Sharp v. Downey

HOLLANDER, J. Nicholas Sharp, appellant, and Barry and Rhonda Downey, appellees, own adjacent tracts of land in Howard County. For almost eight years, the parties, as well as their predecessors in title and some of their neighbors, have been engaged in litigation as to various matters regarding the adjoining parcels. In 2007 and 2008, the Circuit Court for Howard County ordered the parties to submit their disputes to binding arbitration. Of relevance here, in an Arbitration Award (the “Award”) dated December 22, 2008 (issued January 6, 2009), the arbitrator rejected appellant’s claim that he is entitled to an easement over a portion of appellees’ land in order to reach a public road.

That decision left appellant’s parcel “landlocked.” Dissatisfied with the Award, appellant unsuccessfully asked the Circuit Court for Howard County to vacate it. This appeal followed, in which appellant presents one issue: “Whether the circuit court erred in refusing to vacate the ¹³² arbitrator’s decision and award[.]” For the reasons that follow, we shall reverse and remand. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 The properties at issue are two adjacent, irregularly shaped lots in Woodbine, along the South Branch of the Patapsco River at the northern border of Howard County. ■ Appellant’s property is located at 400 Morgan Station Road. We shall refer to it as “Lot 2” or the “Sharp Lot.” Appellees’ property is located at 410 Morgan Station Road.

We shall refer to it as “Lot 1” or the “Downey Lot.” Originally, the two lots were a single tract of land owned by Jack Ryan, Inc., the corporate alter ego of John E. Ryan (collectively, “Ryan”). On February 20, 1996, Ryan divided the tract by deed, creating Lot 1 and Lot 2. By a separate deed of even date, Ryan conveyed Lot 1 (i.e., the Downey Lot) to Pamela Jekel, Inc., 3 and retained ownership of Lot 2 (ie., the Sharp Lot). Notably, the Downey Lot adjoins Morgan Station Road, while the Sharp Lot is (in the words of the arbitrator) “landlocked.” 4 ¹³³ On the same date as the conveyance of Lot 1, Ryan and Jekel executed two instruments relating to two separate easements concerning Lot 1 and Lot 2.

One instrument, entitled “Declaration for Ingress and Egress Easement (Driveway) and Maintenance Agreement,” established an easement “over the existing jeep trail located on Lot 1” (ie., the Downey Lot). We shall refer to this agreement as the “Original Jeep Trail Agreement.” The other easement instrument, entitled “Declaration for Easement and Maintenance Agreement,” is referred to by the parties as the “Riverfront Easement.” All four instruments were recorded in the land records of Howard County on February 27, 1996. According to the Original Jeep Trail Agreement, “[t]he Easement shall be for the sole purpose of ingress and egress for foot and vehicular traffic and for no other purpose.” It noted that the jeep trail “is not described in a metes and bounds description,” but stated that the jeep trail was “shown on an unrecorded plat titled, ‘Health Department Percolation Certification Plan, Project No. 423’ ” (the “Health Department Plan”). 5 The Original Jeep Trail Agreement also provided: “The beginning of the Easement at Morgan Station Road is at the driveway which is used in common with 430 Morgan Station Road and [the easement] ends at the northeast boundary of Lot 2.” Further, it stated that the easement was “perpetual” and “binding on the parties [and their] successors and assigns.” It also provided that, “[i]n the event of disagreement between the owners of Lots 1 and 2 as to the use, repairs, maintenance of the Easement, or any other issue, the dispute shall be resolved in accordance with the American Arbitration Association rules and procedures.... ” ¹³⁴ The Riverfront Easement granted to Jekel (and her successors in title) an easement over a narrow strip of riverfront property that was part of Lot 2, and which separated Lot 1 from the Patapsco River. In relevant part, it stated that “Ryan ■will not in anyway interfere with Jekel’s use of the easement such as moving animals to the river or any other purpose.” The primary significance of the Riverfront Easement to the issues on appeal is that, as we shall explain, the arbitrator ultimately found that the jeep trail referenced in the Original Jeep Trail Agreement cut into, and then out of, the Riverfront Easement area as the jeep trail made its way between Lot 2 and Morgan Station Road. 6 A little over a year after the conveyance of Lot 1, Ryan and Jekel executed and recorded another easement agreement (the “Second Jeep Trail Agreement”), which, like the Original Jeep Trail Agreement, was titled “Declaration for Ingress and Egress Easement (Driveway) and Maintenance Agreement.” It provided: “An easement is established over the existing jeep trails located on Lot 1.” Moreover, the Second Jeep Trail Agreement expressly stated that it “replaces absolutely and in its entirety” the Original Jeep Trail Agreement.

Nevertheless, it largely tracked the language of the Original Jeep Trail Agreement, including the statements that the easement was “perpetual” and was for the purpose of “ingress and egress,” and the requirement that any disputes be resolved by arbitration. , However, unlike the Original Jeep Trail Agreement, it did not explicitly describe the jeep trails as connecting to Morgan Station Road or to the Sharp Lot. The Second Jeep Trail Agreement again identified the jeep trails by reference to the Health Department Plan, but also by reference to a “new road approved by the State of Maryland Department of the Environment Water Management Administration, April 25, 1996, permit 94-NT-1072-1994468197” (the “MDE Per ¹³⁵ mit”). 7 In 1997, Jekel conveyed Lot 1 (the Downey Lot) to Larry and Wendy Raskin. In turn, by a deed dated December 15, 2000, the Raskins conveyed Lot 1 to appellees. On December 13, 2002, in the Circuit Court for Howard County, appellees filed a three-count “Complaint for Declaratory Judgment,” naming as defendants Jack Ryan, Inc., as well as John E. Ryan and Pamela Jekel Ryan individually, and seeking resolution of several disputes regarding the adjoining properties.

Pertinent to this appeal, 8 the second count of the Complaint alleged that Ryan had constructed a driveway on Lot 1 “located outside the easement area,” as described in the Second Jeep Trail Agreement. Therefore, appellees sought a judicial declaration that Ryan was “under an obligation to relocate the driveway serving the [Sharp Lot] to conform” to the Second Jeep Trail Agreement. In the course of the litigation, appellees filed five amended complaints. On September 4, 2003, during the litigation, appellant purchased Lot 2 (the Sharp Lot) from Ryan.

