Sippio v. State

CHASANOW, Judge. In this appeal, we are called upon to address the following issues: 1. Did the trial court err in permitting a medical examiner to give opinion testimony as to a decedent’s manner of death? 2. Does our ruling in Sahin v. State, 337 Md. 304 , 653 A.2d 452 (1995), allowing a defendant on trial for a veracity impeaching offense to present evidence of his character for truthfulness after he testifies, apply where the de ⁶³⁸ fendant has announced his intention to testify but has not yet done so?

For the reasons set forth below, we shall hold that under the rules of evidence on expert testimony, the trial court did not err in admitting a medical examiner’s testimony as to manner of death. We shall further hold that the requirement of Sahin, supra, that a criminal defendant charged with a veracity impeaching offense may present evidence of his or her character for truthfulness only after the defendant elects to testify, is not met by a nonbinding announcement of the defendant’s intention to testify. We shall therefore affirm the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirming Sippio’s conviction. I. It is undisputed that, on December 30, 1995, Brenda Branch died as the result of a gunshot fired by Petitioner Dwayne Sippio, Branch’s acquaintance of seven years and the father of her six-year-old daughter Demetrius.

The shooting occurred in Branch’s home in Baltimore City. Although Sippio maintained a separate residence in Baltimore City, Sippio stayed at Branch’s home on frequent occasions, including the two weeks prior to the shooting. Demetrius and Gavin, Branch’s son from a previous relationship, also resided at Branch’s home. Following Branch’s death, Sippio was arrested and charged with murder, use of a handgun in the commission of a felony, and unlawfully wearing, carrying, and transporting a handgun.

A jury trial commenced on July 9, 1996 in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. Because Sippio admitted to having fired the shot that caused Branch’s death, the trial centered on whether that shooting was accidental or deliberate. At trial, Demetrius, who was an eyewitness to Branch’s death, testified that, on the day of the shooting, she overheard a conversation between Branch and Sippio in which Sippio requested that Branch give him a set of keys she had in her possession and Branch repeatedly asked Sippio for money. Demetrius further testified that after this discussion, she saw ⁶³⁹ Sippio pull a gun from his coat pocket and heard him say to Branch that it was “time for her to go,” to which Branch responded: “[Pjlease don’t shoot me.” Demetrius then saw Sippio shoot Branch.

After the shooting, according to Demetrius, Sippio removed a set of keys from Branch’s body and brought Demetrius to her grandmother’s house. Gavin testified that he left Branch’s residence several hours before the shooting occurred and, thus, did not witness the shooting. Gavin, however, testified that, at times including the few weeks before the shooting, he had heard Sippio call Branch derisive names and, on the night before the shooting, Sippio had responded angrily to Branch’s playful request for money. Gavin further testified that Branch “put [Sippio] out all the time ... [l]ike when he wouldn’t give her money to pay the bills and stuff and she would tell him to pack his stuff and leave.” Gavin also testified that, prior to the shooting, he found Sippio’s unloaded gun in a bedroom drawer and that Sippio kept the bullets separate from the gun.

Another witness for the State, Detective Donald Steinhice, testified that he took a taped statement from Sippio at the Baltimore City Police Department’s Homicide Unit on the day of the shooting. That taped statement was played at trial during the detective’s testimony. According to Sippio’s taped statement, Sippio thought that he had removed all the bullets from the gun before pointing it at Branch and pulling the trigger. Detective Steinhice also testified that, based on his observations of the crime scene, he believed a struggle had occurred.

The last witness for the State’s case-in-chief, John Smialek, Chief Medical Examiner for the State of Maryland, testified as an expert in forensic pathology. Dr. Smialek had conducted the autopsy of Branch and had signed the autopsy report which was admitted into evidence as part of the medical examiner’s report without objection during the direct examination of Dr. Smialek. As required by law, Dr. Smialek recorded Branch’s cause and manner of death in the medical examiner’s report. See Maryland Code (1982, 1994 Repl.Vol.), ⁶⁴⁰ Health-General Article, § 5-311(a)(2)(iii). 1 Based on his examination of Branch, Dr. Smialek concluded that the cause of death was a close range gunshot wound to the head.

