Sibley v. Doe

REED, J. Montgomery Blair Sibley, the appellant, petitioned the Circuit Court for Montgomery County for a declaratory judgment that he has a right to appear in person before the Grand Jury to present evidence that the President of the United States is violating Maryland criminal law by possessing, displaying, and/or representing to be his own “a fictitious or fraudulently altered government identification document.” Md.Code (2002, 2012 RepLVol), Crim. Law (“CL”) § 8-303(b). The circuit ⁶⁴⁹ court, however, refused to enter such a declaratory judgment. Subsequently, the appellant filed this timely pro se appeal.

He presents five questions for our review, which we have reduced to two and rephrased: 1 1. Did the circuit court err where it dismissed the appellant’s Complaint for Declaratory Relief without making a written declaration of the parties’ rights? 2. Did the circuit court commit an abuse of discretion where it denied the appellant’s motions for recusal and pre-service discovery? For the following reasons, we answer the first question in the affirmative and the second in the negative.

Therefore, we shall vacate the judgment below and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Factual and Procedural Background On September 13, 2014, the appellant wrote the Honorable John W. Debelius III requesting that he “issue a warrant for the arrest of [President] Barack Hussein Obama” for violating CL § 8-303. 2 Shortly thereafter, on September 22, 2014, the ⁶⁵⁰ appellant also wrote the Assistant State’s Attorney for Montgomery County requesting permission to appear in person before the Grand Jury to present evidence of President Obama’s aforementioned alleged violations of Maryland criminal law. The Assistant State’s Attorney responded to the appellant by letter dated September 25, 2014. He indicated that “[t]he Grand Jury for Montgomery County, Maryland has considered your request that an investigation be opened into whether documents relating to President Obama’s eligibility for office are fraudulent ... [and] declines to investigate this matter.” The letter was co-signed by the foreman of the Grand Jury; however, the foreman’s signature was illegible.

On October 6, 2014, the appellant filed a Complaint for Declaratory Relief against John Doe, foreman of the Montgomery County Grand Jury. Also on October 6, 2014, the appellant filed a motion to conduct pre-service discovery and a motion to expedite the hearing. Both of these motions were denied by Judge Debelius on October 20, 2014. Therefore, on November 6, 2014, the appellant filed “Verified Emergency Motions to (I) Disqualify the Honorable John W. Debelius III, and (II) Reconsider Orders Denying Motions to Conduct PreService Discovery and to Expedite.” The appellant based his motion to disqualify Judge Debelius on the fact that he had previously sent him a letter requesting a warrant for President Obama’s arrest, thus making him a witness to the action.

Judge Debelius, by Order dated November 6, 2014, denied both the motion to disqualify and the motion for reconsideration. On December 2, 2014, the State’s Attorney for Montgomery County filed a Motion to Intervene and a Motion to Dismiss. On December 19, 2014, Judge Debelius granted the Motion to Intervene, ordering that the State’s Attorney be added as a defendant. A hearing on the State’s Attorney’s Motion to Dismiss was held before the Honorable Michael D. Mason on January 22, 2014.

At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Mason orally granted the Motion to Dismiss subject to the appellant filing an amended complaint. Judge Mason followed up his oral ruling with a written Order of Dismissal dated ⁶⁵¹ February 3, 2015. Before that, on January 27, 2015, the appellant filed an Amended Complaint along with a Motion to Alter or Amend the January 22, 2014, Order of Dismissal. Judge Mason denied the Motion to Alter or Amend on May 11, 2015.

Four days later, the appellant timely noted this appeal. Discussion I. Dismissal of Complaint for Declaratory Relief A. The Contentions of the Parties The parties agree that in granting the Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for Declaratory Relief, the circuit court failed to discharge its duty to make a written declaration of the appellant’s rights. Therefore, the parties concur that at the very least a procedural remand for re-entry of judgment is appropriate. Their agreement, however, ends here.

According to the appellant, the circuit court erred in the first place where it granted the State’s Attorney’s Motion to Dismiss. The appellant advances this argument on a variety of grounds. First, the appellant asserts that under Maryland law, the granting of a motion to dismiss is “rarely appropriate in a declaratory judgment action,” Broadwater v. State, 303 Md. 461, 465 , 494 A.2d 934 (1985), and thus was inappropriate here. Second, the appellant contends that the circuit court should have addressed the fundamental question raised in his Complaint for Declaratory Relief, which was whether the preconditions established by the Court of Appeals in Brack v. Wells, 184 Md. 86 , 40 A.2d 319 (1944), “improperly impaired [his] Common Law right to directly and in person petition the Grand Jury.” Appellant’s Br. at 11.

Third, the appellant argues the circuit court erred by dismissing the Complaint without addressing issues raised therein that were left unresolved by Brack . These include whether, after he has “exhausted] his remedy before the magistrate and state’s attorney,” id. at 97 , 40 A.2d 319 , he has the right to present to the foreman in person his request to appear before the Grand Jury, and whether the foreman would thereafter be required to present his request to the body over which he presides. ⁶⁵² Finally, the appellant assigns error to the fact that “the circuit court failed to declare whether [his] right to access the Grand Jury has been interfered with by prosecutorial misconduct,” Appellant’s Br. at 15 (emphasis omitted), namely, by the Assistant State’s Attorney’s alleged declaration to the foreman that he is a “birther lunatic.” 3 The State’s Attorney, on the other hand, argues that the circuit court did not err beyond its failure to make a written declaration of the appellant’s rights. Accordingly, the State’s Attorney asserts the circuit court did not err insofar as it granted the Motion to Dismiss. The State’s Attorney, pointing to the holding in Brack , contends that private citizens only have the right to ask the foreman for permission to appear before the Grand Jury, not the right to present their requests to the foreman in person.