As a result, appellees added Sharp as a defendant to their suit. Appellant filed a counter complaint, as did other defendants (including Ryan, as well as the Breslins, a couple who owned ¹³⁶ another neighboring parcel and had been named as defendants by the Downeys with respect to claims not at issue here). 9 Before Sharp purchased Lot 2 and entered the lawsuit, Ryan filed a “Motion to Dismiss Count II and to Compel Arbitration.” Ryan cited the language of the Second Jeep Trail Agreement calling for resolution by arbitration of disagreements relative to “any ... issue” concerning the easement, and asked the court to dismiss the second count and to “order [appellees] to initiate the arbitration process.” Noting that appellees “indicated that they do not oppose the Motion,” the court granted Ryan’s motion on May 15, 2003. In the summer of 2003, Ryan and the Downeys began a binding arbitration proceeding to resolve the claims at issue in the Downeys’ original “Count II.” After Sharp purchased Lot 2 from Ryan, he joined in that arbitration proceeding. Subsequently, in July 2007, Ryan and Jekel and their associated entities were dismissed from the lawsuit by a joint stipulation that resolved all claims by and against them.

By “Order” entered on September 11, 2007, the circuit court required Sharp and the Downeys to arbitrate in the pending arbitration proceeding their disputes relative to the “Second Jeep Trail Agreement.” On January 16, 2008, pursuant to an agreement by Sharp and the Downeys, the court entered an Order dismissing the remaining claims between them, and ordering Sharp and the Downeys to submit those claims (which are wholly separate from the issues on appeal) to the arbitrator. Later that month, the Downeys and the Breslins reached a settlement agreement resolving their disputes (which also are not relevant to this appeal). Accordingly, pursuant to joint motions of the parties, the circuit court entered orders dismissing all remaining claims relative to all ¹³⁷ remaining parties. On March 26, 2008, the circuit court entered an order directing the clerk to close the case.

The arbitration proceeding at issue here began in January 2008. 10 The arbitrator heard testimony, received documentary exhibits, and conducted two site visits to the properties. Notably, the proceedings before the arbitrator were not transcribed. On January 6, 2009, the arbitrator issued his Award, in which he recounted the history of the land transactions relative to the two lots. The arbitrator also explained that before Ryan divided his property into the Sharp Lot and the Downey Lot, he had begun “to improve the jeep trail without the necessary government permits regulating flood plain tidal and non-tidal waterways.” The arbitrator continued: On July 9, 1994, Ryan was ordered to stop such activity.

Ryan then filed a Joint Permit application with an attached plat that showed the Jeep Trail. Thereafter, a Letter of Authorization (After-the-Fact) was issued effective May 22, 1995. A dispute arose between Verba O. Day [another neighbor] and Ryan over Ryan’s use of Day’s right-of-way to access Morgan Station Road. To avoid the conflict, Ryan filed a petition to modify the permit to bypass Day’s right-of-way----(Internal citations omitted.) The arbitrator also observed that the Health Department Plan, referenced in both the Original and the Second Jeep Trail Agreement, indicated the “Existing] Jeep Trail” with a “darker broken black line.” In his decision regarding the issues pertinent to this appeal, the arbitrator placed great reliance on the Health Department Plan’s depiction of the jeep trail.

The arbitrator said: There are three issues concerning the Jeep Trails Easement, namely, whether the easement extended to Morgan ¹³⁸ Station Road, whether the easement extended to Lot 2, and whether the driveway as it now exists is the easement created by the [Second Jeep Trail Agreement]. A careful examination of the Health Department [Plan] discloses that the easement does not extend to Morgan Station Road but connected to the Verba O. Day right of way to access Morgan Station Road. When Day disputed Ryan’s use of her right of way, Ryan filed for a modified permit to bypass the Day right-of-way. The permit was granted effective April 25, 1996.

The plat filed with the modified permit application showed the “proposed access driveway” parallel and to the north of the Day right-of-way. The “proposed access driveway” to Morgan Station Road was not built at the location shown [on] the plat attached to Ryan’s [MDE] Permit, but ... connected to the driveway of the Howard County Bus Turnaround. There was no permit to reflect this, nor was there any amendment to the [Second Jeep Trail Agreement] to reflect this. Consequently, the easement created by the [Second Jeep Trail Agreement] does not extend to Morgan State [sic] Road.

The second issue, whether the Jeep Trails Easement extends to Lot 2, also invites the close examination of the Health Department Plan. [The Downeys’ version of the Health Department Plan] shows the Jeep Trail Easement going in a northwesterly direction, i.e. traveling away from Morgan Station Road over Lot 1, through Lot 2, then owned by Ryan, through the ... Riverfront Easement, then curving toward the south and re-entering Lot 1, but stopping short of Lot 2. [Sharp’s version of the Health Department Plan] shows the path of the same Jeep Trail, but instead of stopping short of Lot 2 [the trail] extends into Lot 2. The Downeys argue that the existing Jeep Trail did not extend to Lot 2 ..., but fell short of Lot 2.... Of course, the primary purpose of the Health Department [Plan] was to determine the location of the proposed wells and septic systems.

The Jeep Trail was not determined by a metes and bounds description and, for the most part, simply followed the contour lines on the Health Department Plan. ¹³⁹ The Health Department Plan is dated November 11, 1991. The first recorded evidence of the Jeep Trail easement occurred on February 20, 1996 when Ryan created Lot 1 and Lot 2, conveyed Lot 1 to Jeckel [sic], ... and created with Jekel “the existing Jeep Trail” Easement [ie., the Original Jeep Trail Agreement]. The pertinent language of the [Original Jeep Trail Agreement] reads: “1. An easement is established over the existing Jeep Trail located on Lot 1, but which is not described in a metes and bounds description for the mutual use of both lots.

