Sharp v. State

WATTS, J. This case concerns the worrisome issue of whether, in imposing a sentence, a trial court impermissibly considered the defendant’s election not to plead guilty, and, more specifically, whether the trial court impermissibly considered that the defendant declined the “court’s offer” of a plea agreement. We decide: (I) whether, here, the defendant preserved for appellate review the issue of whether the trial court impermissibly considered during sentencing the defendant’s decision not to plead guilty; and, if so, (II) whether, here, the record supports the inference that the trial court might have been motivated during sentencing by the impermissible consideration of the defendant’s decision not to plead guilty. We hold that, here: (I) the defendant preserved for appellate review the issue of whether the trial court impermissibly considered during sentencing the defendant’s decision not to plead guilty; and (II) the record does not support the inference that the trial court might have been motivated during sentencing by the impermissible consideration of the defendant’s decision not to plead guilty. BACKGROUND In the Circuit Court for Baltimore County (“the circuit court”), the State, Respondent, charged Justin Sharp (“Sharp”), Petitioner, with attempted first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree assault, and openly wearing and carrying a dangerous weapon with the intent to injure.

These ⁶⁷³ charges arose out of a St. Patrick’s Day party during which Sharp allegedly severely beat a young man. Plea Offers On April 30, 2014, the scheduled trial date, the parties appeared before the circuit court; 1 Sharp was represented by counsel. At that time, the circuit court advised Sharp of the possible sentences that he would face if convicted and that it had offered a “counter-proposal” to the State’s plea offer. The circuit court advised Sharp as follows: [C]ount [0]ne of [the] indictment charges you with attempted first[-]degree [premeditated] murder[.

T]hat carries a prison term of up to life [ ] imprisonment. Count [T]wo of the indictment charges you with fírst[-]degree assault.... [T]hat carries up to twenty-five years [of] imprisonment. Count [T]hree is [openly] carrying a [dangerous] weapon with [the] intent to injure[. T]hat’s three years [of imprisonment.] The following exchange regarding plea offers occurred: [CIRCUIT COURT]: [Prosecutor], why don’t you place on the record what your offer is[.

T]he Court will then place on the record what it[ ]s offer is. [PROSECUTOR]: Your Honor, the State had agreed to offer [C]ount [T]wo, which charges [Sharp] with first[-]degree assault. Upon a finding of guilt, the State would recommend a sentence of twenty-five years [of imprisonment], suspend all but ten [years] to serve. It’s my understanding that [Sharp] does not wish to take advantage of that offer. [CIRCUIT COURT]: All right[,] and the Court has offered a counter-proposal of twenty years [of imprisonment], suspending all but the first eight years[. A]nd[, Sharp’s counsel], you’ve had a chance to discuss ... those offers with [Sharp]? ⁶⁷⁴ [SHARP’S COUNSEL]: Yes, I have, Your Honor. [CIRCUIT COURT]: And what is his election! ]? [SHARP’S COUNSEL]: He respectfully wishes to proceed to a trial. [CIRCUIT COURT]: All right[,] and do you understand the offer, sir? [ ] SHARP: Yes, sir. [CIRCUIT COURT]: All right.

It is your desire to plead not guilty[.] On May 1, 2014, a jury trial began. On that day, before the jury panel arrived at the courtroom, the following exchange occurred, during which the circuit court re-extended the “court’s offer”: [CIRCUIT COURT]: I’m just going to reiterate the Court’s offer to [] Sharp. The State is offering you, sir, if you wanted to plead guilty ... to the second count, [which] is first[-]degree assault, which has a maximum penalty of up to twenty-five years [of imprisonment], the Court is offering you a twenty[-]year sentence, suspending all but the first eight [years] as a cap. You and your attorney would be free to argue for anything that you feel is more appropriate than that.

If you wanted a pre-sentence investigation or any other delayed disposition, I would afford you that. But I would guarantee you that I would not give you anything more than eight years of incarceration. Your attorney would be free to argue for anything less. Does [Sharp] understand that offer from the Court[ ]? [SHARP’S COUNSEL]: Well, Your Honor, I apologize to Your Honor.

