Shipley v. Ritter

Tuck, J., delivered the opinion of this court. The doctrines of equity, applicable to cases like the one now before us, are so fully considered in the reported decisions of this court, and the authorities there referred to, that we deem a review of them altogether unnecessary. We consider it the settled law of this State, that although an injunction will not be granted to restrain a trespasser merely because he is a trespasser, yet equity will interfere where the injury is irreparable, or where full and adequate relief cannot be granted at law, or where the trespass goes to the destruction of the property as it had been held and enjoyed, or where it is necessary to prevent multiplicity of suits. This power has been exerted to restrain the destruction of timber, ornamental and fruit trees, on the ground that these are cases of great and irremediable mischief, which damages could not compensate, because it reaches to the very substance and value of the estate, and goes to the destruction of it in the character in which it is enjoyed.

White vs. Flanigain, 1 Md. Rep., 544 . Jerome vs. Ross, 7 Johns. Ch. Rep., 315 .

According to Mr. Justice Story, (Vol. 2, sec. 928,) “ If the trespass be fugitive and temporary, and adequate compensation can be obtained in an action at law, there is no ground to justify the interposition of courts of equity. Formerly, indeed, they were extremely reluctant to interfere at all, even in regard to repeated trespasses. But now there is not the slightest hesitation, if the acts done, or threatened to be done to the property, would be ruinous or irreparable, or would impair the just enjoyment of the property in future. If, indeed, courts of equity did not interfere in cases of this sort, there would be a great failure of justice in the country.” See, also, Amelung vs. Seekamp, 9 G. & J., 468 .

Hamilton vs. Ely, 4 Gill, 34 . Canal Co. vs. Young, 3 Md. Rep., 480. Green vs. Keen, 4 Md. Rep., 98 . ⁴¹⁴ We do not understand the counsel to differ as to the principles governing cases of this description. The point of contest is, whether the present bill of complaint shows a state of facts entitling the appellant, who was the complainant below, to the relief he seeks ?

In deciding this part of the controversy, little aid can be drawn from adjudged cases, as they rarely, if ever, present the same state of facts, and each must be considered with reference to the nature, character and condition of the property to be protected. 1 Md. Rep., 546 . Unlike most of the cases referred to, there is no dispute here as to the facts on which the alleged equity rests. But the argument, on the part of the appellee, is, that the bill does not state a case to satisfy the conscience of the court that the charge and apprehension of irremediable injury is well founded, according to the cases of Amelung vs. Seekamp, 9 G. & J., 468 . Hamilton vs. Ely, 4 Gill, 34 .

Upon this point, however, we think there is no reasonable ground for doubt. The averments admitted by the demurrer show, substantially, that the land belongs to the complainant, and is occupied by him as his dwelling plantation; that a portion of the estate was in timber, particularly valuable as such, as well as for the protection of the dwelling, besides being ornamental; that the defendants, without authority, have cleared part of that timber land, and converted it into waste and pasture land, and that they are continuing to cut down the timber, and to convert the rest of the timber land into waste and pasture land, destroying the forest trees that served to shelter his dwelling from the inclemency of the winter season, and to afford shade to his family in summer, depriving the owner of the use of all the timber on the farm by its utter destruction, to his great and irreparable damage, loss and injury. We see, by the bill, that the timber is of descriptions, though common to that section,