The beginning of the Easement at Morgan Station Road is at the driveway which is used in common with 430 Morgan Station Road and ends at the northeast boundary of Lot 2,” and as “shown on an unrecorded plat, Health Department Percolation Certification Plan, Project No. 423, dated November 11, 1991.” The [Original Jeep Trail Agreement] also stated that the easement “ends at the northeast boundary of Lot 2.... ” The easement stops at the division line of Lot 1 and 2 and does not enter Lot 2. On February 27, 1997, Jeckel [sic] and Ryan executed the [Second Jeep Trail Agreement] that replaced absolutely and in its entirety the [Original Jeep Trail Agreement]. This instrument established an easement “over the existing jeep trails located on Lot 1[”] as [“]shown on the Howard County Health Department Certification Plan” and the “new road” approved by Maryland Water Management permit 94-NT-1072/199468197. Since the prior easement was entirely replaced, this [Second Jeep Trail Agreement] is the sole controlling extant easement and limits the easement to the “existing jeep trails located on Lot 1” of which none give access to Lot 2, the Riverfront Easement, nor to Morgan Station Road.

The remaining issue is whether the existing driveway is located within the Jeep Trails Easement. As stated before, the Jeep Trails Easement does not extend to Morgan Station Road, nor was it built in accordance with the permit ¹⁴⁰ 94-NT-1072/199468197 as modified, nor does the easement extend into Lot 2. The above, together with ... other evidence shows substantial parts of the driveway were not built within the easement designations. (Internal citations omitted.) The arbitrator also rejected a claim by Sharp that, if he did not have an express easement, he nevertheless was entitled to an implied easement.

The arbitrator reasoned: Sharp contends that since he is landlocked, he has an implied easement by necessity. When Ryan created Lot 1 and 2, he immediately sold Lot 1 to Jeckel [sic], [and] created with Jeckel [sic] the Riverfront Easement, then the [Original Jeep Trail Agreement]. All of the above instruments were executed on the same day and recorded among the Land Records of Howard County____ The [Original Jeep Trail Agreement] gave an easement through Lot 1 to Ryan, but it did not extend into Lot 2, the Riverfront Easement, or Morgan Station Road. Obviously, Jeckel [sic] did not want any intrusion into her Riverfront Easement.[ 11 ] Ordinarily, subsequent instruments should not be considered.

Here, however, the [Original Jeep Trail Agreement] was substituted by the [Second Jeep Trail Agreement] by the same parties and concerned the same property and ... also was recorded. This easement did not extend into Lot 2 to cross into the Riverfront Easement nor to Morgan Station Road. This is the operative easement and, once again, it is apparent that Jeckel [sic] did not want her easement rights disturbed. Ryan, now Sharp, does not have an implied easement by necessity.

(Internal citations omitted.) With respect to the instant dispute, the arbitrator made the following “Decision and Findings”: ¹⁴¹ 5. The “Jeep Trails” over which Sharp has an easement are only those depicted on the Health Department Percolation Certification Plan dated November 11, 1991, and as permitted by the Maryland Department of Natural Resources Permit No. 94-NT-1072/199468197 (as modified). 6. The “Jeep Trails” do not provide Sharp access to Morgan Station Road[.] 7. The portions of the paved driveway are not located within the Jeep Trails defined by the [Second Jeep Trail Agreement], and/or extend beyond the 690 feet permitted by the [MDE] Permit, and may be removed by the Dow-neys.

(Internal citations omitted.) By letter dated January 13, 2009, the arbitrator advised the parties that the final sentence of the Award’s discussion of easement by necessity “should read, ‘Ryan, now Sharp, does not have an implied easement by necessity, he does not need one.’ ” (Emphasis added to show addition.) On January 20, 2009, Sharp filed with the arbitrator a “Motion to Reconsider, Modify or Correct Arbitration Award,” in which he asked the arbitrator to reconsider his three “Findings,” numbered 5, 6, and 7, relating to the Second Jeep Trail Agreement. Sharp did not challenge five other findings of the arbitrator, which related to issues that are not the subject of this appeal. In the meantime, on January 15, 2009, appellees reopened the circuit court case by filing a “Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award.” Appellant responded with an answer to appel-lees’ petition, as well as a “Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award.” In these papers, appellant advised the court that he had filed his Motion to Reconsider with the arbitrator on January 20, 2009. According to appellant, appellees’ petition to confirm the Award was “premature,” because “Section 3-222 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides a period of twenty (20) days to file a motion to modify or vacate the award with the arbitrator.” Therefore, Sharp contended that “[n]either [appellant’s] Petition nor the Petition to Confirm Award should be heard until the arbitrator completes his ¹⁴² task by ruling on the Motion to Reconsider,” and indicated that he was filing his Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award “in an excess of caution.” Appellant asked the court to stay action on the competing petitions until the arbitrator ruled on his Motion to Reconsider.

Although the court did not issue a formal stay, it took no immediate action on the two petitions. On March 30, 2009, the arbitrator denied appellant’s Motion to Reconsider. In his “Ruling & Order on Motion of Respondent,” the arbitrator stated: There were three issues relative to the “existing Jeep Trails on Lot 1,” namely, whether the easement extended to Morgan Station Road, whether it extended to Lot 2, and whether the driveway as it now exists is the easement created by the [Second Jeep Trail Agreement]. As to the first issue, the easement did not extend to Morgan Station Road.

The easement was not built in accordance with the plat attached to the [MDE] Permit.... Instead, it was built to connect to the Howard County school bus turnaround. There was no permit to do this. The (after the fact) authorization required “grading and fill associated with improvements to a school bus turnaround.” It was not an authorization to connect to the school bus turnaround, but merely to improve the school bus turnaround.

As stated in the Arbitration Award, the [Second Jeep Trail Agreement] is the controlling easement. It gave no access to Lot 2, the Riverfront Easement, nor Morgan Station Road. In short, Lot 2 has no access to Morgan Station Road since Lot 2 does not have access either to the Riverfront Easement or Lot 1 from Lot 2, and therefore cannot cross Lot 1 to gain access to Morgan Station Road. The Downey’s [sic] own Lot 1 in fee simple unencumbered by the [Second Jeep Trail Agreement] and unencumbered by the replaced [Original Jeep Trail Agreement]. ¹⁴³ Since the owner of Lot 2, presently Sharp, cannot traverse or cross Lot 1, Sharp has no access to Morgan Station Road.