I thought it was twenty [years of imprisonment], suspend all but eight [years]. I didn’t realize that was the cap, so I did not explain that to [ ] Sharp. [CIRCUIT COURT]: Okay. Well, why don’t you go ahead and do that. [SHARP’S COUNSEL]: Okay. After a pause in the proceedings, the following exchange occurred: [SHARP’S COUNSEL]: All right.

Your Honor, I’ve had the opportunity to explain that to [ ] Sharp and he, with all ⁶⁷⁵ due respect to Your Honor, he’d rather go forward by way of a trial. [CIRCUIT COURT]: Okay. The Court withdraws its offer. Trial Testimony At trial, as a witness for the State, Kristopher Summers (“Summers”) testified as follows. On March 17, 2013, Summers and his roommate, Brian Mast (“Mast”), hosted a St. Patrick’s Day party, which Sharp and a Raymond Evianiak (“Evianiak”) attended.

Evianiak, who was “[b]elligerent and drunk[,]” insulted Sharp, who said that he wanted to kill Evianiak. Sharp punched Evianiak in the face “a couple [of] times[.]” Evianiak did not do anything to defend himself, and passed out on the couch in the living room. Summers went to bed. The next morning, Summers awoke and saw Evianiak, who had a bloody nose.

A jacket that Sharp had been wearing was “blood covered” and on the floor, and there was also broken glass on the floor. As a witness for the State, Mast testified as follows. On the night of March 17, 2013 and the early morning of March 18, 2013, Mast, Summers, Evianiak, and Sharp were drinking at Summers’s house. At 1:00 a.m., Evianiak and Sharp got into an oral altercation, and Mast went to bed.

At 4:00 a.m., Mast was awakened by the sounds of screaming and bottles being broken. Mast entered the living room, saw broken glass “all over the floor[,]” and saw blood on the walls, floor, and furniture. Sharp was on top of Evianiak, who was on the floor bleeding. Mast saw Sharp hit Evianiak with a bottle.

As a witness for the State, Evianiak testified as follows. On the night of March 17, 2013 and the early morning of March 18, 2013, Evianiak, Sharp, Summers, and Mast were drinking at Summers’s house. Evianiak had between four and six drinks of whiskey and became “very, very intoxicated.” Evianiak also smoked two blunts’ worth of marijuana and took KlonoPIN pills. 2 At some point, Evianiak was “badly” beaten. ⁶⁷⁶ Evianiak saw Sharp while he was being beaten, and did not remember anyone else beating him. To the best of Evianiak’s memory, he did not try to attack Sharp or otherwise make any aggressive moves toward Sharp.

Evianiak passed out and woke up on a couch “covered in blood” and with “rips” on his face and forehead. Evianiak “woke up thinking ... ‘[D]id I just fight [ ] Sharp last night?’ ” Evianiak had briefly dated the mother of Sharp’s child, and did not have any problems with anyone else who was at Summers’s house. Evianiak called his father, who took him to MedStar Franklin Square Medical Center. Evianiak stayed at that hospital for approximately one week, after which time he was taken to the University of Maryland Medical Center.

Evianiak received stitches and had his jaw wired shut for a month and a half. At the time of trial, Evianiak had scars on his face. As a witness for the State, Jennifer Evianiak (“Jennifer”), Evianiak’s sister, testified as follows. Sometime after March 17, 2013, Jennifer saw Evianiak at MedStar Franklin Square Medical Center.

Jennifer did not recognize Evianiak because “all of his facial features were so covered in blood[.]” Evianiak had multiple gashes on the left side of his face, a large gash under his eye, a large gash on his forehead, and cuts and bruises on his elbow, wrist, and hand. During Jennifer’s testimony, the State offered, and the circuit court admitted into evidence, twelve photographs of Evianiak’s injuries. As an expert witness for the State in the field of DNA analysis, Laura Pawloski (“Pawloski”), a forensic biologist, testified as follows. DNA from blood on the living room ceiling in Summers’s house matched Evianiak’s DNA.

