Shiflett v. State

Nazarian, J. After Katie Hadel was found stabbed to death in the bathtub of her apartment on February 5, 2013, Jeffrey Shiflett was charged with first-degree murder, first-degree assault, first-degree burglary, third-degree burglary, carrying a weapon openly with intent to injure, and two counts of second-degree assault. At trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, Mr. Shiflett conceded that he killed her, and the contested issue was whether Mr. Shiflett, who has been diagnosed with multiple psychiatric disorders, was guilty of first- or second-degree murder. Ultimately, evidence of Mr. Shif-flet’s disorders was not permitted, and Mr. Shifflet was deemed competent after a mid-trial competency hearing. But because of Mr. Shiflett’s disruptive behavior in and around the courtroom, the court ordered him restrained with a stun cuff ⁶⁵² during the proceedings, and when he refused, excluded him from the courtroom unless he agreed to wear it.

As a result, much of the trial was conducted in his absence. On appeal, Mr. Shiflett claims the circuit court abused its discretion by ordering him to wear a stun cuff as a condition of being present in the courtroom. In addition, he argues that the court erred by failing to strike the State’s notice of intent to seek a sentence of life without parole; by excluding evidence of Mr. Shiflett’s psychological profile; by concluding that Mr. Shiflett was competent to stand trial; and by denying his motion to dismiss the burglary count. We affirm his convictions.

I. BACKGROUND Mr. Shiflett and Ms. Hadel were childhood friends who became romantically involved in 2007. At that time, both Mr. Shiflett and Ms. Hadel used heroin and, as we will explain in more detail below, Mr. Shiflett suffered from several untreated mental illnesses. After Mr. Shiflett and Ms. Hadel participated in a robbery and Ms. Hadel was caught on a security camera using a stolen credit card, both were placed on probation. Mr. Shiflett later violated probation and was imprisoned for the full five-year sentence.

While in prison, and until his release in 2012, Mr. Shiflett frequently wrote threatening letters to Ms. Hadel, Ms. Hadel’s mother, and Ms. Hadel’s husband, Craig Gordon. In one letter, dated May 25, 2009 and addressed to Ms. Hadel, Mr. Shiflett threatened her with a graphically violent death if she didn’t comply with his wishes: I’m in prison and not a day goes buy [sic] to where I don’t think about you putting me hear [sic] in this place. It[’]s all good why because they can’t keep me forever one day I will leave this place. When I do I will come looking for you and I will find you.

Where ever you might be I won’t give up until I find you ... You better hope you are telling me things I want to hear. If not I will loose [sic] my mind and cut your fucking head off. ⁶⁵³ Another letter, dated March 10, 2010, addressed Ms. Hadel as “Dear Whore” and stated, “Nobody sends me to prison and gets away with it. It’s not going to be hard to find you.” When he was released in December 2012, Mr. Shiflett moved in with his father in Annapolis.

Mr. Shiflett’s father testified that he believed his son’s mental condition had worsened in prison, where he’d spent a year-and-a-half in solitary confinement. He described his son’s demeanor at the time as highly anxious, that he was unable to sleep or eat and was obsessed with Ms. Hadel. Mr. Shiflett continued to place phone calls to Ms. Hadel and her mother, as well as to write about Ms. Hadel on his Facebook page. Mr. Shiflett disappeared from his father’s house around February 1, 2013.

And he followed through with his threat to find Ms. Hadel: he walked from Annapolis to Reisterstown and, by February 3, 2013, was camped out in the woods behind her apartment, waiting for her husband, Mr. Gordon, to leave. On the night of February 5, Mr. Shiflett broke into Ms. Hadel’s apartment and he encountered Mr. Gordon’s twelve-year old daughter, D, 1 lying in bed with her laptop. He screamed “Where the F is Katie?” at D, then dragged her down the hall toward Ms. Hadel’s bedroom. He let go once he spotted Ms. Hadel near the bathroom, and he pulled out a knife.