After further investigation, which included a discussion with Detective Steinhice, Dr. Smialek concluded, and recorded in the medical examiner’s report, that Branch’s manner of death was homicide, thus ruling out the other possibilities—accident, suicide, natural, and undetermined—that appear in the medical examiner’s report. Throughout direct examination and cross-examination of Dr. Smialek, no mention was made of the concepts of “homicide” or “accident.” On redirect examination, however, Dr. Smialek was asked about his report and testified that he had marked an “X” next to the term “homicide.” On recross, he explained that he had marked “homicide” rather than “accident” because the block marked accident is “reserved for a death that is the result of an action that was unexpected, untoward, that type of an event[, e.g.,\ * * * someone who tripped on the stall's, fell down and struck their head and sustained a fatal ... injury.” He also noted that his opinion that this was a homicide meant “that someone else fired a weapon to kill Ms. Branch,” regardless of the shooter’s intent. The defense called several witnesses to testify to Sippio’s character. One of those witnesses, Michael Martin, who had known Sippio for about fifteen years, described Sippio as a quiet person who stayed to himself.

When, however, Martin was asked “Has [Sippio] been a truthful person to you?,” the State objected, and the court sustained the objection. As defense counsel had indicated during opening statements, Sippio testified at trial. He was the last witness called by the defense. According to Sippio, on the day of the shooting, Branch repeatedly requested money from him and requested that Sippio pack his belongings and leave her home.

One of the items Sippio retrieved was a handgun, which he placed in his pocket. Sippio testified that the gun was normal ⁶⁴¹ ly kept unloaded in Branch’s home, but he had loaded the gun that morning while he was gathering his possessions. According to Sippio, at some point after that but before Branch was shot, he unloaded the bullets into his hand and placed them in his coat’ pocket. He offered no explanation as to how the gun became reloaded before Branch was shot.

According to Sippio, he called Branch into the kitchen where they again discussed money. At some point during this discussion, Sippio retrieved the gun from his coat pocket and began “playing with it.” On direct examination, Sippio explained his version of what happened next: “[Defense counsel]: How did you begin playing with it? What did you do? [Sippio]: No more than just fire it. [Defense counsel]: And when you say no more than firing it, what does that mean to you? [Sippio]: That my hand was on the trigger. [Defense counsel]: Did you pull the trigger? [Sippio]: Yes, sir. [Defense counsel]: How many times did you pull the trigger? [Sippio]: It was numerous times. I don’t remember how many times.

Maybe once, twice or three times, I don’t remember. * * * [Defense counsel]: Where was the gun pointed? [Sippio]: On an angle towards her, by the eye, somewhere along in there. [Defense counsel]: Why were you pointing the gun there? [Sippio]: I was just playing with the gun. [Defense counsel]: And what happened when you were playing with it? ⁶⁴² [Sippio]: After I finished playing with it the first time, the second time nothing happened. [Defense counsel]: ... [W]hat did Ms. Branch do? [Sippio]: Ms. Branch was standing right in front of me. [Defense counsel]: Had you ever done this before? [Sippio]: Only in the privacy of the bedroom area. Behind closed doors. [Defense counsel]: But you did it this morning, is that correct? [Sippio]: Yes, sir, I did. [Defense counsel]: What happened? [Sippio]: First, like I said, the first two times, nothing came out of the gun at all. * * * Then a shot came out. [Defense counsel]: And then what happened? [Sippio]: Ms. Branch dropped right in front of me.” Then, according to Sippio, he grabbed Demetrius and exited the house. The jury acquitted Sippio of first-degree murder, but convicted him of second-degree murder, felonious use of a handgun, and unlawfully wearing, carrying, and transporting a handgun. Sippio was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment for the second-degree murder conviction and to a concurrent five-year term for the felony handgun conviction.

The court merged the other handgun conviction. On June 11, 1997, in an unreported per curiam opinion, the Court of Special Appeals affirmed Sippio’s convictions, holding that the testimony of the medical examiner was properly admitted. The intermediate appellate court also concluded that the requirement set forth in Sahin, supra, precluded Sippio from introducing character testimony as to his veracity before he testified. The court rejected a third claim raised by Sippio, not presently before this Court, that irrelevant and prejudicial evidence was admitted by the trial court.

Sippio ⁶⁴³ petitioned this Court, and we granted certiorari on September 15,1997.

II

The first issue on appeal is whether the trial court properly allowed Dr. Smialek’s opinion testimony that Branch’s manner of death was “homicide.” Manner of death, as opposed to cause of death, refers to how the death occurred, the circumstances surrounding the decedent’s death, e.g., whether the death was the result of a suicide, homicide, accident, or natural causes. Cf. Schlossman v. State, 105 Md.App. 277 , 297 n. 5, 659 A.2d 871 , 381 n. 5 (1995), cert. dismissed, 342 Md. 403 , 676 A.2d 513 (1996). Cause of death, on the other hand, is the actual process which produces the death.

