Sheetz v. Mayor of Baltimore

BISHOP, Judge. This case presents one issue of first impression in Maryland: whether the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, usually applicable in criminal cases, applies to civil administrative disciplinary proceedings involving the alleged misconduct of Baltimore City Jail correctional officers. In resolving this issue, our methodology is grounded in the pragmatism of cost-benefit analysis. Specifically, we must balance the social benefits in excluding illegally obtained evidence against the societal costs for such exclusion.

Because of the especially important public interests in ensuring the safe and efficient operation of our prisons, we decline to extend the exclusionary rule to the administrative proceeding involved in this case. I. FACTS On the evening of November 3, 1983, members of the Baltimore City Police Department had under surveillance a red van of Baltimore City Correctional Officer Lieutenant Clifford Weems, which he had parked across the street from the City Jail. Noticing the trafficking of people to and from the van around 10:15 p.m., the police moved in and arrested Lieutenant Weems, appellant and four other Baltimore City correctional officers, all of whom were inside the vehicle. In a warrantless search incident to the arrest, police seized packaged cocaine, heroin, marijuana and drug paraphernalia. ⁵³ The State charged appellant with possession of cocaine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia and resisting arrest.

The State’s Attorney, however, dropped its prosecution of those charges when the District Court for Baltimore City suppressed all evidence amassed during the arrest on the ground that the search and seizure was in violation of appellant’s fourth amendment rights. Subsequently, a civil administrative proceeding was initiated in which the Warden of the Baltimore City Jail set out to discipline appellant. Relying on the illegally seized evidence, the Warden ruled that appellant Melvin Sheetz had conducted himself in a manner “unbecoming of an employee of the City,” and was thus in violation of Baltimore City Civil Service Commission Rule 56(l)(f). Since the violation of this rule constitutes a “sufficient cause[ ] for removal or discharge,” id., the Warden terminated the employment of appellant as a correctional guard at the Baltimore City Jail.

Sheetz appealed the Warden’s decision to the Civil Service Commission. A hearing officer for the Commission conducted a consolidated hearing involving appellant and several other similarly situated correctional officers. During that hearing, appellant argued that the district court’s recent suppression order should apply to the Warden’s disciplinary proceeding. The hearing officer denied appellant’s request for suppression.

The evidence was received over appellant’s standing objection. In a written opinion dated September 7, 1984, the hearing officer recommended that the Commission should sustain the Warden’s decision to terminate appellant’s employment. The Commission adopted the recommendation in toto. Appellant then filed a petition for Writ of Mandamus 1 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against the Mayor and ⁵⁴ City Council of Baltimore, appellees.

The circuit court, however, affirmed the decision, holding that the exclusionary rule is not applicable in a civil administrative disciplinary proceeding. The Scope of the Exclusionary Rule A. Criminal Cases The Fourth Amendment guarantees: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. CONST. amend.

IV

Based on this amendment, the Supreme Court has crafted the exclusionary rule as “a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect.” United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 , 94 S.Ct. 613, 620 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974); accord United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 , 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3411 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984) (quoting Calandra); see also Whitaker v. Prince George's County, 307 Md. 368, 381 , 514 A.2d 4 (1986). In emphasizing that “the rule’s prime purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures,” the Court in Calandra pointed out: “The rule is calculated to prevent not to repair. Its purpose is to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disregard it.” ⁵⁵ Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347 , 94 S.Ct. at 620 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 , 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1444 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960). The evolution of the rule began in 1914 when the Supreme Court ruled that federal courts must exclude evidence that a federal officer seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.

Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 , 34 S.Ct. 341 , 58 L.Ed. 652 (1914). This rule, supervisory in nature, applied to federal, and not to state court proceedings. State officials could illegally seize material for trial without the threat of judicial sanction in state proceedings, except in the most extreme cases. See, e.g., Wolf v. Colorado, 328 U.S. 25, 27 , 69 S.Ct. 1359, 1361 , 93 L.Ed. 1782 (1949) (determining that Fourth Amendment was applicable to states through the Fourteenth Amendment, but only to the extent of protecting against intrusions that “are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 , 72 S.Ct. 205, 209-10 , 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952) (ruling that an illegal seizure of evidence could be sufficiently offensive to the concept of “ordered liberty” as to render the admission of that evidence a violation of the due process clause).

