Seymour Ruff & Sons, Inc. v. Bricklayers' International Union

⁶⁸⁸ Pattison, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. This appeal is from a decree of the Circuit Court No. 2 of Baltimore City, dismissing a bill in equity, and dissolving a temporary injunction issued on the ex parte application of the plaintiff, the appellant in this court. The bill alleged that the plaintiff, Seymour Buff & Sons, Inc., had been engaged in the business of stone mason contractors in Baltimore City for many years, first as a partnership and since 1928 as a corporation, and that during the entire time in which it had been so engaged it had conducted what is known as a “union shop,” employing only union men affiliated with the defendant, the Bricklayers’, Masons’ & Plasterers’ International Union of America, and its subordinate unions, and with these men had done work in various cities and states of the United States, and while so engaged there was no grievance, trouble, or controversy of any kind between it and its employees. That the defendant is a voluntary unincorporated association with its principal office in Washington, D. C., and subordinate lodges, called “unions” or “locals,” in cities of the United States and Canada.

That for some reason unknown to the appellant the appellee for some years past, through its officers, agents, and servants, has been “harassing, annoying and interfering with” the plaintiff “in the conduct of its business and in the performance of its contracts with those with whom” it “has been doing business, and these unlawful, illegal and unwarranted acts of said defendant have caused losses to the plaintiff aggregating many thousands of dollars,” and that none of these acts was warranted by the constitution and by-laws of said defendant or by anything done by the plaintiff. The bill alleged specifically some of the illegal and unwarranted acts of the defendant, of which the plaintiff complained, among them being those in connection with the building of a church in Frederick, Md., in January, 1929, as a result of which an action was brought and a judgment recovered by the plaintiff against the defendant for the sum of $17,310.24, which, upon appeabto this court, was affirmed. Bricklayers’, Masons’ & Plasterers’ International Union of ⁶⁸⁹ America v. Seymour Ruff & Son, Inc., 160 Md. 483 , 154 A. 52, 53 . In addition thereto, the bill charged the defendant with certain illegal and unwarranted acts in connéction with the masonry work on a school building in Danville, Pa., done by the plaintiff in the fall of 1929 under a contract made by it with the general contractor.

As alleged, some of the union men employed on the job proved incompetent; others indicated an unwillingness to perform a fair day’s work. These men were discharged. As a result of that, a strike was ordered which lasted for several weeks before it was called off, and in consequence of the strike the plaintiff suffered great loss and damage. The bill also alleged: That the defendant wrongfully and illegally interfered with the plaintiff to its great loss and damage in obtaining contracts, and in carrying them out when made, among which were the contracts for work on the Baker residence, Washington, D. C., the Home for Needy Confederate Women at Richmond, Va., and the Connecticut Avenue Bridge in Washington, D. O. That, pursuant to its purpose “to seriously injure and damage” the plaintiff, manifested in various ways, and “with the ultimate view of compelling” it to go out of business, as it could not possibly continue in business as it had for many years past, unless it coiild employ union labor, the defendant wrote the plaintiff the following letter: “Washington, D. 0., June 18, 1931. “Registered Mail.

Return Receipt Requested. “Seymour Ruff & Sons, Inc., 2133 Maryland Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland. “Gentlemen: We call your attention to section 16, subsection 2 of article 18 of the constitution of the Bricklayers’, Masons’ & Plasterers’ International Union of America, which provides as follows: “2. No member of this International Union shall work for any person, firm or corporation which employs non-union employees in any branch of the trades within the jurisdiction of this International Union, or ⁶⁹⁰ work for any sub-contractor who takes a contract from any person or firm which employs any non-union employee in any branch of the trade composing this International Union, or work for any firm or person,, either directly or indirectly, which has been placed on the unfair list by the International Union.” “We are advised by counsel that the enforcement of this provision against companies entering into contracts with general contractors employing non-union labor in direct competition with members of our union, is legally permissible. In view of the fact that your company persists in accepting sub-contracts from general contractors known by your company to employ non-union labor in direct competition with members of our union, we are writing to advise you that the members “of this union will decline to accept employment from you on jobs begun on and after the 15th day of July, 1931. “We are writing you this letter at this time in order that you may be given full opportunity to make such other arrangements as the necessities of your business may require. We desire to advise you further, however, that any contracts on which members of this union have begun work or have accepted employment prior to the aforementioned date, will be fulfilled to the letter as far as the members of this union are concerned. “We do not believe you can reasonably expect the members of this union to work on a job under a gen- • eral contractor who is opposed to union principles and who brings union and non-union men into direct competition. “Very truly yours, “[Signed] John J. G-leeson, Secretary.” The bill then alleged: It was evident from the language of this letter that the defendant and all connected with it intended to do everything in their power not only to prevent the plaintiff from continuing on with the work it had already contracted to do, but also to prevent it from securing contracts in the future.

