLINS]: Well, when Mr. Myers was there it was much easier, we just jumped over the wall. We used it as a launch for our swimming. We had a canoe or, at least, some people brought a canoe out of the water all the time, my children, my friends, Shirley, we went swimming there. ³¹⁴ [APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: When you say you jumped over the wall, you mean the retaining wall you believe is on your property? [MS. COLLINS]: Yes. [APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: Okay.

At that time was there — you were talking about Mr. — when Mr. Myers was there? [MS. COLLINS]: Yes. [APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: At that time there was no fence? [MS. COLLINS]: No, no. [APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: Did Mr. Myers give you permission to use the boat ramp? [MS. COLLINS]: There was never any question about permission. [APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: So you didn’t ask permission? [MS.

COLLINS]: Absolutely not. [8] [APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: You told [the judge] earlier you — you and Mr. Myers got along very well? [MS. COLLINS]: Yes. [APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: You used the boat ramp frequently? [MS. COLLINS]: Yes, because the house wasn’t built, we didn’t have any furniture. We would go over there and sit.

According to Ms. Collins, before appellant moved into the Senez Property in November 2000, appellant hired a contractor to erect a wooden fence that ran along the Wall, sitting just on the Senez side of the Wall. Ms. Collins recalled that before appellant constructed the fence, the two discussed its location. Ms. Collins said: When we were down there planting she called me towards the fence or towards the wall and said, can my fence follow the wall instead of the property line? And I said, hum, I ³¹⁵ can’t answer that because my husband and I own the property jointly, we’ll have to talk about it.

Nevertheless, Ms. Collins maintained that the fence was “absolutely” constructed without appellees’ permission. At trial, Ms. Collins was asked: “After the fence was constructed and you became aware of it, did you have any conversations with Ms. Senez about the fence?” Collins responded: “Yes, we did.” She continued: “[Appellant] said we did not say no.” Mr. Collins corroborated his wife’s testimony as to this point. He denied that they gave Ms. Senez permission to build the fence. Mr. Collins recalled: “We were [asked for permission to build the fence] and, unfortunately, we did not respond quick enough for her.

Um, when we returned to the property the fence was in place.” 9 Ms. Collins admitted that both before and after the fence was erected, she maintained the Collins Property only up to the Wall; the Myers, and later appellant, maintained the property on the other side of the Wall. Despite the concerns about the fence, Ms. Collins testified that until April 2004, appellees and appellant had a cordial relationship, which included possessing keys to each other’s homes. They would also socialize together and take care of each other’s pets, as needed. Moreover, Ms. Collins claimed that appellees and their children continued to use the ramp after appellant moved into the Senez Property; they launched their canoe from the ramp “several dozen” times.

At some point after appellant initially constructed the fence, however, she extended it along the Wall towards the water, with wire fencing, purportedly to keep her dogs in her yard. 10 After the fence was extended, it was no longer possible for appellees to cross between the two properties at the end of the Wall to gain access to the ramp. ³¹⁶ According to Ms. Collins, appellant’s property suffered storm damage as a result of Hurricane Isabelle in 2003. As a result, appellant had to replace a railroad-tie retaining wall on her property that ran parallel to the Wall and supported a terraced yard adjacent to the house on the Senez Property. Appellant rebuilt the railroad-tie wall higher than its original, and constructed a fence or railing atop it, which blocked appellees’ view down Norman Creek from their property. 11 Ms. Collins also testified that appellant regraded the area between the replaced terrace wall and the Wall, such that more water would run off onto appellees’ property. Ms. Collins admitted that she and her husband began to inquire with various permitting authorities as to whether appellant had acquired the necessary permits to erect the replacement terrace wall.

At that point, in April or May of 2004, the relationship between the neighbors began to sour. At some point (Ms. Collins did not specify a date), appellant constructed a wooden gate across the boat ramp, supposedly to keep her dogs from entering the water. At another point, according to Ms. Collins, appellant “slurried concrete in the water” to make the boat ramp longer and wider. For reasons that Ms. Collins did not explain, at some point appellees used concrete to block the weep holes in the Wall.

This ultimately caused a portion of the Wall to fall down in 2006. Although appellant’s perspective was significantly different, appellant agreed with appellees about many matters. She testified that, at first, she and appellees “became friends.” She “invited them to [her] house to have drinks, occasionally, out on the deck. Watched fireworks together down on the lower level of the property.