DNA from blood on the hallway ceiling, a bedroom doorway, and a bedroom doorway lock face in Summers’s house matched Sharp’s DNA. The prosecutor played recordings of telephonic conversations between Sharp and his mother that occurred while Sharp ⁶⁷⁷ was incarcerated. During one such conversation, Sharp said that the police report stated that he “and somebody else were beating” Evianiak; Sharp’s mother asked who “the other person” was; and Sharp replied: “There is no other person.” During another conversation, Sharp told his mother: “St. Patrick’s Day[,] I was with you all night in the house, I was downstairs playing X[b]ox, all right?” On his own behalf, Sharp testified as follows. On the night of March 17, 2013, Sharp went to Summers’s house, where he smoked marijuana, took four or five KlonoPIN pills, and drank three or four shots of alcoholic drinks.

At some point, Evianiak, who was drunk, “lunge[d] toward[ ]” Sharp. Evianiak and Sharp “g[o]t to wrestling” and fell onto a coffee table, knocking glasses onto the floor and causing glass to get “everywhere[J” Summers entered the room and smashed a glass bottle on Evianiak’s head. The broken bottle cut Evianiak, Summers, and Sharp’s hand, which squirted blood onto the walls and ceiling. State’s Closing Argument, Verdict, and Sentencing Proceeding During the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor said that Sharp had committed a “horrific assault” against Evianiak, who suffered multiple facial[ ] broken bones.

He suffered a puncture wound to the top of his head. He suffered a giant slice to his head.... [T]he disfigurement ... [is] the scars that you saw still present on [ ] Evianiak’s face even to this day. So he’s got a reminder every day when he looks in the mirror about what [Sharp] did to him on St. Patrick’s Day of last year. Before the jury reached a verdict, the State nolle prossed the charge for attempted first-degree premeditated murder. 3 ⁶⁷⁸ The jury convicted Sharp of first-degree assault, second-degree assault, and openly wearing and carrying a dangerous weapon with the intent to injure.

On July 9, 2015, at the sentencing proceeding, the prosecutor made the following remarks in recommending a sentence: Your Honor, as was outlined in the pre-sentence investigation, this was far from [Sharpj’s first contact with the system.... Because of his moderate prior record, which includes things such as [controlled dangerous substance] distribution and burglary, Your Honor, his guidelines[ 4 ] are seven to thirteen years [of imprisonment] on the first[-]degree assault. That is giving him the benefit of the doubt as to [] Evianiak’s injuries. [] Evianiak’s injuries, both the [pre-sentence investigation] and I, indicated those injuries to be non-permanent. Frankly, I think [that Evianiak]’s going to be living with the remnants of this for the rest of his life.

He’s had numerous surgeries. I gave [Sharp] the benefit of the doubt with the seven to thirteen [years of imprisonment under the] guidelines. But[,] as Your Honor will remember from hearing the testimony in this case[,] and, more importantly, from seeing these pictures, the violence in this case is absolutely shocking. This, I would argue, is not a guidelines case.

That was reflected in the State’s [plea] offer prior to trial, which was twenty[-five 5 years of imprisonment], suspend all but ten [years,] and Your Honor had offered prior to trial twenty [years of imprisonment], suspend all but a cap of eight [years]. Your Honor, based on, and, frankly, I’ve been doing this job for a long time now, I’m chief of violent crimes, and these pictures shocked me. Just, he looks, [ ] Evianiak looked dead. I recognize that everybody at that party was incredibly ⁶⁷⁹ intoxicated.

I understand that. But the evidence was also that [ ] Evianiak was passed out. He was defenseless[,] and instead, we have blood spatter of both [Sharp] from his cut hand after swinging that bottle at [] Evianiak and [] Evianiak’s blood on the ceiling of the location. That is, it’s rare to see in a murder of violence to that level.

