Simmons v. State

⁶³¹ ROSALYN B. BELL, Judge. Henry Bradford Simmons, a/k/a Abduell Qadir Nazzag, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of second degree murder. Simmons admitted to the fatal stabbing of his stepfather during an alleged argument, but asserted that he had acted in self-defense — either perfect or imperfect. On appeal Simmons asserts the court erred only in connection with his claim of imperfect self-defense.

He contends that the psychiatric testimony relative to his mental state when he murdered the victim should not have been excluded. 1 At trial, the State sought to preclude the testimony of Dr. McDaniel. The defense proffered that her testimony would suggest that appellant may have held the subjective belief that he was in danger when he stabbed the victim: “[The psychiatrist] would say that [Simmons’s] mental condition and emotional condition is such that it is entirely possible that this was an honestly held subjective belief. I am not saying that he did. I am saying that all the circumstances surrounding it that she knows professionally, and she has examined him, that having such a subjective belief would not be inconsistent with his psychiatric make-up as distinguished from that of a person who does not have the bizarre psychiatric background of Mr. Simmons.” ⁶³² The court excluded the testimony concluding that although such evidence would be admissible for an insanity defense, it was not proper in a case of imperfect self-defense.

We agree. The defense of imperfect self-defense was first recognized in this State in Shuck v. State, 29 Md.App. 33 , 349 A.2d 378 (1975), cert. denied, 278 Md. 733 (1976) and explained with greater detail in Faulkner v. State, 54 Md.App. 113, 115 , 458 A.2d 81 (1983), aff'd., State v. Faulkner, 301 Md. 482 , 483 A.2d 759 (1984). Perfect self-defense requires that the defendant subjectively believed that his action was necessary for his safety and that objectively a reasonable man would have so believed. Unlike a perfect self-defense, imperfect self-defense “requires no more than a subjective honest belief on the part of the killer that his actions were necessary for his safety, even though, on an objective appraisal by a reasonable man, they would not be found to be so.” Faulkner v. State, supra at 115, 458 A.2d 81 .

Thus, at least, where the defendant is not the aggressor and “evidence is presented showing the defendant’s subjective belief that the use of force was necessary to prevent imminent death or serious bodily harm, the defendant is entitled to a proper instruction on imperfect self-defense.” State v. Faulkner, supra [301 Md.] at 500, 483 A.2d 759 . See also Cunningham v. State, 58 Md.App. 249 , 473 A.2d 40 , cert. denied, 300 Md. 316 , 477 A.2d 1195 (1984). In the instant case, appellant was permitted to introduce evidence that a subjective belief as to his danger existed. He was, however, prohibited from establishing by psychiatric testimony that he was capable of entertaining such an “honestly held subjective belief” because of his “bizarre psychiatric background.” There is a distinction between evidence showing a belief existed and evidence showing one is capable of forming such a belief.

The evidence appellant sought to introduce went to his capacity ⁶³³ or diminished capacity to act in an objectively reasonable manner. This evidence is not admissible in Maryland. The Court of Appeals has specifically held that the defense of diminished capacity is not recognized in this State. Johnson v. State, 292 Md. 405, 418 , 439 A.2d 542 (1982). 2 Under that defense, a defendant would be allowed to present “any evidence relevant to the existence of [specific] intent, including evidence of an abnormal mental condition not constituting legal insanity ... for the purpose of [negating] that intent.” Id. at 419 , 439 A.2d 542 , quoting Annot. 22 A.L.R.3d 1228 , 1238 (1969).

Johnson, supra, however,