Lot 2 is landlocked. Relative to the remaining issue, the location of the driveway on Lot 1, such is no longer the concern of the owner of Lot 2, presently Sharp. (Internal citations omitted.) On April 7, 2009, appellees filed a “Memorandum in Further Support of Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award” in the circuit court. On April 28, 2009, appellant filed a “Further Petition and Memorandum to Vacate Arbitration Award.” In brief, appellant contended that the Arbitration Award was “irrational” and displayed a “manifest disregard of the law.” In Sharp’s view, the arbitrator illogically “failed to actually locate the ‘new road’ referred to in the Jeep Trails Easement when the location was shown on exhibits referred to in the Award.” Further, appellant argued that, “if the easement was not beatable by the Declaration of Easement, it must be presumed to be in the location the parties constructed their driveway.” Additionally, Sharp maintained that the Downeys “took title to Lot 1 subject to the known and clearly visible easement for the existing driveway clearly visible to them on the ground.” Finally, Sharp disputed the arbitrator’s statement that an implied easement was “not needed,” arguing: “The finding of no implied easement, because it was ‘not needed’, leaves Lot 2 landlocked, clearly an arbitrary, irrational decision in manifest disregard of the law.

Such clearly was not the intention of Jekel and Ryan when they expressly created the two easement documents for ingress and egress.” On September 28, 2009, the court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Order, confirming the Award. It recognized that “Maryland law favors the resolution of legal disputes through binding arbitration as evidenced by the codification of the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act....” The court also explained that “the Act severely limits the Court’s authority to vacate an arbitration award,” and that, “[t]o prevent a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for the decision of the arbitrator, a court ‘shall not vacate the award or refuse to ¹⁴⁴ confirm the award on the ground that a court of law or equity could not or would not grant the same relief.’” (Quoting statute; circuit court’s emphasis). Nevertheless, the circuit court recognized case law for the proposition that “arbitrators ‘exceed! ] their powers’ when they reach a completely irrational result,” O-S Corp. v. Samuel A. Kroll, Inc., 29 Md.App. 406, 409 , 348 A.2d 870 (1975), cert. denied, 277 Md. 740 (1976), and that an arbitrator’s award may be vacated where it displays “ ‘manifest disregard of the law,’ ” which is “ ‘something beyond and different from a mere error in the law or failure on the part of the arbitrator! ] to understand or apply the law.’ ” Board of Educ. of Prince George’s County v. Prince George’s County Educators’ Ass’n, Inc., 309 Md. 85, 102 , 522 A.2d 931 (1987) (citation omitted). The circuit court concluded that the arbitrator “completely, and rationally, adjudicated all issues presented in the arbitration proceedings.” The court explained: The arbitrator reasoned based on careful analysis of the[ ] land records and weighing of testimony and evidence that the existing Jeep Trails Easement did not extend to Morgan Station Road and did not provide [Sharp] access to Morgan Station Road.

The evidence before the arbitrator included the fact that the existing driveway was not built in accordance with the Modified Permit or the joint application’s proposed driveway. Furthermore, the arbitrator was not obligated to consider the proposed access driveway contained in the joint application because, contrary to [Sharp’s] assertion, the proposals were not incorporated into the Jeep Trails Easement or the Modified Permit.... As such, it was reasonable for the arbitrator to locate the Jeep Trails Easement ... based upon the accepted controlling documents to find that the easement did not provide [Sharp] access to Morgan Station Road. The court also rejected appellant’s assertion that the easement should be “presumed” to be located where Ryan had physically placed his driveway, stating: ¹⁴⁵ [T]he parties’ predecessors-in-interest granted a way with a fixed location found in the Modified Permit.

While an easement was intended, the [Downeys] should not be burdened by the unapproved existing driveway because the parties’ predecessors-in-interest elected not to comply with the recorded Jeep Trails Easement and follow the Modified Permit for the access road. In denying Sharp’s claim that the Downeys should be burdened by the easement because it was readily apparent “on the ground,” the court observed that “whether an unrecorded easement is apparent to a purchaser is a fact determination.” In the court’s view, the arbitrator’s conclusion that no easement supported the existing driveway was “reasonable ... based upon the record ... which includes evidence that [Sharp] purchased his property with knowledge that [the Downeys] had a pending declaratory judgment action against the predecessor-in-title, Jack Ryan, regarding the land.” The court declined to “substitute” its judgment for “the judgment of the arbitrator.” Finally, the court rejected Sharp’s claim “that an implied easement is necessary to keep his land from being landlocked and that such a finding is supported by Maryland law.” The court stated: “An owner may freely cut off access to his land.” For that proposition, it cited Shpak v. Oletsky, 280 Md. 355, 371 , 373 A.2d 1234 (1977). The court explained that, in the arbitrator’s view, “[t]he parties’ predecessors-in-interest created an easement involving the Jeep Trails, but ... did not extend it into [appellant’s] property (Lot 2), the Riverfront Easement, or Morgan Station Road, leaving [appellant] landlocked.” Finding no error in the arbitrator’s determination, the circuit court reasoned: The necessity to access [Sharp’s] property and Morgan Station Road did not exist at the time of severance of title as evidenced by the boundaries of the easement agreements, preventing a finding of an implied easement by necessity. This lack of necessity is also reflected in [appellant’s] purchase of the property at a reduced rate based upon knowledge that [appellees] were challenging the existence of ¹⁴⁶ encumbrances to the land.

It is reasonable to conclude that [Sharp] purchased the land with the understanding that any easements may not be valid or upheld. Accordingly, the court entered its “Order” granting the Downeys’ Petition to Confirm Arbitration Award and denying Sharp’s competing Petition to Vacate Arbitration Award. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION As the circuit court correctly recognized, this case is governed by the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act (the “Act”), codified in Md.Code (2006 Repl.Vol., 2010 Supp.), §§ 3-201 et seq. of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article (“C.J.”).

The Act is an expression of Maryland’s “ ‘strong legislative policy favoring enforcement of arbitration agreements.’ ” Louis Fireison & Assocs., P.A. v. Alkire, 195 Md.App. 461, 471 , 6 A.3d 945 (2010) (quoting All State Home Mortg., Inc. v. Daniel, 187 Md.App. 166, 178 , 977 A.2d 438 , cert. denied, 410 Md. 560 , 979 A.2d 707 (2009)). See also Questar Homes of Avalon, LLC v. Pillar Constr., Inc., 388 Md. 675, 684 , 882 A.2d 288 (2005). 12 ¹⁴⁷ In Mandl v. Bailey, 159 Md.App. 64, 82-83 , 858 A.2d 508 (2004), the Court explained: Arbitration is the process by which parties voluntarily agree to substitute a private tribunal for an otherwise available public tribunal to decide specified disputes. Cheek v. United Healthcare of the Mid-Atlantic, Inc., 378 Md. 139, 146 [ 835 A.2d 656 ] (2003) (citing Gold Coast Mall, Inc. v. Larmar Corp., 298 Md. 96, 103 [ 468 A.2d 91 ] (1983)). Arbitration is encouraged in Maryland because it provides an informal, expeditious, and inexpensive alternative to conventional litigation.

