Shapiro v. Chapman

BLOOM, Judge. Stephen Shapiro, Norman Wotring, and John Dignan appeal from judgments of the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, which awarded each of them $1.00 compensatory and $1.00 punitive damages in their suit against appellee, Barry Norman Chapman. Facts Appellants are all profoundly retarded adults who are involuntarily committed to the Rosewood Center, a state operated facility for the care of the mentally ill. Two of them are also blind.

During the period of time relevant to this action, all of the applicants were in the care of appellee, a direct care aide at Rosewood Center. Appellee’s responsibilities included escorting residents of the facility to medical appointments and supervising them during meals. In December 1982, Richard Rowland, a newly assigned direct care aide reported to the administrative director of Rosewood that he had witnessed several violent incidents involving appellants and Chapman. Rowland stated that he had seen Chapman strike, kick, drag and otherwise assault ³¹¹ appellants on more than one occasion.

The director conducted an investigation and, pursuant to Md.Health-Gen. Code Ann. section 7-602(m)(2)(iii)(2), reported the matter to the Maryland Advocacy Unit for the Developmentally Disabled (MAUDD), a private non-profit corporation designated by Executive Order as the state agency for the protection and advocacy of the rights of developmentally disabled persons. COMAR 01.01.1977.07. MAUDD, through appellants’ guardians ad litem, filed an action on behalf of appellants, seeking redress for Chapman’s abusive conduct.

The complaint asserted three causes of action for each complainant, based on alternative theories of recovery: (1) Chapman’s conduct deprived appellants of their Fourteenth Amendment due process right to be free from physical abuse, made actionable through 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ; (2) Chapman violated rights guaranteed appellants under Md.Health-Gen.Code Ann., section 7-601; 1 and (3) common law assault and battery. The court below granted Chapman’s motion for judgment as to the first two counts. It was the court’s reasoning that because appellants could obtain relief for Chapman’s abuse through an action for common law assault, they had not been deprived of any constitutional right, thus an action under § 1983 did not lie. With respect to the count premised upon Md. Health-Gen.Code section 7-601, the court ruled that no separate cause of action existed for a violation of that statute.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of appellants on the surviving count and awarded each appellant $1.00 in compensatory damages and $1.00 in punitive damages. Appellants filed a motion for new trial, with respect to the meager damage awards. The court denied the motion and entered judgments in accordance with the verdicts; this appeal ensued. ³¹² I w U.S.C. § 1983 Appellants contend that the court erred in refusing to permit their first count, which alleged a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 , to go to the jury. 2 To prevail under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish (1) that the defendant deprived him of a right secured by the constitution or laws of the United States and (2) that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 , 100 S.Ct. 1920, 1923 , 64 L.Ed.2d 572 (1980).

There can be no dispute as to the second element; Chapman, as an employee of the state charged with the duty of providing for appellants’ care and safety, was a state actor with respect to the alleged incidents of abuse. Cf. Spence v. Staras, 507 F.2d 554 (7th Cir.1974); Patricia B. v. Jones, 454 F.Supp. 18 (W.D.Pa.1978). The focus of our inquiry, therefore, is whether appellants were deprived of a constitutionally secured right.

The court below found that no constitutional violation had occurred because appellants were able to seek redress for their injuries in a common law action for assault and battery. Although the availability of another remedy is highly relevant where the claimed deprivation is of procedural due process, see Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 , 101 S.Ct. 1908 , 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), the availability of post-deprivation state law remedies is irrelevant in cases involving denial of substantive due process. Cf. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 , 106 S.Ct. 662, 678 , 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring).

The violation of a substantive constitutionally guaranteed right exists independently of the procedures available to redress that wrong. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597-98 , 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2697-98 , 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). It is, therefore, illogical to condition the finding of a substantive violation of a constitutional right on the non-existence of procedural remedies. ³¹³ See Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864, 871 (7th Cir. 1983) ; Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387, 395 (5th Cir. 1982) ; Spell v. McDaniel, 591 F.Supp. 1090, 1105 (E.D.N.C.1984) ; Begg v. Moffitt, 555 F.Supp. 1344, 1362 (N.D.Ill. 1983) . Because appellants asserted a violation of their substantive due process rights to be free from physical abuse at the hands of one acting under color of state authority, the court erred in holding that the availability of an action for assault and battery negated any violation of appellants’, constitutional rights.