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) expanded radically the scope of the exclusionary rule. Holding the rule applicable to state criminal proceedings, the Court explained: Since the Fourth Amendment’s right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be “a form of words,” valueless and undeserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all ⁵⁶ brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court’s high regard as a freedom “implicit in the ‘concept of ordered liberty.’ ” Id. at 655, 81 S.Ct. at 1691 . The effect of Mapp was simply to prevent the use of illegally obtained evidence in the State’s case-in-chief.

The Court left unanswered the question of what other situations the exclusionary rule should apply. A review of decisions subsequent to Mapp , however, indicates that the Court has taken a conservative approach to expanding the scope of the rule in other criminal contexts. For example, the Court has declined to extend the rule to federal habeas corpus proceedings filed in a federal court by a state prisoner, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 , 96 S.Ct. 3037 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1976), to grand jury proceedings, United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 , 94 S.Ct. 613 , 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974), and has limited the rule in situations in which law enforcement officials have conducted a search and seizure in good faith reliance on a facially valid search warrant, which a court subsequently renders invalid. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984); see also Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 , 99 S.Ct. 2627 , 61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979) (holding exclusionary rule not applicable when police conduct search in good faith reliance on a substantive criminal statute that subsequently is declared unconstitutional).

In addition, the Court has recognized that evidence, which is inadmissible in the case-in-chief, may be used to impeach defendant’s direct testimony. United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 627 , 100 S.Ct. 1912, 1916 , 64 L.Ed.2d 559 (1980). See generally Leon, 468 U.S. at 910-13 , 104 S.Ct. at 3413-15 (discussing narrow scope of the exclusionary rule). B. Noncriminal Cases In discussing the scope of the exclusionary rule, the Supreme Court has admonished: ⁵⁷ Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary rule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons.

As with any remedial device, the application of the rule has been restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 , 94 S.Ct. at 620 . Following this conservative approach, the Court has concluded that the rule’s remedial objectives are not efficaciously served in several types of noncriminal proceedings. See, e.g., I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 , 104 S.Ct. 3479 , 82 L.Ed.2d 778 (1984) (holding exclusionary rule is not applicable to deportation proceedings); United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 , 96 S.Ct. 3021 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1046 (1976) (refusing to extend the exclusionary rule to federal civil tax proceedings where evidence was obtained illegally by State authorities).

The Court, however, had identified forfeiture proceedings as at least one type of noncriminal proceeding in which the exclusionary rule should apply. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 , 85 S.Ct. 1246 , 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965). In that case, Pennsylvania police stopped and searched a car, finding in the trunk thirty-one cases of liquor not bearing Pennsylvania tax seals. Pursuant to statute, the State filed a petition for forfeiture of the automobile.

At the hearing, the owner of the car sought dismissal on the ground that the forfeiture of the automobile depended upon the admission of evidence that police obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected this objection and held the exclusionary rule was inapplicable. The Supreme Court reversed. Noting that the object of a forfeiture proceeding is “to penalize for the commission of an offense against the law,” the Court characterized the proceeding as “quasi-criminal” in nature.

Plymouth Sedan, 380 U.S. at 700 , 85 S.Ct. at 1250 . In reaching this conclusion, the Court focused on the substantial penalty which the forfeiture proceeding imposed ⁵⁸ on the defendant: forfeiture of a car valued at approximately one thousand dollars. Given the fact the defendant could have received a less severe penalty, a fine that could not exceed five hundred dollars, for the criminal conviction for the same offense, the Court reasoned that, the exclusionary rule should apply: It would be anomalous indeed, under the circumstances, to hold that in the criminal proceeding the illegally seized evidence is excludable, while in the forfeiture proceeding, requiring the determination that the criminal law has been violated, the same evidence would be admissible. Id. at 701 , 85 S.Ct. at 1251 .

The case sub judice involves an administrative disciplinary proceeding, and not a forefeiture proceeding. Appellant, nevertheless, contends Plymouth Sedan is controlling by analogy. In each case, the proof of a criminal violation in a noncriminal proceeding brings on the imposition of a related, but noncriminal, sanction. In Plymouth Sedan, proof that defendant illegally transported liquor in his car results in the forfeiture of the vehicle involved in that transportation.

In the instant case, proof that appellant violated various narcotics laws results in the termination of his employment as a correctional officer. There is a general similarity in the two proceedings. Like the forfeiture proceeding, the administrative proceeding does contain a punitive element. Depriving an individual of his employment is a penalty of serious magnitude.