RTKL Assocs., Inc. v. Baltimore Co., 147 Md.App. 647, 656 [ 810 A.2d 512 ] (2002). The obligation to arbitrate is a creature of contract. Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 [ 123 S.Ct. 588 , 154 L.Ed.2d 491 ] (2002); Cheek, supra, 378 Md. at 147 [ 835 A.2d 656 ]; C.W. Jackson & Assocs., Inc. v. Brooks, 289 Md. 658, 666 [ 426 A.2d 378 ] (1981). A party cannot be compelled to submit a dispute to arbitration unless he has agreed to do so.

Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank, F.S.B., 363 Md. 232, 249 [ 768 A.2d 620 ] (2001); Curtis G. Testerman Co. v. Buck, 340 Md. 569, 579 [ 667 A.2d 649 ] (1995).... Also, because private arbitration is a matter of contract, an arbitrator derives his power from the arbitration agreement itself. MCR of Am., Inc. v. Greene, 148 Md.App. 91, 111-12 [ 811 A.2d 331 ] (2002). The parties delineate the extent of the arbitrator’s authority by the scope of their agreement to arbitrate and submission to arbitration.

Id. at 112 [ 811 A.2d 331 ]; Barclay Townhouse Assocs. v. Stephen L. Messersmith, 67 Md.App. 493, 497 [ 508 A.2d 507 ] (1986), [aff'd, 313 Md. 652 , 547 A.2d 1048 (1988) ]. Maryland law does not restrict arbitration to issues of fact. Soc’y of Am. Foresters v. Renewable Natural Res.

Found., 114 Md.App. ¹⁴⁸ 224, 235 [ 689 A.2d 662 ] (1997) (quoting Contract Constr., Inc. v. Power Technology Ctr. Ltd. P’ship, 100 Md.App. 173, 185 [ 640 A.2d 251 ], [cert. denied, 336 Md. 301 , 648 A.2d 203 ] (1994)). Unless the parties agree otherwise, issues of fact and law are submitted to the arbitrator for decision. Soc’y of Am.

Foresters, supra, 114 Md.App. at 235 [ 689 A.2d 662 ]. (Emphasis in original.) Where the parties have agreed to submit a dispute to binding arbitration, the Act gives “the courts jurisdiction to enforce arbitration agreements and enter judgments on arbitration awards.” Questar Homes, 388 Md. at 684 , 882 A.2d 288 . The courts are also empowered to determine whether the parties have a valid agreement to arbitrate. C.J. § 3-207. “If a party to an arbitration agreement” that is covered by the Act “refuses to arbitrate, the other party may file a petition with a court to order arbitration.” Id.

Once an arbitrator has rendered an award, C.J. § 3-227 authorizes either party to file a petition in court to confirm the award. The Act also permits the filing of a petition to vacate an arbitration award “within 30 days after delivery of a copy of the award to the petitioner,” or within 30 days after “corruption, fraud, or other undue means” in procuring the award “become known or should have become known to the petitioner.” C.J. § 3-224(a). 13 “The court shall confirm the award, unless the other party has filed an application to vacate, modify, or correct the award____” C.J. § 3-227(b). 14 ¹⁴⁹ Notably, the Act contemplates an extremely limited role for the courts in reviewing or countermanding an arbitrator’s decision. As we observed in Mandl, 159 Md.App. at 85 , 858 A.2d 508 , “the General Assembly has severely restricted the role the courts play in the arbitration process.” Further, we explained: “To prevent the possibility that a reviewing court will substitute its judgment for the decision of the arbitrator, thereby frustrating the purpose of arbitration, the General Assembly has narrowly confined ... the circumstances in which the court has the power to vacate an arbitral award.” Id. Under the Act, a court may not vacate an award or refuse to confirm an award “on the ground that a court of law or equity could not or would not grant the same relief.” C.J. § 3-224(c).

Rather, C.J. § 3-224(b) enumerates limited circumstances in which a court “shall vacate an award”: (1) An award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means; (2) There was evident partiality by an arbitrator appointed as a neutral, corruption in any arbitrator, or misconduct prejudicing the rights of any party; (3) The arbitrators exceeded their powers; (4) The arbitrators refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause being shown for the postponement, refused to hear evidence material to the controversy, or otherwise so conducted the hearing, contrary to the provisions of [C. J.] § 3-213 ..., as to prejudice substantially the rights of a party; or (5) There was no arbitration agreement as described in [C.J.] § 3-206 ..., the issue was not adversely determined in proceedings under [C.J.] § 3-208 ..., and the party did not participate in the arbitration hearing without raising the objection. When a party to an arbitration proceeding seeks to vacate the arbitrator’s award, no matter how “the mistake is characterized, the burden of showing that an award is invalid rests with the party attacking the award.” Baltimore Teach ¹⁵⁰ ers Union, Am. Fed. of Teachers, Local 340 v. Mayor of Baltimore, 108 Md.App. 167, 181-82 , 671 A.2d 80 (citation omitted), cert. denied, 342 Md. 472 , 677 A.2d 565 (1996). Moreover, “this burden is a heavy one.” Id. “Courts generally refuse to review arbitration awards on the merits, reasoning that the parties are required ‘to submit to the judgment of the tribunal of their own selection and abide by the award.’ ” Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 1619 v. Prince George’s County, 74 Md.App. 438, 444 , 538 A.2d 329 (1988) (quoting Roberts Bros. v. Consumers’ Can Co., 102 Md. 362, 369 , 62 A. 585 (1905)).