D escaped to a neighbor’s house to get help, but by the time police arrived, Ms. Hadel had been stabbed sixteen times and was lying face down, “lifeless,” in the bathtub. Two other children, a one-year-old and a three-year-old, were found in the apartment when police arrived; both were unharmed. Mr. Shiflett was charged with first-degree murder, first-degree assault, first-degree burglary, third-degree burglary, carrying a weapon openly with intent to injure, and two counts of second-degree assault. He conceded that he was responsible for Ms. Hadel’s murder, but disputed that the murder was premeditated.

To that end, the defense attempted to introduce evidence of Mr. Shiflett’s untreated mental illnesses to rebut ⁶⁵⁴ the State’s contention that he premeditated Ms. Hadel’s murder, and when that failed, to demonstrate that Mr. Shiflett was not competent to stand trial. After a mid-trial hearing, the circuit court found him competent. Before and throughout trial, Mr. Shiflett behaved in a disruptive and threatening manner. He directed his displeasure primarily, although not exclusively, toward the judge and the prosecutor; he addressed both using profane adaptations of their names.

He was permitted to sit in the courtroom unrestrained during jury selection, but after Mr. Shiflett tried to force his way into the judge’s chambers, the court ordered him to wear a stun cuff, 2 a device worn around the ankle that administers an electric shock, if he wanted to remain in the courtroom for the trial. He refused to wear it, and the trial continued while he remained in the courthouse lock-up, with a video and audio hook-up that allowed him to see and hear the proceedings. The jury convicted Mr. Shiflett of first-degree premeditated murder, first-degree felony murder, and the remaining counts, except for one count of second-degree assault. At the sentencing hearing, he moved for jury sentencing, but the court denied his motion and sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole.

This timely appeal followed. We will provide more facts as appropriate to the discussion below.

II

DISCUSSION Mr. Shiflett presents five questions on appeal, which we address in a slightly different order. 3 First, he argues that the ⁶⁵⁵ circuit court abused its discretion by ordering him to wear a stun cuff, then by proceeding with trial in his absence when he refused to wear it. Second, he argues that he was entitled to have a jury determine whether he should be sentenced to life without the possibility of parole, and that his life sentence, administered by the court rather than by the jury, is unconstitutional. Third, Mr, Shiflett argues that the trial court erred by refusing to admit testimony regarding his psychological profile, and fourth, in its decision that he was competent to stand trial. Finally, Mr. Shiflett argues that the court erred by refusing to dismiss the first-degree burglary count.

A. The Circuit Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Requiring Mr. Shiflett To Wear A Stun Cuff To Remain In The Courtroom. Mr. Shiflett argues first that the circuit court erred by ordering him to wear a stun cuff as a condition of remaining in the courtroom, then by allowing the trial to proceed in his absence when he refused to wear it. In-court physical restraints are inherently prejudicial to criminal defendants in that they can diminish the accused’s ability to mount a meaningful defense as well as his ability to communicate with his lawyer, Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 631 , 125 S.Ct. 2007 , 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005), and no reported Maryland decision has considered whether and under what circumstances a stun cuff can serve as a courtroom restraint during a jury trial. We begin, then, with a closer look at Mr. Shiflett’s behavior, the ⁶⁵⁶ range of options available to the trial court, and the court’s responses.

Mr. Shiflett’s statements and conduct had raised serious security concerns for the court long before trial. In the weeks leading up to jury selection, he’d taken to writing the presiding judge letters that he sent to her home. We decline to memorialize the text of those letters in the Maryland Appellate Reports — trust us when we say that their contents were thoroughly inappropriate and venomously vulgar. It was the Sheriff who first recommended placing Mr. Shiflett in a stun cuff after listening to a phone call Mr. Shiflett placed to his father from prison.

