Sibug v. State

KRAUSER, C.J. In 1999, Mario Sibug, appellant, was charged with multiple counts of assault and related handgun offenses, 1 all of which arose out of a single incident. That same year, he pleaded not guilty, in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, to those charges and alleged that he was not competent to stand trial. The Baltimore County circuit court subsequently ordered him committed to the Clifton T. Perkins Hospital Center (“Perkins”) for inpatient care and treatment. There, he remained for the next four years until Perkins, in a letter to the circuit court, expressed its view that Sibug was now competent to stand trial.

In May of 2004, Sibug was transported from Perkins to the courthouse, where he entered a plea of not guilty, on an agreed statement of facts, to the 1999 charge of second-degree assault, and was sentenced to a term of four-and-a-half years’ imprisonment on that charge. A year later, however, the circuit court vacated his conviction and sentence, concluding that Sibug’s trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by not informing him of the immigration consequences of his assault conviction, and granted Sibug a new trial. Sibug was retried in September of 2008. After a jury found him guilty of multiple counts of assault, using a handgun in ³⁶² the commission of a crime of violence, and giving minors access to a firearm, he was sentenced to a term of ten years’ imprisonment.

Although Sibug did not note an appeal from his convictions, three years later he did file a petition for post-conviction relief and was thereafter granted the right to file a belated appeal. Having done so, he now presents two questions for our consideration. Rephrased to facilitate review, they are: I. Was Sibug’s right to due process of law violated by the court’s failure to determine, prior to his new trial, that he was competent to stand trial?

II

Did the trial court err in finding, at the sentencing hearing following Sibug’s new trial, that he was competent to stand trial? Finding no merit to either contention, we affirm. Background In October of 1998, Sibug called his five children to the kitchen table. When the family had gathered as demanded, Sibug pulled out a handgun and pointed it at each of his children, and then “cock[ed]” it to demonstrate that it was loaded.

He then instructed his frightened children that they were to stop acting “rebellious” and were to respect his authority as their father. A month later, Sibug’s fifteen-year-old son called the police to report this incident. He told them that Sibug, after becoming angry with him and his siblings, had pointed a gun at him and that he was afraid that his father was going to kill him. When Baltimore County police subsequently arrested Sibug, they found a handgun, as well as an assault rifle, lying on shelves in Sibug’s bedroom at the family’s residence.

Both guns were in cases, but neither case was locked and both weapons were loaded and fully operable. Sibug was ultimately charged with multiple counts of both first-degree assault and second-degree assault, reckless endangerment, and using a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, as well as permitting a minor access to a firearm. ³⁶³ When Sibug subsequently alleged that he was not competent to stand trial, the Baltimore County circuit court ordered the State Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (“the Department”) to examine Sibug. 2 In accordance with that order, Sibug was admitted to Perkins for evaluation on November 2, 1999. A little more than a month later, Perkins sent a letter and a “competency evaluation” of Sibug to the circuit court. In that evaluation, Perkins opined that Sibug was not competent to stand trial and was suffering from a mental disorder that rendered him “dangerous” to himself and others.

The evaluation further disclosed that Sibug believed that his children were “bad” and “lawless” in spite of his “godly instruction,” and that he had decided to discipline his children according to the Bible and “God’s law.” Perkins ultimately diagnosed Sibug as suffering from both a “Delusional Disorder, Mixed Type” and a “Narcissistic Personality Disorder.” 3 As for Sibug’s competency to stand trial, the Perkins evaluation stated that, although Sibug understood the operation and purpose of the judicial system, he was convinced that he would not receive a fair trial because “the judicial system and its agents are ‘of Satan,’ ” and the prosecution against him was a battle between the “righteous” and the “wicked.” He therefore intended to base his defense on Scripture. The evaluation concluded that Sibug was unable to “appreciate” the proceedings against him or to assist a lawyer in his defense, particularly if the lawyer did not share his religious beliefs. In light of that evaluation, the circuit court found, on January 13, 2000, that Sibug was not competent to stand trial and then ordered that Sibug be committed to the Department for ³⁶⁴ inpatient care and treatment at Perkins until the court was “satisfied that [he was] no longer incompetent to stand trial.” Four months later, on May 1, 2000, Perkins sent the circuit court a letter and a new evaluation that opined that, in its view, Sibug was now competent to stand trial and, furthermore, it believed that he was “criminally responsible” 4 at the time of the offense. Sibug’s trial was subsequently set for August 28,'2000. 5 But three-and-a-half weeks before that trial was to occur, the court received, on August 3, 2000, yet another letter from Perkins.

