Shetler v. Fink
Horney, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. In this adoption proceeding, the only question on appeal is whether the consent of the natural father was withheld contrary to the best interests of the child. When John W. Shetler petitioned for the adoption of his six year old step-daughter Carrie Lynne, the natural mother (Martha L. Shetler) joined in the petition, but the natural father of the child (Robert L. Fink) refused to give his consent and filed an answer opposing the adoption. The natural father and mother of the child were married in September of 1954 while he was in the armed forces.
They separated in August of 1959 and were divorced at the initiative of the wife in April of 1960 apparently on the ground of cruelty. But the causes that gave rise to their marital difficulties seem to have stemmed from the inability of the husband to keep steady employment and from what the wife described as his “drinking and extra-curricular activities.” Although the divorce decree was silent as to custody and support, the mother retained custody of and supported the child. She asked for no support from the natural father and he gave none other than the sum of one dollar — a gift to his daughter— which the mother returned to him with the explanation that the child was not allowed to accept gifts of money without her knowledge. Except for a brief period when the child was with the mother in Washington, D. C., where she had secured employment as a secretary, the child stayed with the maternal grandparents in Clearfield, Pennsylvania, until the remarriage of the mother.
The mother and step-father were married in September of 1960 and reside in an apartment in Hyattsville. Carrie Lynne came to live with them immediately after the marriage. Since 305 then two other girls have been born to the mother and stepfather. The step-father is regularly employed by the Westinghouse Air Arms Division as an electronics technician at Friendship, and there is no question as to his financial worth and personal stability.
He and his wife have created and maintain a creditable home in which to rear children. The husband is a Roman Catholic and his wife, at present a Lutheran, is preparing to enter his Church. Carrie Lynne was baptized in the faith of her mother and the younger children have been baptized in the faith of their father. According to the mother, Carrie Lynne would be happier if she had the same name and the same religion as the remainder of the family so that she too would be a member of the family rather than a member of the household.
After his military service ceased, the natural father was employed as a policeman in Clearfield from October of 1955 until December of 1958 when he was dismissed for behavior unbecoming an officer. After that he was employed only at doing odd jobs for a few days a week. At the time of the adoption hearing he still had no regular employment and he was earning only about $25 a week. After the separation and before the divorce, the natural father would stop occasionally to see Carrie Lynne at the home of the grandparents.
On some occasions he was allowed to see her. On other occasions he was not. But his mother and sister were permitted to see the child and visit her from time to time. At or about the time of the divorce, the natural father was advised in a letter from the wife’s attorney that visitation rights to him and his family would no longer be considered because he had not contributed to the support of his daughter.
After the divorce and remarriage of the mother, the natural father never attempted to see or visit the child. When the adoption proceedings came on for a hearing, the natural father sought to amend his answer to the petition by adding a prayer that he be awarded custody of the child. A ruling on the motion was reserved by the chancellor, and during the course of his examination as a witness, the father seems to have abandoned the idea of wanting custody. He not only conceded that it would be best for the child to remain with the 306 mother, but even indicated that he would have no real objection to a change in the religious affiliation of the child so long as he could “see her [and] visit with her.” In deciding the case the chancellor stated that it was unquestionably in the best interests of the child that she remain in the Shetler household.
But he decided the question — as to whether the conduct of the natural father had been such as to constitute a forfeiture of his parental rights — in the negative. In analyzing the evidence, the chancellor came to the conclusion that “while the father did not pursue the matter of visiting his child with any degree of vigor that would warrant commendation, he received no encouragement on this score from the mother or ‘in-laws/ ” and that the mother had “adopted a policy that it was worth not receiving any support money to be relieved of any demands for visitation rights.” And in his opinion and order denying adoption, the chancellor found that “consent of the father to the adoption was not withheld contrary to the best interest of his daughter” and that his conduct did not justify “a finding that he had voluntarily relinquished his parental rights.” The present statute and rule contemplate that a decree of adoption shall not be granted until a signed and verified statement of consent has been filed in the adoption proceeding unless the court shall have found after hearing that the required consent had been improperly withheld. See Code (1957), Art. 16, § 74, and Maryland Rule D73. Prior to the enactment of the existing statute, 1 the consent of a parent or other interested person (other than a child capable of giving assent)
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