That subsection 2 of section 16 of article 18 of the constitution and by-laws of the defendant was ⁶⁹¹ adopted at its annual convention in September, 1930. Prior to that time the constitution and by-laws of the defendant contained no such provision, and the plaintiff is “convinced and therefore avers that said section was adopted for the sole purpose of placing said defendant in the position of doing precisely what it has done * * * to wit, to compel” the plaintiff “to discontinue business.” That the charge contained in the letter that the plaintiff persists in accepting subcontracts from general contractors known by it to employ nonunion labor is “absolutely false and untrue in every particular and the falsity thereof was known to said defendant and its officers” at the time the letter was written. The bill also alleged: That the members of the defendant’s association are now employed by subcontractors on a number of jobs in Baltimore City where the general contractors for such work are known and recognized as “open shop” contractors, who employ men whom they deem competent to do their work “irrespective of whether they are union or non-union, and no effort has been made by said defendant, its officers, agents and servants to in any manner interfere with any of said jobs or to prevent its members from working with, for and under such open shop contractors, but on the contrary, said jobs are progressing without interference or interruption, and members of said defendant are working on said jobs daily with non-union mechanics.” That the sole and absolute power “to declare strikes of members of said defendant, is vested in said defendant, and if said defendant declares a strike or orders its members to discontinue their employment * * * said employees are bound so to do, otherwise they will be subject to severe fines, penalties and expulsion from their union,” and, should they order the plaintiff’s employees to discontinue working for it, “as they have expressed their determination to do” in the letter of June 18th, “said employees will quit work and discontinue their employment” with the plaintiff, and that, if “said defendant is permitted to cany out the threat contained in the letter * * * and order the mechanics employed” by it “to refuse to work for” the plaintiff, “it will compel” it “to go out of business.” “That ⁶⁹² no damages will compensate for the loss of a business and business reputation built up over a period of more than thirty years by hard work and earnest effort; that these constitute assets which money cannot buy or favor procure, and these invaluable assets will be utterly destroyed if said defendant is permitted to carry out its malicious, wanton, unlawful and illegal acts as manifested in said letter.” That the plaintiff’s relations with its own employees “are and have always been satisfactory and of a friendly nature and that no controversy of any kind exists between” it and any of its employees, “nor is there any controversy of any kind between it and those with whom it has contracted, and any interference by the defendant, its officers, agents and servants with any of said jobs by the calling of a strike or ordering the men employed” by the plaintiff “to discontinue work will work great and irreparable injury and damage” to the plaintiff, and, as above stated, compel it to discontinue business and subject it to suits for damages by those with whom it has contracted, by reason of its inability to complete the various jobs, which it has undertaken by contract with various parties. Upon the allegations of the bill, a preliminary injunction was granted, which in effect restrained the defendant from interfering in any manner with the plaintiff in thé performance of its contracts, and from carrying out its determination not to allow its members to accept employment from the plaintiff, as expressed in the letter of June 18th, 1931.