In the touchstone case of O-S Corp. v. Samuel A. Kroll, Inc., supra, 29 Md.App. at 407-08 , 348 A.2d 870 , this Court recognized that the Act “restrictively defin[es] the grounds upon which a court might vacate an [arbitration] award, and expressly proscribe^] any possibility of substitution of a reviewing court’s judgment for that of the arbitrators.” Nevertheless, the Court recognized that the text of the Act supported a “very limited extension of the reviewing court’s scope of review to include authority to vacate an award that is ‘completely irrational.’ ” Id. at 409, 348 A.2d 870 . Although the “completely irrational” standard derives originally from common law standards of review of arbitration awards that predate the Act, we gleaned “[statutory support” for its application “in the fact that arbitrators ‘exceeded their powers’ when they reach a completely irrational result, [and] in the connotation of the words ‘undue means’____” Id. (quoting C. J. § 3-224(b)(l) & (3)). Thus, the Kroll Court held that, “when reviewing the fruits of an arbitrator’s award, a judge may withhold only such as were tainted by improbity or based on a completely irrational interpretation of the contract.” 15 Id. at 408-09, 348 A.2d 870 (emphasis in original).

Explaining its holding, the Court stated that courts are empowered by the Act to grant relief “from an arbitration award that was arrived at in good faith ¹⁵¹ but, because of grossly misguided judgment, is shockingly absurd[. |” Id. at 408 , 348 A.2d 870 . Notably, the Court made clear that this restrictive standard of review is distinct from, and sets a bar far higher than, the standards of review applicable to the decisions of trial courts or administrative agencies. It stated: “We must judicially accept an arbitrary interpretation of a contract by an arbitrator. We shall vacate a completely irrational one.” Id. at 410 , 348 A.2d 870 .

Further, the Court said: “[Ojur review ... need not seek a preponderance of the evidence to support the award, nor even substantial evidence. There need only be some evidence to meet the test of rationality, i.e., it may be so little as to make the result ‘arbitrary’, so long as it is not completely irrational.” Id. at 411 , 348 A.2d 870 (emphasis in original). 16 In addition, we have recognized that the Act’s standard for vacatur of an arbitral award where the award was procured by “undue means,” C.J. § 3—224(b)(1), or the “arbitra ¹⁵² tors exceeded their authority,” C.J. § 3-224(b)(3), may encompass reversal of an award that displays “manifest disregard of the law.” See, e.g., Southern Md. Hosp. Ctr. v. Edward M. Crough, Inc., 48 Md.App. 401, 407-08 , 427 A.2d 1051 (reviewing and affirming arbitrator’s award under “manifest disregard of the law” standard and Kroll standard), cert. denied, 290 Md. 721 (1981); see also MCR of America, Inc. v. Greene, 148 Md.App. 91, 120 , 811 A.2d 331 (2002); Birkey Design Group, Inc. v. Egle Nursing Home, Inc., 113 Md.App. 261, 266-67 , 687 A.2d 256 (1997); Graceman v. Goldstein, 93 Md.App. 658, 675-76 , 613 A.2d 1049 (1992), cert. denied, 329 Md. 336 , 619 A.2d 546 (1993). “Manifest disregard of the law” involves “ ‘something beyond and different from a mere error in the law or failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand or apply the law.’” Bd. of Educ. of Prince George’s County v. Prince George’s County Educators’ Ass’n, 309 Md. 85, 102 , 522 A.2d 931 (1987) (citation omitted); see Southern Md. Hosp. Ctr., 48 Md.App. at 407 , 427 A.2d 1051 .

The concept of “manifest disregard of the law” connotes “a ‘palpable mistake of law or fact ... apparent on the face of the award’ or a ‘mistake so gross as to work manifest injustice’.... ” Baltimore Teachers Union, 108 Md.App. at 181 , 671 A.2d 80 (alteration in original; citation omitted). Put another way, it occurs “ “when arbitrators understand and correctly state the law, but proceed to disregard the same.’ ” MCR, 148 Md.App. at 120 , 811 A.2d 331 (citation omitted). As with the “completely irrational” standard, review for “manifest disregard of the law” is strictly circumscribed. “Judicial deference is appropriate unless the arbitrator’s award actually violated the law or any explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy.” Birkey Design Group, 113 Md.App. at 267 , 687 A.2d 256 . See MCR, 148 Md.App. at 120 , 811 A.2d 331 ; Graceman, 93 Md.App. at 676 , 613 A.2d 1049 .

To constitute “manifest disregard of the law,” an arbitrator’s decision must violate a public policy ascertainable “ ‘by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from ¹⁵³ general considerations of supposed public interests.’ ” Amalgamated Transit Union, Div. 1300 v. Mass Transit Admin., 305 Md. 380, 389 , 504 A.2d 1132 (1986) (citations omitted). See also Baltimore County v. Mayor of Baltimore, 329 Md. 692, 702 , 621 A.2d 864 (1993); Int’l Ass’n of Firefighters, Local 1619, 74 Md.App. at 449-50 , 538 A.2d 329 . The Court of Appeals has not expressly adopted review for “manifest disregard of the law” in cases arising under the Act. But, in Prince George’s County Educators’ Ass’n, 309 Md. at 98 , 522 A.2d 931 , the Court reviewed an arbitrator’s award in a case for which the Act did not apply, and utilized the “manifest disregard of the law” standard as a matter of common law.

The Court said: “Since ... the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act is not applicable to the instant arbitration award, we need not and do not decide whether an arbitration award subject to the Uniform Act may be vacated ... for ‘manifest disregard’ of the law.” Id. at 105 , 522 A.2d 931 . Nevertheless, the Court stated that “an arbitration award which is contrary to a clear public policy will not be enforced.” Id. at 100, 522 A.2d 931 . It also cited cases from other states applying the “manifest disregard” standard in matters arising under their versions of the UAA, and federal cases applying the standard in review of arbitration awards under the FAA. Id. at 102-05, 522 A.2d 931 .

The “manifest disregard” standard derives from Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 , 74 S.Ct. 182 , 98 L.Ed. 168 (1953), a case arising under the FAA. There, the Supreme Court said that “the interpretations of the law by the arbitrators^] in contrast to manifest disregard [of the law,] are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.” 17 See also First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 942 , 115 S.Ct. 1920 , 131 L.Ed.2d 985 (1995). However, a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Hall ¹⁵⁴ Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576 , 128 S.Ct. 1396 , 170 L.Ed.2d 254 (2008), has cast doubt on the viability of “manifest disregard of the law” as a ground for vacatur of an arbitral award under the FAA. Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 579 , 128 S.Ct. 1396 , began as a lease dispute between Hall Street, the landlord, and Mattel, the tenant.

