Shipley v. Matlack

DAVIS, Judge. Venice L. Shipley 1 appeals two separate decisions of the Circuit Court for Howard County. The first memorandum and order issued June 21, 2000 construed the Will of Evelyn G. Meyn after a trial on the merits was held on April 11, 2000. The lower court concluded that Evelyn’s residual estate went to her contingent legatee, appellee Timothy Matlack, by express language in the Will.

The date of entry of the judgment in the circuit court occurred on June 28, 2000. From that decision appellant, on September 12, 2000, filed an appeal presenting the following question for our review: I. Did the lower court err in determining that Evelyn’s devise to her brother-in-law had lapsed, 2 when he predeceased her and that the anti-lapse statute did not apply in this situation, when Evelyn had expressly named a ⁴⁶¹ contingent beneficiary in the event that the first two legatees did not survive her? A hearing was held in the Circuit Court for Howard County on August 21, 2000 on appellant’s petition for a determination of lot boundary and a motion to show cause and appellee’s motion to dismiss. Appellant’s petition asked the lower court to declare that an existing encroachment of the mobile home park on Evelyn’s property was an easement, which could be used in common by the adjoining property owners Henry and Marie Meyn.

The circuit court granted appellee’s motion to dismiss. From that decision, appellant also appealed on September 12, 2000, presenting the following question for our review: II. Did the circuit court abuse its discretion by granting appellee’s motion to dismiss and declining to hear appellant’s request for a determination of lot boundaries? FACTUAL BACKGROUND Marie Cadle married Henry Meyn in 1935.

Her sister, Evelyn, married Henry’s brother, John, in 1938. The two couples lived in a house on 2.1 acres located on Gorman Road in Howard County that John and Evelyn owned. Marie and Henry owned 4.37 acres adjacent to John’s and Evelyn’s property and upon which was a mobile village. Both Meyn couples lived together in the Gorman Road residence until their deaths.

Henry was the last of the four to survive. He died in 1997. During their lives, the Meyns operated the forty-site trailer park business known as Ev-Mar Mobile Village. Evelyn managed the park from an office inside the house; Henry and John assisted with maintaining the premises; Marie kept the books for the business.

John Meyn was the first to die in 1984. His wife, Evelyn, became the sole owner of the 2.1 acres by operation of law. In the summer of 1986, Evelyn contacted Thomas E. Lloyd 3 ⁴⁶² and arranged for a meeting that also included Henry and Marie. At the meeting, each of the surviving Meyns discussed their desire that the last surviving party should own the home and the trailer park business.

Lloyd, therefore, prepared each of the Meyn’s individual wills and deeds to effectuate each of their washes. The deeds, by use of a straw person, conveyed Evelyn’s 2.1 acres to Evelyn and Marie as joint tenants with the right of survivorship and conveyed Henry and Marie’s 4.37 acres to Henry, Marie, and Evelyn as joints tenants with rights of survivorship. Marie died in 1997 leaving as executor of her Will her husband, then her sister. Evelyn died a few months later and Henry died twenty-six days after Evelyn’s death.

The putative legatees subsequently disputed the construction of Evelyn’s Will. Her Will reads, in pertinent part: ITEM III. All the rest, residue and remainder of my estate whether real, personal or mixed, of every kind and description, whether now owned or hereafter acquired, and wheresoever situate, which I may own or have the power to dispose of at my death, whether in possession, reversion, expectancy, or remainder including all such property over which I now have or may have at the time of my death the power of appointment, I hereby give, devise, bequeath and appoint unto my sister, MARIE ELIZABETH MEYN, absolutely, if she shall survive me for a period of thirty (30) days; but if my sister, MARIE, shall predecease me or fail to survive me a period of thirty (30) days, then and in any of those events, I give, devise, bequeath and appoint all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate unto my brother-in-law, HENRY EDWARD MEYN, absolutely. ITEM IV.