Cf id. During the State’s case-in-chief, Dr. Smialek testified that Branch’s cause of death was a gunshot wound to the head, and the medical examiner’s report that Dr. Smialek prepared was admitted into evidence without objection. On redirect examination, Dr. Smialek testified that he placed an “X” on the medical examiner’s report to denote that Branch’s manner of death was homicide. Sippio objected, and the court overruled the objection.

The contested issue at trial surrounding Branch’s death was whether the shooting by Sippio was accidental or deliberate. According to Sippio, by testifying that the manner of death was homicide, Dr. Smialek was explicitly rejecting the possibility that the shooting was an accident. Sippio contends that, although “the term ‘homicide,’ taken alone, does not constitute a crime[, w]hen juxtaposed with such concepts as accident, suicide, and natural causes, ... it clearly takes on a criminal connotation.” Sippio also claims this testimony reached a legal conclusion reserved for the jury and, therefore, was not a proper subject of expert opinion testimony according to settled Maryland case law. We disagree.

A. Prior to the instant case, this Court had not addressed the admissibility of a medical examiner’s testimony concerning ⁶⁴⁴ manner of death. We did, however, address a similar issue in Benjamin v. Woodring, 268 Md. 593 , 303 A.2d 779 (1973), which involved the admissibility of a death certificate containing a medical examiner’s written opinion as to manner of death. In Benjamin , the testator’s wife commenced a civil suit against the personal representative of the testator’s estate, seeking to have the testator’s earlier will admitted to probate, thus nullifying a later will. 268 Md. at 595 , 303 A.2d at 781 . She claimed that, at the time the testator executed the subsequent will, he was suffering from an insane delusion regarding her marital fidelity and thus lacked testamentary capacity.

Benjamin, 268 Md. at 600 , 303 A.2d at 784 . An autopsy was performed on the testator by an assistant state medical examiner, Dr. Charles Springate. The jury was advised that the death certificate prepared by Dr. Springate stated that the “ ‘immediate cause of death was an overdose of barbiturates.’ ” Benjamin, 268 Md. at 596 , 303 A.2d at 782 . Upon the personal representative’s objection, however, the trial court refused to admit into evidence the death certificate itself which contained the medical examiner’s opinion that the manner of the testator’s death was suicide.

Id. A finding of suicide would have supported the wife’s assertion that the testator suffered from insane delusions at the time the later will was drawn. Benjamin, 268 Md. at 605 , 303 A.2d at 786 . The trial court in Benjamin excluded the manner of death portion of the death certificate from evidence based on Md. Code (1957, 1971 Repl.Vol.), Article 43, § 26, 2 which provided in pertinent part: “ ‘Certificates of birth, death and fetal death filed within one year, after the event, and certified copies of such certificates shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. .. .’(Emphasis added.)” 268 Md. at 606 , 303 A.2d at 787 .

The trial court interpreted that section of the statute to mean that, despite a statutory mandate that certain information be incorporated into the certificate, not all infor ⁶⁴⁵ mation contained in a death certifícate qualified as facts. Benjamin, 268 Md. at 606-07 , 303 A.2d at 787 . The trial court referred to such nonfactual information as “ ‘indications, inferences, or conclusions drawn by the certificate maker.’ ” 3 Benjamin, 268 Md. at 606 , 303 A.2d at 787 . This Court affirmed the trial court’s exclusion of the death certificate from evidence, reasoning that the legislature evidently intended to limit the medical examiner’s investigative duties to “ ‘essential facts concerning the medical causes of death.’ ” Benjamin, 268 Md. at 608 , 303 A.2d at 788 (quoting Md.Code (1957, 1973 RephVol.), Art. 22, § 6)(emphasis added in Benjamin ). 4 Sippio now urges this Court to extend Benjamin one step further to prohibit per se a medical examiner’s testimony at trial regarding manner of death.

As we shall explain, however, we do not believe such an extension is warranted. We turn now to the statutory basis for the medical examiner’s opinion and developments in that law which make Benjamin inapposite. B. Section 5-301 et seq. of the Health-General Article establishes the State Postmortem Examiners Commission and sets ⁶⁴⁶ forth the procedures for the medical examiner to follow where death occurs as a result of, for example, suicide, violence, etc. Where such deaths occur, § 5-309 requires the medical examiner to investigate. Section 5-311 requires the medical examiner to keep complete records of each such case.