In that particular call, Mr. Shiflett reacted to the court’s ruling that he would not be permitted to introduce psychiatric testimony; the call contained “a tremendous amount of profanity and some rather horrific statements” about Ms. Hadel. Defense counsel objected to the Sheriffs recommendation, and after learning that Mr. Shiflett had not made any direct threats against the court or the prosecutor, the court declined to order Mr. Shiflett to wear the stun cuff in the courtroom: As counsel knows in this case, Mr. Shiflett has written to me on many occasions. Even though I keep writing back to him telling him not to write to me, he continues to write to me. And in many of his letters, there was never a direct threat against me or the Prosecutor — or either Prosecutor, but certainly language that this Court would consider to be highly inappropriate, vulgar and heated in terms [you would] describe a letter as heated.

And this Court never felt in any way that there was a threat against her cause if I did, I would have brought that to the attention frankly — of the Sheriffs office and of the State and decisions would have been made based on that. So considering the factors, being aware of the security necessary for this trial ... I’m not going to order that the ankle cuff be put in. I appreciate why the Sheriffs office wanted to put it in.

I think in this particular case, I don’t ⁶⁵⁷ believe it will [be] necessary. If at any time I feel that it becomes necessary, then I will modify my order. Jury selection then went forward as scheduled, and Mr. Shiflett was disruptive throughout that process. He made “constant remarks, often time inappropriate remarks, often vulgar remarks, often obscene remarks, for which the Court either tolerated ... or admonished him to stop speaking.” Still, jury selection continued, and at that point the court elected not to revise its ruling on the stun cuff.

But the next morning, before the courtroom day got under way, Mr. Shi-flett attempted to break free from the guards and enter the judge’s chambers. A scuffle ensued as sheriffs tried to restrain him; they were eventually able to move him away from the judge, but not before he spit in a sheriffs face: This morning at ten to ten as Mr. Shiflett ... was being brought to begin the trial, he attempted to — I was in chambers and I heard him call out my name, my first name, several times, and saying [the Judge’s name], which is my first name, and then he attempted to enter my chambers. At that point, the sheriffs — and there was three or four of them I believe that were with him at that time — moved him away from my chambers, put him up against the wall and attempted to calm him down and deter him from trying to enter my chambers in what appeared to be his effort to want to talk to me. They then moved him over into the courtroom and tried to get him to sit down.

A scuffle occurred, and they were unable to really secure him, continued to become more agitated and resistive in his behavior. After that the sheriffs then took him back into the lockup, and I believe [defense counsel] came around as well in an effort to calm down Mr. Shiflett. I subsequently had a chambers conference with counsel, indicated my concern for courtroom security. I also had an opportunity to talk to the sheriffs since I did not witness all of the behavior of Mr. Shiflett.

I only heard him screaming out and calling my first name. In further talking to the sheriffs, they indicated to me not only were they hav[ing] ⁶⁵⁸ difficulty securing him, but that he also spit at one of the sheriffs. And then they attempted again to push him down the hallway to try and secure his attendance into the courtroom. I told counsel in chambers based on his behavior this morning, that it was this Court’s intent and concern for courtroom security and his highly agitated state that I was going to order the sheriffs to place a cuff on him that would administer a shock if he acted up.

And that was this Court’s decision. It was decided at that time to put all this on the record, and then go back to talk to Mr. Shiflett. The court went on to explain that she wanted to place Mr. Shiflett in a stun cuff because she thought “his rights are more secure and the appearance to the jury would be less intrusive with the cuff than with six sheriffs standing around him.” The judge and counsel then proceeded to Mr. Shiflett’s holding cell, where the court (with a court reporter present) gave Mr. Shiflett the opportunity to return to the courtroom if he agreed to wear the stun cuff: THE COURT: The purpose of this hearing, Mr. Shiflett ... — we are in lockup, this hearing is being held in lockup— is based on your behavior this morning. ¡¡; So based on your behavior, I have determined that the only way to maintain courtroom security, which is my job, is to have the cuff on you. Now, you can choose not to use the cuff, not to wear the cuff.

And if you choose to do that, then you will be waiving your right to be in the courtroom. You have an absolute right to be in the courtroom and participate in the proceedings. I have the absolute right as the Judge to determine courtroom security. It is my decision, based on your conduct this morning, that you wear the cuff. [MR.