If both my sister and my brother-in-law shall predecease me as hereinbefore provided, then I give, devise, bequeath and appoint all the rest, residue and remainder of ⁴⁶³ my estate to TIMOTHY MATLACK, [a nephew by marriage] absolutely, per stirpes. ITEM V. I do hereby nominate, constitute and appoint my sister, MARIE ELIZABETH MEYN, to be the Executrix of this my LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT; if for any reason my sister, MARIE ELIZABETH MEYN, shall predecease me or shall fail or refuse for any reason to qualify, then and in that event, I hereby nominate, constitute and appoint my attorney, THOMAS E. LLOYD, to be the Executor of this my LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT. My personal representatives shall serve without the necessity of giving bond for the performance of their duties hereunder other than that bond required by law. Prior to Henry’s death, Lloyd prepared a new Will, which Henry executed on June 13, 1997 while confined in a hospital.

In his Will, Henry left twenty percent of his estate to each of the five following legatees: Shipley, Toni M. Abram, Michele Froats, Timothy Matlack, and Dale Matlack. Letters of administration were issued to Lloyd on June 6,1997 in the estate of Evelyn. On June 30, 1997, letters of administration were issued to Lloyd as personal representative in the estate of Henry. On January 25, 1998, appellee filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City seeking a declaratory judgment that he was Evelyn’s sole legatee.

In April 1998, Lloyd filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for Howard County seeking judicial interpretation of the testamentary language of the Will of Evelyn and appellee responded by filing a motion for summary judgment. The complaint asked the court to determine the true intent and purpose of the last Will and Testament of Evelyn G. Meyn and Henxy E. Meyn. All of the residuary legatees were served. The Circuit Court for Howard County, on February 19, 1999, granted summary judgment in favor of Timothy Matlack based on the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: (a) Henry E. Meyn, by operation of Section 4-401 of the Estates and Trusts Article, is considered to have predeceased Evelyn G. Meyn; ⁴⁶⁴ (b) Since both Marie Meyn and Henry E. Meyn predeceased Evelyn G. Meyn, then under Item IV of the Will, the residuary estate of Evelyn G. Meyn shall be distributed to J. Timothy Matlack.

Since that time, numerous pleadings have been filed. Three of the residuary legatees in Henry’s Will, appellant, Abram, and Froats, filed a motion to alter or amend judgment. Lloyd submitted an affidavit to the court. After reviewing the motion and affidavit, the circuit court determined that summary judgment should not have been granted, struck the judgment, and set the case for trial.

A trial on the merits was held on April 11, 2000 and the court permitted the parties to file post-trial submissions. In its June 20, 2000 memorandum and order, the court ordered and declared that: (a) Henry E. Meyn, by operation of Section 4-401 of the Estates and Trust Article, is considered to have predeceased Evelyn G. Meyn; (b) Since both Marie Meyn and Henry E. Meyn predeceased Evelyn G. Meyn, then under Item IV of the Will, the residuary estate of Evelyn G. Meyn shall be distributed to J. Timothy Matlack; and (c) Under the terms of the Will of Evelyn G. Meyn, the legacy to Henry E. Meyn became inoperative upon his death, and the anti-lapse statute, Section 4-403 of the Estates and Trust Article, does not apply. DISCUSSION I Appellant’s first contention is that the circuit court erred in the construction of Evelyn’s Will by not applying Maryland’s Anti-lapse Statute, Md.Code (Repl.Vol.2001), Estates & Trusts (E.T.) § 4-403: (a) Death of legatee prior to testator. — Unless a contrary intent is expressly indicated in the will, a legacy may not lapse or fail because of the death of a legatee after the ⁴⁶⁵ execution of the will but prior to the death of the testator if the legatee is: (1) Actually and specifically named as legatee; (2) Described or in any manner referred to, designated, or identified as legatee in the will; or (3) A member of a class in whose favor a legacy is made. (b) Effect of death of legatee. — A legacy described in subsection (a) shall have the same effect and operation in law to direct the distribution of the property directly from the estate of the person who owned the property to those persons who would have taken the property if the legatee had died, testate or intestate, owning the property.

(c) Creditors of deceased legatee. — Creditors of the deceased legatee shall have no interest in the property, whether the claim is based on contract, tort, tax obligations, or any other item. (Emphasis added.) Appellant states correctly that E.T. § 4-403 effectively saves the legacy from lapsing when a legatee