As part of the medical examiner’s investigation, the medical examiner receives notice from the police or sheriff of “facts concerning the time, place, manner, and circumstances of the death.” § 5-309(b). The medical examiner shall perform an autopsy if the medical examiner considers it necessary. § 5-310. If so, the autopsy report is attached to the record of the medical examiner’s case pursuant to § 5-311(b). After the medical examiner’s report and autopsy are completed and after performing an investigation, the medical examiner then “deliver[s] to the State’s Attorney for the county where the body was found a copy of each record that relates to a death for which the medical examiner considers further investigation advisable.” § 5-311(c).

This record 8 can be used as “competent evidence in any court in this State of the matters and facts contained in it.” § 5-311(d)(2). Before 1990, it was the practice of the medical examiner to record the manner of death on a death certificate form. 5 6 It was not until a 1990 amendment to the Health-General Article, however, thát the legislature specifically added “manner of death” to the list of items 7 that a medical examiner was to record in the records of each case. See Chapter 238 of the Acts of 1990 (amending § 5-311(a)(2)(iii)). At that time, the legislature did not define manner of death, nor did it mandate how manner of death should be expressed in the medical examiner’s records. ⁶⁴⁷ The issue in the instant case is, thus, whether a medical examiner may testify to a finding, i.e., manner of death, which he or she is required by law to denote and record for possible use at trial.

To create a per se rule prohibiting such testimony would be akin to holding that medical examiners are not qualified to determine manner of death, or that medical examiners’ findings are generally unreliable evidence in a court of law. We choose not to do so, for the wisdom of our legislature has guided us in a different direction. When this Court decided Benjamin , determining manner of death was merely “incumbent upon [medical examiners] in completing the [death certificate] form.” 268 Md. at 609 , 303 A.2d at 788 . By specifically adding the words “manner of death,” however, the 1990 statutory amendment made it abundantly clear that the legislature intended to bring the determination of manner of death into the province of the medical examiner’s duties.

Prior to the 1990 amendment, the Court of Special Appeals upheld the trial court’s admission of a medical examiner’s opinion as to a child’s manner of death in Terry v. State, 34 Md.App. 99 , 366 A.2d 65 (1976). In Terry , Mary Alice Terry was convicted of child abuse and second-degree murder of her five-year-old son. At trial, an assistant medical examiner testified that the child’s death “‘resulted from cumulative effects of repeated child abuse.’ ” Terry, 34 Md.App. at 102 -OS, 366 A.2d at 67 . The medical examiner was later asked to give an opinion as to the child’s manner of death.

Terry, 34 Md.App. at 104 , 366 A.2d at 68 . Over Terry’s objection, the medical examiner testified: “ ‘In view of the evidence presented I come to the conclusion that the manner of death is to be considered as homicide.’ ” Terry, 34 Md.App. at 105 , 366 A.2d at 68 . On appeal, the Court of Special Appeals found Benjamin to be inapposite on the issue of a medical examiner’s opinion testimony on manner of death. Terry, 34 Md.App. at 107 , 366 A.2d at 70 .

As the intermediate appellate court explained: “In spite of the suggestion by the Court [in Benjamin ] that the investigative duties of medical examiners are limited by ⁶⁴⁸ law to ‘essential facts concerning the medical causes of death,’ we cannot conceive that this precludes calling the medical examiner as an expert witness to express his opinion in a case. Once called, testifying under oath, subject to the requirement that he state the basis for his conclusion and be subject to cross-examination, an entirely different situation exists than an effort to introduce that opinion into evidence solely on the basis of a death certificate.” (Citation omitted). Terry, 34 Md.App. at 107-08 , 366 A.2d at 70 . We believe Benjamin is similarly inapplicable here.

Consequently, we reject Sippio’s request to extend Benjamin to include the prohibition per se of a medical examiner’s testimony regarding manner of death, Our inquiry, however, does not end here. Dr. Smialek’s testimony, as with all lay and expert opinion testimony, is subject to certain requirements in order to qualify as admissible evidence in a court of law. We must now decide whether Dr. Smialek’s testimony as to manner of death was properly admitted into evidence. C. Under the well-established Maryland common law of evidence, it is within the sound discretion of the trial court to determine the admissibility of expert testimony.