Our holding that the court below erred in granting judgment in Chapman’s favor on the § 1983 action does not end our inquiry. We must also determine whether the lower court’s error was harmless. In the context of this appeal, harmlessness may be found if (1) the evidence demonstrated no violation of substantive due process or (2) even if such a violation was shown, appellants would have been entitled to no greater relief than that which they received from the jury under the count of assault and battery. Upon review of the record, we conclude that the error was not harmless in either respect.

The Supreme Court has made it clear that an involuntarily committed resident of a state mental facility has a substantive liberty interest in his own personal safety. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315 , 102 S.Ct. 2452, 2457 , 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982). This does not imply, however, that every act which impinges upon that liberty works a constitutional deprivation. Not every tort committed by a state employee is a violation of the constitution.

Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607 , 613 (4th Cir.1980); Spell v. McDaniel, supra, 591 F.Supp. at 1100 . Cf. Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 , 100 S.Ct. 553, 559 , 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980) (“not every injury in which a state official played some part is actionable under [section 1983]”); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 , 99 S.Ct. 2689, 2696 , 61 L.Ed.2d 433 (1979) (“false imprisonment does not become a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment merely because the defend ³¹⁴ ant is a state official”); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 , 97 S.Ct. 285, 292 , 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976) (“medical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner”). The critical question before us is whether Chapman’s conduct was so egregious that the torts he committed rise to the level of a constitutional violation.

Williams v. Kelley, 624 F.2d 695, 697 (5th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1019 , 101 S.Ct. 3009 , 69 L.Ed.2d 391 (1981). In our search for the answer to that question we find instructive the words of Chief Judge Friendly, uttered in a slightly different context—a § 1983 action against a prison guard for an unprovoked attack on a prisoner: In determining whether the constitutional line has been crossed, a court must look to such factors as the need for the application of force, the relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of the injury inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 , 94 S.Ct. 462 , 38 L.Ed.2d 324 (1973). Application of those factors to the facts before us does not require this Court to mull through the details of each incident of Chapman’s misconduct.

In order to award punitive damages, the jury necessarily found that Chapman’s actions were excessive, wanton and malicious. See Wedeman v. City Chevrolet Co., 278 Md. 524, 530-33 , 366 A.2d 7 (1976). As a matter of law, therefore, the acts complained of—wanton, malicious and excessive use of force against patients involuntarily committed to a state institution by one employed by the state to care for those patients—rise to the level of constitutional torts for which recovery may be had under U.S.C. Title 42, § 1983. Nevertheless, but for the existence of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 , which provides for the awarding of attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in a civil rights action, we would be constrained to hold that the court’s error in granting judg ³¹⁵ ment on the first count was harmless.

Courts traditionally have fashioned remedies for violations of § 1983 by employing the principles of relief associated with analogous common law torts. E.g., Clappier v. Flynn, 605 F.2d 519, 528 (10th Cir.1979). See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 259 , 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1050 , 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978). We see no significant difference between the interests protected by the substantive due process right to be free from physical abuse and the interests protectable by an action for the common law tort of assault and battery.

The elements of damages recoverable in an action under § 1983 are identical to those recoverable in a common law action for assault and battery. Appellants would have been entitled to no greater measure of damages as a result of the violation of § 1983 than that afforded them by the jury under the third count in their complaint. They would not have been permitted to recover twice for the same tort merely because the wrong gave rise to alternative theories of recovery. Cf.

Kramer v. Emche, 64 Md.App. 27, 38 , 494 A.2d 225 , cert. denied, 304 Md. 297 , 498 A.2d 1184 (1985) (expressing the “one wrong—one recovery” rule). 3 There is, however, one substantial difference between recovery in a § 1983 action and recovery in a common law tort action. As the prevailing parties to a civil rights action, 4 appellants would be entitled, under § 1988, to ³¹⁶ attorneys’ fees