Exchanged keys to the house so in the event [she] got home late they could let [her] dog out,” and vice versa. ³¹⁷ According to appellant, she hired a contractor to erect the fence along the Wall prior to final settlement on the Senez Property with the Myers. At the time she decided to construct the fence, she had not yet met appellees. She explained that after she hired the contractor, “the contractor talked about possibly putting [the] fence ... up on top of the [W]all,” rather than alongside it, so as to “eliminate that small space between the fence and the [W]all.” She claimed that she “mentioned” this possibility to appellees, who did not respond affirmatively or negatively, and there was “no further conversation.” Accordingly, she “just decided to put the fence ... right next to the wall.” Appellant recounted that “Mrs. Collins occasionally asked for permission to come to the boat ramp to feed the ducks or geese with her granddaughter,” and appellant granted permission. According to appellant, appellees never requested to launch a boat from the ramp, nor objected when she repaired the ramp.

She testified that she extended the ramp further into Norman Creek, but did not widen it. According to appellant, in late April of 2004, appellees complained that her construction of the terrace wall and terrace fence blocked their view of the water. She recalled that she met with appellees on May 9, 2004, a date which she remembered because it was her father’s birthday, “and that’s when Mr. Collins told [her] that half the boat ramp was his.” Appellant stated: “I was a little surprised because I had assumed my property line had gone to the wall----” According to appellant, she offered to purchase the sliver of land, but said that the parties first would have to obtain a boundary survey to establish the property line. She recalled that Mr. Collins made her a counter-offer: “[H]e told me if I take the boathouse down, if I give him permission to take the boathouse down and pay for it, he would gift me the piece of property.” According to appellant, Mr. Collins had told her on previous occasions that he considered her boathouse an “eyesore.” Appellant declined Mr. Collins’s offer, and at that point their relationship deteriorated.

She stated: “After that, it ³¹⁸ became quite heated, with Baltimore County coming out to the property, pulling permits, putting a stop order.” She recounted that on approximately a dozen occasions she met with various county, state, and federal permitting agencies as a result of complaints lodged against her by appellees. On cross-examination, appellant was asked whether she asked appellees’ permission to install the initial fence she erected along the Wall. She responded: No, I did not ask permission. I discussed with them, putting the fence on top of the wall to minimize and reduce four inch space [sic] between the wall and the fence, and it was only in a passing thought as to what to do.

I never heard back from them. I really didn’t pursue it. I thought it was just as easy for me to put in — in the ground and probably cheaper. At the close of the hearing, the court made an oral ruling, granting judgment in favor of appellees on their trespass, possession, and quiet title claims, but awarding no damages.

The court also denied appellant’s adverse possession claim. On December 20, 2006, the court entered its “Final Judgment,” which it followed, sua sponte, on December 21, with an “Amended Final Judgment” to correct the inadvertent omission of a provision it had dictated in open court. 12 • Appellant filed a “Motion to Alter/Amend Judgment, or in the Alternative, Motion for New Trial” on January 2, 2006, seeking reconsideration of the court’s ruling on the issue of adverse possession, and seeking further clarification of the court’s order relating to ownership of the boat ramp. She contended that the terms of the court’s order had inadvertently created an “easement by implication” with respect to the boat ramp. Appellees opposed the motion.

In response, the court issued its “Second Amended Final Judgment” on February 23, 2007, in which it clarified the ³¹⁹ language of its order relative to the boat ramp, but otherwise denied the motion. In this ruling, as to appellee’s possession of property and quiet title claims, the court said: 4. Judgment on Count IV (possession of property) is hereby entered in favor of [appellees] and against [appellant] in that [appellant] is hereby ORDERED, absent an agreement by the parties to the contrary, to remove any gate or fence blocking access by the parties for the enjoyment and use of the boat ramp presently located on the east side of 339 and 341 Worton Road at Norman Creek. [Appellees] own approximately fifteen (15%) percent of the boat ramp on the side closest to their property; [appellant] owns the remaining eighty-five (85%) percent. 5. Judgment on Count V (quiet title) is entered in favor of [appellees] and against [appellant] in that the 291 square foot area ... shall remain the property of [appellees].... [F]urther, [appellant] shall remove the fence presently existing on [appellees’] property.

