Seward v. State

¹⁷³ ADKINS, J. Maryland Code (2001, 2008 RepLVol., 2015 Cum.Supp.), § 8-301 of the Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”) allows a person convicted of a crime to file a petition for writ of actual innocence under certain circumstances and seek a new trial. In Douglas v. State, we held that an order denying such a petition is appealable because it is a final judgment. 423 Md. 156, 170-71 , 31 A.3d 250, 258-59 (2011). Today we resolve a question left open by the decision in Douglas: does an order granting such a petition constitute a final judgment, such that the State can appeal it directly? Because we conclude that the procedural context is materially different when a court grants a petition for writ of actual innocence, the order is not a final judgment, and the State cannot directly appeal it.

FACTS AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS Around noon on July 26, 1984, a man knocked on Phyllis Diacont’s (“Diacont”) door and asked to use her phone after claiming that his car had broken down. Shortly after entering her home, the man raped, robbed, and shot Diacont. Diacont survived and later identified George Cameron Seward (“Seward”) as her attacker. In 1985, before the Circuit Court for Baltimore County (“the trial court”), Louise Stamathis (“Stamathis”) testified that Seward had worked at her dog grooming shop during the summer of the attack on Diacont.

Because she was caring for her ill husband, however, Stamathis was unable to locate employment records and state whether Seward was at work the week of the crime. The trial court found Seward guilty of first degree rape, first degree sex offense, assault with intent to murder, breaking and entering of a dwelling house, using a handgun in the commission of a felony, and robbery with a dangerous and deadly weapon. Diacont’s testimony provided the only substantive evidence to identify Seward as her attacker. Seward received two consecutive life sentences plus 73 years.

The trial court merged the additional counts. ¹⁷⁴ The Court of Special Appeals affirmed Seward’s convictions in an unreported opinion. This Court denied Seward’s petition for writ of certiorari. Seward v. State, cert. denied, 307 Md. 406 , 514 A.2d 24 (1986). Between 1996 and 1997, Seward’s postconviction attorney located Stamathis’s employment records.

After reviewing the records, Stamathis concluded it was “impossible” that Seward could have left the dog grooming shop to attack Diacont. In 1997, Seward filed a petition for postconviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. He alleged that his trial attorney failed to properly present evidence for an alibi defense. The Circuit Court for Baltimore County (“the post-conviction court”) denied Seward’s petition in 1999.

The postconviction court concluded that Seward’s trial attorney acted reasonably in investigating Stamathis as an alibi witness. The Court of Special Appeals denied Seward’s application for leave to appeal the denial of postconviction relief. In 2009, the General Assembly enacted Maryland Code (2001, 2008 Repl.Vol., 2015 Cum.Supp.), § 8-301 of the Criminal Procedure Article (“CP”), which states, in pertinent part: A person charged by indictment or criminal information with a crime triable in circuit court and convicted of that crime may, at any time, file a petition for writ of actual innocence in the circuit court for the county in which the conviction was imposed if the person claims that there is newly discovered evidence that: (1) creates a substantial or significant possibility that the result may have been different, as that standard has been judicially determined; and (2) could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Maryland Rule 4-331. Seward filed a petition for writ of actual innocence in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County (“Circuit Court”) in 2010.

At the hearing on this petition, Stamathis testified, based on her employment records, that Seward was at work the day of ¹⁷⁵ the crime. Discussing her policy and procedures, she explained that her employees, including Seward, usually worked between eight o’clock and four o’clock, ate lunch at the shop, and did not leave during the day. Moreover, Stamathis testified that her employees could not leave without her opening the doors to the shop, which she kept locked. The Circuit Court granted Seward a new trial in 2012.

Based on Stamathis’s employment records, the Circuit Court concluded that a substantial possibility existed that the result of Seward’s trial could have been different. At trial, the State had relied “solely” on Diacont’s identification of Seward as her attacker. The records showed that Seward “could not have been at the scene of the crime while the crime was occurring.” The Circuit Court also concluded that the records could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Maryland Rule 4-331, i.e., that Seward’s trial attorney had acted with “due diligence.” After reviewing the postconviction court’s analysis of Seward’s trial attorney’s performance, the Circuit Court refused to conclude that the attorney “could have done anything else to obtain” the records. Finally, the Circuit Court decided that the records were newly discovered evidence — although Seward and the State knew the records existed during trial, the parties did not then know the records’ exculpatory nature.

The State filed a notice of appeal, but Seward moved to dismiss, citing the State’s limited authority to appeal as established by statute. In a reported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals denied Seward’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the State can appeal an order granting a petition for writ of actual innocence. State v. Seward, 220 Md.App. 1, 5 , 102 A.3d 798, 801 (2014), cert. granted, 441 Md. 666 , 109 A.3d 665 (2015). On the merits of the State’s appeal, the intermediate appellate court concluded that Seward’s petition must be denied.