Your Honor, given the violent nature of this crime as well as his prior record, Your Honor, the State is asking for substantial incarceration above the guidelines. Afterward, the following exchange regarding sentencing between the circuit court and Sharp’s counsel occurred: [SHARP’S COUNSEL]: ... I’m going to ask Your Honor to consider not incarcerating [] Sharp outside the guidelines^] and, in fact, Your Honor offered, if [ ] Sharp wanted to take a plea, to sentence him to twenty years [of imprisonment], suspend all but a cap of eight [years]. [CIRCUIT COURT]: Umhm. [SHARP’S COUNSEL]: So that Your Honor would have heard the same facts from the State in that plea. You would have heard about the injuries, you would have theoretically seen [] Evianiak, you would, I mean, nothing is anything different because we went to trial, other than [ ] Sharp wanted the opportunity to speak and to defend himself in what he believed was a situation that was more than just himself and mutual as well.

So— [CIRCUIT COURT]: So you don’t believe that putting [the] State’s witnesses, the victim through, reliving that and testifying in Court is no different than if he would have admitted what he did and pled guilty in front of me? You’re saying that that, that’s all the same? [SHARP’S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I’m not saying, I’m not saying [that] it’s no different,] but I also don’t— [CIRCUIT COURT]: That’s what you, you just, you just said [that] there’s no difference. [SHARP’S COUNSEL]: No, I don’t believe in punishing someone for wanting to go to trial. So,— [CIRCUIT COURT]: Well, but the whole idea of an offer of a plea is to give something in exchange for sparing the State ⁶⁸⁰ and the witnesses and the victims the trauma, the risk of a trial. I mean, that’s— [SHARP’S COUNSEL]: Right. [CIRCUIT COURT]: Would, would you agree? [SHARP’S COUNSEL]: I would agree— [CIRCUIT COURT]: That there’s a give and take when it comes to a plea negotiation. [SHARP’S COUNSEL]: I would[.] Later during the sentencing proceeding, the circuit court announced, and explained the reasons for, the sentence that it imposed as follows: The guidelines call for a sentence between seven years and thirteen years [of imprisonment].

I am going to exceed the guidelines in this case. I find this attack to be one of the most brutal and heinous that I have seen in almost thirty years [in the] practice of law. It is amazing that [Evianiak] was able to live after having been [so] brutally attacked. I, I’ve heard it described in his allocution[,] as well as some others[,] that this was a fight.

This was not a fight. This was a massacre. This was a victim who was unconscious when he was attacked by [Sharp], who consistently beat [Evianiak] about his face with bottles, fracturing his eye socket, leaving him, well, it’s, in this Court’s eyes, it’s amazing that he survived this attack. I have never seen photographs of injuries that I’ve seen in this case.

I do not find anything in the pre-sentence report or his allocution or mitigation [that] would persuade me that [Sharp] has any redeeming qualities whatsoever. I find it repulsive that he’s saying that others are victims in this matter. There’s one victim, [ ] Evianiak. These tangential issues about [Sharp’s] child, his mother,[ 6 ] where were those concerns when he was doing what he did?

He wasn’t concerned about them there. He is being sentenced for what he did, not for the impact ⁶⁸¹ that it has on his mother or the impact that it has on his child. The sentence of the Court for first[-]degree assault is twenty-five years to the Division of Corrections.[ 7 ] The sentence [for openly wearing and carrying a dangerous] weapon [with the intent to injure] is three years to the Division of Corrections, that sentence will be concurrent to the twenty-five years that has been imposed for the first[-]degree assault. He does have credit for the time [that] he has served.

Procedural History in the Appellate Courts On July 16, 2014, Sharp noted an appeal. In the Court of Special Appeals, Sharp contended that the circuit court erred in impermissibly considering during sentencing his decision not to plead guilty. In an unreported opinion dated June 29, 2015, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgments of conviction. That Court reasoned that Sharp failed to preserve for appellate review the issue of whether the circuit court impermissibly considered during sentencing his decision not to plead guilty, as, according to the Court of Special Appeals, Sharp’s counsel did not object during the exchange with the circuit court, and Sharp’s counsel appeared to agree with the circuit court at the end of the exchange, and thus acquiesced to the circuit court’s ruling.