The parties agreed to arbitrate their dispute, and drafted an arbitration agreement that provided, in part, that a court “ ‘shall vacate, modify or correct any award ... where the arbitrator’s conclusions of law are erroneous.’ ” Id. (quoting agreement). An arbitration award was made in favor of Mattel, but Hall Street successfully urged the federal district court to vacate the award for “legal error.” Id. at 580 , 128 S.Ct. 1396 . After the Ninth Circuit reversed, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the FAA’s statutory grounds for vacatur “may be supplemented by contract.” Id. at 578 , 128 S.Ct. 1396 .

It recognized a split in the appellate courts “over the exclusiveness of [the FAA’s] statutory grounds ... with some saying the recitations are exclusive, and others regarding them as mere threshold provisions open to expansion by agreement.” Id. at 583 , 128 S.Ct. 1396 . The Supreme Court expressly held “that the statutory grounds are exclusive.” Id. at 578 , 128 S.Ct. 1396 . In particular, the landlord unsuccessfully argued “that the grounds set out for vacating or modifying an award are not exclusive, taking the position ... that expandable judicial review authority has been accepted as the law since Wilko ....” Id. at 584, 128 S.Ct. 1396 . As the Supreme Court explained, “Hall Street reads [Wilko ] as recognizing ‘manifest disregard of the law’ as a further ground for vacatur on top of those listed in § 10 [of the FAA], and some Circuits have read it the same way.

Hall Street sees this supposed addition to § 10 as the camel’s nose: if judges can add grounds to vacate (or modify), so can contracting parties.” Id. at 584-85, 128 S.Ct. 1396 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court rejected this view, however. “Quite apart from its leap from a supposed judicial expansion by interpretation to a private expansion by contract,” said the Court, “Hall Street overlooks the ¹⁵⁵ fact that the statement [from Wilko ] it relies on expressly rejects just what Hall Street asks for here, general review for an arbitrator’s legal errors.” Id. at 585, 128 S.Ct. 1396 . The Supreme Court opined that, even if the parties agree otherwise, “the text [of the FAAJ compels a reading of the [statutory] categories as exclusive.” Id. at 586 , 128 S.Ct. 1396 . In its view, the FAA “carries no hint of flexibility” as to expansion of the grounds for vacatur.

Id. at 587 , 128 S.Ct. 1396 . The Court reasoned, id. at 585 , 128 S.Ct. 1396 (citations omitted): Maybe the term “manifest disregard” was meant to name a new ground for review, but maybe it merely referred to the § 10 grounds collectively, rather than adding to them. Or, as some courts have thought, “manifest disregard” may have been shorthand for ... the paragraphs authorizing vacatur when the arbitrators were “guilty of misconduct” or “exceeded their powers.” We, when speaking as a Court, have merely taken the Wilko language as we found it, without embellishment, and now that its meaning is implicated, we see no reason to accord it the significance that Hall Street urges. In the wake of Hall Street, a lively debate has ensued in the federal circuit courts of appeal over the continued vitality of the “manifest disregard of the law” standard.

Some circuits have taken the view that because Hall Street holds that the FAA’s statutory grounds are “exclusive,” it follows that “manifest disregard” is no longer viable. See Citigroup Global Markets Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349 , 350 & 355-58 (5th Cir.2009) (“Manifest disregard of the law is no longer an independent ground for vacating arbitration awards under the FAA.”); Medicine Shoppe Int’l, Inc. v. Turner Investments, Inc., 614 F.3d 485, 489 (8th Cir.2010) (citing Hall Street for the proposition that a “claim that the arbitrator disregarded the law” is “not cognizable”); Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., LLC, 604 F.3d 1313, 1322-24 (11th Cir.2010) (stating that prior circuit precedent had recognized “manifest disregard” as a “non-statutory ground! ] for vacatur,” but holding that “our judicially-created bases for vacatur are no longer valid in light ¹⁵⁶ of Hall Street Ramos-Santiago v. United Parcel Serv., 524 F.3d 120 , 124 n. 3 (1st Cir.2008) (opining, in a non-FAA case, that Hall Street’s “holding” is that “manifest disregard of the law is not a valid ground for vacating or modifying an arbitral award in cases brought under the ... FAA”). But see Kashner Davidson Sec. Corp. v. Mscisz, 601 F.3d 19, 22-23 (1st Cir.2010) (declining to recall mandate in case holding arbitrator manifestly disregarded the law, describing Ramos-Santiago’s discussion as “dicta,” and stating that First Circuit has “not squarely determined whether our manifest disregard case law can be reconciled with Hall Street ”).

Yet, other circuits have looked to Hall Street’s description of “manifest disregard” as referring to the FAA statutory grounds “collectively,” or as “shorthand” for particular statutory grounds, expressing the opinion that review for “manifest disregard” remains sound. See Stolt-Nielsen SA v. Animal-Feeds Int’l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 93-95 (2d Cir.2008), rev’d on other grounds, 559 U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 1758 , 176 L.Ed.2d 605 (2010); Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv West Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277 , 1281 & 1289-90 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 558 U.S. -, 130 S.Ct. 145 , 175 L.Ed.2d 36 (2009). 18 Still others have recognized the open question, without resolving it. See, e.g., MCI Constructors, LLC v. City of Greensboro, 610 F.3d 849 , 857 & n. 5 (4th Cir.2010) (declining to decide whether “mani ¹⁵⁷ fest disregard” survives Hall Street, where arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law). 19 Of import here, the Supreme Court recently reviewed the Second Circuit’s decision in Stolt-Nielsen, supra, 548 F.3d 85 . The Supreme Court assumed that the “manifest disregard” standard applied and declined to resolve the controversy.

It said: “We do not decide whether ‘manifest disregard’ survives our decision in Hall Street ... as an independent ground for review or as a judicial gloss on the enumerated grounds for vacatur set forth at 9 U.S.C. § 10 ____Assuming, arguendo, that such a standard applies, we find it satisfied.... ” Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. -, - n. 3, 130 S.Ct. 1758 , 1768 n. 3, 176 L.Ed.2d 605 (2010). In its view, the arbitration panel improperly “imposed its own policy choice and thus exceeded its powers.” Id. at -, 130 S.Ct. at 1770 . We recognize that the issue remains unsettled. But, for several reasons, we decline to reconsider whether “manifest disregard of the law” remains a viable basis to vacate an arbitral award under the Maryland Act.

