Shehan v. I. Tanenbaum, Son & Co.

Constable, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. The appellee, a foreign corporation, applied to the insurance commissioner to issue to it an insurance broker’s license “in its own valuable corporate name.” under section 200 of Art. 23, Code (1904). The commissioner refused to issue the license, upon the ground that the laws of the State did not authorize him to issue licenses to any but natural persons and to a bona fide co-partnership. Thereupon the appellee filed a petition asking that the writ of mandamus might issue, to compel the commissioner to issue such a license to it.

Epon hearing had, the .Court passed an order directing the commissioner to issue an insurance broker’s license to the appellee as prayed. Thereupon the appellant took this appeal. Section 200, Article 23, Code (1904), provides as follows : “Any person applying for the same and paying to the insurance commissioner the sum of one hundred dollars for the use of the State, and an additional sum of one dollar as a fee to the said commissioner for issuing’ said license, may obtain a license for carrying on the business of an insurance broker, and no license shall be issued to permit more than one person or the members of a bona fide co-partnership to act thereunder.” The construction put by the commissioner upon the word person, appearing in the Act, was that it did not include or apply to an artificial person or body corporate. ²⁸⁵ Unquestionably tbe purpose of this Act, in addition to the regulation of the business of insurance brokers, was the raising of revenue for the purposes of the State. With that purpose held in view what construction should be placed upon the statute ?

The object of all construction of statutes is to arrive at the intention of the Legislature, and when that is ascertained it will be carried out. A leading case in this State is that of Canal Co. v. B. & O. R. R., 4 G. & J. 152 , in which the Court, speaking through Buchanan, C. J., said: “Statutes should be construed with a view to the original intent and meaning of the makers and such construction should be put upon them as best to answer that intention, which may be collected from the cause or necessity of making the Act, or from foreign circumstances, and when discovered ought to be followed, although such construction may seem contrary to the letter of the statute.” If the language of a statute is ambiguous Courts are not confined to it but may make use of extraneous aids to arrive at the meaning of the Act. In such eases the intention of the law makers is deduced from a view of the subject matter, the necessity of the Act and the object of the Legislature. Clark v. Baltimore City, 29 Md. 285 ; Broadway Ferry Co. v. Hankey, 31 Md. 346 ; Mincher v. State, 66 Md. 232 .

In the case of Milburn v. State, 1 Md. 17 , this Court said: “That the policy and intention of the Legislature should be kept constantly in view, and control in a considerable degree the interpretation of language to be found in the revenue Acts.” These are a few of the many cases on the construction of statutes in this State, but they all follow the cardinal principle that the intention of the Legislature should be sought and followed. In Black on Interpretation of Laws, 138, the rule is thus stated: “There are many cases in which the Legislature does not mean that the word person shall include corporations. This is always a question of intention, and the intention must be sought for and determined in each case by the aid of the context, the general scope and purpose of the Act and other pertinent ²⁸⁶ considerations.” To the same effect is section 89 of Endlich on the Interpretation of