However, the State’s Attorney argues that in this case the appellant did not even trigger his right to ask the foreman for permission to appear because he did not “exhaust his remedy before the magistrate and state’s attorney.” Brack, 184 Md. at 97 , 40 A.2d 319 . The State’s Attorney asserts that while the appellant apparently read “magistrate” in Brack to mean the circuit court, “the Court’s reference to ‘magistrate’ in 1944 is equivalent to ‘District Court Commissioner’ in 2015.” Appellee State’s Attorney’s Br. at 5. ⁶⁵³ In response to the appellant’s contention regarding prosecutorial misconduct in connection with the Assistant State’s Attorney’s statement to the foreman that he is a “birther lunatic,” the State’s Attorney argues that “[u]nder Maryland law, ... there is no prohibition against prosecutors communicating to a grand jury their opinions about allegations before the jury, including the credibility of those who make the allegations.” B. Standard of Review We have recently explained that we conduct[ ] a de novo review of the circuit court’s granting of a motion to dismiss, see Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc., 427 Md. 128, 142 , 46 A.3d 443 (2012), applying the same standard as the circuit court and determining whether that decision was legally correct. See Reichs Ford Rd. Joint Venture v. State Roads Comm’n, 388 Md. 500, 509 , 880 A.2d 307 (2005) (citing Adamson v. Corr.

Med. Servs., 359 Md. 238, 246 , 753 A.2d 501 (2000)). “The appellate court accords no special deference to the circuit court’s legal conclusions.” Patton, 437 Md. at 95, 85 A.3d 167 . Margolis v. Sandy Spring Bank, 221 Md.App. 703, 713-14 , 110 A.3d 784 (2015). Thus, because we apply the same standard as the circuit court, we are required to assume[ ] the truth of the complaint’s factual allegations and of any reasonable inferences that can be drawn therefrom.

See, e.g., Patton v. Wells Fargo Fin. Md., Inc., 437 Md. 83, 95 , 85 A.3d 167 (2014) (citing Bobo v. State, 346 Md. 706, 708 , 697 A.2d 1371 (1997)). A court, however, need not accept the truth of pure legal conclusions. See, e.g., Shepter v. Johns Hopkins Univ., 334 Md. 82, 103 , 637 A.2d 1223 (1994); John B. Parsons Home, LLC v. John B. Parsons Found., 217 Md.App. 39, 69 , 90 A.3d 534 (2014) (quoting Shenker v. Laureate Educ., Inc., 411 Md. 317, 335 , 983 A.2d 408 (2009)) (“ ‘[m]ere conclusory charges that are not factual allegations need not be considered’ ”).

Moreover, “[a]ny ambiguity or uncertainty in the allegations bearing on whether the complaint states a cause of action must be ⁶⁵⁴ construed against the pleader.” Shenker, 411 Md. at 335 , 983 A.2d 408 ; John B. Parsons, 217 Md.App. at 69 , 90 A.3d 534 . A court should dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim only if the alleged facts and reasonable inferences would fail to afford relief to the plaintiff. Bobo, 346 Md. at 709 , 697 A.2d 1371 . Margolis, 221 Md.App. at 713 , 110 A.3d 784 .

C. Analysis The seminal case on the issue of what rights a private citizen has when he or she desires to present evidence of criminal violations to the Grand Jury is Brack, supra. The Court of Appeals summarized its holding in that case as follows: It is the opinion of this Court that every citizen has a right to offer to present to the grand jury violations of the criminal law. This does not mean that an individual member of that body may be approached. The citizen should exhaust his remedy before the magistrate and state’s attorney as was done in the instant case, and if relief can not [sic] be had there, he then has the right to ask the grand jury for permission to appear before that body.

Id. at 97 , 40 A.2d 319 . The State’s Attorney argues that this holding stands not for the notion that a private citizen has the right to present in person before the foreman, but rather for the idea that he or she has the right to ask the foreman for the permission to appear before the Grand Jury. We agree and shall explain. The Court of Appeals’ holding in Brack , as we see it, is straightforward.

Its core is that “every citizen has a right to offer to present to the grand jury violations of the criminal law.” Id. Conveniently, the Court of Appeals left no room for ambiguity regarding what this right entails. For example, the Court clearly stated that the existence of the right “does not mean that an individual member of [the Grand Jury] may be approached.” Id. (underline added).

In addition, the Court ⁶⁵⁵ described how a citizen is to go about exercising his right to offer to present evidence to the Grand Jury as follows: “The citizen should exhaust his remedy before the magistrate and state’s attorney[,] ... and if relief can not [sic] be had there, he then has the right to ask the grand jury for permission to appear before that body.” Id. In the case sub judice, the appellant first wrote Judge Debeláis to request the issuance of an arrest warrant for President Obama. He then wrote the Assistant State’s Attorney to request permission to appear before the Grand Jury to present evidence of President Obama’s alleged violations of Maryland criminal law. His latter request was responded to on February 5, 2015, in the