Further, the court said: “Judgment on the Counter Claim (for title by adverse possession) is hereby entered in favor of [appellees].” As to appellees’ trespass claims, the court awarded judgment in appellees’ favor, without damages. But, the court entered judgment in favor of appellant as to appellees’ claims of nuisance and invasion of privacy, as well as their claim to title by adverse possession over an area of land other than the disputed area on appeal. The court also denied appellees’ request for a permanent injunction. The court accompanied the Second Amended Final Judgment with a written “Motions Ruling” concerning appellant’s motion to alter or amend.

The court made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: Under Maryland law, to obtain title to property, the person claiming adverse possession must prove actual, open, notorious and visible, exclusive, hostile and continuous possession of the claimed property for at least 20 years. Bratton v. Hitchens, 43 Md.App. 348 , 405 A.2d 333 (1979); Blickenstaff v. Bromley, 243 Md. 164 , 220 A.2d 558 (1966). ³²⁰ In 1981, when the Myers took title to 341, a concrete wall existed along the property line of 341 and 339. The wall fell sometime in the 1980’s and was rebuilt by Cook (owner of 339) in the original wall’s foot print. The wall sat partly on 339, and partly on 341, crossing the boundary line at one point.

Myers installed a boat ramp which sat on both properties. In addition, Myers had a bulkhead installed across the waterfront of 341 to the boat ramp. Myers maintained the property on the 341 side of the wall, including the boat ramp. Myers granted permission to neighbors to use the property between Myers’ house and the wall, including the boat ramp, to access the waterfront to launch boats, in part, because a local boat ramp had closed.

The Cooks, including their son-in-law used the boat ramp. As a result, the Court does not infer that Mr. and Mrs. Myers’ possession of 341 and use of the property in dispute was adverse to the Cooks. When [appellees] purchased 339, they too used the boat ramp, as did [appellant] when she purchased ,341. At the time [appellant] purchased her property, [appellee] had already used the boat ramp to launch canoes and to feed ducks.

Thus, by using their property, [appellees] were in possession of their property. Initially, the parties were friendly. It is unfortunate for both sides that their friendship has not continued. The Court found [appellees’] testimony that they had never asked permission to use the boat ramp credible.

The Court did not find credible [appellant’s] testimony that [appellees] asked her for permission. Nor does the Court accept the suggestion that [appellees] were required to file suit to assert their ownership of the property in dispute. [Appellant] added a gate to the boat ramp to prevent her dogs from going into the water on the ramp. [Appellees], who also have dogs, did not object to the addition of the gate. The Court did not view the gate as evidence sufficient to deprive the [appellees] of their property. ³²¹ From the time she acquired 341 in November 2000, [appellant] maintained the boat ramp and the property on her side of the wall. Most of the boat ramp is on [appellant’s] property; maintaining the boat ramp is clearly in her best interest.

Neglecting to maintain one side of it, the small portion which is on [appellees’] property, could result in collapse or other failure of the ramp. [Appellant’s] maintenance of the small sliver of area in front of the wall as well as the ramp were not, in the Court’s view, sufficient evidence of control to deprive [appellees] of their property. In his deposition testimony, Arthur Myers testified that he always cooperated with his neighbors, the Cooks. While it is true that he mowed the grass in the area now in dispute, he did not appear to view his actions as an assertion of control or dominion over the area. At best, Myers’ actions toward the property in dispute indicate use or “actual possession” of the property in question but nothing more.

When he decided to sell 341, Myers commissioned a survey of the property. The survey shows the property line and area in dispute. Myers included the survey with the documents he provided to all prospective buyers including [appellant]. Contrary to the testimony of [appellant], Myers said that he showed a copy of the survey to [appellant] when he was selling 341 to her. [13] Myers’ testimony is clear that he and the Cooks were friendly throughout the years they were neighbors.

There is no evidence in the record that there was any adversity or hostility between them. Although no ill-will is required, there must be some proof. Myers believed when the wall was built, and then rebuilt, that it was on his property. There is no evidence that his use of the area was “exclusive.” The neighbors were friendly, and cooperative. [Appellant] argues that when Myers’ ownership is added to her ownership, she has met the 20 year requirement. ³²² Myers owned his property for 19 years and 7 months.

