Siemiesz v. Amend

Marbury, J., delivered the opinion of the Court. Zofia Siemierz Amend, one of the appellees, was a joint tenant with her uncle, Feliks Siemiesz, appellant, of a residential fee simple property in Baltimore City at 3518 Frankford Avenue. Mrs. Amend and her husband, the other appellee, filed a bill in equity for sale of the property in lieu of partition, to which an answer and cross bill was filed by her uncle alleging his sole ownership of the property and seeking appropriate relief. An answer was filed to the cross bill.

On June 2, 1964, after testimony had been taken in open court, the chancellor signed a decree dismissing the cross bill with prejudice and ordering sale of the property. Mrs. Amend and appellant are Polish by birth, and she is the daughter of his brother. Mr. Siemiesz has been in this country since 1907, and has never married. Apparently, he has from time to time financially assisted members of his family abroad, and in 1958 he sent funds to enable his niece to come to this country.

She arrived in February 1958. At this time, her uncle furnished additional funds and purchased clothes for his niece which she considered as gifts. In July of that year she obtained employment. It is to be noted that the niece understood no English when she arrived.

However, the appellant spoke some English but an interpreter was used in the trial below for his testimony. In August 1958, a contract to purchase the property in ques ⁴⁴⁰ tion was entered into by Mrs. Amend and her uncle. The testimony shows that appellant relied upon the advice and counsel of an acquaintance, Mr. Pietruszewski, who is now deceased. The uncle wanted to purchase the house, but to accomplish this, it was necessary that another responsible and younger individual’s obligation appear on the purchase money mortgage.

In September, settlement for the house was made, when Mr. Pietruszewski discussed in Polish the details of the transaction. The record shows that appellant knew and understood that Mrs. Amend was a co-tenant of the property. The attorney for the Hamilton Federal Savings and Loan Association, mortgagee, testified as to his regular office practice of discussing the nature of tenancies with purchasers, and had noted in his file the presence of Mr. Pietruszewski. The purchase price was $14,500 which included the purchase mortgage of $9,600; the difference and settlement expenses, a little less than $5,500, were paid by appellant.

Title was placed in their names as joint tenants, and both he and his niece executed the mortgage. The niece and appellant moved into the house. In December 1958 she married Charles Amend, and the three parties lived in the house as a family. The uncle made three lump sum payments on the mortgage totaling $4000, and the first five or six monthly payments of $100 each.

The record indicates that regular monthly payments were also made by appellees as well as payments for maintenance, fuel, alterations and the like. The parties lived together in reasonable harmony until the latter part of 1963 or early 1964, when differences arose leading to this litigation. On this appeal, the uncle claims that the lower court erred in ordering the property sold and holding that the niece was a joint tenant since her name was put in the deed by mistake or fraud. Thus, he contends that she holds title to an interest in the property as trustee for him, and there was a resulting or constructive trust in his favor.

The court below found that no resulting or constructive trust existed. We agree. The burden of proof rests heavily on one challenging the accuracy of an instrument of title to land. If this were not so, the reliance which the public necessarily puts upon land title instruments would be seriously disturbed.

Fasman v. Pottash ⁴⁴¹ nick, 188 Md. 105 , 51 A. 2d 664 ; Kelley v. Kelley, 178 Md. 389 , 13 A. 2d 529 . Implied trusts may be either resulting or constructive trusts. A resulting trust arises upon the presumed intention of the parties where the terms of the disposition or accompanying facts establish that beneficial interest is not to go with legal title. In a suit to establish a resulting trust in real estate, the complainant has the burden of proof to