Alternatively, as to the merits, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that the circuit court did not err at the sentencing proceeding, as the exchange between Sharp’s counsel and the circuit court did not indicate that that the circuit court was influenced in any way during sentencing by the fact that Sharp had declined to plead guilty. On August 10, 2015, Sharp petitioned for a writ of certiorari. On October 16, 2015, this Court granted the petition. See Sharp v. State, 445 Md. 19 , 123 A.3d 1005 (2015). 8 ⁶⁸² DISCUSSION I. Sharp contends that he preserved for appellate review the issue of whether the circuit court impermissibly considered during sentencing his decision not to plead guilty because, during the sentencing proceeding, his counsel stated: “I don’t believe in punishing someone for wanting to go to trial.” Sharp acknowledges that his counsel later said “I would agree” in response to the circuit court’s statement that “the whole idea of an offer of a plea is to give something in exchange for sparing the State and the witnesses and the victims the trauma, the risk of a trial[,]” but Sharp argues that his counsel did not agree that it was acceptable to punish him for deciding to go to trial, or in any way forfeit his objection to the circuit court’s earlier statements.

The State responds that Sharp failed to preserve the issue for appellate review because Sharp’s counsel’s statement — “I don’t believe in punishing someone for wanting to go to trial” — was an “observation about sentencing considerations” instead of an objection to the circuit court’s alleged impermissible consideration of Sharp’s election to decline the circuit court’s plea offer. Alternatively, the State contends that, even if Sharp’s counsel’s statement constituted an objection, Sharp forfeited appellate review of the issue because, afterward, Sharp’s counsel agreed with the circuit court’s assertion that declining to impose a reduced sentence that was part of a plea offer is not the same as punishing a defendant for declining a plea offer. “Ordinarily, the appellate court will not decide any [non-jurisdictional] issue unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court[.]” Md. R. 8-131(a). In a criminal case, “[f]or purposes of review by the trial court or on appeal of any [ ] ruling or order [other than the admission of evidence], it is sufficient that a party, at the time the ruling or order is made or sought, makes known to the [trial] court ... the objection to the action of the [trial] court.” Md. R. 4-323(c). ⁶⁸³ Under Maryland Rule 8-131(a), a defendant must object to preserve for appellate review an issue as to a trial court’s impermissible considerations during a sentencing proceeding. See Abdul-Maleek v. State, 426 Md. 59, 69 , 43 A.3d 383, 389 (2012) (“[T]here is no good reason why either the circumstances presented here should be exempt from the preservation requirement or the trial court should not have been given the opportunity to address at the time the concern that [the defendant] now raises.”). 9 Accordingly, in Abdul-Maleek, 426 Md. at 69, 68 , 43 A.3d at 389, 388 , this Court held that, by failing to object, a defendant failed to preserve for appellate review an issue as to a trial court’s impermissible considerations during a sentencing proceeding. 10 Here, we agree with Sharp that the issue of whether the circuit court impermissibly considered during sentencing his decision not to plead guilty is preserved for appellate review.

Sharp’s counsel asked the circuit court to impose the sentence that was part of the circuit court’s plea offer. Sharp’s counsel stated: “[N]othing is anything different because we went to trial[.]” Soon afterward, the circuit court stated: “So you don’t believe that putting [the] State’s witnesses, the victim through, reliving that and testifying in Court is no different than if he would have admitted what he did and pled guilty in front of me?” Soon after that, Sharp’s counsel stated: “I don’t believe in punishing someone for wanting to go to trial.” Sharp’s counsel’s statement was sufficient to “make[ ] known to the [circuit] court[,]” Md. R. 4-323(c), that Sharp took issue with what his counsel characterized as the circuit court’s ⁶⁸⁴ “punishing [Sharp] for wanting to go to trial.” In other words, Sharp’s counsel’s statement made known his objection to the circuit court’s allegedly penalizing Sharp by impermissibly considering during sentencing that Sharp declined the State’s and the circuit court’s plea offers. We are not persuaded by the State’s contention that Sharp forfeited appellate review of the issue by saying “I would agree” in response to the circuit court’s statement that “the whole idea of an offer of a plea is to give something in exchange for sparing the State and the witnesses and the victims the trauma, the risk of a trial.” In agreeing with the circuit court’s statement, Sharp’s counsel did not retreat from the position that he had taken earlier — namely, the position that the circuit court should not penalize Sharp for having elected to go to trial. Sharp’s counsel’s agreement with the circuit court was nothing more than an acknowledgement of the well-known principle that one of the reasons that the State may offer — and, upon the defendant’s agreement, the trial court may accept — a plea agreement is to save the victim and other witnesses the experience of testifying and being cross-examined at trial.