The defendant in its answer to the bill admitted the calling of the strike by the defendant at Frederick, which resulted in the suit and recovery by the plaintiff of the judgment against the defendant. It also admitted the strike at Danville, but asserted that the reasons for calling the strike were adequate and amply sufficient in law. The answer contained a general denial of the charge of conspiracy, and specific denials of the charges of interfering with the plaintiff in obtaining or carrying out its contracts. It further denied the charge that section 16, subsection 2, of article 18 of the Constitution of the International Union, was adopted for the purpose of empowering the defendant to injure the plaintiff, and alleged ⁶⁹³ that such constitutional provision was only an expression in clear language of a policy of the defendant which had been in force for many years prior to the date of its adoption.

The defendant admitted by its answer that it sent to the plaintiff the letter of June 18th, 1931, though it denied that it was sent “with any purpose to injure or damage the. plaintiff, but for the express purpose of giving the plaintiff an opportunity to avoid any damage or injury which might incidentally result from an unannounced enforcement by the defendant of the agreement between its members embodied in its constitution.” It also denied “that its object in addressing said letter to the plaintiff was to compel the plaintiff to discontinue its business or to injure or hamper the plaintiff in any way, but on the contrary avers that the sole motive which induced it to address said letter to the plaintiff was the necessity for the enforcement of its own constitution which embodies the agreement entered into voluntarily by every member of the defendant union, not to accept employment under conditions destructive of the right to collective bargaining, and the defendant avers that the provisions of said constitution are reasonable and proper provisions, the due observance of which is vitally necessary to the maintenance of the principle of collective bargaining, and indeed to the very preservation and continued existence of the defendant as an agency for ameliorating labor and trade conditions, and that if said constitution is not enforced in a case so flagrant as the present one the result would be so to cripple and hamper the defendant as to most seriously impair its usefulness.” A great volume of testimony was heard in the case. Much of it was immaterial and irrelevant, and a great part of it trifling in its character. It is shown, however, from the record, that the plaintiff has for a number of years employed only members of the defendant association, with which it had always maintained friendly relations. FTot until the controversy occurred over the building of the church at Frederick were these friendly relations disturbed.

The trouble between the parties at Frederick arose from the fact that the plaintiff contracted with one Culler, a gen ⁶⁹⁴ eral contractor, to1 do the brick and masonry work on the church. Culler, it seems, did hot wholly confine himself to the employment of union men of the defendant’s craft. While the church at Frederick was in the course of construction, Culler had in his employ non-union bricklayers and masons working on a school building under construction at Frederick. The defendant, on learning of this fact, demanded that the plaintiff have Culler employ only union men on the school building, and the plaintiff was told by the defendant that, if it failed to bring about that result, the defendant would call a strike on the work being done by the plaintiff on the church.

Culler 'continued to employ non-union men on the school building, and in consequence thereof the strike was called, and the plaintiff’s work stopped on the church. As a result of the strike, the plaintiff was unable to- continue and complete the work under its contract with Culler, and the work was then completed by some one else. The plaintiff then sued and recovered judgment for damages suffered by him because of its failure or inability to complete its contract. The question in that ease (Bricklayers’, Masons’ & Plasterers’ International Union of America v. Saymour Ruff & Sons, Inc., supra) was “whether an employer who has entered into a subcontract to perform work on a certain building may recover damages against the labor unions of which, with his knowledge, his employees are members, because those unions have ordered them to quit work on the building in question for the reason that the general contractor has refused to employ union labor on other jobs in the same locality; there being no contract of employment between the subcontractor and his employees.” In deciding the question there presented, this court, speaking through Judge Digges, said: “Workmen have the undoubted right to organize for the purpose of securing lucrative employment under proper conditions as to working hours and wages; that, in order to enforce such right, they may peaceably strike or quit work, without liability, in cases where there is no contract of employment to the contrary; that what is a legal right of an individual do!es not become illegal sim ⁶⁹⁵ ply because done in combination with others by concerted action.

There would seem to be m> doubt that laborers working for an employer against whom they had a just or fancied grievance as to hours of work, wages, and the like, about which there was dispute with the employer, and with whom they have no contract as to the term of their employment, are entitled to withdraw, either singly or in combination, for the purpose of coercing their employer into complying with their demands; and, even though such quitting results in loss and damage to the employer, it is not an actionable wrong. This must be true, because, when not bound by contract, every free man has a natural right to work for whom he pleases, and to cease