See, e.g., Powell v. Zuckert, 366 F.2d 634, 640 (D.C.Cir.1966) (noting that the Supreme Court, in considering proceedings to discharge a public employee, “has analogized to proceedings that ‘involve the imposition of criminal sanctions’ ”) (quoting Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 344 , 75 S.Ct. 790, 797 , 99 L.Ed. 1129 (1955); citing Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496-97 , 79 S.Ct. 1400, 1413 , 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959)); Board of Selectmen of Framingham v. Municipal Court of Boston, 373 Mass. 783 , 369 N.E.2d 1145, 1147 (1977) (indicating that disciplinary hearing is “not a purely civil proceeding by one private party against another”); Govern ⁵⁹ ing Board of Mountain View School District v. Metcalf, 36 Cal.App.3d 546, 551-52 , 111 Cal.Rptr. 724 (1974) (recognizing that discharging a teacher “is punitive in character” and that such a “deprivation ... may be a much more severe punishment for a criminal offense than anything the criminal law imposes”, but nonetheless refusing to apply the exclusionary rule because of the nature of the profession); Rinderknecht v. Maricopa County Employees Merit System, 21 Ariz.App. 419 , 520 P.2d 332, 335 (Ariz.Ct.App.1974) (concluding that discharge “proceedings [against a deputy sheriff] have a sufficient quasi-criminal nature to warrant application of the exclusionary rule in order to protect Fourth Amendment rights” and therefore directing the application of the rule); City of New Brunswick v. Speights, 157 N.J.Super. 9 , 384 A.2d 225, 231 (1978) (noting “that the loss of a police officer’s position with a city is sufficiently severe and carries with it such penal and quasi-criminal overtones as may require” the imposition of the exclusionary rule). See generally Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 , 83 S.Ct. 554, 567-68 , 9 L.Ed.2d 644 (1963) (discussing the tests traditionally applied to ascertain whether law is penal or regulatory in nature). Notwithstanding the existence of a punitive element inherent in employment discrimination proceedings, we do not find Plymouth Sedan controlling in the disposition of the case sub judice. First, the object of the disciplinary proceeding was not purely to punish.

Appellant was dismissed pursuant to Civil Service Commission Rule 56, which provides, in pertinent part: The following are recognized by the Commission as sufficient causes for removal or discharge of an employee from the Classified Civil Services, although charges may be based upon causes other than those enumerated. ****** (f) That the employee has committed acts while on and off duty which amount to conduct unbecoming to an employee of the city. ⁶⁰ The Commission defines “removal for cause” as “the suspension for [sic] Classified Civil Service of those employees interfering with the efficient discharge of the duties of their position.” Rule 1 S. (emphasis added) To challenge the decision to terminate, appellant must file with the Commission a request to investigate pursuant to Rule 57(l)(a), which provides in pertinent part: In case an employee is removed by an appointing officer, or by the Commission, and such employee has reason to believe that his removal is for reasons other than the good of the service, or for or on account of his political or religious opinions or affiliations, or for refusal to contribute to any political fund, or refusing to render any political services, said employee shall file with the Commission within five days after the receipt of his order of removal, a request in writing that the Commission investigate his removal, and said written request shall contain an answer to his notice of removal and shall contain a statement that he believes that his removal was for reasons other than the good of the service, or for or on account of his political or religious opinions or affilitations, or for refusing to contribute to any political fund, or refusing to render any political services. (emphasis added). Conspicuously absent from the Civil Service Commission Rules is any reference that would suggest the object of the proceeding is to impose sanctions or to punish employees.

Rather, the Rules speak in terms of promoting the “efficient discharge of the duties” and the “good of the service.” Rule 1 S and 57(l)(a). See also Charter of Baltimore City § 118(a) (forbidding the removal of employees except for “those ... [causes which] may interfere with the efficient discharge of the duties of the position”). The absence of punitive' language cannot change the realities of thé situation. Especially in light of the case law already described, the discharge of appellant for conduct unbecoming a city employee operates as a punishment of appellant and may deter other employees from engaging in ⁶¹ similar misconduct.

The presence of language requiring city officials and the Commission to base an employee's dismissal solely in terms of “the good of the service” and “efficient discharge of duties”, however, does suggest that the object of the disciplinary proceeding was not solely punitive. Rather, these explicitly stated positive goals indicate that a significant, if not principal, purpose of the proceeding was to promote an efficient civil service work force. Because the proceeding in the case sub judice is clearly distinguishable from the purely punitive proceeding of Plymouth Sedan, we hold that this precedent does not require this Court to apply the exclusionary rule in