Having concluded that Sharp preserved for appellate review the issue of whether the circuit court impermissibly considered during sentencing his decision not to plead guilty, we proceed to address the merits.

II

Sharp contends that the circuit court erred in impermissibly considering during sentencing his decision not to plead guilty. In support of his assertion that the circuit court impermissibly considered during sentencing his decision not to plead guilty, Sharp relies on the circumstance that the circuit court stated to Sharp’s counsel, among other things: “you don’t believe that putting [the] State’s witnesses, the victim through, reliving that and testifying in Court is no different than if he would have admitted what he did and pled guilty in front of me?”; and “the whole idea of an offer of a plea is to give something ⁶⁸⁵ in exchange for sparing the State and the witnesses and the victims the trauma, the risk of a trial.” At oral argument, Sharp’s counsel suggested that the circuit court sentenced Sharp more harshly because Sharp declined the circuit court’s plea offer. Specifically, Sharp’s counsel argued that “the last [plea offer] to be rejected was the one offered by the [circuit court], wh[ich] is now sentencing [ ] Sharp, and is now making these comments at sentencing.” Sharp’s appellate counsel observed that, at sentencing, Sharp’s trial counsel wanted to remind the circuit court that it had offered a “cap” of eight years of imprisonment. In its brief, the State responds that the record does not support the inference that the circuit court impermissibly considered during sentencing Sharp’s decision not to plead guilty.

The State points out that the circuit court’s remarks on which Sharp relies were made in response to Sharp’s counsel’s request that the circuit court impose the sentence that was part of the circuit court’s plea offer. The State argues that, in making the statements on which Sharp relies, the circuit court did not indicate that it would “punish.” Sharp for not pleading guilty; instead, the circuit court simply explained “that there [i]s a difference between punishing someone for demanding a trial and not imposing the same lenient sentence” that was part of a plea offer. A trial court “may exercise wide discretion in fashioning a defendant’s sentence.” McGlone v. State, 406 Md. 545, 557 , 959 A.2d 1191, 1197 (2008) (citation omitted). Thus, generally, this Court reviews for abuse of discretion a trial court’s decision as to a defendant’s sentence.

See State v. Wilkins, 393 Md. 269, 279-80 , 900 A.2d 765, 771-72 (2006) (This Court listed cases in which this Court reviewed for abuse of discretion trial courts’ decisions as to defendants’ sentences.). There are “only three grounds for appellate review of [a] sentence[ ] ...: (1) whether the sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment or violates other constitutional requirements; (2) whether the [trial court] was motivated by ill-will, prejudice^] or other impermissible con ⁶⁸⁶ siderations; and (3) whether the sentence is within statutory limits.” Jones v. State, 414 Md. 686, 693 , 997 A.2d 131, 135 (2010) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This case involves the second ground for appellate review of a sentence — namely, alleged impermissible considerations by a trial court during sentencing. Under the Self-Incrimination Clauses of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 11 the Trial Clauses of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, 12 and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 13 a trial court may not consider during sentencing a defendant’s decision not to plead guilty.