SHIFLETT]: All rights- ⁶⁵⁹ THE COURT: By not complying with my order, you are waiving your right under [Md. Rule] 4-281. So I wanted to advise you of your right to be present[.] Amidst the confusion that followed, Mr. Shiflett responded that “I’m not going to wear that fucking cuff,” and the court explained the implications of his decision: THE COURT: So as a result of your refusal to comply with my order, and I’m doing this based on your behavior this morning and this Court’s concern about courtroom security, then you will be waiving your right to be present at trial, and the trial will continue— [MR. SHIFLETT]: And I am not waiving my right to be present at trial. Put the microphone right here.

I am not waiving my right to be present at the trial today. I want to be in the courtroom, but I’m not going to be treated like I’m some fucking kind of animal. Thank you. THE COURT: Okay. [MR.

SHIFLETT]: Now, let me say something about this bracelet. THE COURT: So the trial — you understand the trial will continue without your presence. [MR. SHIFLETT]: I don’t really care about that. That’s fíne. !|! * * THE COURT: Okay.

All right. So I’m going to leave you in your cell, and every time we have a break, I’m going to revisit this issue with you. So you will continue to have the right to consult with a lawyer. I am not going to have you sent back to the jail.

We will continue to explore the option for you to come back into court. From there, the trial continued in Mr. Shiflett’s absence. During the luncheon recess that same day, the judge, the prosecutor, and defense counsel returned to Mr. Shiflett’s cell, and Mr. Shiflett maintained his refusal to wear the stun cuff in the courtroom: [MR. SHIFLETT]: I ain’t seeing that nasty bitch. ⁶⁶⁰ [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We’re about to go on the record. [MR.

SHIFLETT]: Woo-hoo. THE COURT: All right. Mr. Shiflett, we are back— [MR. SHIFLETT]: Hey— THE COURT: We are back— [MR.

SHIFLETT]: —baby [Judge]' 4 3 Hey, babe. THE COURT: We are back on the record— [MR. SHIFLETT]: Hey babe. THE COURT: I am Judge [last name], Mr. Shiflett. [MR.

SHIFLETT]: You’re baby [Judge] to me. THE COURT: (Inaudible) address me in that way. [MR. SHIFLETT]: You’re baby [Judge]. THE COURT: We are back on the record— [MR.

SHIFLETT]: I have to think up a nickname for (inaudible). THE COURT: — in the State of Maryland versus Jeffrey Shiflett, case Number K-13-1295. [MR. SHIFLETT]: Is [Prosecutor] for the State? THE COURT: We are now present — I am present, [defense counsel and the State] are here as well— [MR.

SHIFLETT]: Oh, shit. THE COURT: — along with my court clerk. [MR. SHIFLETT]: Oh, shit. THE COURT: I’m here to advise you of where we are in the proceeding and of your right to go back into the court if you choose to.

We have concluded with three or four witnesses— [MR. SHIFLETT]: And I should have been there so I can fucking hear what they have to say about me, and so I could have told me [sic] attorney some fucking questions to ask them that I might thought that was relevant to this case, ⁶⁶¹ and I was denied my constitutional right, but we all know they don’t give a fuck about people’s rights around here. THE COURT: So, Mr.— [MR. SHIFLETT]: Ain’t that right [Prosecutor]?

THE COURT: Mr.— [MR. SHIFLETT]: Yes, ma’am. THE COURT: —Shiflett- [MR. SHIFLETT]: Hey, babe.

THE COURT: I’m giving you the opportunity to come to the courtroom. [MR. SHIFLETT]: Does it look like I want to come back to the courtroom? THE COURT: Sir— [MR. SHIFLETT]: All right.

Hold on. I want to come back — I’m going to say one thing, okay, for this record here. For this record, I — I got to make it known, okay, that I do suffer from a mood disorder, okay? Another thing I do have to make a note for the record is at night, I don’t get a chance to go to sleep because I go back to my cell and I constantly think about this case, and I just stay up all night with my mind’s spinning in circles, okay?