This letter advised that Sibug’s condition had “deteriorated” and that, consequently, he was currently not competent to stand trial. Almost three years later, on May 27, 2003, Perkins sent another letter to the circuit court, informing it that Sibug’s condition had improved as a result of the medication he was receiving and that, as a consequence, Sibug was now competent to stand trial. Although Perkins requested that the court schedule a hearing to determine Sibug’s competence to do so and attached, to that letter, a “draft order of competence” for the court to execute, the record does not contain this order or provide any indication that a hearing was ever held. On September 22, 2003, Sibug entered, in the Baltimore County circuit court, pleas of not guilty and not criminally responsible “at the time of the commission of the offenses alleged,” but did not claim that he was not competent to stand trial.

Two days later, the circuit court, once again, ordered the Department to examine Sibug and determine whether he was criminally responsible “at the time of [his] alleged criminal conduct.” But nothing in that order required the Depart ³⁶⁵ ment to determine whether Sibug was presently competent to stand trial. Perkins informed the court, in a letter received on October 20, 2003, 6 of its conclusion that Sibug was criminally responsible “at the time of the offense,” as indicated by the accompanying report. That letter was followed by two additional letters from Perkins, the first on December 4, 2003, and the second on January 14, 2004; both of which reiterated that Sibug was presently competent to stand trial. On May 11, 2004, four months after Perkins sent its final letter opining that Sibug was competent to stand trial, Sibug appeared in Baltimore County circuit court and, though no competency hearing had been held or a formal judicial finding of competency made, entered a plea of not guilty, on an agreed statement of facts, to one count of second-degree assault.

The court then found Sibug guilty and sentenced him to a term of four-and-a-half years’ imprisonment, but granted him credit for time served, which resulted in Sibug’s immediate release. During that proceeding, neither defense counsel, the State, nor the court raised the question of Sibug’s competence to stand trial. Only two months later, Sibug filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis in the Baltimore County circuit court, contending, among other things, that he had not been advised of the effect a conviction for assault would have on his immigration status. 7 On June 21, 2005, the circuit court, upon finding that Sibug’s trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by not advising him of the immigration consequences of his assault conviction, granted Sibug’s peti ³⁶⁶ tion for writ of error coram nobis, vacated his sentence, and granted Sibug a new trial. Three years later, on September 10, 2008, Sibug’s new trial commenced before a jury in the Baltimore County circuit court.

The record reveals that, in the three years between the circuit court’s order granting a new trial and the start of that trial, Sibug never pleaded that he was not competent to stand trial, nor did he or his counsel give any indication to the court that his competence was in issue. At trial, the jury heard testimony from three of Sibug’s children regarding the events of October of 1998. Sibug’s oldest son, who had reported the incident to the police, recalled Sibug pointing his handgun at each of the children and that he had been “scared” and “thought [he] was going to die.” 8 Then, testifying on his own behalf, Sibug admitted that he placed his handgun on the kitchen table, while sitting with his children, but said that he was only trying to “get [his children’s] attention” because they did not respect and love him and, consequently, did not respect and love the teachings of the Bible. His display of a handgun was, in his words, to “test” his children’s “faith.” The jury found Sibug guilty of two counts of first-degree assault, two counts of second-degree assault, one count of using a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and one count of giving minors access to a firearm.

A motion for a new trial followed in which Sibug alleged, for the first time, that he had not been competent to stand trial, which was bourne out, asserted the motion, by Sibug’s testimony at trial and “his lack of intelligent communications with his trial attorney.” 9 ³⁶⁷ At Sibug’s sentencing proceeding on October 31, 2008, over a month after his trial had ended, the court considered his motion for a new trial. At that time, the court asked Sibug’s counsel whether he wished to proffer any “additional evidence” as to Sibug’s competence to stand trial. Defense counsel responded that he was “not prepared” to do so. 10 After observing that neither Sibug nor his counsel had ever alleged, either before or during trial, that Sibug’s competency was in question; that the court file contained the January 14, 2004 letter from Perkins stating that, in its opinion, Sibug was competent to stand trial; and that Sibug had “seemed to understand exactly what was going on” during his trial proceedings, the court found that Sibug was competent to stand trial. It therefore denied Sibug’s motion for a new trial and sentenced him to a total of ten years’ imprisonment with credit for pre-trial detention, which included the time that Sibug had been committed to Perkins.