See Johnson v. State, 274 Md. 536, 537, 542-43 , 543 n. 5, 336 A.2d 113, 114, 117 , 117 n. 5 (1975) (“The scope of this Court’s review, as directed in the writ [of certiorari], is ‘limited solely to the question (of) ⁶⁸⁷ whether the (trial) court denied ... [the defendant] due process by sentencing him ‘to a longer term based upon his not admitting guilt but instead pleading not guilty and testifying in his own behalf.’ ... [I]t is improper to conclude that a decision, constitutionally protected, not to plead guilty ... is a factor which ought to, in any way, influence the [trial court in] sentencing [] to the detriment of the [defendant]____ The constitutional protections which may be infringed upon if a penalty were attached to th[e] decision [as to sentencing] include: Amendments V [ (right against self-incrimination) ] and VI [ (right to a trial) ] to the United States Constitution and Articles 21 [ (right to a trial) ] and 22 [ (right against self-incrimination) ] of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.” (Parentheses in original) (citation and some internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, in Johnson, id. at 545, 589-40, 336 A.2d at 118, 115 , this Court vacated a sentence and remanded for resentencing where, during sentencing, a trial court stated: [I]f you had come in here with a plea of guilty and been honest about (it) and said, [“]Of course I did it,[”] which you did, you would probably have gotten a modest sentence, concurrent with the one [that you are serving] in the District of Columbia, and you would have gotten out of it. But with this attitude that you have[,] you can’t receive that kind of treatment. The sentence of the court is that you be confined under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correctional Services for a period of twelve years, to run concurrent with the sentence that you are serving in the District of Columbia.

(Parentheses in original) (paragraph break omitted). This Court explained that, in making this statement, the trial court indicated that [it], at least to some degree, punished [the defendant] more severely because he failed to plead guilty and, instead, stood trial. Although a reading of the [trial court]’s remarks in full does not necessarily demonstrate that a more severe sentence was imposed, the words just quoted manifest that an impermissible consideration may ⁶⁸⁸ well have been employed. Any doubt in this regard must be resolved in favor of the defendant.

Id. at 543 , 336 A.2d at 117 . Similarly, in Abdul-Maleek, 426 Md. at 74, 66-67 , 43 A.3d at 391, 387 , this Court vacated a sentence and remanded for resentencing where, during sentencing, a trial court stated: You have every right to go to trial in this case, which you did — not once, but twice. [The victim] was victimized, and then she had to ... testify in [the] District Court; then she had to come back [] and testify [at a de novo trial] in [a c]ircuit [c]ourt, and she had to do that because you have every right to have all of those opportunities to put forth your position. I am at a total loss. The Court will impose a sentence of [eighteen] months to the Montgomery County Detention Center.

The Court will suspend all but eight months, and the Court will recommend the Pre-Release Center [and] place you on [eighteen] months of supervised probation upon your release. (Emphasis and paragraph break omitted). This Court explained: Reading these statements in the context of the entire sentencing proceeding (which necessarily includes consideration of the [prosecutor’s explicit request that the [trial] court impose a higher sentence than the District Court had imposed), we do not conclude that the [trial] court actually considered the fact of [the defendant’s exercise of his right to a de novo [trial] and imposed a more severe sentence as punishment for having done so. To the contrary, we infer that the [trial court’s comments were intended simply to explain to the victim the reason for her return to court for a [de novo] trial, while, at the same time, to underscore [the defendant’s entitlement to avail himself of a right granted him by our system of justice.

Likewise, we are quite conscious of the doctrine that [trial courts are presumed to know the law and apply it correctly, and we are confident the [trial] court did precisely that here. All that said, we are constrained nonetheless to remand this case for resen ⁶⁸⁹ tencing because the [trial] court’s explicit reference to [the defendant]^ exercise of his de novo [trial] right could lead a reasonable person to infer that the court might have been motivated by an impermissible consideration. In this circumstance, we are bound to resolve any doubt in [the defendant’s favor. Id. at 73-74 , 43 A.3d at 391 (emphasis in original) (brackets, citations, internal quotation marks, and paragraph break omitted).

Under Abdul-Maleek, id. at 73,