And when I don’t get any sleep, I get very moody and I get very agitated very easily, especially when asshole police officers try to put their hands on me for no unapparent reason, okay? Just so everybody knows that stuff. You know, I like to make sure that everybody understands. THE COURT: Thank you for sharing that with us. [MR.

SHIFLETT]: Hey, baby, I’ll share anything with you. What about you share with me? That’s what I want to know. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Jeff, do you want to come into the courtroom or not? [MR. SHIFLETT]: Fuck, no, I ain’t coming into that mother.

You’re going to put that fucking bracelet on me and ⁶⁶² treat me like a fucking animal, you think I’m going— another thing I want to say about that. One thing I can tell you about that bracelet okay? It’s inhumane to fucking have me wear that, okay? THE COURT: Go ahead. [MR.

SHIFLETT]: There’s enough sheriffs here to fucking have 20 sheriffs in that courtroom to where if I acted up, you could have 20 sheriffs do something to me. I don’t need a fucking bracelet on my fucking leg to treat me like I’m a fucking cow and you’re going to use a cattle prod on me and tame me. THE COURT: Go ahead. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So what— [MR. SHIFLETT]: Are you fucking crazy? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So what you’re saying is that you don’t want to come to the courtroom now? [MR.

SHIFLETT]: I don’t waive no rights. I want to fucking come into the courtroom. But I’m not wearing a fucking bracelet and being treated like an animal. THE COURT: The only way you’re coming into my courtroom, sir, is with that bracelet— [MR.

SHIFLETT]: Oh, well. THE COURT: —that’s it. [MR. SHIFLETT]: (Inaudible) highly agitated? Let’s fuck so I can release some of my stress, baby.

Hey [Prosecutor], you’re a faggot. You take it up the ass (inaudible) you faggot, you queer, you homosexual. I love you baby [Judge]. The trial continued in Mr. Shiflett’s absence.

But later that day, the court was forced to excuse the jury when the Sheriff discovered that Mr. Shiflett had created another disturbance: THE SHERIFF: We got a situation that he — we got a situation that he shitted in a — in a cell. THE COURT: He’s— THE SHERIFF: He’s shitted in the cell on the floor. THE COURT: Okay. $ *i' ⁶⁶³ THE SHERIFF: My sergeant — sergeant is going down to get a shield because we don’t know what’s going to happen once we go in, if he’s going to throw it or not. THE COURT: If he’s going to?

THE SHERIFF: Throw it. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Throw something. THE COURT: Okay. All right. So do you know what is currently in the cell at this point in time other than toilet paper?

There’s no— THE SHERIFF: Feces. THE COURT: I’m sorry, feces? THE SHERIFF: Feces that he did on the floor. THE COURT: Okay.

THE SHERIFF: Right in front of the door. THE COURT: In front of the door. Okay. So — and I appreciate you bringing] it to our attention, and you want to deal -with it now.

So what do you want to do specifically? THE SHERIFF: Basically just want to take him back to the — to the jail. * * * THE COURT: Okay. All right. So you — you—you now have permission to go ahead and remove him and take him back to the Detention Center.

It was not my plan to talk with him again today. I’ve already talked to him twice today, and I will talk with him again tomorrow. But my plan, frankly, is not — unless things dramatically change, I planned to speak with him once a day, perhaps twice, but I’m not going to speak with him on every break. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. THE COURT: I don’t feel there’s any reason to do that.

I will once again continue to reiterate to him when I do have the opportunity to speak to him about his right to be present and how he can be present in order to comply with this Court’s order. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, it is a fluid situation. ⁶⁶⁴ THE COURT: Uh-huh. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And at — at some point if he indicates to me— THE COURT: Uh-huh. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: — that he decides to be in the courtroom, I will bring that to the Court’s attention. The next morning, a video monitor was set up in the courtroom so that Mr. Shiflett could see and hear what was transpiring in the courtroom from the detention center. The court reviewed the sheriffs stun cuff protocol with Mr. Shi-flett, and also gave him another opportunity to return to the courtroom: THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Shiflett, we are on record.