See Simmons v. State, 313 Md. 33, 41 , 542 A.2d 1258, 1262 (1988); State v. Allewalt, 308 Md. 89, 101 , 517 A.2d 741, 747 (1986); Nizer v. Phelps, 252 Md. 185, 192 , 249 A.2d 112, 116 (1969). The Maryland Rules of Evidence, adopted by this Court in 1994, did not limit that discretion. See Maryland Rule 5-702. A trial court’s ruling either admitting or excluding such testimony “will seldom constitute a ground for reversal.” Radman v. Harold, 279 Md. 167, 173 , 367 A.2d 472, 476 (1977).

Such a ruling, however, may be reversed on appeal “if it is founded on an error of law or some serious mistake, or if the trial court clearly abused its discretion.” Id. ⁶⁴⁹ According to Md. Rule 5-702, which codified the modern common-law rule regarding expert testimony, a trial court must determine whether the evidence to be presented is a proper subject of expert testimony. The inquiry turns on whether the trier of fact will receive appreciable help from the expert testimony in order to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. See Simmons, 313 Md. at 41 , 542 A.2d at 1262 ; Bloodsworth v. State, 307 Md. 164, 184-85 , 512 A.2d 1056, 1066 (1986)(quoting Shivers v. Carnaggio, 223 Md. 585, 588-89 , 165 A.2d 898, 900 (1960)). The trial court need not consider whether the trier of fact could possibly decide the issue without the expert testimony.

Nizer v. Phelps, 252 Md. at 193 , 249 A.2d at 117 . Nor must the subject of the expert testimony be so far beyond the level of skill and comprehension of the average layperson that the trier of fact would have no understanding of the subject matter without the expert’s testimony. 6 Lynn McLain, Maryland Evidence § 702.1, at 212-13 (1987). In ascertaining whether expert testimony will be helpful to the trier of fact, a trial court must instead determine whether certain requirements have been satisfied: (1) the proposed witness must be qualified to testify as an expert; (2) the subject matter about which the witness will testify must be appropriate for expert testimony; and (3) there must be a legally sufficient factual basis to support the expert’s testimony. Md. Rule 5-702; see also Simmons, 313 Md. at 41-42 , 542 A.2d at 1262 .

Here all three requirements are met. First, Dr. Smialek was qualified to testify as an expert in the area in which he was testifying. In order to determine whether a proposed witness is qualified to testify as an expert, the trial court must examine whether the witness has sufficient knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education pertinent to the subject of the testimony. See Md. Rule 5-702(1); see also Simmons, 313 Md. at 41 , 542 A.2d at 1262 ; Crews v. Director, 245 Md. 174, 179 , 225 A.2d 436, 439 (1967).

In the instant case, we find no merit to Sippio’s assertion that Dr. Smialek’s expertise as a forensic pathologist did not ⁶⁵⁰ qualify him to render an opinion as to manner of death. Dr. Smialek was qualified as an expert in forensic pathology without challenge by the defense. Moreover, Dr. Smialek explained that forensic pathologists are “trained to recognize certain patterns of injury and [have] to be familiar with gunshot wounds ... so that [they] can render a proper diagnosis in an attempt to reconstruct the events surrounding the sudden death of an individual.” His testimony as to manner of death was, therefore, consistent with his extensive medical training and professional experiences. Second, the subject matter about which Dr. Smialek testified was appropriate for expert testimony.

See Md. Rule 5-702(2). To properly conclude this, the trial court must determine, in essence, whether the subject matter is beyond the proper realm of expert opinion testimony. See, e.g., Simmons, 313 Md. at 47 , 542 A.2d at 1265 ; see also Stebbing v. State, 299 Md. 331, 347-48 , 473 A.2d 903, 910-911 , cert. denied, 469 U.S. 900 , 105 S.Ct. 276 , 83 L.Ed.2d 212 (1984). Here, Dr. Smialek personally performed the autopsy on Branch.

He described the nature of the fatal gunshot wound in an articulate and concise manner so that the jury could understand the exact cause of death. On cross examination, Dr. Smialek testified that the density of gun powder residue found on her skin indicated that the gunshot was fired at close range to Branch’s head. He also testified that he had received information from Detective Steinhice prior to performing the autopsy as to the circumstances surrounding the shooting. On recross examination, Dr. Smialek testified: “[Dr. Smialek:] I had information that [Sippio] had told the police that he had shot Ms. Branch. [Defense Counsel:] And did that aid you in coming up with the conclusion that it was not a natural, accidental, suicidal or undetermined cause of death? [Dr. Smialek:] I considered that information together with the physical findings on the body, the fact that the wound was not a typical contact gunshot wound such as I would see in a suicide. ⁶⁵¹ So that the form from the investigation together with my findings at the autopsy allowed me to reach a conclusion that this was a homicide, which means that someone else fired a weapon to kill Ms. Branch.” (Emphasis added).