Id. at 27, 102 A.3d at 813-14 . It concluded that the Circuit Court erred by applying the wrong standard for due diligence. Id. at 17-18 , 102 A.3d at 808 . Rather than remand for further proceedings, the intermediate appellate court re ¹⁷⁶ versed, reasoning that the records were not newly discovered evidence under a proper due diligence analysis.

Id. at 25-26 , 102 A.3d at 812-13 . We granted Seward’s Petition for Writ of Certiorari on the following questions: 1. In a case of alleged innocence, where the State concedes the new alibi evidence of innocence is “material,” and the Circuit Court also held that “[i]f the trial judge had known that the records existed that showed that the Petitioner could not have been at the scene of the crime while the crime was occurring, there is a substantial possibility that he would not have found the Petitioner guilty;” (Ex. 2 at 4) can an appellate court rest a decision to reverse the granting of a Writ of Actual Innocence on the belief that trial counsel failed to investigate [ ] the alibi, without considering the evidence of all the things trial counsel actually did to locate the alibi evidence? 2. Does the State have the right to appeal a Circuit Court decision granting a Writ of Actual Innocence under Md.Code, Criminal Procedure § 8-301, in light of: (1) this Court’s prior precedent in Douglas v. State, 423 Md. 156 [, 31 A.3d 250 ] (2011); and (2) the General Assembly’s decision not to put any appellate right in the statute? 3.

Did the Court of Special Appeals err in mischaracterizing the record evidence and factual findings by the Circuit Court to the extent that the Court’s decision rests on a misunderstanding of the record? Because we answer no to the second question, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. STANDARD OF REVIEW The right of appeal is entirely statutory in Maryland. Pack Shack, Inc. v. Howard Cnty., 371 Md. 243, 247 , 808 A.2d 795, 797 (2002).

Thus, we examine Maryland Code (1973, 2013 RepLVol.), § 12-301 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings ¹⁷⁷ Article (“CJP”) to resolve a question of law — whether the State has a right to appeal an order granting a petition for writ of actual innocence under CP § 8-301. We do so without according deference to the intermediate appellate court’s ruling. DISCUSSION Critical to each party’s argument is Douglas v. State, in which we held that “a denial of a petition for writ of actual innocence is a final judgment under [CJP] § 12-301.” 423 Md. at 174 , 31 A.3d at 261 . Seward argues that the State cannot seek a direct appeal under CJP § 12-301 because, unlike in Douglas , there is no final judgment here.

An order granting a petition for writ of actual innocence is merely an interlocutory order. Seward also relies on Douglas to argue that an action under CP § 8-301 is part of the underlying criminal case. Finally, he alleges that the legislative history of CP § 8-301 does not justify the State’s appeal. The State counters that it can directly appeal a decision in a CP § 8-301 case because the Douglas Court concluded that such a decision was a final judgment under CJP § 12-301.

The State then argues that an action under CP § 8-301 is a civil proceeding, collateral to the criminal case, as is true of a postconviction or coram nobis proceeding. Notably, it emphasizes that CP § 8-301 appears under Title 8 of the Criminal Procedure Article: “Other Postconviction Review.” Finally, the State finds the legislative history of CP § 8-301 instructive in that the General Assembly deleted a proposed right to appeal from the text of CP § 8-301 because CJP § 12-301 already authorized that right. “It is an often stated principle of Maryland law that appellate jurisdiction, except as constitutionally authorized, is determined entirely by statute, and that, therefore, a right of appeal must be legislatively granted.” Gisriel v. Ocean City Bd. of Supervisors of Elections, 345 Md. 477, 485 , 693 A.2d 757, 761 (1997). Because the State tethers its right to appeal ¹⁷⁸ directly to CJP § 12-301, we begin with the pertinent part of that statute: Except as provided in § 12-302 of this subtitle, a party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court. The right of appeal exists from a final judgment entered by a court in the exercise of original, special, limited, statutory jurisdiction, unless in a particular case the right of appeal is expressly denied by law.

It is our role “to define and give content to the meaning of the term, ‘final judgment.’ ” See Sigma Reprod. Health Ctr. v. State, 297 Md. 660, 664 , 467 A.2d 483, 485 (1983) (citations omitted). The State reads this statute as authorizing its appeal because the order entered by the Circuit Court was “a final judgement.” 1 The State construes Douglas as affirming that CJP § 12-301 applies “in actual innocence cases.” The State would have us read Douglas for the proposition that any decision in an actual innocence case constitutes a final judgment. But the State fails to confront a patent difference between Douglas and this case.

Although we held that the Circuit Court’s decision in Douglas was a final judgment under CJP § 12-301, the