I’ve called your case and your attorneys are present. I wanted to put a couple of things on the record. I have provided your attorney with the protocol for the use of the stun cuff that is dated September the 1st, 2011, and — and I wanted a court exhibit that will now become part of the record. Have you had an opportunity to review that with your attorney? [MR.

SHIFLETT]: (Inaudible). THE COURT: Okay, did he talk to you about it? [MR. SHIFLETT]: No. He just told me that you gave him some paperwork for me. That’s all.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I’m going to review it with you now. So this is an order that is — was developed by the sheriffs office that gives the protocol for when the stun cuff can be used. Specifically it says under Paragraph 3-B, that it can be used to control violent or potentially violent prisoners when a member, which is a sheriff, reasonably believes that the following conditions exist: Number one, lethal force does not appear to be justifiable and/or necessary, attempts to subdue the individual by conventional tactics will likely cause injury to the individual members, c[o]urt personnel or citizens, and then there will be a reasonable expectation that will be unsafe for members to be approaching the individual within contact range. ⁶⁶⁵ Those are the — the criteria for use of a stun cuff, which also includes persons that are trained to use it, where they affix it which is in your — at your ankle level, and the — the proper use of it, and the — the only criteria, which are the ones I just described.

Do you understand? [MR. SHIFLETT]: Basically you’re trying to treat me like a fucking animal. THE COURT: No, sir. [MR. SHIFLETT]: (Inaudible).

THE COURT: It is this Court’s job to insure courtroom security. Based on your actions yesterday, you have demonstrated to the Court that you will not comply with this Court’s position that you must — your conduct must comply with proper courtroom decorum. This Court has concerns, based [on your] conduct yesterday, of both safety of the courtroom personnel, myself, other members of the courtroom staff, and for those reasons, I find that you are a security risk, that you have exhibited violent behavior and threatening behavior in your conduct yesterday, and that is the reason that I have ordered the — the cuff to be placed. You can return to the courtroom if you can— [MR.

SHIFLETT]: (Inaudible). THE COURT: Let me just — just listen to me. You can return— [MR. SHIFLETT]: It doesn’t matter.

THE COURT: You can return— [MR. SHIFLETT]: (Inaudible). THE COURT: All right. So you can return to the courtroom if you promise that you will comply with the rules of civility and act appropriately and behave in a proper manner. [MR.

SHIFLETT]: I don’t know how to live civilized. THE COURT: I’m sorry? [MR. SHIFLETT]: I don’t know how to live civilized. THE COURT: You don’t know how to live civilized, is that what you[ ] said? ⁶⁶⁶ [MR.

SHIFLETT]: Yes, ma’am. THE COURT: Okay. All right. So I have offered you the right to come in.

You have indicated you are unable to comply and live civilized and comply with it. I’ve also indicated to you that you can come in with the — the cuff, and you have indicated that you are unwilling to do that, is that correct? [MR. SHIFLETT]: Yes, because Amendment Number Eight says that prohibits (inaudible) cruel and unusual punishment. You’re not going to treat me like an animal.

You have more than enough officers (inaudible) in the courtroom. And I’m not wearing that cuff so people on the jury can see me and see that you people are treating me like an animal, THE COURT: All right. Just to be clear, Mr. Shiflett, the cuff is not visible. It is under your pant leg.

It can only be administered by the sheriff who is trained in it— [MR. SHIFLETT]: And what happens if the jury sees you drop me and people shock me? THE COURT: You would not — well, first off, they could not— [MR. SHIFLETT]: (Inaudible) they couldn’t see that either?

THE COURT: They would not see the cuff. And— [MR. SHIFLETT]: (Inaudible) get out of here with this dumb shit. THE COURT: And the shock can only be administered under those three very limited areas that I described. [MR.

SHIFLETT]: Well, tell [Prosecutor] I want to shock his balls. THE COURT: So I understand that you are refusing to comply with my order, that you will not come into the courtroom and act in a civilized manner and— [MR. SHIFLETT]: No. THE COURT: — I have — I have offered that to you, to participate. You can change your mind at anytime, and I will ⁶⁶⁷ continue to offer you[ ] that option during the day.