But during the last few months of his ownership, [appellees] acquired 339 Worton and used the boat ramp. Myers did not testify he gave them permission; and, [appellees] testified they never asked. The pages from Myers’ desposition transcript cited by [appellant] for the proposition that Myers “granted permission” to [appellees] do not make that statement. [Appellees’] use of the area in dispute destroys the claimed 20 years period required for [appellant] to establish her adverse possession claim. The Court was not persuaded that the fact that [appellees] did not move into their residence at 339 full-time until the year after purchase helps [appellant’s] claim.

The testimony was uncontradicted that [appellees] made frequent visits to 339 Worton for recreation, boating and supervision of the demolition and construction. Further, there was persuasive testimony that [appellee] Ann Collins used the boat ramp before and after residing at 339 Worton. Use of the boat ramp without seeking permission by [appellee] was the equivalent of asserting an ownership interest or dominion over the property. In sum, the Court was not persuaded that [appellant] met her burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to establish adverse possession of the area in dispute.

(Emphasis added.) DISCUSSION The issue here is whether the court erred in concluding that appellant did not acquire title to the disputed area by adverse possession. 14 This Court recently discussed the doctrine of adverse possession in Yourik v. Mallonee, 174 Md. App. 415, 422 , 921 A.2d 869 (2007): “Adverse possession is a method whereby a person who was not the owner of property obtains a valid title to that ³²³ property by the passage of time.” Md. Civ. Pattern Jury Instr. 2:1 (MPJI-Civ.). “A number of policy justifications for the doctrine of adverse possession have been advanced.” Herbert T. Tiffany & Basil Jones, Tiffany Real Property, Neighbor § 6:2 (1975, through Sept. 2006) (hereafter cited as “Tiffany”). Most commonly, “courts justify the existence and application of adverse possession” for one or more of the following reasons: First, there is a societal interest in “quieting” title to property by cutting off old claims. Second, there is a desire to punish true owners of land who neglect to assert their proprietary rights.

Third, there is a need to protect the reliance interests of either the adverse possessor or others dealing with the adverse possessor that are justifiably based on the status quo. Last, an efficiency rationale, asserting a goal of promoting land development, seeks to reward those who will use land and cause it to be productive. Id. The elements of adverse possession are well settled: “ ‘To establish title by adverse possession, the claimant must show possession of the claimed property for the statutory period of 20 years....

Such possession must be actual, open, ³²⁴ notorious, exclusive, hostile, under claim of title or ownership, and continuous or uninterrupted.’ ” White v. Pines Cmty. Improvement Ass’n, 403 Md. 13, 36 , 939 A.2d 165 (2008) (citation omitted); see also, e.g., E. Wash. Ry. v. Brooke, 244 Md. 287, 294 , 223 A.2d 599 (1966); Bishop v. Stackus, 206 Md. 493, 498 , 112 A.2d 472 (1955); Gore v. Hall, 206 Md. 485, 490 , 112 A.2d 675 (1955). The “statutory period” is established by Md.Code (2006 RepLVol., 2007 Supp.), § 5-103 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (“C.J.”), which requires that “[wjithin 20 years from the date the cause of action accrues,” a landowner must either “[f]ile an action for recovery of possession of a corporeal freehold or leasehold estate in land,” or “[ejnter on the land.” Initially, “[t]he burden of proving title by adverse possession is on the claimant.” Costello v. Staubitz, 300 Md. 60, 67 , 475 A.2d 1185 (1984); see Hungerford v. Hungerford, 234 Md. 338, 340 , 199 A.2d 209 (1964); Porter v. Schaffer, 126 Md.App. 237, 276 , 728 A.2d 755 , cert. denied, 355 Md. 613 , 735 A.2d 1107 (1999).

We have said: “In evaluating a claim, the pertinent inquiry is whether the claimant has proved the elements ‘based on the claimant’s “objective manifestation” of adverse use, rather than on the claimant’s subjective intent.’ ” Porter, 126 Md.App. at 276 , 728 A.2d 755 (quoting Barchowsky v. Silver Farms, Inc., 105 Md.App. 228, 241 , 659 A.2d 347 , cert. denied, 340 Md. 301 , 666 A.2d 1236 (1995)). Broadly, the elements of adverse possession can be placed in three groups: possession must be (1) actual, open and notorious, and exclusive; (2) continuous or uninterrupted for the requisite period; and (3) hostile, under claim of title or ownership. 15 We shall address these three categories of elements, seriatim. The first group of elements concerns the requirement that possession be actual, open and notorious, and ³²⁵ exclusive. For the purpose of this case, all of these elements essentially collapse into the requirement of actual use.