First, neither Hall Street nor Stolt-Nielsen squarely states that “manifest disregard” is no longer viable. Moreover, the case sub judice arises under the Maryland Act, not the FAA; regardless of Hall Street’s import for review of arbitral awards under the FAA, it has only persuasive value in interpreting Maryland’s Act. In addition, this Court’s case law on “manifest disregard” has never been overruled by the Court of Appeals. Therefore, the well settled principles of stare decisis apply here. 20 ¹⁵⁸ It is also salient that our earlier decisions align with those of several federal courts, see Stolt-Nielsen, supra, 548 F.3d 85 ; Comedy Club, supra, 553 F.3d 1277 , which, after Hall Street, viewed “manifest disregard” as a “shorthand” or “collective” expression for enumerated statutory grounds for vacatur (specifically, C.J. § 3—224(b)(1) and (3) in the Maryland Act).

See, e.g., Southern Md. Hosp. Ctr., 48 Md.App. at 407-08 , 427 A.2d 1051 . 21 In explaining its holding that “manifest disregard” survives Hall Street, the Second Circuit said in Stolt-Nielsen that, where the arbitrator has “ ‘willfully flouted the governing law by refusing to apply it,’ ” the arbitrator has “ ‘failed to interpret the contract at all,’ for parties do not agree in advance to submit to arbitration that is carried out in manifest disregard of the law.” Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 95 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). We find this reasoning instructive. ¹⁵⁹ The Act’s grounds to vacate arbitral awards are all directed at preserving the integrity of the arbitration process. Arbitration is fundamentally a creature of contract, Gold Coast Mall, 298 Md. at 103 , 468 A.2d 91 , by which the parties relinquish their right to a judicial dispute resolution forum (containing a variety of procedural benefits, including comprehensive appellate review), in favor of “an expeditious and more affordable resolution of the controversy,” including a choice of decision maker.

Schuele v. Case Handyman & Remodeling Servs., LLC, 412 Md. 555, 575 , 989 A.2d 210 (2010). However, while parties to arbitration agree to accept the arbitrator’s interpretation of the law, Soc’y of Am. Foresters, supra, 114 Md.App. at 235-36 , 689 A.2d 662 , this does not mean that they agree to permit the arbitrator to fabricate the law from whole cloth. If agreeing to arbitrate meant relinquishing any expectation that the arbitrator will apply fundamental substantive legal principles, no rational party would ever agree to submit a dispute to arbitration.

Thus, limited judicial review for manifest disregard of the law reinforces the process of arbitration by protecting the parties’ ex ante expectation of an alternative but principled dispute resolution mechanism. Finally, the parties have not asked us to reconsider the standard. To the contrary, they agree that an arbitrator’s award may be vacated for manifest disregard of the law. Therefore, while recognizing that the statutory grounds are the sole grounds for vacatur of arbitral awards, we see no inconsistency in applying the “manifest disregard” standard.

Although the parties agree as to the standards of review that we have elucidated, they disagree as to the result we should reach in applying these standards. Because the parties’ contentions implicate the law of easements, we pause to review applicable easement law. The basic legal principles governing easements are well established. “‘An easement is broadly defined as a nonpossessory interest in the real property of another....’” Rogers v. P-M Hunter’s Ridge, LLC, 407 Md. 712, 729 , 967 A.2d 807 (2009) (quoting Boucher v. Boyer, 301 Md. 679, 688 , ¹⁶⁰ 484 A.2d 630 (1984)). An easement involves “ ‘the privilege of doing a certain class of act on, or to the detriment, of another’s land, or a right against another that he refrain from doing a certain class of act on or in connection with his own land....’” Rau v. Collins, 167 Md.App. 176, 185 , 891 A.2d 1175 (2006) (citation omitted).

Generally, “the terms ‘easement’ and ‘right-of-way’ are regarded as synonymous.” Miller v. Kirkpatrick, 377 Md. 335, 349 , 833 A.2d 536 ( 2003). As the Court of Appeals has explained, “ ‘[i]n every instance of a private easement—that is, an easement not enjoyed by the public—there exists the characteristic feature of two distinct tenements—one dominant and the other servient..’ ” Bd. of County Comm’rs of Garrett County v. Bell Atlantic-Md., Inc., 346 Md. 160, 175 , 695 A.2d 171 (1997) (citation omitted). An easement can be described as a right of the owner of the dominant estate—often, a right of way—over the real property that comprises the servient estate. In other words: “A dominant tenant is the owner of ‘[a]n estate that benefits from an easement’; a servient tenant is the owner of ‘[a]n estate burdened by an easement.’ ” Rogers, 407 Md. at 715 n. 1, 967 A.2d 807 (quoting Blacks Law Dictionary 589 (8th ed.2004); alterations in Rogers).

Of import here, there are several ways to create an easement. “An easement may be created by express grant, by reservation in a conveyance of land, or by implication.” Kobrine, L.L.C. v. Metzger, 380 Md. 620, 635 , 846 A.2d 403 (2004). An express easement, whether by grant or reservation, must be created by a written memorandum that satisfies the Statute of Frauds; and “a right[ ] of way created by deed” must satisfy “ ‘the mode and manner prescribed by the recording statutes.’ ” Id. at 636 , 846 A.2d 403 (citations omitted). In Rogers, 407 Md. at 729-30 , 967 A.2d 807 , the Court explained: “An express easement by reservation often arises when a property owner conveys a portion of his property to another, which would otherwise render the retained part inaccessible, so the reservation permits a right-of-way.” In contrast, an easement by implication “ ‘may be created in a ¹⁶¹ variety of ways, such as by prescription, necessity, the filing of plats, estoppel and implied grant or reservation where a quasi-easement has existed while the two tracts are one.’ ” Id. at 730 , 967 A.2d 807 (quoting Boucher, 301 Md. at 688 , 484 A.2d 630 ). This case involves principles regarding both express easements and a particular category of implied easement: an implied easement by necessity.