Although Sibug did not appeal his convictions, he filed, two- and-a-half years later, on March 8, 2011, a pro se petition for post-conviction relief, seeking the right to file a belated notice of appeal. On December 18, 2012, with the consent of both sides to the controversy, the circuit court entered an order granting Sibug the right to file a belated notice of appeal within thirty days. This appeal followed. Discussion I. Sibug contends that the circuit court denied him due process of law in failing to determine whether he had regained his competence to stand trial before proceeding with his re ³⁶⁸ trial.

He points out that, after the circuit court found him to be incompetent to stand trial in 2000, the court never subsequently formally found him to be otherwise. The court erred, he insists, in trying him in 2008 without rendering such a finding. It is “well established that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the criminal prosecution of a defendant who is not competent to stand trial.” Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 439, 112 S.Ct. 2572 , 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992); see also Trimble v. State, 321 Md. 248, 254 , 582 A.2d 794 (1990) (“If a state fails to observe procedures adequate to protect a defendant’s right not to be tried or convicted while incompetent, it denies him due process.”). To be “not competent to stand trial” means that a defendant is not able “(1) to understand the nature or object of the proceeding; or (2) to assist in [his] defense.” Md.Code Crim.

Proc. § 3 — 101(f) (2001, 2008 Repl.Vol.). Conversely, “to be competent to stand trial” means that a defendant has the “present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and a “rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.” Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 77, 85 , 622 A.2d 727 (1993) (internal citation omitted). In any event, until proven otherwise, a defendant is presumed to be competent to stand trial. Peaks v. State, 419 Md. 239, 251 , 18 A.3d 917 (2011).

In “plac[ing] the duty to determine competence to stand trial on the trial court,” Gregg v. State, 377 Md. 515, 526 , 833 A.2d 1040 (2003), the legislature has mandated “precise actions to be taken by a trial court when an accused’s competency to stand trial [is] questioned,” Roberts v. State, 361 Md. 346, 363 , 761 A.2d 885 (2000). Of particular relevance to any competency determination is section 3-104(a) of the Criminal Procedure Article, 11 which states: If, before or during a trial, the defendant in a criminal case ... appears to the court to be incompetent to stand trial or ³⁶⁹ the defendant alleges incompetence to stand trial, the court shall determine, on evidence presented in the record, whether the defendant is incompetent to stand trial. In other words, there are three ways a trial court’s duty to determine a defendant’s competence may be triggered: upon the motion of the defendant, upon the motion of the defendant’s counsel, or “upon a sua sponte determination by the court that the defendant may not be competent to stand trial.” Thanos, 330 Md. at 85 , 622 A.2d 727 . Once a defendant’s incompetence to stand trial has been alleged, the actions a court must take in determining his or her competence are organized into three successive steps: (1) First, a determination of competency may be made at any time before or during a trial; (2) Second, such a determination must be made if the defendant in a criminal case appears to be incompetent to stand trial or the defendant alleges incompetence to stand trial; and (3) Finally, the court must make its determination on the evidence presented on the record.

Wood v. State, 436 Md. 276, 286 , 81 A.3d 427 (2013) (quoting Roberts, 361 Md. at 364 , 761 A.2d 885 ). The first step “specifies the time frame within which the question of the [defendant’s] competency must be made,” the second step requires that the issue of competency be “properly before the court,” and the third step ensures that the defendant’s due process rights are protected. Id. at 286-87, 81 A.3d 427 . Although the court’s determination of competence “need not be in the form of a formal hearing,” Peaks, 419 Md. at 254 , 18 A.3d 917 if the defendant’s allegation of incompetence is “unsupported by any evidence on the record to that time,” the defendant must be allowed to “present evidence on which a determination may be made,” Gregg, 377 Md. at 539 , 833 A.2d 1040 .

Finally, the