The element of “open and notorious” pertains to the concept of constructive notice to the title owner. Possession “must be visible and notorious, so that the owner may be presumed to have notice of it.” Beatty v. Mason, 30 Md. 409, 414 (1869). However, actual notice to the owner is not required. “Possessory acts of dominion over land may be sufficient to charge the record owner with knowledge that the land is adversely possessed.” Miceli v. Foley, 83 Md.App. 541, 561 , 575 A.2d 1249 (1990) (citing Blickenstaff v. Bromley, 243 Md. 164 , 220 A.2d 558 (1966)). “Exclusive possession means that the claimant must possess the land as his own and not for another.” Orfanos Contractors, Inc. v. Schaefer, 85 Md.App. 123, 130 , 582 A.2d 547 (1990). The Bliekenstaff Court quoted 3 AM.

JUR.2d, Adverse Possession, § 50, for the following proposition: “[Exclusive possession simply means that the disseisor must show an exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit. An adverse claimant’s possession need not be absolutely exclusive, however; it need only be a type of possession which would characterize an owner’s use.” Blickenstaff, 243 Md. at 173 , 220 A.2d 558 . Determination of whether a claimant is in actual possession of the claimed land is a fact-intensive inquiry. ³²⁶ Clearly, “something more than ‘mere occasional use of land’ is needed.” Porter, 126 Md.App. at 277 , 728 A.2d 755 (quoting Barchowsky, 105 Md.App. at 241 , 659 A.2d 347 ). But, “the character, location, and use of lands vary, and the type of possessory acts necessary to constitute actual possession in one case may not be essential in another.” Blickenstaff, 243 Md. at 171 , 220 A.2d 558 .

Therefore, “the court must consider the character and location of the land and the uses and purposes for which the land is naturally adapted.” Orfanos Contractors, 85 Md.App. at 129 , 582 A.2d 547 ; see also Goen v. Sansbury, 219 Md. 289, 296 , 149 A.2d 17 (1959); Miceli, 83 Md.App. at 553 , 575 A.2d 1249 . As we said in Porter, 126 Md.App. at 277 , 728 A.2d 755 , “acts sufficient to demonstrate possession of wild, undeveloped forest may fall short of the activity needed to establish possession of developed property.” Similarly, in Blickenstaff, 243 Md. at 171 , 220 A.2d 558 , the Court explained: “It is sufficient if the acts of ownership are of such a character as to openly and publicly indicate an assumed control or use such as is consistent with the character of the premises in question. The standard to be applied to any particular tract of land is whether the possession comports with the ordinary management of similar lands by their owners, and if so, it furnishes satisfactory evidence of adverse possession.” (Quoting 3 Am.Jur.2d, Adverse Possession, § 14); accord Mauck v. Bailey, 247 Md. 434, 441 , 231 A.2d 685 (1967). Appellant suggests that the circuit court “conceded that Mr. Myers was in ‘actual possession’ of the disputed property.” She claims that her maintenance and improvement of the disputed area was “equivalent” to that of the Myers, and contends that the circuit court “inexplicably concluded that such actions ‘were not, in the Court’s view, sufficient evidence of control to deprive [appellees] of their property.’ ” According to appellant, the Myers maintained the property up to the Wall (i.e., on land titled at the time to the Cooks); constructed the boat ramp; and maintained the waterfront ³²⁷ north of the ramp by installing the wooden bulkhead.

She asserts that she “exercised further control over the disputed property,” which belonged to the Cooks, “by erecting a ... privacy fence along the existing Wall, improving the boat ramp with a gate, [and] maintaining the boat ram p.... ” In her view, the actions that she and the Myers took with respect to the disputed area are “nearly identical” to those in Blickenstaff which, according to the Court of Appeals, constituted actual possession. Moreover, she maintains that the court’s “curious observation that Appellant’s action[s] were undertaken in her best interest is of no consequence in this regard, as the actions of any possessor of land are generally exercised in furtherance of the possessor’s best interests.” Appellees dispute appellant’s characterization of the circuit court’s decision, commenting: “Appellant’s brief reads as though the trial court had found that but for the reentry on the land by Appellees, Appellant’s predecessor in title would have perfected an adverse possession claim.” They assert: “As a matter of fact, what the trial judge concluded ... is that ‘At best, Myers’ actions toward the property in dispute indicate use or “actual possession” of the property but nothing more.’ ” However, appellees do not pursue the point, insisting instead that “whether Mr. Myers’ possession of the 291 square feet was adverse is immaterial to an adverse possession analysis here because the requisite 20 years period was interrupted” when appellees reentered the land after their purchase. Appellees also concede that appellant has had actual possession at least since she constructed the “privacy fence” running along the Wall. They recognize that this “effectively ousts [appellees] from exercising dominion over that portion of their titled real property.” In our view, the circuit court seemed to assume, arguendo, that the Myers had actual possession of the disputed area.