If at any time you change your mind, you can let the sheriff know ... On at least one occasion every day through the conclusion of trial, the court met with Mr. Shiflett, on the record and with counsel present, and offered him the opportunity to return to the courtroom with the stun cuff on. Each time, he refused. 1. The court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that restraints were necessary.

Mr. Shiflett argues that, as a preliminary matter, the court’s decision to order restraints of any kind was an abuse of discretion. Visible physical restraints during trial are inherently prejudicial to criminal defendants because they “highlight the need to separate the defendant from the community at large,” and undermine the presumption of innocence and the fairness of the fact-finding process. Wagner v. State, 213 Md.App. 419, 476-77 , 74 A.3d 765 (2013) (quoting Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 409 , 583 A.2d 218 (1990)); see also Deck, 544 U.S. at 630 , 125 S.Ct. 2007 , People v. Allen, 222 Ill.2d 340 , 305 Ill.Dec. 544 , 856 N.E.2d 349, 352 (2006) (“The presumption of innocence is central to our administration of justice. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, an accused has the right to stand trial with the appearance, dignity, and self-respect of a free and innocent man.”) (citations omitted).

For that reason, the Due Process Clause “prohibits the use of physical restraints visible to a jury absent a trial court determination, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are justified by a state interest specific to a particular trial.” Deck, 544 U.S. at 629 , 125 S.Ct. 2007 . This applies to both the guilt and sentencing phases of trial. Id. at 633 , 125 S.Ct. 2007 . Even so, three essential state interests “may justify physically restraining a defendant: Preventing the defendant’s escape, protecting those in the courtroom, and maintaining order in the courtroom.” Wagner, 213 Md.App. at 477 , 74 A.3d 765 (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 569 , 106 S.Ct. 1340 , 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986)). “Where a defendant is ‘disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant’ in a manner that inter ⁶⁶⁸ feres with the dignity, order, and decorum of the courtroom, the trial court has the discretion to order ‘constitutionally permissible’ accommodations.” In re D.M., 228 Md.App. 451, 455 , 139 A.3d 1073 (2016) (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343-44 , 90 S.Ct. 1057 , 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970)).

So restraints aren’t per se unconstitutional — the issue in each case is whether the restraint “was so inherently prejudicial that [Mr. Shi-flett] was thereby denied his constitutional right to a fair trial. Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 567, 570 , 106 S.Ct. 1340 . “The prejudice posed by security measures, and whether a compelling state interest outweighs that prejudice, must be measured on a case-by-case basis.” Hunt, 321 Md. at 410 , 583 A.2d 218 . And ultimately, restraints are appropriate if, after making an individual evaluation, the court decides that the need for the restraint outweighs the potential prejudice, and ensures that the record reflects the need for extraordinary security measures. Id.

Mr. Shiflett acknowledges, as he must, that physical restraints may be appropriate when the court makes a particularized finding on the record that a compelling interest outweighs the prejudice to the defendant. Instead, he argues that his behavior at trial did not justify restraining him in the manner the court ordered here. By Mr. Shiflett’s account, he simply tried to enter the presiding judge’s chambers in an attempt to talk to her. Although his actions undoubtedly were inappropriate, he argues, they failed to demonstrate any concrete threat, and did not support a finding that restraints were necessary.

This argument isn’t borne out by the transcript though, which reveals that Mr. Shiflett screamed the judge’s name from outside her chambers until he was forcibly restrained, which resulted in a fracas during which Mr. Shiflett spit in a sheriffs face. By the time this incident occurred, Mr. Shiflett had already sent the presiding judge inappropriate, vulgar letters at her home address, and the sheriff had already recommended that the court order Mr. Shiflett to wear the stun cuff in light of his phone calls from prison. The incident formed the basis for the court’s on-record, particularized finding that Mr. Shiflett posed a threat to courtroom ⁶⁶⁹ security, and we discern no abuse of discretion in that finding, and Mr. Shiflett’s subsequent demeanor and behavior only confirmed the correctness of the court’s assessment. And as such, the court did not err when it ordered Mr. Shiflett restrained, so long as the need to protect courtroom order and security outweighed any prejudice to Mr. Shiflett that might result from the restraint imposed. 2.