Although suicide was not an issue raised in this case, Dr. Smialek’s professional training and experience enabled him to reject this potential manner of death. The nature of the gunshot wound to Branch’s head was consistent with a finding of homicide. Dr. Smialek’s finding that the gun was discharged at a distance of four to eight inches from Branch’s head, in conjunction with the path of travel of the discharged bullet, enabled Dr. Smialek to reject the shooting as an accident. Moreover, Dr. Smialek aided the jury by distinguishing between homicide and accident.

The pertinent testimony is as follows: “[Defense Counsel:] If a shooting is an accidental shooting and you examined the body of that accident victim not knowing whether it is an accident or not, and the cause of death is a gunshot wound to the head, would you use the block homicide to check off your findings? [Dr. Smialek:] I’m not sure I understand your question. If the information available to me indicates that a gunshot wound was the result of an accident such as a gun falling onto a floor and discharging, I would call [it] an accident. Is that what the form from the investigation to go with my examination led me to believe? I would not call an accident a homicide.

I wouldn’t call a homicide an accident.” Dr. Smialek testified further: “[Defense Counsel:] And homicide has a lot of different categories, does it not, sir? [Dr. Smialek:] Legally there are categories for homicides, yes. [Defense Counsel:] What would those categories include, if you know? ⁶⁵² [Dr. Smialek:] There are categories that include self defense, categories that allow a homicide that’s caused in the course of say police action to be excusable. Those are some of the categories. Self defense is a categorization of homicide. [Defense Counsel:] All of that would be included under your check mark of homicide, correct? [Dr. Smialek:] I don’t consider those particular factors. What leads to the homicide, whether it was intentional or unintentional in reaching my conclusion, those are legal issues. [Defense Counsel:] So intent, what caused that person to be on your table, is not part of your conclusion in this report, is that correct? [Dr. Smialek:] That’s right.

The intent of the person who pulls the trigger isn’t something that I can consider.” It is conceivable that, without explanation, the term homicide suggests to the average layperson a degree of culpability greater than accident. This, however, supports our view that Dr. Smialek’s testimony was helpful to the jury. Without Dr. Smialek’s testimony, the jurors may have concluded that the word homicide, referred to in the medical examiner’s report that was admitted into evidence, connoted a degree of culpability greater than its definition allows. Dr. Smialek’s testimony, in essence, neutralized the unexplained manner of death listed on the autopsy report previously admitted into evidence.

In concluding that the subject of Dr. Smialek’s testimony was appropriate for expert testimony, we also reject Sippio’s contention that Dr. Smialek’s opinion testimony was inadmissible because it resolved a conflict in the evidence and because it related to the credibility of a witness. Dr. Smialek’s testimony as to manner of death did not resolve a conflict in the evidence. Expert opinion testimony, like any opinion testimony, is designed to introduce, bolster, or place doubt on evidence properly admitted before the trial court. The fact ⁶⁵³ that Petitioner and Respondent have different theories of Branch’s death in no way precludes either party from introducing evidence that tends to support or place doubt on previously admitted evidence.

Similarly, Dr. Smialek’s testimony did not resolve a question of Sippio’s credibility merely because Sippio denied the shooting was deliberate. Had Dr. Smialek testified that Sippio’s credibility was questionable based on statements Sippio made before or during trial, an exclusion of such testimony might have been proper. Dr. Smialek, however, did not opine on Sippio’s credibility. Finally, there was a sufficient factual basis to support Dr. Smialek’s testimony.

See Md. Rule 5-702(3); see also State Health Dep’t v. Walker, 238 Md. 512, 520 , 209 A.2d 555, 559-60 (1965)(stating “[t]he facts upon which an expert bases his opinion must permit reasonably accurate conclusions as distinguished from mere conjecture or guess”). A factual basis for expert testimony may arise from a number of sources, such as facts obtained from the expert’s first-hand knowledge, facts obtained from the testimony of others, and facts related to an expert through the use of hypothetical questions. 6 Lynn McLain, Maryland Evidence, § 703.1, at 236-37 (1987). Here, Dr. Smialek’s examination of Branch, in conjunction with his