The court found the following facts as to the Myers: “Myers installed a boat ramp which sat on both properties. In addition, Myers had a bulkhead installed across the waterfront of 341 to the boat ramp. Myers maintained the property on the 341 side of the wall, including the boat ramp.” As to ³²⁸ appellant, the court found that she “added a gate to the boat ramp to prevent her dogs from going into the water on the ramp,” and that, “[f]rom the time she acquired 341 in November 2000, [appellant] maintained the boat ramp and the property on her side of the wall.” The court discounted these findings, however, reasoning that appellees, “who also have dogs, did not object to the addition of the gate,” and that “[m]ost of the boat ramp is on [appellant’s] property; maintaining the boat ramp is clearly in her best interest. Neglecting to maintain one side of it, the small portion which is on [appellees’] property, could result in collapse or other failure of the ramp.” The court concluded that none of appellant’s maintenance activities were “sufficient evidence of control to deprive [appellees] of their property.” We disagree.

In our view, appellant’s maintenance of the disputed area and the boat ramp was a paradigmatic example of the type of use that the cases have recognized as establishing actual possession. Both the Myers and appellant engaged in a course of use, maintenance, upkeep, and improvement upon the disputed area that was consistent with the “ ‘ordinary management’ ” that one would expect the owner of such land to undertake. BlicJcenstaff, 243 Md. at 171 , 220 A.2d 558 (citation omitted). Both the Myers and appellant engaged in basic yard work and maintenance over the disputed area.

Mr. Myers constructed the boat ramp in its entirety, and constructed the wooden bulkhead along the north side of the boat ramp, entirely within the disputed area, to prevent erosion of the land. After appellant purchased the property from the Myers, she constructed a privacy fence bordering the disputed area and a gate to prevent her dogs from using the boat ramp to enter the creek. She also repaired and extended the boat ramp by pouring additional concrete. In Blickenstaff, 243 Md. 164 , 220 A.2d 558 , upon which appellant relies, the land in issue was a “small parcel” of “scrubby, brush land” adjacent to a farm.

Id. at 166-69 , 220 A.2d 558 . The Blickenstaffs, who claimed title by adverse possession, “clear[ed] brush ... cut[ ] bean poles ... fell[ed] ³²⁹ large trees ... and ... plant[ed] and maintained a] flower bed” on that property. Id. at 172 , 220 A.2d 558 . The circuit court did not find that they were entitled to the disputed land, based on adverse possession.

The Court of Appeals reversed. Id. at 174 , 220 A.2d 558 . Noting that “there was never an assertion of ownership of the subject parcel by [title] owners,” id. at 172 , 220 A.2d 558 , the Court concluded that the acts of the adverse possessors, “when the character and location of the small parcel are considered, were sufficient to comport with the ordinary management of similar lands by owners.” Id. Therefore, it reversed the circuit court and held that the Blickenstaffs satisfied all the elements to obtain title by adverse possession.

Id. at 174 , 220 A.2d 558 . Miceli v. Foley, supra, 83 Md.App. 541 , 575 A.2d 1249 , also provides guidance. In that case, a landowner sued neighboring landowners who allegedly trespassed on the southwestern and northwestern boundaries of his property. Id. at 546 , 575 A.2d 1249 .

The circuit court found that each of the neighbors had adversely possessed the respective land in dispute. Id. at 547 , 575 A.2d 1249 . As to the southwestern neighbor, the Court observed that the adverse possessor “consistently maintained and mowed the parcel up to the fence line,” and “used the land to gather firewood and as a playground for [his] children.” Id. at 556 , 575 A.2d 1249 . “Further,” we said, “no evidence was produced that such uses are