The court’s compelling interest in maintaining security and order outweighed any prejudice to Mr. Shiflett. Assuming that we would disagree with his contention that no restraints were required, Mr. Shiflett argues next that the security measures imposed by the court — an ultimatum to wear the stun cuff or be excluded from the court room — was unreasonable. He contends that the cuff would have put him at risk of injury, and would have unfairly prejudiced him by interfering with his ability to participate in his own defense and to consult with counsel. He asks us to hold that the court abused its discretion in ordering him to wear the cuff when other (in his view, less prejudicial) options were available, such as leg irons or ordering additional sheriffs to guard him in the courtroom.

His argument flows, however, from the faulty premise that judges are required to employ the least restrictive alternative, as judged by twenty-twenty hindsight. The standard is in fact more realistic. “Trial judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stubbornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the circumstances of each case.” Allen, 397 U.S. at 344 , 90 S.Ct. 1057 . And therefore, judges have “broad discretion in maintaining courtroom security,” and we review a trial judge’s decision regarding the manner of restraint for abuse of discretion. Hunt, 321 Md. at 408 , 583 A.2d 218 .

We need not determine “whether less stringent security measures were available to the trial court, but whether the measures applied were reasonable, and whether they posed an unacceptable risk of prejudice to the defendant.” Id. Instead, we assess the methods the court actually used — the requirement that Mr. Shiflett wear the stun cuff as a condition ⁶⁷⁰ of remaining in the courtroom — in the context of the security and behavioral threats he posed. First, we hold that the court's decision to exclude Mr. Shiflett from the courtroom was reasonable under the circumstances. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant the right to be present at every stage of his trial, but a defendant “who engages in conduct that justifies exclusion from the courtroom” waives that right, Md. Rule 4-231(c)(l)~ (2).

The Supreme Court held in Illinois v. Allen that a trial judge confronted with a disruptive defendant can “(1) bind and gag the defendant, thereby [keeping the defendant in the courtroom]; (2) cite [the defendant] for contempt; or (3) take him out of the courtroom until he promises to conduct himself properly.” 397 U.S. at 344 , 90 S.Ct. 1057 . Those possible alternatives aren’t exhaustive, though; courts faced with similarly recalcitrant defendants have employed these security methods, and others, to varying degrees of success, and the “appropriateness and lawfulness of any action taken in a given case will depend naturally on the facts of each case.” Smith v. State, 382 Md. 329, 343-45 , 855 A.2d 339 (2004) (approving the trial court’s decision to cite a disruptive defendant for contempt three times throughout his trial); see also Bruce v. State, 318 Md. 706, 720 , 569 A.2d 1254 (1990) (upholding the trial court’s decision to post four plainclothes marshals in addition to two bailiffs as a security measure); Bowers v. State, 306 Md. 120, 138 , 507 A.2d 1072 (1986) (finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision, at the recommendation of the sheriffs office, to order the defendant to wear leg irons during trial); Wagner, 213 Md.App. at 481 , 74 A.3d 765 (observing that no prejudice resulted from placing the defendant in shackles for the jury’s verdict announcement, because the shackles were hidden by the defendant’s suit coat, while his leg irons were obscured because he was standing up). However, “trial in absentia should be the extraordinary case, ‘undertaken only after the exercise of a careful discretion by the trial court.” Biglari v. State, 156 Md.App. 657, 674 , 847 A.2d 1239 (2004) (quoting Pinkney v. State, 350 Md. 201, 221 , 711 A.2d 205 (1998)). ⁶⁷¹ Mr. Shiflett did not simply speak out of turn or make the occasional outburst. He consistently used angry, vulgar, and violent language with the court.

He repeatedly threatened the judge and the prosecutor. And he defecated on the floor of his cell in a temporarily successful effort to prevent the trial from proceeding. Faced with this